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Profile: Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Oxford University)
  1. Why Truthmakers.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2005 - In H. Beebee & J. Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: the contemporary debate. Oxford University Press. pp. 17-31.
    Consider a certain red rose. The proposition that the rose is red is true because the rose is red. One might say as well that the proposition that the rose is red is made true by the rose’s being red. This, it has been thought, does not commit one to a truthmaker of the proposition that the rose is red. For there is no entity that makes the proposition true. What makes it true is how the rose is, and how (...)
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  2. Grounding is Not a Strict Order.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (3):517-534.
    The paper argues that grounding is neither irreflexive, nor asymmetric, nor transitive. In arguing for that conclusion the paper also arguesthat truthmaking is neither irreflexive, nor asymmetric, nor transitive.
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  3. Truthmakers.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (2):186–200.
    This bulletin contains a summary of the main topics of discussion in truthmaker theory, namely: the definition of truthmakers, problems with Truthmaker Necessitarianism and Truthmaker Maximalism, the ontological burden of truthmakers and the recalcitrant topic of truthmakers for negative truths.
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  4. Resemblance Nominalism.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
    Gardeners, poets, lovers, and philosophers are all interested in the redness of roses; but only philosophers wonder how it is that two different roses can share the same property. Are red things red because they resemble each other? Or do they resemble each other because they are red? Since the 1970s philosophers have tended to favour the latter view, and held that a satisfactory account of properties must involve the postulation of either universals or tropes. But Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra revives the (...)
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  5. Truthmaking, Entailment, and the Conjunction Thesis.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2006 - Mind 115 (460):957-982.
    In this paper I undermine the Entailment Principle according to which if an entity is a truthmaker for a certain proposition and this proposition entails another, then the entity in question is a truthmaker for the latter proposition. I argue that the two most promising versions of the principle entail the popular but false Conjunction Thesis, namely that a truthmaker for a conjunction is a truthmaker for its conjuncts. One promising version of the principle understands entailment as strict implication but (...)
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  6. The Bundle Theory is Compatible with Distinct but Indiscernible Particulars.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):72-81.
    1. The Bundle Theory I shall discuss is a theory about the nature of substances or concrete particulars, like apples, chairs, atoms, stars and people. The point of the Bundle Theory is to avoid undesirable entities like substrata that allegedly constitute particulars. The version of the Bundle Theory I shall discuss takes particulars to be entirely constituted by the universals they instantiate.' Thus particulars are said to be just bundles of universals. Together with the claim that it is necessary that (...)
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  7. What is the Problem of Universals?Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2000 - Mind 109 (434):255-273.
    In this article I address the Problem of Universals by answering questions about what facts a solution to the Problem of Universals should explain and how the explanation should go. I argue that a solution to the Problem of Universals explains the facts the Problem of Universals is about by giving the truthmakers (as opposed to the conceptual content and the ontological commitments) of the sentences stating those facts. I argue that the sentences stating the relevant facts are those like (...)
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  8. The Subtraction Arguments for Metaphysical Nihilism: Compared and Defended.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2013 - In Tyron Goldschmidt (ed.), The Puzzle of Existence. Why is There Something rather than Nothing? Routledge. pp. 197-214.
    The subtraction argument, originally put forward by Thomas Baldwin (1996), is intended to establish Metaphysical Nihilism, the thesis that there could have been no concrete objects. Some modified versions of the argument have been proposed in order to avoid some difficulties faced by the original argument. In this paper I shall concentrate on two of those versions, the so-called subtraction argument* (presented and defended in Rodriguez-Pereyra 1997, 2000, 2002), and Efird and Stoneham’s recent version of the argument (Efird and Stoneham (...)
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  9. Resemblance Nominalism and the Imperfect Community.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):965 - 982.
    The object of this paper is to provide a solution to Nelson Goodman’s Imperfect Community difficulty as it arises for Resemblance Nominalism, the view that properties are classes of resembling particulars. The Imperfect Community difficulty consists in that every two members of a class resembling each other is not sufficient for it to be a class such that there is some property common to all their members, even if ‘x resembles y’ is understood as ‘x and y share some property’. (...)
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  10. Truthmaker Maximalism Defended.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2006 - Analysis 66 (3):260–264.
    Peter Milne has tried to refure Truthmaker Maximalism. the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker, by producing a simple and direct counterexample to it, the sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. I argue that, contrary to what Milne argues, on Truthmaker Maximalism M is equivalent to the Liar, which gives the truthmaker maximalist a way to defend his position from Milne's counterexample: to argue that M expresses no proposition.
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  11. Truthmaker Maximalism Defended Again.Eduardo Barrio & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2015 - Analysis 75 (1):3-8.
    In this note we shall argue that Milne’s new effort does not refute Truthmaker Maximalism. According to Truthmaker Maximalism, every truth has a truthmaker. Milne has attempted to refute it using the following self-referential sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. Essential to his refutation is that M is like the Gödel sentence and unlike the Liar, and one way in which Milne supports this assimilation is through the claim that his proof is essentially object-level and not semantic. In Section (...)
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  12. There Might Be Nothing: The Subtraction Argument Improved.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1997 - Analysis 57 (3):159–166.
  13. Descartes's Substance Dualism and His Independence Conception of Substance.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2008 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (1):69-89.
    Descartes maintained substance dualism, the thesis that no substance has both mental and material properties. His main argument for this thesis, the so-called separability argument from the Sixth Meditation (AT VII: 78) has long puzzled readers. In this paper I argue that Descartes’ independence conception of substance (which Descartes presents in article 51 of the Principles) is crucial for the success of the separability argument and that Descartes used this conception of substance to defend his argument for substance dualism from (...)
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  14. How Not to Trivialise the Identity of Indiscernibles.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2006 - In P. F. Strawson & A. Chakrabarti (eds.), Concepts, Properties and Qualities. Ashgate.
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  15.  17
    The Argument From Almost Indiscernibles.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    What I call the argument from almost indiscernibles is an argument, put forward by Robert Adams in 1979, for the possibility of indiscernibles based on the possibility of almost indiscernibles. The argument is that if almost indiscernibles are possible, indiscernibles are possible, but since almost indiscernible are possible, indiscernibles are possible. The argument seems to be an improvement over the mere appeal to intuitions, like that suggested by Max Black, that situations in which there are indiscernibles are possible, for the (...)
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  16. Infinite Analysis, Lucky Proof, and Guaranteed Proof in Leibniz.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra & Paul Lodge - 2011 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 93 (2):222-236.
    According to one of Leibniz's theories of contingency a proposition is contingent if and only if it cannot be proved in a finite number of steps. It has been argued that this faces the Problem of Lucky Proof , namely that we could begin by analysing the concept ‘Peter’ by saying that ‘Peter is a denier of Christ and …’, thereby having proved the proposition ‘Peter denies Christ’ in a finite number of steps. It also faces a more general but (...)
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  17. Resemblance Nominalism and Russell's Regress.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):395 – 408.
    Bertrand Russell argued that any attempt to get rid of universals in favor of resemblances fails. He argued that no resemblance theory could avoid postulating a universal of resemblance without falling prey to a vicious infinite regress. He added that admitting such a universal of resemblance made it pointless to avoid other universals. In this paper I defend resemblance nominalism from both of Russell's points by arguing that (a) resemblance nominalism can avoid the postulation of a universal of resemblance without (...)
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  18. Sobre los escepticos griegos.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1989 - Idea 3 (3):59-74.
    In this paper I argue that Ancient Greek Sceptics implicitly presupposed a Parmenidean ontology.
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  19. Metaphysical Nihilism Defended: Reply to Lowe and Paseau.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):172–180.
    I believe in metaphysical nihilism, the thesis that there could have been no concrete objects, because I believe in a version of the subtraction argument, the subtraction argument*, that proves it. But both Jonathan Lowe (2002) and Alexander Paseau (2002) express doubts about the subtraction argument*. Paseau thinks the argument is invalid, and Lowe argues that invoking concrete* objects is unnecessary. Furthermore Lowe attempts to rebut my objections (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2000) to his anti-nihilist argument (Lowe 1998). In this paper I defend (...)
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  20. Sobre una version del Nominalismo de Semejanzas.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1996 - Revista de filosofía (Chile) 11 (1/2).
    The concern of this paper is a version of Resemblance Nominalism according to which resemblance classes, i.e. classes of resembling things, are determined by paradigms. I show that the theory is false, since paradigms do not generally determine resemblance classes. Although I concentrate upon the version of the theory which was delineated by H. H. Price, my results apply to any other theory constructing resemblance classes out of paradigms.
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  21. The Principles of Contradiction, Sufficient Reason, and Identity of Indiscernibles.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - forthcoming - In Maria Rosa Antognazza (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Leibniz. Oxford University Press.
    Leibniz was a philosopher of principles: the principles of Contradiction, of Sufficient Reason, of Identity of Indiscernibles, of Plenitude, of the Best, and of Continuity are among the most famous Leibnizian principles. In this article I shall focus on the first three principles; I shall discuss various formulations of the principles (sect. 1), what it means for these theses to have the status of principles or axioms in Leibniz’s philosophy (sect. 2), the fundamental character of the Principles of Contradiction and (...)
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  22. Resemblance Nominalism and Counterparts: Reply to Bird.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):229–237.
    In my book *Resemblance Nominalism* I argued that the truthmakers of ´a and b resemble each other´ are just a and b. In his "Resemblance Nominalism and counterparts" Alexander Bird objects to my claim that the truthmakers of ´a and b resemble each other´ are just a and b. In this paper I respond to Bird´s objections.
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  23. Kripke y las descripciones rígidas.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1993 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 19 (1):109-113.
    In this paper I discuss a passage from *Naming and Necessity* where Kripke assumes that the essential properties by means of which a definite description designates are a sufficient condition of its rigidity. I put forward two examples that show the falsity of this assumption. Then I examine the non-rigid character of definite descriptions that designate by means of properties that are sufficient conditions of identity of the objects designated by those descriptions. I conclude that the properties by means of (...)
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  24.  91
    Leibniz on Substance in the Discourse on Metaphysics.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2015 - In T. Stoneham & P. Lodge (eds.), Locke and Leibniz on Substance. Routledge.
    In the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz put forward his famous complete-concept definition of substance. Sometimes this definition is glossed as stating that a substance is an entity with a concept so complete that it contains all its predicates, and it is thought that it follows directly from Leibniz’s theory of truth. Now, an adequate definition of substance should not apply to accidents. But, as I shall point out, if Leibniz’s theory of truth is correct then an accident is an entity (...)
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  25. Resemblance Nominalism, Conjunctions and Truthmakers.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (1):21-38.
    The resemblance nominalist says that the truthmaker of 〈Socrates is white〉 ultimately involves only concrete particulars that resemble each other. Furthermore he also says that Socrates and Plato are the truthmakers of 〈Socrates resembles Plato〉, and Socrates and Aristotle those of 〈Socrates resembles Aristotle〉. But this, combined with a principle about the truthmakers of conjunctions, leads to the apparently implausible conclusion that 〈Socrates resembles Plato and Socrates resembles Aristotle〉 and 〈Socrates resembles Plato and Plato resembles Aristotle〉 have the same truthmakers, (...)
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  26. Leibniz's Argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles in His Letter to Casati (with Transcription and Translation).Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2012 - The Leibniz Review 22:137-150.
    Leibniz’s short letter to the mathematician and physicist Ludovico Casati of 1689 is a short but interesting text on the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, to which it is entirely dedicated. Since there is no watermark in the paper of the letter, the letter is difficult to date, but it is likely that it was written during Leibniz’s stay in Rome, sometime between April and November of 1689 (A 2 2 287–8). When addressing the letter, Leibniz wrote ‘Casani’, but this (...)
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  27. Postscript to Why Truthmakers.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2008 - In E. J. Lowe & A. Rami (eds.), Truth and Truth-making. Acumen Publishing.
    In this chapter I shall reply to a pair of articles in which the main contention of my “Why truthmakers” – namely, that an important class of synthetic true propositions have entities as truth-makers – is rejected. In §§1–5 I reply to Jennifer Hornsby’s “Truth without Truthmaking Entities” (2005) and in §§6–7 I reply to Julian Dodd’s “Negative Truths and Truthmaker Principles” (2007).
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  28.  16
    Indiscernible Universals.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2016 - Inquiry 60 (6):604-624.
    Universals have traditionally thought to obey the identity of indiscernibles, that is, it has traditionally been thought that there can be no perfectly similar universals. But at least in the conception of universals as immanent, there is nothing that rules out there being indiscernible universals. In this paper, I shall argue that there is useful work indiscernible universals can do, and so there might be reason to postulate indiscernible universals. In particular, I shall argue that postulating indiscernible universals can allow (...)
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  29. Leibniz : Mind-Body Causation and Pre-Established Harmony.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2009 - In Robin Le Poidevin, Peter Simons, Andrew McGonigal & Ross Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge. pp. 109-118.
    Causation was an important topic of philosophical reflection during the Seventeenth Century. This reflection centred around certain particular problems about causation, one of which was the problem of causation between mind and body. The doctrine of the pre-established harmony is Leibniz's response to the problem of causation between mind and body. In this chapter I shall (a) explain the problem of mind-body causation; (b) explain Leibniz's pre-established harmony; and (c) assess his case for it.
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  30. Paradigms and Russell's Resemblance Regress.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (4):644 – 651.
    Resemblance Nominalism is the view that denies universals and tropes and claims that what makes F-things F is their resemblances. A famous argument against Resemblance Nominalism is Russell's regress of resemblances, according to which the resemblance nominalist falls into a vicious infinite regress. Aristocratic Resemblance Nominalism, as opposed to Egalitarian Resemblance Nominalism, is the version of Resemblance Nominalism that claims that what makes F-things F is that they resemble the F-paradigms. In this paper I attempt to show that a recently (...)
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  31. Truth and Ontology, by Trenton Merricks. [REVIEW]Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):542-552.
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  32. Mellor's Facts and Chances of Causation.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1998 - Analysis 58 (3):175–181.
    Mellor´s theory of causation has two components, one according to which causes raise their effects´ chances, and one according to which causation links facts. I argue that these two components are not independent from each other and, in particular, that Mellor´s thesis that causation links facts requires his thesis that causes raise their effects´ chances, since without the latter thesis Mellor cannot stop the slingshot argument, an argument that is a threat to any theory postulating facts as the relata of (...)
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  33.  43
    The Problem of Universals and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2002 - Philosophical Papers 31 (1):39-47.
    In this paper I argue, contra Fraser MacBride, that conceptual analysis, and in particular the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity, can solve the Problem of Universals, whether understood as the One over Many or the as the Many over One. In this paper I show why the solutions needed to solve either version of the problem must be in terms of truthmakers, and that the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity is not sufficient to solve them.
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  34.  63
    El problema metafísico de la verdad.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2000 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 26 (2):351-59.
    In this paper I present what I call the 'Metaphysical Problem of Truth', which consists in explaining in virtue of what all true sentences are true, and argue that a version of the Correspondence Theory of Truth is the most plausible solution to this problem.
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  35.  83
    Modal Realism and Metaphysical Nihilism.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2004 - Mind 113 (452):683-704.
    In this paper I argue that Modal Realism, the thesis that there exist non-actual possible individuals and worlds, can be made compatible with Metaphysical Nihilism, the thesis that it is possible that nothing concrete exists. Modal Realism as developed by Lewis rules out the possibility of a world where nothing concrete exists and so conflicts with Metaphysical Nihilism. In the paper I argue that Modal Realism can be modified so as to be compatible with Metaphysical Nihilism. Such a modification makes (...)
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  36.  41
    Nominalism in Metaphysics.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  37. Leibniz's Argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles in Primary Truths.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2004 - In M. Carrara, A. M. Nunziante & G. Tomasi (eds.), Individuals, minds and bodies: themes from Leibniz. Franz Steiner Verlag.
    In this paper I reconstruct Leibniz's argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles in his *Primary Truths*. I criticise the alternative interpretation put forward by Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne and defend my own interpretation, both on philosophical and hermeneutical grounds.
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  38.  50
    Review of "Facing Facts", by S. Neale. [REVIEW]Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):780-786.
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  39.  45
    The Language of Publication of "Analytic" Philosophy.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2013 - Critica 45 (133):83-90.
    This note argues that research in analytical philosophy broadly conceived should be published exclusively in English. Reasons are given for this and the thesis is defended against thirteen objections.
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  40.  67
    Leibniz's Argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles in His Correspondence with Clarke.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):429 – 438.
    In Section 21 of his fifth letter to Clarke Leibniz attempts to derive the Identity of Indiscernibles from an application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason to God´s act of creation, namely that God has a reason to create the world he creates. In this paper I argue that this argument fails, not just because the Identity of Indiscernibles is false, but because there is a counterexample to one of the premises that Leibniz cannot satisfactorily rule out.
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  41. Review: Facing Facts. [REVIEW]Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):780-786.
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  42.  12
    Real Metaphysics.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra & Hallvard Lillehammer (eds.) - 2003 - Routledge.
    Real Metaphysics brings together new articles by leading metaphysicians to honour Hugh Mellor's outstanding contribution to metaphysics. Some of the most outstanding minds of current times shed new light on all the main topics in metaphysics: truth, causation, dispositions and properties, explanation, and time. At the end of the book, Hugh Mellor responds to the issues raised by each of the thirteen contributors and gives us new insight into his own highly influential work on metaphysics.
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  43. Truthmaking and the Slingshot.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1999 - In Uwe Meixner & Peter Simons (eds.), Metaphysics in the Post-Metaphysical Age: Papers of the 22nd International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
    In this paper I shall show how the Correspondence Theory of Truth can block Davidson’s Slingshot (Davidson 1984), which threatens to make the Correspondence Theory collapse. In particular I shall show that the Slingshot is unsound − and in so doing I shall show that the Correspondence Theory has some metaphysical commitments about the nature of facts.
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  44.  38
    Searle's Correspondence Theory of Truth and the Slingshot.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):513-522.
  45.  27
    La anotación 202 de las Investigaciones Filosóficas de Wittgenstein.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1993 - Logos: Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica 27 (2):25-3.
    The paper clarifies the sense of remark 202 of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* with respect to its relation to the private language argument. It argues, against what some have maintained, that remark 202 is not meant to reject the possibility of a private language as this is defined in remark 243.
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  46. What is Wrong with the Relational Theory of Change?Gonzalo Rodríguez-Pereyra - 2003 - In Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics. Routledge. pp. 184--195.
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  47.  3
    The Language of Philosophy.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2014 - Revista de Filosofia Aurora 26 (469):157.
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  48. El hacer verdad, la implicación y la tesis de la conjunción.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2007 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 33 (1):55-85.
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  49.  1
    Leibniz’s Argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles in His Letter to Casati.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2012 - Leibniz Society Review 22:137-150.
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  50.  75
    Nominalism About Properties: New Essays.Ghislain Guigon & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.) - 2015 - Routledge.
    Nominalism, which has its origins in the Middle Ages and continues into the Twenty-First Century, is the doctrine that there are no universals. This book is unique in bringing together essays on the history of nominalism and essays that present a systematic discussion of nominalism. It introduces the reader to the distinction between particulars and universals, to the difficulties posed by this distinction, and to the main motivations for the rejection of universals. It also describes the main varieties of nominalism (...)
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