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Graeme Forbes [104]Graeme A. Forbes [10]Graeme R. Forbes [3]
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Graeme (R.) Forbes
University of Colorado, Boulder
Graeme A. Forbes
University of Kent
  1.  79
    The Future, and What Might Have Been.Rachael Briggs & Graeme A. Forbes - 2018 - Philosophical Studies:1-28.
    We show that five important elements of the ‘nomological package’— laws, counterfactuals, chances, dispositions, and counterfactuals—needn’t be a problem for the Growing-Block view. We begin with the framework given in Briggs and Forbes (in The real truth about the unreal future. Oxford studies in metaphysics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012 ), and, taking laws as primitive, we show that the Growing-Block view has the resources to provide an account of possibility, and a natural semantics for non-backtracking causal counterfactuals. We show (...)
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  2. The Metaphysics of Modality.Graeme Forbes - 1985 - Clarendon Press.
    Analytic philosophy has recently demonstrated a revived interest in metaphysical problems about possibility and necessity. Graeme Forbes here provides a careful description of the logical background of recent work in this area for those who may be unfamiliar with it, moving on to d discuss the distinction between modality de re and modality de dicto and the ontological commitments of possible worlds semantics. In addition, Forbes offers a unified theory of the essential properties of sets, organisms, artefacts, substances, and events, (...)
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  3. The Growing Block’s Past Problems.Graeme A. Forbes - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):699-709.
    The Growing-Block view of time has some problems with the past. It is committed to the existence of the past, but needs to say something about the difference between the past and present. I argue that we should resist Correia and Rosenkranz’ response to Braddon-Mitchell’s argument that the Growing-Block leads to scepticism about whether we are present. I consider an approach, similar to Peter Forrest, and show it is not so counter-intuitive as Braddon-Mitchell suggests and further show that it requires (...)
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  4. The Growing-Block: Just One Thing After Another?Rachael Briggs & Graeme A. Forbes - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):927-943.
    In this article, we consider two independently appealing theories—the Growing-Block view and Humean Supervenience—and argue that at least one is false. The Growing-Block view is a theory about the nature of time. It says that past and present things exist, while future things do not, and the passage of time consists in new things coming into existence. Humean Supervenience is a theory about the nature of entities like laws, nomological possibility, counterfactuals, dispositions, causation, and chance. It says that none of (...)
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  5. Languages of Possibility: An Essay in Philosophical Logic.Graeme Forbes - 1989 - Blackwell.
  6.  18
    Frege's Puzzle.Graeme Forbes & Nathan Salmon - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (3):455.
  7.  35
    Attitude Problems: An Essay on Linguistic Intensionality.Graeme Forbes - 2006 - Clarendon Press.
    Ascriptions of mental states to oneself and others give rise to many interesting logical and semantic problems. Attitude Problems presents an original account of mental state ascriptions that are made using intensional transitive verbs such as 'want', 'seek', 'imagine', and 'worship'. Forbes offers a theory of how such verbs work that draws on ideas from natural language semantics, philosophy of language, and aesthetics.
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  8. The Real Truth About the Unreal Future.Rachael Briggs & Graeme A. Forbes - 2012 - In Karen Bennett & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume 7.
    Growing-Block theorists hold that past and present things are real, while future things do not yet exist. This generates a puzzle: how can Growing-Block theorists explain the fact that some sentences about the future appear to be true? Briggs and Forbes develop a modal ersatzist framework, on which the concrete actual world is associated with a branching-time structure of ersatz possible worlds. They then show how this branching structure might be used to determine the truth values of future contingents. They (...)
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  9. The Indispensability of Sinn.Graeme Forbes - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (4):535-563.
  10. Intensionality: Graeme Forbes.Graeme Forbes - 2002 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1):75-99.
    [Graeme Forbes] In I, I summarize the semantics for the relational/notional distinction for intensional transitives developed in Forbes (2000b). In II-V I pursue issues about logical consequence which were either unsatisfactorily dealt with in that paper or, more often, not raised at all. I argue that weakening inferences, such as 'Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon, therefore Perseus seeks a gorgon', are valid, but that disjunction inferences, such as 'Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon, therefore Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon or an (...)
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  11. The Problem of Factives for Sense Theories.Graeme Forbes - 2011 - Analysis 71 (4):654-662.
    This paper discusses some recent responses to Kripke’s modal objections to descriptivism about names. One response, due to Gluer-Pagin and Pagin, involves employing "actually" operators in a new way. Another, developed mainly by Chalmers, involves distinguishing the dimension of meaning modal operators affect from the dimension other operators, especially epistemic ones, affect. I argue that both these moves run into problems with "mixed" contexts involving factive verbs such as "know", "establish", "prove", etc. In mixed contexts there are both modal and (...)
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  12.  5
    Is There a Problem About Persistence?Mark Johnston & Graeme Forbes - 1987 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 61 (1):107-156.
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  13.  67
    Intensional Transitive Verbs.Graeme Forbes - 2008 - In Edward Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A verb is transitive iff it usually occurs with a direct object, and in such occurrences it is said to occur transitively . Thus ‘ate’ occurs transitively in ‘I ate the meat and left the vegetables’, but not in ‘I ate then left’ (perhaps it is not the same verb ‘left’ in these two examples, but it seems to be the same ‘ate’). A verb is intensional if the verb phrase (VP) it forms with its complement is anomalous in at (...)
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  14.  80
    Indexicals and Intensionality: A Fregean Perspective.Graeme Forbes - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (1):3-31.
  15.  92
    Objectual Attitudes.Graeme Forbes - 2000 - Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (2):141-183.
  16. How Much Substitutivity?Graeme Forbes - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):109–113.
  17. Philosophical Papers.Graeme Forbes & David Lewis - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):108.
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  18.  52
    Does the New Route Reach its Destination?Teresa Robertson & Graeme Forbes - 2006 - Mind 115 (458):367-374.
    A New Route to the Necessity of Origin’, Guy Rohrbaugh and Louis deRossett argue for the Necessity of Origin in a way that they believe avoids use of any kind of transworld constitutional sufficiency principle. In this discussion, we respond that either their arguments do imply a sufficiency principle, or else they entirely fail to establish the Necessity of Origin.
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  19. Realism and Skepticism: Brains in a Vat Revisited.Graeme Forbes - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):205-222.
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  20.  65
    Substitutivity and the Coherence of Quantifying In.Graeme Forbes - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (3):337-372.
  21.  32
    Identity and Essence.Graeme Forbes & Baruch Brody - 1980 - Philosophical Quarterly 31 (125):368.
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  22. Canonical Counterpart Theory.Graeme Forbes - 1982 - Analysis 42 (1):33 - 37.
    In a recent article in Analysis, Graeme Hunter and William Seager (1981) attempt to rescue counterpart theory (CT) from some objections of Hazen 1979. They see these objections as arising from ‘uncritical use of the translation scheme originally proposed by Lewis’, and intend to meet them by refraining from use of that scheme. But they do not offer a new scheme; they say ‘…it is no more necessary to have one to capture the sense of modal idiom than it is (...)
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  23. Time, Events, and Modality.Graeme Forbes - 1993 - In Robin Le Poidevin & Murray MacBeath (eds.), The Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press. pp. 80--95.
     
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  24. Content and Theme in Attitude Ascriptions.Graeme Forbes - unknown
    This paper is about a substitution-failure in attitude ascriptions, but not the one you think. A standard view about the semantic shape of ‘that’-clause attitude ascriptions is that they are fundamentally relational. The attitude verb expresses a binary relation whose extension, if not empty, is a collection of pairs each of which consists in an individual and a proposition, while the ‘that’-clause is a term for a proposition. One interesting problem this view faces is that, within the scope of many (...)
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  25.  5
    Why a 10,000-Year Clock is Being Built Under a Mountain – and Why 10,000 Years is Too Long.Graeme A. Forbes - 2018 - The Conversation 3 (1).
    A clock designed to work for 10 millennia is being built – but what is the point of it?
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  26.  84
    Origin and Identity.Graeme Forbes - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 37 (4):353-62.
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  27.  82
    A Dichotomy Sustained.Graeme R. Forbes - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (March):187-211.
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  28.  91
    In Defense of Absolute Essentialism.Graeme Forbes - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):3-31.
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  29. The Metaphysics of Modality.Graeme Forbes - 1985 - Mind 95 (377):135-138.
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  30. Intensional Transitive Verbs: The Limitations of a Clausal Analysis.Graeme Forbes - unknown
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  31.  93
    Thisness and Vagueness.Graeme Forbes - 1983 - Synthese 54 (2):235-259.
    This paper is about two puzzles, or two versions of a single puzzle, which deserve to be called paradoxes, and develops some apparatus in terms of which the apparently conflicting principles which generate the puzzles can be rendered consistent. However, the apparatus itself is somewhat controversial: the puzzles are modal ones, and the resolution to be advocated requires the adoption of a counterpart theoretic semantics of essentially the kind proposed by David Lewis, which in turn requires qualified rejection of certain (...)
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  32. Modern Logic: A Text in Elementary Symbolic Logic.Graeme Forbes - 1994 - Oxford University Press.
    Filling the need for an accessible, carefully structured introductory text in symbolic logic, Modern Logic has many features designed to improve students' comprehension of the subject, including a proof system that is the same as the award-winning computer program MacLogic, and a special appendix that shows how to use MacLogic as a teaching aid. There are graded exercises at the end of each chapter--more than 900 in all--with selected answers at the end of the book. Unlike competing texts, Modern Logic (...)
     
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  33. Intensional Verbs in Event Semantics.Graeme Forbes - 2010 - Synthese 176 (2):227 - 242.
    In Attitude Problems, I gave an account of opacity in the complement of intensional transitive verbs that combined neo-Davidsonian event-semantics with a hidden-indexical account of substitution failure. In this paper, I extend the account to clausal verbs.
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  34.  13
    Editors’ Note.Graeme Forbes & Thomas Ede Zimmermann - 2017 - Linguistics and Philosophy 40 (5):427-427.
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  35.  47
    Nozick on Scepticism.Graeme Forbes - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (134):43-52.
  36.  8
    Languages of Possibility.Joseph Melia & Graeme Forbes - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (159):271.
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  37.  65
    Actuality and Context Dependence I.Graeme Forbes - 1983 - Analysis 43 (3):123 - 128.
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  38.  3
    XIII—Scepticism and Semantic Knowledge.Graeme Forbes - 1984 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 84 (1):223-240.
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  39.  38
    Solving the Iteration Problem.Graeme Forbes - 1993 - Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (3):311 - 330.
  40.  6
    Realism and Skepticism: Brains in a Vat Revisited.Graeme Forbes - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):205.
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  41. An Anti-Essentialist Note on Substances.Graeme Forbes - 1980 - Analysis 41 (1):32 - 37.
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  42.  83
    Critical Notice of Kit Fine's Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers.Graeme Forbes - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):275-287.
    In this critical review I discuss the main themes of the papers in Kit Fine's Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers. These themes are that modal operators are intelligible in their own right and that actualist quantifiers are to be taken as basic with respect to possibilist quantifiers. I also discuss a previously unpublished paper of Fine's on modality and existence.
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  43.  74
    Accounting for Experiences as of Passage: Why Topology Isn’T Enough.Graeme A. Forbes - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):187-194.
    Time appears to us to pass. Some philosophers think that we should account for these experiences by appeal to change in what there unrestrictedly is . I argue that such an appeal can only be the beginning of an account of passage. To show this, I consider a minimal type of view—a purely topological view—that attempts to account for experiences as of passage by an appeal to ontological change and topological features of the present. I argue that, if ontological change (...)
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  44.  35
    Physicalism, Instrumentalism and the Semantics of Modal Logic.Graeme Forbes - 1983 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 12 (3):271 - 298.
    The delicate point in the formalistic position is to explain how the non-intuitionistic classical mathematics is significant, after having initially agreed with the intuitionists that its theorems lack a real meaning in terms of which they are true (S. C. Kleene, 1952).
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  45.  49
    Two Solutions to Chisholm's Paradox.Graeme Forbes - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (2):171 - 187.
  46.  48
    Melia on Modalism.Graeme Forbes - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (1):57 - 63.
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  47. Meaning Postulates, Inference, and the Relational/Notional Ambiguity.Graeme Forbes - manuscript
    This paper in revised form appears in Facta Philosophica 5:1 (2003) 49­75. It addresses some problems about intensional transitives raised by Moltmann and Zimmerman, corrects some oversights in my paper in The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (S.V. for 2002), and adds new material on binary vs. tripartite construals of “relational/notional”, bridge inferences, weakening inferences, and the relevance problem. Its other sections are, like the PASS paper, concerned with the conjunctive force of disjunctive NP complements of intensional transitive verbs: “Smith (...)
     
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  48.  46
    On the Philosophical Basis of Essentialist Theories.Graeme Forbes - 1981 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (1):73-99.
  49.  26
    Comparatives in Counterpart Theory: Another Approach.Graeme Forbes - 1994 - Analysis 54 (1):37 - 42.
    The article considers whether arguments involving sentences that make cross-world comparisons ("I could have been taller than I actually am") are better handled by counterpart theory than by standard modal semantics. The author describes a modal object-language in which such statements may be symbolized and gives both a Kripkean and a counterpart-theoretic semantics for it.
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  50.  4
    Languages of Possibility.Mark Richard & Graeme Forbes - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (1):139.
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