Aristotle figures significantly in the recent boom of literature on forgiveness, particularly accounts wishing to construe forgiveness as a virtue. While his definition of anger is often invoked, he is also a foil for accounts valuing forgiveness more than did Aristotle. I argue through interpretive exegesis of Aristotle’s texts that, while there are definite limits on forgiveness in his thought, so that his notion of forgiveness does not extend as far as in Christian ethics, it does play a significant role (...) in his ethics. Forgiveness is particularly connected with the emotion and dynamic of anger, and my paper examines Aristotle’s discussions of anger, hatred and righteous indignation, indicating how forgiveness fits into these. Finally, I express my suspicions of recent accounts attempting to construe forgiveness itself as a virtue, arguing it is traditionally and more adequately understood as governed by virtues, in particular mildness (praōtēs) as Aristotle articulates it. (shrink)

Aristotle figures significantly in the recent boom of literature on forgiveness, particularly accounts wishing to construe forgiveness as a virtue. While his definition of anger is often invoked, he is also a foil for accounts valuing forgiveness more than did Aristotle. I argue through interpretive exegesis of Aristotle’s texts that, while there are definite limits on forgiveness in his thought, so that his notion of forgiveness does not extend as far as in Christian ethics, it does play a significant role (...) in his ethics. Forgiveness is particularly connected with the emotion and dynamic of anger, and my paper examines Aristotle’s discussions of anger, hatred and righteous indignation, indicating how forgiveness fits into these. Finally, I express my suspicions of recent accounts attempting to construe forgiveness itself as a virtue, arguing it is traditionally and more adequately understood as governed by virtues, in particular mildness as Aristotle articulates it. (shrink)

Passages in Aristotle’s Politics Book 3 are cited in discussions of the “rule of law”, most particularly sections in 1287a where the famous characterization of law as “mind without desire” occurs and in 1286a where Aristotle raises and explores the question whether it is better to be ruled by the best man or the best laws. My paper aims, by exegetically culling out Aristotle’s position in the Politics, Nicomachean Ethics and Rhetoric, to argue that his view on the rule of (...) law and its relations to human subjects is considerably more complex and considerably more interesting. Despite Aristotle’s dictum, laws are not expressions or institutions of a pure and passionless rationality, and in order to be framed, understood and administered well, one must both have the sort of solid understanding of virtues, vices, passions, and motives of human action that Aristotle’s moral philosophy provides and have developed, at least to some degree, certain virtues. My paper focuses particularly on three themes: the role of the passions and desires in judgment, action, virtues and vices; the inescapability of passions and desires in the functioning of law; the possibility for rule of law and a certain level of virtue to be mutually supporting. (shrink)

An important issue raised and resolved in St. Anselm’s Proslogion is the compatibility between justice and mercy as divine attributes. In this paper I argue that Anselm’s discussion of divine justice and mercy is an exploration of God’s nature as quo maius cogitari non potest, and that his discussion contributes to a better understanding of the complicated relationship between God and creatures—including the creatures attempting to know or argue about God. It seems at first that God’s mercy must be in (...) contradiction with God’s justice. On the basis of a more adequate way of framing the issue, however—one that requires reference to other parts of the Proslogion and is supported by the Monologion—we can grasp, though not fully comprehend, the harmony between divine justice and divine mercy. (shrink)

Maurice Blondel's later works address the problem of the relationship between the Catholic Church and tradition and modernity. This dissertation situates Blondel's developed position between the analyses of modern philosophy and culture developed in the encyclicals Pascendi Dominicus Gregis and Fides et Ratio. Modernism in Catholic circles bears implications for philosophy in general, since modernism has its source in modern philosophy and the culture it gives rise to and reinforces. Three key concepts operating in Blondel's later works are the concrete (...) logic, the philosophy of insufficiency, and the option between egoism and charity. The concrete logic is a logic of the moral life, a logic in which opposition is fundamentally on the basis of hexis and steresis instead of the apophasis and kataphasis , equivalent to the inclusion and exclusion of abstract logic. Use of a logic in philosophy is unavoidable, and inadequate philosophical positions are the result of reliance on abstract logic where a concrete logic is both required and secretly relied upon. The philosophy of insufficiency works within the concrete logic. It has a critical function of assessing and uncovering the insufficiency of the claims made by other philosophical systems, and it has a reconstructive function of leading the human subject towards what could allow it to be rendered sufficient, a supernatural order. This supernatural order imposes a requirement for the human subject to make an option either for egoism of for charity. Modernism represents one modality of the option for egoism, and the option for charity can lead not only to the supernatural order but also to recognition of the continued importance of the Catholic tradition in supporting and keeping intelligible the option for charity. (shrink)

In Maurice Blondel’s work, the problem of immortality is dealt with in terms of one’s resolution of the problem of human destiny articulated in the form of a self-determinative option. Although this option can take many determinate forms, it is ultimately one between egoism and selfishness or mortification and charity. In the course of this paper, I outline this opposition and indicate in particular how it bears on intellectual life and culture. For Blondel, the theoretical and the practical could not (...) be neatly separated; thinking and expression are forms of action, and action requires structuring for its intelligibility and fruition. One commits oneself and forms the elements of one’s ultimate judgment, not only by what one does, but also by what one says or thinks, what doctrines and institutions one commits oneself to. (shrink)

Freedom, justice, and inclinations of the will have significant roles in St. Anselm’s moral theory, as does, I argue, virtues and vices, which can be understoodin relation to freedom and justice and as inclinations of the will. The first section of the paper discusses the relationship between freedom, justice, and the will inAnselm’s works. The second part explores Anselm’s distinctions between different aspects of the human will, as will-as-instrument, will-as-use, and will-as-inclination, then examines his further distinction of the latter into (...) the will-for-justice and will-for-benefit. The third part then argues that the will-as-inclination-for-justice takes determinate forms as virtues, which may be understood as ways of properly using and preserving human freedom. (shrink)

A prominent theme of Jacques Derrida's recent work has been that of responsibility. He hasattempted to approach moral issues and philosophy without abandoning his philosophical project ofdeconstruction, a project that in the past has seemed critical if not outright hostile to moralphilosophy.Moral and philosophical reflection is situated, and by the time one can even start posing questions,one is already embroiled for better or for worse, in a moral situation for which one bears someresponsibility, and which also involve a responsibility of (...) reflection as well as action. Adopting aconfessedly conservative reading of Derrida, I argue that his recent philosophy does allow for thepossibility of morality to be realized through philosophical and moral projects, and that the everpresentpossibility of these lapsing into irresponsibility does not undermine the positive, though contingent and gratuitous, achievement of responsibility when it does take place. (shrink)

This volume of translations of early Kant reception, both of critics and of a few defenders, makes available important texts, both for study of modern philosophy and for contemporary discussion of the relevance of Kant’s immense historical influence. The volume’s five sections address several of the main problems posed by the theoretical part of Kant’s Critical Philosophy to his contemporaries, in particular the three central discussions centered on the Transcendental Aesthetic, Idealism, and the Categories. The volume is heavily endnoted, providing (...) many useful supplementary discussions and a wealth of references to other relevant works; two appendices give short sketches of the authors and other important figures in early Kant reception, and there is a glossary of German terms. (shrink)

In Maurice Blondel’s work, the problem of immortality is dealt with in terms of one’s resolution of the problem of human destiny articulated in the form of a self-determinative option. Although this option can take many determinate forms, it is ultimately one between egoism and selfishness or mortification and charity. In the course of this paper, I outline this opposition and indicate in particular how it bears on intellectual life and culture. For Blondel, the theoretical and the practical could not (...) be neatly separated; thinking and expression are forms of action, and action requires structuring for its intelligibility and fruition. One commits oneself and forms the elements of one’s ultimate judgment, not only by what one does, but also by what one says or thinks, what doctrines and institutions one commits oneself to. (shrink)

The article argues that Hobbes articulates a modern problematic of reason, where the shared rationality of human beings is an integral part of the danger they present to each other, and where reason suggests a solution, the social contract and the laws of nature, enforced and interpreted by absolute sovereign authority. This solution reflects a tension in modern reason itself, since it requires the alienation of self-determination of the rational human subject precisely to preserve the condition for the possibility of (...) the rationality of the rational human subject, i.e. one’s life, which is threatened by the very rationality of other human subjects. I discuss interpretations of Hobbes which stress the other motives of conflict, i.e. competition and vanity, and acknowledge that they play a role in the threat subjects present to each other, but argue that the danger presented precisely by shared rationality, which I discuss with some reference to the Hegelian dialectic of consciousness and mutual recognition, has been underplayed by Hobbes’ interpretation. (shrink)

Freedom, justice, and inclinations of the will have significant roles in St. Anselm’s moral theory, as does, I argue, virtues and vices, which can be understoodin relation to freedom and justice and as inclinations of the will. The first section of the paper discusses the relationship between freedom, justice, and the will inAnselm’s works. The second part explores Anselm’s distinctions between different aspects of the human will, as will-as-instrument, will-as-use, and will-as-inclination, then examines his further distinction of the latter into (...) the will-for-justice and will-for-benefit. The third part then argues that the will-as-inclination-for-justice takes determinate forms as virtues, which may be understood as ways of properly using and preserving human freedom. (shrink)

A prominent theme of Jacques Derrida's recent work has been that of responsibility. He has attempted to approach moral issues and philosophy without abandoning his philosophical project of deconstruction, a project that in the past has seemed critical if not outright hostile to moral philosophy. Moral and philosophical reflection is situated, and by the time one can even start posing questions, one is already embroiled for better or for worse, in a moral situation for which one bears some responsibility, and (...) which also involve a responsibility of reflection as well as action. Adopting a confessedly conservative reading of Derrida, I argue that his recent philosophy does allow for the possibility of morality to be realized through philosophical and moral projects, and that the ever-present possibility of these lapsing into irresponsibility does not undermine the positive, though contingent and gratuitous, achievement of responsibility when it does take place. (shrink)