Among ethicists and engineers within robotics there is an ongoing discussion as to whether ethical robots are possible or even desirable. We answer both of these questions in the positive, based on an extensive literature study of existing arguments. Our contribution consists in bringing together and reinterpreting pieces of information from a variety of sources. One of the conclusions drawn is that artifactual morality must come in degrees and depend on the level of agency, autonomy and intelligence of the machine. (...) Moral concerns for agents such as intelligent search machines are relatively simple, while highly intelligent and autonomous artifacts with significant impact and complex modes of agency must be equipped with more advanced ethical capabilities. Systems like cognitive robots are being developed that are expected to become part of our everyday lives in future decades. Thus, it is necessary to ensure that their behaviour is adequate. In an analogy with artificial intelligence, which is the ability of a machine to perform activities that would require intelligence in humans, artificial morality is considered to be the ability of a machine to perform activities that would require morality in humans. The capacity for artificial (artifactual) morality, such as artifactual agency, artifactual responsibility, artificial intentions, artificial (synthetic) emotions, etc., come in varying degrees and depend on the type of agent. As an illustration, we address the assurance of safety in modern High Reliability Organizations through responsibility distribution. In the same way that the concept of agency is generalized in the case of artificial agents, the concept of moral agency, including responsibility, is generalized too. We propose to look at artificial moral agents as having functional responsibilities within a network of distributed responsibilities in a socio-technological system. This does not take away the responsibilities of the other stakeholders in the system, but facilitates an understanding and regulation of such networks. It should be pointed out that the process of development must assume an evolutionary form with a number of iterations because the emergent properties of artifacts must be tested in real world situations with agents of increasing intelligence and moral competence. We see this paper as a contribution to the macro-level Requirement Engineering through discussion and analysis of general requirements for design of ethical robots. (shrink)

Over the last two decades, network-focused approaches have become highly popular in diverse fields of biology, including neuroscience, ecology, molecular biology and genetics. While the network approach continues to grow very rapidly, some of its conceptual and methodological aspects still require a programmatic foundation. This challenge particularly concerns the question of whether a generalized account of explanatory, organisational and descriptive levels of networks can be applied universally across biological sciences. Consequently, the central focus of this theme issue will be on (...) the definition, motivation and application of key concepts in biological network science, such as levels, hierarchies, and explanatory directionality. A unification will be achieved by formulating norms for delimiting the distinctively network-topological class of explanations that connect general as well as very specific biological research questions. The impact of this theme issue is broad and encompassing, as it is highly interdisciplinary and opens a uniquely normative perspective on the foundational aspects of network-based explanations and modelling. This theme issue is intended to become a landmark publication for practical research as well as funding policy decisions, by unifying network approaches in biological sciences in terms of fundamental concepts and informing the public understanding of the network science. (shrink)

We provide three innovations to recent debates about whether topological or “network” explanations are a species of mechanistic explanation. First, we more precisely characterize the requirement that all topological explanations are mechanistic explanations and show scientific practice to belie such a requirement. Second, we provide an account that unifies mechanistic and non-mechanistic topological explanations, thereby enriching both the mechanist and autonomist programs by highlighting when and where topological explanations are mechanistic. Third, we defend this view against some powerful mechanist objections. (...) We conclude from this that topological explanations are autonomous from their mechanistic counterparts. (shrink)

Principle of equality of arms is part of fair trial concept, which encompasses several guarantees linked to the defence opportunities during the criminal procedure. The accused person is entitled to a fair trial. Balance of rights between the parties is bedrock for procedural fairness and the judge has to perform his competence in providing all necessary preconditions as for the trial to be fair. There are differences between interpretation and implementation of equality of arms in the jurisprudence of European court (...) on human rights and international criminal courts. Decisions of ECtHR are much more similar with domestic understanding of equality of arms as reasonable opportunity of the defence to present the case without disadvantages vis-à-vis the prosecutor, due to inherent inequity between the parties. When analyzing proceeding before the ad hoc Tribunals, there is “more liberal interpretation” of this principle, which allowed the Prosecutor to invoke equality of arms, as well. ICTY Trial Chamber in Aleksovski case concluded that application of the concept of a fair trial in favor of both parties is understandable because the Prosecution acts on behalf of and in the interests of the international community, including the interests of the victims of the offence charged and also has held that it is difficult to see how a trial could ever be considered to be fair where the accused is favored at the expense of the Prosecution. This interpretation has been justified with dependence of the international Tribunals on state cooperation and due to the fact that international criminal courts have no autonomous enforcement agencies at their disposal. Fortunately, ICC Statute considered equality of arms as solely afforded to the defence, or to the Prosecutor on the behalf of accused. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a general theory of topological explanations, and illustrate its fruitfulness by showing how it accounts for explanatory asymmetry. My argument is developed in three steps. In the first step, I show what it is for some topological property A to explain some physical or dynamical property B. Based on that, I derive three key criteria of successful topological explanations: a criterion concerning the facticity of topological explanations, i.e. what makes it true of a particular system; (...) a criterion for describing counterfactual dependencies in two explanatory modes, i.e. the vertical and the horizontal; and, finally, a third perspectival one that tells us when to use the vertical and when to use the horizontal mode. In the second step, I show how this general theory of topological explanations accounts for explanatory asymmetry in both the vertical and horizontal explanatory modes. Finally, in the third step, I argue that this theory is universally applicable across biological sciences, which helps to unify essential concepts of biological networks. (shrink)

U odnosu filozofije i umjetnosti, metaforičko mišljenje ima poseban status. Od antičke retorike, metafora je bitna jezička figura. U prošlom stoljeću postaje modelom estetičkih i znanstvenih procesa spoznaje i stvaralaštva i teorijskih rasprava u znanosti o književnosti, filozofiji jezika i lingvistici, tj. o hermeneutičkim, jezičkoanalitičkim i strukturalističkim paradigmama. Zanimati će nas Grassijeva hermeneutika metafore. Dok Heidegger drži da je pretpostavka metaforičkog mišljenja tradicionalno razlikovanje osjetilnog i nadosjetilnog bića, tj. da pjesništvo nije metafora, Grassi ide drugim putom, zastupajući tezu da je (...) pjevanje pjesnika i sâmo povijesni bitak zapadnog čovjeka − tumačeći npr. ironički izraz u romantičara novim oblikom mišljenja. Slično Grassiju, i Ricoeur smatra da je Heideggerova upotreba metafore ipak važnija od onoga što usput govori protiv nje. (shrink)

This chapter provides a systematic overview of topological explanations in the philosophy of science literature. It does so by presenting an account of topological explanation that I (Kostić and Khalifa 2021; Kostić 2020a; 2020b; 2018) have developed in other publications and then comparing this account to other accounts of topological explanation. Finally, this appraisal is opinionated because it highlights some problems in alternative accounts of topological explanations, and also it outlines responses to some of the main criticisms raised (...) by the so-called new mechanists. (shrink)

In the last 20 years or so, since the publication of a seminal paper by Watts and Strogatz :440–442, 1998), an interest in topological explanations has spread like a wild fire over many areas of science, e.g. ecology, evolutionary biology, medicine, and cognitive neuroscience. The topological approach is still very young by all standards, and even within special sciences it still doesn’t have a single methodological programme that is applicable across all areas of science. That is why this special issue (...) is important as a first systematic philosophical study of topological explanations and their relation to a well understood and widespread explanatory strategy, such as mechanistic one. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the newly developed network approach in neuroscience and biology provides a basis for formulating a unique type of realization, which I call topological realization. Some of its features and its relation to one of the dominant paradigms of realization and explanation in sciences, i.e. the mechanistic one, are already being discussed in the literature. But the detailed features of topological realization, its explanatory power and its relation to another prominent view of realization, namely the (...) semantic one, have not yet been discussed. I argue that topological realization is distinct from mechanistic and semantic ones because the realization base in this framework is not based on local realisers, regardless of the scale but on global realizers. In mechanistic approach, the realization base is always at the local level, in both ontic and epistemic accounts. The explanatory power of realization relation in mechanistic approach comes directly from the realization relation-either by showing how a model is mapped onto a mechanism, or by describing some ontic relations that are explanatory in themselves. Similarly, the semantic approach requires that concepts at different scales logically satisfy microphysical descriptions, which are at the local level. In topological framework the realization base can be found at different scales, but whatever the scale the realization base is global, within that scale, and not local. Furthermore, topological realization enables us to answer the “why” questions, which according to Polger 2010 make it explanatory. The explanatoriness of topological realization stems from understanding mathematical consequences of different topologies, not from the mere fact that a system realizes them. (shrink)

In non-causal explanations, some non-causal facts (such as mathematical, modal or metaphysical) are used to explain some physical facts. However, precisely because these explanations abstract away from causal facts, they face two challenges: 1) it is not clear why would one rather than the other non-causal explanantia be relevant for the explanandum; and 2) why would standing in a particular explanatory relation (e.g., “counterfactual dependence”, “constraint”, “entailment”, “constitution”, “grounding”, and so on), and not in some other, be explanatory. I develop (...) an explanatory relevance account which is based on erotetic constraints and show how it addresses these two challenges. (shrink)

Ova četiri teksta prilagođena su izlaganja o knjizi Gordane Bosanac "Utopija i inauguralni paradoks", održana prigodom njezina predstavljanja.Predstavljanje se, uz raspravu, odvijalo u Klubu sveučilišnih nastavnika u Zagebu 24. listopada 2005.These four contributions are adapted talks on Gordana Bosanac’s book Utopija i inauguralniparadoks, delivered on the occasion of its presentation.This presentation took place at the Croatian University Teachers’ Club in Zagreb on 24th October2005.

Proponents of ontic conceptions of explanation require all explanations to be backed by causal, constitutive, or similar relations. Among their justifications is that only ontic conceptions can do justice to the ‘directionality’ of explanation, i.e., the requirement that if X explains Y , then not-Y does not explain not-X . Using topological explanations as an illustration, we argue that non-ontic conceptions of explanation have ample resources for securing the directionality of explanations. The different ways in which neuroscientists rely on multiplexes (...) involving both functional and anatomical connectivity in their topological explanations vividly illustrate why ontic considerations are frequently (if not always) irrelevant to explanatory directionality. Therefore, directionality poses no problem to non-ontic conceptions of explanation. (shrink)

Agents and agent-based systems are becoming essential in the development of various fields, such as artificial intelligence, ubiquitous computing, ambient intelligence, autonomous computing, and intelligent robotics. The concept of autonomous agents, inspired by the observed agency in living systems, is also central to current theories on the origin, development, and evolution of life. Therefore, it is crucial to develop an accurate understanding of agents and the concept of agency. This paper begins by discussing the role of agency in natural systems (...) as an inspiration and motivation for agential technologies and then introduces the idea of artificial agents. A systematic approach is presented for the classification of artificial agents. This classification aids in understanding the existing state of the artificial agents and projects their potential future roles in addressing specific types of problems with dedicated agent types. (shrink)

This paper connects information with computation and cognition via concept of agents that appear at variety of levels of organization of physical/chemical/cognitive systems – from elementary particles to atoms, molecules, life-like chemical systems, to cognitive systems starting with living cells, up to organisms and ecologies. In order to obtain this generalized framework, concepts of information, computation and cognition are generalized. In this framework, nature can be seen as informational structure with computational dynamics, where an (info-computational) agent is needed for the (...) potential information of the world to actualize. Starting from the definition of information as the difference in one physical system that makes a difference in another physical system – which combines Bateson and Hewitt’s definitions, the argument is advanced for natural computation as a computational model of the dynamics of the physical world, where information processing is constantly going on, on a variety of levels of organization. This setting helps us to elucidate the relationships between computation, information, agency and cognition, within the common conceptual framework, with special relevance for biology and robotics. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore the conceptual problems arising when using network analysis in person- centered care (PCC) in psychiatry. Personalized network models are potentially helpful tools for PCC, but we argue that using them in psychiatric practice raises boundary problems, i.e., problems in demarcating what should and should not be included in the model, which may limit their ability to provide clinically-relevant knowledge. Models can have explanatory and representational boundaries, among others. We argue that we can make more explicit (...) what kind of questions personalized network models can address in PCC, given their representational and explanatory boundaries, using perspectival reasoning. (shrink)

Filozofija danas, kao i posljednjih desetljeća, u različitim varijantama raspravlja o utemeljenju i širini pojma pluralizma, multikulturalizma/transkulturalizma, mogućeg prihvaćanja drugačijeg i uopće o načinima posredovanja. Tim se povodom u tekstu želi skrenuti pažnja na tek djelomično recipirano djelo Ernesta Grassija. Prije svega riječ je o njegovom drugačijem tumačenju povijesti novovjekovne filozofije, raspravljanju o odnosu filozofije i kulture i trajnom naporu u premošćivanju i međusobnom upućivanju talijanske i njemačke filozofije, te otvorenosti prema drugim kulturama.Grassi je zastupao stajalište da susret sa stranim (...) i drugačijim traži situaciji primjerene teorijske i praktičke odgovore, otvaranje izvornosti onoga što nam pridolazi kao novo. Teorijska otvorenost iskustvu drugačijih svjetova, provlačenje kroz doživljaj drugačijeg što posebno iskazuje u svojim «južnoameričkim meditacijama», ujedno je za njega propitivanje samorazumljivosti europskog iskustva i europskog tumačenja prostora, vremena, umjetnosti…Pitanje je stoga koliko Grassi, koji je kao metodu spoznaje zastupao znanstvene razgovore što uključuju individualnu, historijsku situaciju i interakciju sudionika u aktualnoj govornoj situaciji, i danas može biti zanimljiv sugovornik. Takav njegov pristup utemeljen je na tumačenju zbiljnosti polazeći od jezika, što uključuje kritiku metafizike.For several decades now, philosophy has and is attempting various approaches to the foundationand scope of pluralism, multiculturalism/transculturalism, possible ways to accepting the different,and general means of mediation. In response, this article deals with the partially received work ofErnesto Grassi – in particular, his singular interpretation of the history of modern age philosophy,his discussion on relations between philosophy and culture, his ongoing effort to bridge the differencesand refer to each other the German and the Italian philosophy, his receptiveness to othercultures.Ernesto Grassi supported the view that encounters with the strange and the different call for appropriatetheoretical and practical responses, a receptiveness to genuineness of what one approaches asnew. For him, the theoretical receptiveness to experiencing different worlds, the involvement in thedifferent that he particularly expresses in his »South American meditations«, is also the means ofquestioning the taking for granted of the European experience and its interpretation of essentialssuch as space, time, and art.It remains a question to what extend is Grassi, who viewed a scientific exchange – with its individual,historical context and the interaction of the participants in the current conversational act – asa cognitive method, still an interesting conversationalist today. He builds this approach upon interpretationof reality from the point of language, which includes a criticism of metaphysics. (shrink)

Danilo Pejović je na Odsjeku za filozofiju, nakon Milana Kangrge, predavao estetiku od početka šezdesetih do početka sedamdesetih godina, kada je tu Katedru preuzeo Danko Grlić, zajedno s kojim je preveo Heideggerov tekst O bîti umjetnosti .U Pejovićevu promišljanju umjetnosti Heidegger je, kao i hermeneutika, bio glavni orijentir u razumijevanju umjetničkog djela preko paradigme jezika i u tom je kontekstu u suvremenoj filozofiji umjetnosti, posebno ukazujući i na značaj ekspresionizma, istraživao odnos umjetnosti i prirode, tehnike, oblika, zbiljnosti, osjećajnosti, razumljivosti i (...) slobode. Raspravljanje o mogućnosti umjetnosti Pejović uvijek postavlja u epohalni kontekst, ustvrđujući da je nakon smrti Goethea i Hegela umro i jedan svijet, koji s oscilacijama seže sve do Homerova doba, a Marx samo radikalizira Hegelovo pitanje o tome čemu još umjetnost,da bi se ono nakon Marxa, u doba tehnike, još više zaoštrilo.Pejović zastupa tezu da bez pojma slobode ne možemo dospjeti do toga što jest umjetnost, a živeći u svijetu prepunu oblika uništavanja ljudske slobode, gube se osjećajnost i ljepota kao pripadne umjetnosti.Danilo Pejović hat nach Milan Kangrga an der Abteilung für Philosophie vom Beginn der Sechziger bis zum Beginn der Siebziger Jahren Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik gehalten, als diesen Lehrstuhl Danko Grlić übernahm, mit wem er Heideggers Werk Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes übersetzte.In Pejovićs Bedenken der Kunst war Heidegger neben der Hermeneutik der Hauptorientierungspunkt im Verstehen des Kunstwerkes mittels Sprachparadigma, und in diesem Kontext in der zeitgenössischen Kunstphilosophie, mit der besonderen Betonung auf die Wichtigkeit des Expressionismus, hat er die Beziehung zwischen Kunst und Natur, Technik, Formen, Wirklichkeit, Sensibilität, Verständlichkeit und Freiheit erforscht. Die Erörterung über die Möglichkeit der Kunst wird von Pejović immer in den Epochen-Kontext gesetzt, mit der Behauptung, dass nach Goethes und Hegels Tod eine Welt, die mit den Schwankungen noch vom Homers Zeitalter dauerte, gestorben ist, und Marx radikalisiert Hegels Frage darüber, warum noch die Kunst, nur dass diese Frage im Zeitalter der Technik nach Marx immer mehr verschärft wurde.Pejović vertritt die These, dass man ohne den Begriff der Freiheit das Wesen der Kunst nicht erreichen kann, und Leben in der Welt, die voll von Vernichtung der Freiheit der Menschen ist, führt zur Verlust der Sensibilität und Schönheit als angehöriger Kunst. (shrink)

What is reality for an agent? What is minimal cognition? How does the morphology of a cognitive agent affect cognition? These are still open questions among scientists and philosophers. In this chapter we propose the idea of info-computational nature as a framework for answering those questions. Within the info-computational framework, information is defined as a structure, and computation as the dynamics of information. To an agent, nature therefore appears as an informational structure with computational dynamics. Both information and computation in (...) this context have broader meaning than in everyday use, and both are necessarily grounded in physical implementation. Evolution of increasingly complex living agents is understood as a process of morphological computation driven by agents’ interactions with the environment. It is a process much more complex than random variation; instead the mechanisms of change are morphological computational processes of self-organisation. Reality for an agent emerges as a result of interactions with the environment together with internal information processing. Following Maturana and Varela, we take cognition to be the process of living of an organism, and thus it appears on different levels of complexity, from cellular via organismic to social. The simpler the agent, the simpler its “reality” defined by the network of networks of info-computational processes, which constitute its cognition. The debated topic of consciousness takes its natural place in this framework, as a process of information integration that we suggest naturally evolved in organisms with a nervous system. Computing nature/pancomputationalism is sometimes confused with panpsychism or claimed to necessarily imply panpsychism, which we show is not the case. Even though we focus on natural systems in this chapter, the info-computational approach is general and can be used to model both biological and artifactual cognitive agents. (shrink)

In this paper, I outline a heuristic for thinking about the relation between explanation and understanding that can be used to capture various levels of “intimacy”, between them. I argue that the level of complexity in the structure of explanation is inversely proportional to the level of intimacy between explanation and understanding, i.e. the more complexity the less intimacy. I further argue that the level of complexity in the structure of explanation also affects the explanatory depth in a similar way (...) to intimacy between explanation and understanding, i.e. the less complexity the greater explanatory depth and vice versa. (shrink)

Over the last decades, network-based approaches have become highly popular in diverse fields of biology, including neuroscience, ecology, molecular biology and genetics. While these approaches continue to grow very rapidly, some of their conceptual and methodological aspects still require a programmatic foundation. This challenge particularly concerns the question of whether a generalized account of explanatory, organisational and descriptive levels of networks can be applied universally across biological sciences. To this end, this highly interdisciplinary theme issue focuses on the definition, motivation (...) and application of key concepts in biological network science, such as explanatory power of distinctively network explanations, network levels, and network hierarchies. (shrink)

Some intriguing questions such as: What is reality for an agent? How does reality of a bacterium differ from a reality of a human brain? Do we need representation in order to understand reality? are still widely debated. Starting with the presentation of the computing nature as an info-computational framework, where information is defined as a structure, and computation as information processing, we address questions of evolution of increasingly complex living agents through interactions with the environment. In this context, the (...) concept of computation will be discussed and the sense in which computation is observer-relative. Using the results on morphological/ morphogenetic computation as information self-organization we argue that reality for an agent is a result of networked agent-based computation. Consciousness is a (computational) process of information integration that evolved in organisms with nervous system. We present an argument why pancomputationalism (computing nature) is a sound scientific strategy and why panpsychism is not. (shrink)

The philosophical literature on scientific explanation in neuroscience has been dominated by the idea of mechanisms. The mechanist philosophers often claim that neuroscience is in the business of finding mechanisms. This view has been challenged in numerous ways by showing that there are other successful and widespread explanatory strategies in neuroscience. However, the empirical evidence for all these claims was hitherto lacking. Empirical evidence about the pervasiveness and uses of various explanatory strategies in neuroscience is particularly needed because examples and (...) case studies that are used to illustrate philosophical claims so far tend to be hand-picked. The risk of confirmation bias is therefore considerable: when looking for white swans, all one finds is that swans are white. The more systematic quantitative and qualitative bibliometric study of a large body of relevant literature that we present in this paper can put such claims into perspective. Using bibliometric tools, we identify the typical linguistic patterns used in the alleged mechanistic, dynamical, and topological explanations in the literature, their preponderance and how they change over time. Our findings show abundant use of mechanistic language, but also the presence of a significant neuroscience literature using topological and dynamical explanatory language, which grows over time and increasingly differentiates from each other and from mechanistic explanations. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to explore the ways and forms in which history is present, represented and used in Vygotsky’s theorizing. Given the fact that Vygotsky’s theory is usually described as a cultural-historical theory, the issue of history is necessarily implicated in the theory itself. However, there is still a gap between history as implicated in the theory and an explicit theorizing of history – both in Vygotsky’s writings and in Vygotskian scholarship. Therefore it is expected that it (...) would be fruitful to shed light on some possible pathways that can bridge this gap. The prevailing theoretical role of history in Vygotsky’s theory is to serve as a general framework which provides tools for the development of higher psychic functions. Thus, history is recognized as a formative context of psychic life. Further, history appears in Vygotsky’s writings also as a projected better future. All these uses of history presuppose an idea of history as linear progress. But Vygotsky also argues for a stronger epistemological claim – that history is the most powerful explanatory principle. After conceptual and theoretical reflection on history, some limitations of Vygotsky’s historicizing of the history of psychic development will be pointed out and related to general epistemological problems of historicizing. Finally, Vygotsky’s cultural-historical theory, an edifice built up in the 1930s but relying on the rich philosophical and psychological legacy available up to that time, will be positioned against the pluralistic, postmodern and hermeneutic turn in contemporary social and human sciences. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to explore the ways and forms in which history is present, represented and used in Vygotsky’s theorizing. Given the fact that Vygotsky’s theory is usually described as a cultural-historical theory, the issue of history is necessarily implicated in the theory itself. However, there is still a gap between history as implicated in the theory and an explicit theorizing of history – both in Vygotsky’s writings and in Vygotskian scholarship. Therefore it is expected that it (...) would be fruitful to shed light on some possible pathways that can bridge this gap. The prevailing theoretical role of history in Vygotsky’s theory is to serve as a general framework which provides tools for the development of higher psychic functions. Thus, history is recognized as a formative context of psychic life. Further, history appears in Vygotsky’s writings also as a projected better future. All these uses of history presuppose an idea of history as linear progress. But Vygotsky also argues for a stronger epistemological claim – that history is the most powerful explanatory principle. After conceptual and theoretical reflection on history, some limitations of Vygotsky’s historicizing of the history of psychic development will be pointed out and related to general epistemological problems of historicizing. Finally, Vygotsky’s cultural-historical theory, an edifice built up in the 1930s but relying on the rich philosophical and psychological legacy available up to that time, will be positioned against the pluralistic, postmodern and hermeneutic turn in contemporary social and human sciences. (shrink)

Ova četiri teksta prilagođena su izlaganja o knjizi Gordane Bosanac "Utopija i inauguralni paradoks", održana prigodom njezina predstavljanja.Predstavljanje se, uz raspravu, odvijalo u Klubu sveučilišnih nastavnika u Zagebu 24. listopada 2005.These four contributions are adapted talks on Gordana Bosanac’s book Utopija i inauguralniparadoks , delivered on the occasion of its presentation.This presentation took place at the Croatian University Teachers’ Club in Zagreb on 24th October2005.

This paper is concerned with a quality space model as an account of the intelligibility of explanation. I argue that descriptions of causal or functional roles (Chalmers Levine, 2001) are not the only basis for intelligible explanations. If we accept that phenomenal concepts refer directly, not via descriptions of causal or functional roles, then it is difficult to find role fillers for the described causal roles. This constitutes a vagueness constraint on the intelligibility of explanation. Thus, I propose to use (...) quality space models to develop a systematic way of studying different modalities of perception and feelings, e.g., visual and auditory perception, pain, and emotion, that can reveal some structural relations among these modalities. It might turn out that topological explanation can be more intelligible than causal explanation in this case. I discuss two accounts of a quality space for color vision (Clark, 2000; Rosenthal, 2010) and propose how to construct a quality space for pain. Daniel Kostic is Associated Researcher at Berlin School of Mind and Brain. (shrink)

Od svih suvremenika Praxisa, koji je nesumnjivo najsnažnija pojava u novijoj povijesti filozofije i kulture na ovim prostorima, Blaženku Despot treba smatrati onom izuzetnom osobnošću koja, ni formalno niti konceptualno, ne pripada tom krugu, iako s njime dijeli problematsku suštinu prijepora kojim se svi oni u to doba intenzivno bave. Ona, kao i Praxis , oštro i bespoštedno kritizira »socijalističku zbilju«, ali pritom ide dalje, propitujući i promišljajući odnos misaonih, idejnih izvora na koje se »realizacija socijalističke zbilje« poziva, kao i (...) kvalitetu, domet i istinitost same realizacije. Tako su u žarište njezinih preokupacija postavljeni misaoni korpus Hegela i Marxa, njihove razlike i istovjetnosti, granice i nepotpunosti u odnosu na povijesnu zakrivljenost našeg vremena. Poduzimajući filozofsku analizu tzv. društvenih pojava ona poduzima suočavanje »socijalističke stvarnosti« s idejama njezinih marksističkih uzora. Stoga poduzima »ponovno čitanje Hegela«, koje znači i ponovno čitanje Marxa, naročito na onim mjestima na kojima ih je »socijalistička stvarnost«, kao i cjelokupna povijest, potpuno demantirala, a to je područje humanističkog dometa emancipacije žena. Otvarajući među prvima u nas upravo ovo teorijsko-filozofsko polje, Blaženka Despot slijedi svjetske trendove teorije i filozofije feminizma, u čemu je ostavila ne samo neizbrisivi trag doprinosu produbljavanja filozofije slobode nego je u nas postavila temelje feminističke filozofije.Blaženka Despot should be regarded as an extraordinary person among all Praxis’s contemporaries, because she was concerned with the same themes, although she did not belong to the group, neither formally nor conceptually. She, like the philosophers closely associated with Praxis , harshly and without pity criticizes the so called “socialist reality”, but goes on even further to examine and rethink the conceptual foundations on which it is based, as well as its quality, range and truthfulness of the whole project. Therefore, Hegel and Marx lie in the very centre of her interest – the differences and similarities between them, and their limitations and insufficiencies regarding the historical context of our times. Putting effort into the philosophical analysis of social phenomena , she puts “socialist reality” and the ideas of its Marxist role-models side by side. Thus, she “re-reads Hegel”, and thereby also unavoidably Marx, in the context completely neglected by both “socialist reality” and the entire history of ideas – in the context of humanistic emancipation of women. Opening that theoretic-philosophical field of investigation, Blaženka Despot follows the world trends in theory, including also dealing with the philosophy of feminism, where she left an indelible mark concerning her efforts to deepen the “philosophy of freedom” and to establish feminist philosophy in Croatia. (shrink)