Results for 'Gotlob Frege'

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  1. Translations From the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege.Gottlob Frege - 1952 - Blackwell.
  2. The Frege Reader.Gottlob Frege & Michael Beaney (eds.) - 1997 - Blackwell.
    This is the first single-volume edition and translation of Frege's philosophical writings to include his seminal papers as well as substantial selections from ...
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  3. Nachgelassene Schriften.Gotlob Frege - 1970 - Synthese 21 (3):488-493.
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  4. Gottlob Frege Werk Und Wirkung : Mit den Unveröffentlichten Vorschlägen Für Ein Wahlgesetz von Gottlob Frege.Gottlob Frege & Gottfried Gabriel - 2000
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  5. The Frege-Hilbert Correspondence.Gottlob Frege - 1895 - In Gottfried Gabriel, Hans Hermes, Friedrich Kambartel, Christian Thiel, Albert Veraart, Brian McGuinness & Hans Kaal (eds.), Gottlob Frege: Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence. Blackwell. pp. 33--51.
     
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  6. Translations From the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Edited by Peter Geach and Max Black.Gottlob Frege - 1952 - Blackwell.
     
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  7. Selection From the Frege-Russell Correspondence.Gottlob Frege - 1988 - In Nathan U. Salmon & Scott Soames (eds.), Propositions and Attitudes. Oxford University Press. pp. 56--57.
     
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  8.  48
    Frege Against the Formalists (II): A Translation of Part of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik.Gottlob Frege - 1950 - Philosophical Review 59 (2):202-220.
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  9.  17
    Frege Against the Formalists, I, II, III.Gottlob Frege - 1950 - Philosophical Review 59:77.
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  10.  27
    Frege Against the Formalists. III: A Translation of Part of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik.Gottlob Frege - 1950 - Philosophical Review 59 (3):332-345.
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    Frege Und Die Grundlagen der Geometrie.Hans Georg Steiner, G. Frege, M. E. Szabo & E. D. Klemke - 1971 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (1):155-155.
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  12.  4
    Frege Against the Formalists. A Translation of Part of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik.Max Black & Gottlob Frege - 1953 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 18 (1):93-93.
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  13. Frege’s Letters to Wittgenstein About the Tractatus.Gottlob Frege & Richard Schmitt - 2003 - The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly 120.
     
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  14. White. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1979. Xm+ 288 P.. Index. Gottlob Frege. Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence. Abridged for the English Edition by Brian Mac Guinness and Translated by Hans Kaal. Oxford. Basil Blackwell. 1980. Xvm+ 214 P.. Index. [REVIEW]Gottlob Frege - 1983 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 144:199.
  15. Frege: Philosophy of Language.Michael Dummett - 1973 - London: Duckworth.
    This highly acclaimed book is a major contribution to the philosophy of language as well as a systematic interpretation of Frege, indisputably the father of ...
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  16. Frege and German Philosophical Idealism.Nikolay Milkov - 2015 - In Dieter Schott (ed.), Frege: Freund(e) und Feind(e): Proceedings of the International Conference 2013. Logos. pp. 88-104.
    The received view has it that analytic philosophy emerged as a rebellion against the German Idealists (above all Hegel) and their British epigones (the British neo-Hegelians). This at least was Russell’s story: the German Idealism failed to achieve solid results in philosophy. Of course, Frege too sought after solid results. He, however, had a different story to tell. Frege never spoke against Hegel, or Fichte. Similarly to the German Idealists, his sworn enemy was the empiricism (in his case, (...)
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  17. The Problem with the Frege–Geach Problem.Nate Charlow - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):635-665.
    I resolve the major challenge to an Expressivist theory of the meaning of normative discourse: the Frege–Geach Problem. Drawing on considerations from the semantics of directive language (e.g., imperatives), I argue that, although certain forms of Expressivism (like Gibbard’s) do run into at least one version of the Problem, it is reasonably clear that there is a version of Expressivism that does not.
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  18. Frege and Peano on Definitions.Edoardo Rivello - forthcoming - In Proceedings of the "Frege: Freunde und Feinde" conference, held in Wismar, May 12-15, 2013.
    Frege and Peano started in 1896 a debate where they contrasted the respective conceptions on the theory and practice of mathematical definitions. Which was (if any) the influence of the Frege-Peano debate on the conceptions by the two authors on the theme of defining in mathematics and which was the role played by this debate in the broader context of their scientific interaction?
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  19. Frege's Contribution to Philosophy of Language.Richard Heck & Robert May - 2006 - In Barry C. Smith & Ernest Lepore (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. pp. 3-39.
    An investigation of Frege’s various contributions to the study of language, focusing on three of his most famous doctrines: that concepts are unsaturated, that sentences refer to truth-values, and that sense must be distinguished from reference.
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  20. Frege's Other Program.Aldo Antonelli & Robert May - 2005 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 46 (1):1-17.
    Frege's logicist program requires that arithmetic be reduced to logic. Such a program has recently been revamped by the "neologicist" approach of Hale and Wright. Less attention has been given to Frege's extensionalist program, according to which arithmetic is to be reconstructed in terms of a theory of extensions of concepts. This paper deals just with such a theory. We present a system of second-order logic augmented with a predicate representing the fact that an object x is the (...)
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  21. Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: Some Exegetical Notes.Saul A. Kripke - 2008 - Theoria 74 (3):181-218.
    Frege's theory of indirect contexts and the shift of sense and reference in these contexts has puzzled many. What can the hierarchy of indirect senses, doubly indirect senses, and so on, be? Donald Davidson gave a well-known 'unlearnability' argument against Frege's theory. The present paper argues that the key to Frege's theory lies in the fact that whenever a reference is specified (even though many senses determine a single reference), it is specified in a particular way, so (...)
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  22. Solving Frege's Puzzle.Richard G. Heck Jr - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (1-2):132-174.
    So-called 'Frege cases' pose a challenge for anyone who would hope to treat the contents of beliefs (and similar mental states) as Russellian propositions: It is then impossible to explain people's behavior in Frege cases without invoking non-intentional features of their mental states, and doing that seems to undermine the intentionality of psychological explanation. In the present paper, I develop this sort of objection in what seems to me to be its strongest form, but then offer a response (...)
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  23. Frege's Puzzle.Nathan U. Salmon - 1986 - Ridgeview.
  24. What is Frege's "Concept Horse Problem" ?Ian Proops - 2013 - In Michael Potter and Peter Sullivan (ed.), Wittgenstein's Tractatus: History and Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 76-96.
    I argue that Frege's so-called "concept 'horse' problem" is not one problem but many. When these separate sub-problems are distinguished, some are revealed to be more tractable than others. I further argue that there is, contrary to a widespread scholarly assumption originating with Peter Geach, little evidence that Frege was concerned with the general problem of the inexpressibility of logical category distinctions in writings available to Wittgenstein. In consequence, Geach is mistaken in thinking that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein (...)
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  25. The Frege-Geach Problem.Jack Woods - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 226-242.
    This is an opinionated overview of the Frege-Geach problem, in both its historical and contemporary guises. Covers Higher-order Attitude approaches, Tree-tying, Gibbard-style solutions, and Schroeder's recent A-type expressivist solution.
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  26.  21
    Platonism in Lotze and Frege Between Psyschologism and Hypostasis.Nicholas Stang - 2019 - In Sandra Lapointe (ed.), Logic from Kant to Russell. Routledge. pp. 138–159.
    In the section “Validity and Existence in Logik, Book III,” I explain Lotze’s famous distinction between existence and validity in Book III of Logik. In the following section, “Lotze’s Platonism,” I put this famous distinction in the context of Lotze’s attempt to distinguish his own position from hypostatic Platonism and consider one way of drawing the distinction: the hypostatic Platonist accepts that there are propositions, whereas Lotze rejects this. In the section “Two Perspectives on Frege’s Platonism,” I argue that (...)
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  27. Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem.Nicholas Unwin - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):337-352.
    Expressivists, such as Blackburn, analyse sentences such as 'S thinks that it ought to be the case that p' as S hoorays that p'. A problem is that the former sentence can be negated in three different ways, but the latter in only two. The distinction between refusing to accept a moral judgement and accepting its negation therefore cannot be accounted for. This is shown to undermine Blackburn's solution to the Frege-Geach problem.
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  28. Does Semantic Relationism Solve Frege’s Puzzle?Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):97-118.
    In a series of recent works, Kit Fine, 605–631, 2003, 2007) has sketched a novel solution to Frege’s puzzle. Radically departing from previous solutions, Fine argues that Frege’s puzzle forces us to reject compositionality. In this paper we first provide an explicit formalization of the relational semantics for first-order logic suggested, but only briefly sketched, by Fine. We then show why the relational semantics alone is technically inadequate, forcing Fine to enrich the syntax with a coordination schema. Given (...)
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  29. Relational Approaches to Frege's Puzzle.Aidan Gray - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (10):e12429.
    Frege's puzzle is a fundamental challenge for accounts of mental and linguistic representation. This piece surveys a family of recent approaches to the puzzle that posit representational relations. I identify the central commitments of relational approaches and present several arguments for them. I also distinguish two kinds of relationism—semantic relationism and formal relationism—corresponding to two conceptions of representational relations. I briefly discuss the consequences of relational approaches for foundational questions about propositional attitudes, intentional explanation, and compositionality.
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  30.  92
    Frege and Other Philosophers.Michael Dummett - 1991 - Oxford University Press UK.
    The ideas of the German philosopher and mathematician Gottlob Frege lie at the root of the analytical movement in philosophy. Frege and Other Philosophers comprises all of Professor Dummett's published and previously unpublished essays on Frege, with the exception of those included in his Truth and Other Enigmas. In some of these essays he explores the relation of Frege's ideas to those of his predecessors and contemporaries. In others he considers critically some interpretations of Frege, (...)
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  31. Frege and the Logic of Sense and Reference.Kevin C. Klement - 2001 - Routledge.
    This book aims to develop certain aspects of Gottlob Frege’s theory of meaning, especially those relevant to intensional logic. It offers a new interpretation of the nature of senses, and attempts to devise a logical calculus for the theory of sense and reference that captures as closely as possible the views of the historical Frege. (The approach is contrasted with the less historically-minded Logic of Sense and Denotation of Alonzo Church.) Comparisons of Frege’s theory with those of (...)
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  32. Frege's New Science.G. Aldo Antonelli & Robert C. May - 2000 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 41 (3):242-270.
    In this paper, we explore Fregean metatheory, what Frege called the New Science. The New Science arises in the context of Frege’s debate with Hilbert over independence proofs in geometry and we begin by considering their dispute. We propose that Frege’s critique rests on his view that language is a set of propositions, each immutably equipped with a truth value (as determined by the thought it expresses), so to Frege it was inconceivable that axioms could even (...)
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  33.  56
    Formality of Logic and Frege’s Begriffsschrift.Daniele Mezzadri - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):182-207.
    This paper challenges a standard interpretation according to which Frege’s conception of logic (early and late) is at odds with the contemporary one, because on the latter’s view logic is formal, while on Frege’s view it is not, given that logic’s subject matter is reality’s most general features. I argue that Frege – in Begriffsschrift – retained the idea that logic is formal; Frege sees logic as providing the ‘logical cement’ that ties up together the contentful (...)
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  34. Frege and Carnap on the Normativity of Logic.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):143-162.
    In this paper I examine the question of logic’s normative status in the light of Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance. I begin by contrasting Carnap’s conception of the normativity of logic with that of his teacher, Frege. I identify two core features of Frege’s position: first, the normative force of the logical laws is grounded in their descriptive adequacy; second, norms implied by logic are constitutive for thinking as such. While Carnap breaks with Frege’s absolutism about logic and (...)
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  35.  56
    Frege’s Unmanageable Thing.Michael Price - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (3):368-413.
    _ Source: _Volume 95, Issue 3, pp 368 - 413 Frege famously maintained that concepts are not objects. A key argument of Frege’s for this view is, in outline, as follows: if we are to account for the unity of thought, concepts must be deemed _unsaturated_; since objects are, by contrast, saturated entities, concepts cannot be objects. The author investigates what can be made of this argument and, in particular, of the unsaturated/saturated distinction it invokes. Systematically exploring a (...)
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  36. Truth, Assertion, and the Horizontal: Frege on "the Essence of Logic".William W. Taschek - 2008 - Mind 117 (466):375-401.
    In the opening to his late essay, Der Gedanke, Frege asserts without qualification that the word "true" points the way for logic. But in a short piece from his Nachlass entitled "y Basic Logical Insights", Frege writes that the word true makes an unsuccessful attempt to point to the essence of logic, asserting instead that "what really pertains to logic lies not in the word "true" but in the assertoric force with which the sentence is uttered". Properly understanding (...)
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  37. Unity and the Frege–Geach Problem.Christopher Hom & Jeremy Schwartz - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):15-24.
    The problem of the unity of the proposition asks what binds together the constituents of a proposition into a fully formed proposition that provides truth conditions for the assertoric sentence that expresses it, rather than merely a set of objects. Hanks’ solution is to reject the traditional distinction between content and force. If his theory is successful, then there is a plausible extension of it that readily solves the Frege–Geach problem for normative propositions. Unfortunately Hanks’ theory isn’t successful, but (...)
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  38. Concept Cartesianism, Concept Pragmatism, and Frege Cases.Bradley Rives - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (2):211-238.
    This paper concerns the dialectal role of Frege Cases in the debate between Concept Cartesians and Concept Pragmatists. I take as a starting point Christopher Peacocke’s argument that, unlike Cartesianism, his ‘Fregean’ Pragmatism can account for facts about the rationality and epistemic status of certain judgments. I argue that since this argument presupposes that the rationality of thoughts turn on their content, it is thus question-begging against Cartesians, who claim that issues about rationality turn on the form, not the (...)
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  39. The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction and the Classical Model of Science: Kant, Bolzano and Frege.Willem R. de Jong - 2010 - Synthese 174 (2):237-261.
    This paper concentrates on some aspects of the history of the analytic-synthetic distinction from Kant to Bolzano and Frege. This history evinces considerable continuity but also some important discontinuities. The analytic-synthetic distinction has to be seen in the first place in relation to a science, i.e. an ordered system of cognition. Looking especially to the place and role of logic it will be argued that Kant, Bolzano and Frege each developed the analytic-synthetic distinction within the same conception of (...)
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  40. Fragments of Frege’s Grundgesetze and Gödel’s Constructible Universe.Sean Walsh - 2016 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 81 (2):605-628.
    Frege's Grundgesetze was one of the 19th century forerunners to contemporary set theory which was plagued by the Russell paradox. In recent years, it has been shown that subsystems of the Grundgesetze formed by restricting the comprehension schema are consistent. One aim of this paper is to ascertain how much set theory can be developed within these consistent fragments of the Grundgesetze, and our main theorem shows that there is a model of a fragment of the Grundgesetze which defines (...)
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  41. Are Frege Cases Exceptions to Intentional Generalizations?Murat Aydede & P. Robbins - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-22.
    This piece criticizes Fodor's argument (in The Elm and the Expert, 1994) for the claim that Frege cases should be treated as exceptions to (broad) psychological generalizations rather than as counterexamples.
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    On the Consistency of the Δ11-CA Fragment of Frege's Grundgesetze.Fernando Ferreira & Kai F. Wehmeier - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (4):301-311.
    It is well known that Frege's system in the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik is formally inconsistent. Frege's instantiation rule for the second-order universal quantifier makes his system, except for minor differences, full (i.e., with unrestricted comprehension) second-order logic, augmented by an abstraction operator that abides to Frege's basic law V. A few years ago, Richard Heck proved the consistency of the fragment of Frege's theory obtained by restricting the comprehension schema to predicative formulae. He further conjectured that (...)
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  43. Russellian Acquaintance and Frege’s Puzzle.Donovan Wishon - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):321-370.
    In this paper, I argue that a number of recent Russell interpreters, including Evans, Davidson, Campbell, and Proops, mistakenly attribute to Russell what I call ‘the received view of acquaintance’: the view that acquaintance safeguards us from misidentifying the objects of our acquaintance. I contend that Russell’s discussions of phenomenal continua cases show that he does not accept the received view of acquaintance. I also show that the possibility of misidentifying the objects of acquaintance should be unsurprising given underappreciated aspects (...)
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  44. Frege's Begriffsschrift as a Lingua Characteristica.Tapio Korte - 2010 - Synthese 174 (2):283 - 294.
    In this paper I suggest an answer to the question of what Frege means when he says that his logical system, the Begrijfsschrift, is like the language Leibniz sketched, a lingua characteristica, and not merely a logical calculus. According to the nineteenth century studies, Leibniz's lingua characteristica was supposed to be a language with which the truths of science and the constitution of its concepts could be accurately expressed. I argue that this is exactly what the Begriffsschrift is: it (...)
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  45. Frege on Vagueness and Ordinary Language.Stephen Puryear - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):120-140.
    Frege is widely thought to believe that vague predicates have no referent (Bedeutung). But given other things he evidently believes, such a position would seem to commit him to a suspect nihilism according to which assertoric sentences containing vague predicates are neither true nor false. I argue that we have good reason to resist ascribing to Frege the view that vague predicates have no Bedeutung and thus good reason to resist seeing him as committed to the suspect nihilism. (...)
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  46. Frege's Judgement Stroke and the Conception of Logic as the Study of Inference Not Consequence.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (4):639-665.
    One of the most striking differences between Frege's Begriffsschrift (logical system) and standard contemporary systems of logic is the inclusion in the former of the judgement stroke: a symbol which marks those propositions which are being asserted , that is, which are being used to express judgements . There has been considerable controversy regarding both the exact purpose of the judgement stroke, and whether a system of logic should include such a symbol. This paper explains the intended role of (...)
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  47. Frege on Thoughts and Their Structure.José Luis Bermúdez - 2001 - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 4:87-105.
    The idea that thoughts are structured is essential to Frege's understanding of thoughts. A basic tenet of his thinking was that the structure of a sentence can serve as a model for the structure of a thought. Recent commentators have, however, identified tensions between that principle and certain other doctrines Frege held about thoughts. This paper suggests that the tensions identified by Dummett and Bell are not really tensions at all. In establishing the case against Dummett and Bell (...)
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  48. Frege on Judging as Acknowledging the Truth.M. Textor - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):615-655.
    According to Frege, judgement is the ‘logically primitive activity’. So what is judgement? In his mature work, he characterizes judging as ‘acknowledging the truth’ (‘Anerkennen der Wahrheit’). Frege’s remarks about judging as acknowledging the truth of a thought require further elaboration and development. I will argue that the development that best suits his argumentative purposes takes acknowledging the truth of a thought to be a non-propositional attitude like seeing an object; it is a mental relation between a thinker, (...)
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  49. Frege's Puzzle for Perception.Boyd Millar - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):368-392.
    According to an influential variety of the representational view of perceptual experience—the singular content view—the contents of perceptual experiences include singular propositions partly composed of the particular physical object a given experience is about or of. The singular content view faces well-known difficulties accommodating hallucinations; I maintain that there is also an analogue of Frege's puzzle that poses a significant problem for this view. In fact, I believe that this puzzle presents difficulties for the theory that are unique to (...)
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  50. Fodor on Concepts and Frege Puzzles.Murat Aydede - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):289-294.
    ABSTRACT. Fodor characterizes concepts as consisting of two dimensions: one is content, which is purely denotational/broad, the other the Mentalese vehicle bearing that content, which Fodor calls the Mode of Presentation (MOP), understood "syntactically." I argue that, so understood, concepts are not interpersonally sharable; so Fodor's own account violates what he calls the Publicity Constraint in his (1998) book. Furthermore, I argue that Fodor's non-semantic, or "syntactic," solution to Frege cases succumbs to the problem of providing interpersonally applicable functional (...)
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