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Giulia Felappi
University of Southampton
  1.  64
    Empty Names, Presupposition Failure, and Metalinguistic Negation.Giulia Felappi - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (5):270-287.
    When it comes to empty names, we seem to have reached very little consensus. Still, we all seem to agree, first, that our semantics should assign truth to negative singular existence statements in which an empty name occurs and, second, that names are used in such statements. The purpose of this paper is to show that ruling out that the names are mentioned is harder than it has been thought. I will present a new metalinguistic account for negative singular existence (...)
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  2. Objects of Thought? On the Usual Way Out of Prior’s Objection to the Relational Theory of Propositional Attitude Sentences.Giulia Felappi - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):438-444.
    Traditionally, ‘that’-clauses occurring in attitude attributions are taken to denote the objects of the attitudes. Prior raised a famous problem: even if Frege fears that the Begriffsschrift leads to a paradox, it is unlikely that he fears a proposition, a sentence or what have you as the alleged object denoted by the ‘that’-clause. The usual way out is to say that ‘that’-clauses do not contribute the objects of the attitudes but their contents. I will show that, if we accept this (...)
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  3.  15
    Propositionalism and Questions that do not have Correct Answers.Giulia Felappi - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-19.
    As the label suggests, according to propositionalism, each intentional mental state, attitude or event is or involves a relation to a proposition. In this paper, I will discuss a case that seems prima facie not to be accountable for by propositionalism. After having presented the case, I will show why it is different from others that have been discussed in the literature as able to show that propositionalism cannot be correct. I will then consider what the propositionalist can say to (...)
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  4. Publish or Perish.Benjamin Davies & Giulia Felappi - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (5):745-761.
    Funds and positions in philosophy should be awarded through systems that are reliable, objective, and efficient. One question usually taken to be relevant is how many publications people have in a group of well-respected journals. In the context of significant competition for jobs and funding, however, relying on quantity of publications creates a serious downside: the oft-lamented demand that we publish or perish. This article offers a systematic review of the problems involved in contemporary academic philosophy, and argues that the (...)
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  5. On Product‐Based Accounts of Propositional Attitudes.Giulia Felappi - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):302-313.
    Propositional attitude sentences, such as "John believes that snow is white," are traditionally taken to express the holding of a relation between a subject and what ‘that’-clauses like ‘that snow is white’ denote, i.e. propositions. On the traditional account, propositions are abstract, mind- and language-independent entities. Recently, some have raised some serious worries for the traditional account and thought that we were mistaken about the kind of entities propositions are. Over the last ten years there has then been a boom (...)
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  6. Lost in Translation?Giulia Felappi & Marco Santambrogio - 2019 - Topoi 38 (2):265-276.
    According to neo-Russellianism, in a sentence such as John believes that Mont Blanc is 4000 m high, any other proper name co-referring with Mont Blanc can be substituted for it without any change in the proposition expressed. Prima facie, our practice of translation shows that this cannot be correct. We will then show that neo-Russellians have a way out of this problem, which consists in holding that actual translations are not a matter of semantics, but also make an attempt at (...)
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  7. Susanne Langer and the Woeful World of Facts.Giulia Felappi - 2017 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (2).
    Susanne Langer is mainly known as the American philosopher who, starting from her famous Philosophy in a New Key, worked in aesthetics and famously saw art as the product of the human mind’s most important, distinctive and remarkable ability, i.e., the ability to symbolise. But Langer’s later consideration of the connection between art and symbol is propagated by an early interest in the logic of symbols themselves. This rather neglected early part of Langer’s thought and her early interests and lines (...)
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  8.  6
    Wittgensteinian Facts as Ultimate Items of Tractarian Ontology?Giulia Felappi - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (3):338-342.
    ABSTRACTAccording to Zalabardo, Wittgenstein in TLP solves the metaphysical problem of the unity of facts by holding that facts are the only ultimate items of Tractarian ontology. With his intrigui...
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  9.  4
    Pure Russellians Are Allowed Not to Believe.Giulia Felappi - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    According to Pure Russellianism, if -/- (1) David believes that Hesperus is a planet -/- is true, -/- (2) David believes that Phosphorus is a planet -/- is also true. It is also usually thought, by friends and foes of Pure Russellianism alike, that on it, when (1) and (2) are true, -/- (3) David does not believe that Phosphorus is a planet -/- cannot but be false and because of this, many departed from Pure Russellianism. In this paper, I (...)
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  10. The Face‐Value Theory, Know‐That, Know‐Wh and Know‐How.Giulia Felappi - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):63-72.
    For sentences such as (1), "Columbus knows that the sea is unpredictable", there is a face-value theory, according to which ‘that’-clauses are singular terms denoting propositions. Famously, Prior raised an objection to the theory, but defenders of the face-value theory such as Forbes, King, Künne, Pietroski and Stanley urged that the objection could be met by maintaining that in (1) ‘to know’ designates a complex relation along the lines of being in a state of knowledge having as content. Is the (...)
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  11.  22
    “It is Quite Conceivable That Judgment is a Very Complicated Phenomenon”: Dorothy Wrinch, Nonsense and the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement.Giulia Felappi - 2021 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 30 (2):250-266.
    ABSTRACT In her paper “On the Nature of Judgment”, published in 1919 in Mind, Dorothy Wrinch aimed at understanding how Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgement might be made to work. In this paper we will focus on Wrinch’s claim that on the theory it is impossible, as it should be, to judge nonsense. After having presented the prima facie objection to the theory created by nonsense and what we can take her solution to such a problem to imply, we (...)
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  12. Why Fuss About These Quirks of the Vernacular? Propositional Attitude Sentences in Prior’s Nachlass.Giulia Felappi - 2016 - Synthese 193 (11):3521-3534.
    In English, in order to speak about Arthur’s attitudes, we use sentences like “Arthur believes that natural language is messy”. For sentences of this kind we have a standard theory, according to which the ‘that’-clause ‘that natural language is messy’ denotes a proposition. As Prior showed for the first time, the standard theory appears to be at odds with some linguistic data. Geach and Prior both assumed that linguistic data are to be taken as reliable guides to a correct semantic (...)
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  13. ‘In Defence of Sententialism’.Giulia Felappi - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (4):581-603.
    Propositional attitude sentences, such as (1) Pierre believes that snow is white, have proved to be formidably difficult to account for in a semantic theory. It is generally agreed that the that-clause ‘that snow is white’ purports to refer to the proposition that snow is white, but no agreement has been reached on what this proposition is. Sententialism is a semantic theory which tries to undermine the very enterprise of understanding what proposition is referred to in (1): according to sententialists, (...)
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  14.  34
    The Metaphysics of Representation. [REVIEW]Giulia Felappi - 2020 - Philosophy 1:1-5.
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  15. Metametaphysics. New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology: Chalmers, D.J., Manley, D., Wasserman, R., Luciano. [REVIEW]Giulia Felappi - 2011 - Humana Mente 4 (19).
    http://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/pages/30-issue19 .
     
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  16. Otto Said That I Am a Fool : Sententialism, Indexicals and Kaplanian Monsters.Giulia Felappi - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 2 (102):172-191.
    According to sententialism, ‘Otto said that I am a fool’ expresses the holding of a relation between Otto and the sentence ‘I am a fool’. Sententialism is generally considered doomed, but I will show that a suitably developed sententialist account can surmount the many objections that have been raised. I will also show how important it is to have a fairer attitude towards sententialism. For if sententialist accounts are recognised as real options, it should also be recognised that the conclusion, (...)
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  17. On Wrinch's Extension of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment.Giulia Felappi - 2021 - Logique Et Analyse 256:385-401.
    In 1919, Dorothy Wrinch suggested how to extend Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment in order for the theory to be able to account also for molecular and quantified judgments. In this paper, some worries for her extension, which all stem from metaphysical considerations, will be presented and what Wrinch said and could have said about them will be discussed.
     
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