Results for 'Group minds'

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  1.  14
    Toward a Science of Other Minds: Escaping the Argument by Analogy.Cognitive Evolution Group, Since Darwin, D. J. Povinelli, J. M. Bering & S. Giambrone - 2000 - Cognitive Science 24 (3):509-541.
    Since Darwin, the idea of psychological continuity between humans and other animals has dominated theory and research in investigating the minds of other species. Indeed, the field of comparative psychology was founded on two assumptions. First, it was assumed that introspection could provide humans with reliable knowledge about the causal connection between specific mental states and specific behaviors. Second, it was assumed that in those cases in which other species exhibited behaviors similar to our own, similar psychological causes were (...)
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  2.  24
    Attributing Mental Concepts to Nonlinguistic Animals Poses Wellknown Problems to Ethologists and Philosophers. It is All Too Easy to Interpret a Piece of Animal Social Behavior (Ie a Behavior Performed Inside a Group on the Basis of Information Being Displayed by Behaviors From Other Members of the Group) as Involving Representations of Other Individual's Beliefs And.Can Nonhuman Primates Read Minds & Joëlle Proust - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 27 (1):203-232.
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  3.  54
    Group Minds and Natural Kinds.Robert D. Rupert - forthcoming - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies.
    The claim is frequently made that structured collections of individuals who are themselves subjects of mental and cognitive states – such collections as courts, countries, and corporations – can be, and often are, subjects of mental or cognitive states. And, to be clear, advocates for this so-called group-minds hypothesis intend their view to be interpreted literally, not metaphorically. The existing critical literature casts substantial doubt on this view, at least on the assumption that groups are claimed to instantiate (...)
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  4.  32
    Group Minds and Explanatory Simplicity.Mark Sprevak & David Statham - 2015 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:3-19.
    This paper explores the claim that explanation of a group 's behaviour in term of individual mental states is, in principle, superior to explanation of that behaviour in terms of group mental states. We focus on the supposition that individual-level explanation is superior because it is simpler than group -level explanation. In this paper, we consider three different simplicity metrics. We argue that on none of those metrics does individual-level explanation achieve greater simplicity than a group (...)
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  5.  41
    A Beginner’s Guide to Group Minds.Georg Theiner - forthcoming - In Jesper Kallestrup & Mark Sprevak (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Conventional wisdom in the philosophy of mind holds that (1) minds are exclusively possessed by individuals, and that (2) no constitutive part of a mind can have a mind of its own. For example, the paradigmatic minds of human beings are in the purview of individual organisms, associated closely with their brains, and no parts of the brain that are constitutive of a human mind are considered as capable of having a mind. Let us refer to the conjunction (...)
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  6. Empirical Arguments for Group Minds: A Critical Appraisal.Robert D. Rupert - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (9):630-639.
    This entry addresses the question of group minds, by focusing specifically on empirical arguments for group cognition and group cognitive states. Two kinds of positive argument are presented and critically evaluated: the argument from individually unintended effects and the argument from functional similarity. A general argument against group cognition – which appeals to Occam’s razor – is also discussed. In the end, much turns on the identification of a mark of the cognitive; proposed marks are (...)
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  7.  26
    A Beginner’s Guide to Group Minds.Georg Theiner - 2014 - In Kallestrup Jesper & Sprevak Mark (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 301-22.
    Conventional wisdom in the philosophy of mind holds that (1) minds are exclusively possessed by individuals, and that (2) no constitutive part of a mind can have a mind of its own. For example, the paradigmatic minds of human beings are in the purview of individual organisms, associated closely with their brains, and no parts of the brain that are constitutive of a human mind are considered as capable of having a mind. Let us refer to the conjunction (...)
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  8.  7
    Mimetic Minds: Meaning Formation.Mimetic Minds - 2006 - In A. Loula, R. Gudwin & J. Queiroz (eds.), Artificial Cognition Systems. Idea Group Publishers. pp. 327.
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  9. Consciousness in Human and Robot Minds.Robot Minds - 2009 - In Susan Schneider (ed.), Science Fiction and Philosophy: From Time Travel to Superintelligence. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 186.
  10. Unifying Approaches to the Unity of Consciousness Minds, Brains and Machines Susan Stuart.Brains Minds - 2005 - In L. Magnani & R. Dossena (eds.), Computing, Philosophy and Cognition. pp. 4--259.
     
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  11. Against Biological Determinism the Dialects of Biology Group.Steven P. R. Rose & Dialects of Biology Group - 1981
     
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  12. Holy Ground Theoretical Issues Relating to the Landscape and Material Culture of Ritual Space Objects : Papers From a Session Held at the Theoretical Archaeology Group Conference, Cardiff 1999.A. T. Smith, A. Brookes & Theoretical Archaeology Group - 2001
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  13.  53
    From Extended Minds to Group Minds: Rethinking the Boundaries of the Mental.Georg Theiner - 2008 - Dissertation, Indiana University
    In my dissertation, I explore the remarkable talent of human beings to modify and co-opt resources of their material and socio-cultural environment, and integrate them with their biological capacities in order to enhance their cognitive prowess. In the first part, I clarify and defend the claim – known as the extended mind thesis – that a significant portion of human cognition literally extends beyond the head into the world, actively incorporating our bodies and an intricate web of material resources (Clark, (...)
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  14.  12
    Group Minds and the Problem of the First Belief.Arto Laitinen - 2014 - Balkan Journal of Philosophy 2014 (1):43-48.
    ABSTRACT. This article presents theories of group belief with a problem. It is conceptually and psychologically impossible for there to be a believer with just one belief. For conceptual reasons, a single belief could not have any content without the background of other beliefs. Or even if it could, it would for psychological reasons be impossible for the believer to know or understand the content of its sole belief. With certain plausible assumptions, however, groups would at some point of (...)
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  15. Minding One's Cognitive Systems: When Does a Group of Minds Constitute a Single Cognitive Unit?Robert D. Rupert - 2005 - Episteme 1 (3):177-188.
    The possibility of group minds or group mental states has been considered by a number of authors addressing issues in social epistemology and related areas (Goldman 2004, Pettit 2003, Gilbert 2004, Hutchins 1995). An appeal to group minds might, in the end, do indispensable explanatory work in the social or cognitive sciences. I am skeptical, though, and this essay lays out some of the reasons for my skepticism. The concerns raised herein constitute challenges to the (...)
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  16. Individual Minds as Groups, Group Minds as Individuals.Robert D. Rupert - manuscript
  17.  55
    Group Minds.D. H. M. Brooks - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (4):456-70.
  18. Collective Memory, Group Minds, and the Extended Mind Thesis.Robert A. Wilson - 2005 - Cognitive Processing 6 (4).
    While memory is conceptualized predominantly as an individual capacity in the cognitive and biological sciences, the social sciences have most commonly construed memory as a collective phenomenon. Collective memory has been put to diverse uses, ranging from accounts of nationalism in history and political science to views of ritualization and commemoration in anthropology and sociology. These appeals to collective memory share the idea that memory ‘‘goes beyond the individual’’ but often run together quite different claims in spelling out that idea. (...)
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  19.  13
    Who Is Afraid of Group Agents and Group Minds?Raimo Tuomela - 2013 - In Michael Schmitz, Beatrice Kobow & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), The Background of Social Reality. Springer. pp. 13--35.
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  20. Group Minds and Indeterminacy.D. Brooks - 1987 - South African Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):81-83.
     
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  21. Coalescing Minds: Brain Uploading-Related Group Mind Scenarios.Kaj Sotala & Harri Valpola - 2012 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (01):293-312.
    We present a hypothetical process of mind coalescence, where arti cial connections are created between two or more brains. This might simply allow for an improved form of communication. At the other extreme, it might merge the minds into one in a process that can be thought of as a reverse split-brain operation. We propose that one way mind coalescence might happen is via an exocortex, a prosthetic extension of the biological brain which integrates with the brain as seamlessly (...)
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  22.  6
    What is on Our Children's Minds? An Analysis of Children's Writings as Reflections of Group‐Specific Socialisation Practices.Eddie Denessen, Lisette Hornstra & Linda van den Bergh - 2010 - Educational Studies 36 (1):73-84.
    In the present study it has been examined how children?s creative writing tasks may contribute to teachers? understanding of children?s values. Writings of 300 elementary school children about what they would do if they were the boss of The Netherlands were obtained and seemed to reflect different types of values. Most children were concerned with charity. Also, writings concerned materialist values and socio?political topics, such as human rights, power and tolerance. Analyses of group?specific differences showed girls to write more (...)
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  23. How to Share a Mind: Reconsidering the Group Mind Thesis.Thomas Szanto - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):99-120.
    Standard accounts in social ontology and the group cognition debate have typically focused on how collective modes, types, and contents of intentions or representational states must be construed so as to constitute the jointness of the respective agents, cognizers, and their engagements. However, if we take intentions, beliefs, or mental representations all to instantiate some mental properties, then the more basic issue regarding such collective engagements is what it is for groups of individual minds to share a mind. (...)
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  24.  2
    Students’ Learning Characteristics, Perceptions of Small-Group University Teaching, and Understanding Through a “Meeting of Minds”.Evangelia Karagiannopoulou & Noel Entwistle - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
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  25. Philosophy and Social Studies of Biology, the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the International History, Philosophy and Science Teaching Group. Kelly Hamilton is an Assistant Professor at Saint Marys College, Notre Dame, IN. Her Article,“Wittgenstein and the Minds Eye,” Recently Ap. [REVIEW]Myles Jackson - 2001 - Perspectives on Science 9 (1).
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  26.  44
    Do Corporations Have Minds of Their Own?Kirk Ludwig - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (3):265-297.
    Corporations have often been taken to be the paradigm of an organization whose agency is autonomous from that of the successive waves of people who occupy the pattern of roles that define its structure, which licenses saying that the corporation has attitudes, interests, goals, and beliefs which are not those of the role occupants. In this essay, I sketch a deflationary account of agency-discourse about corporations. I identify institutional roles with a special type of status function, a status role, in (...)
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  27.  41
    Is Distributed Cognition Group Level Cognition?Kirk Ludwig - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (2):189-224.
    This paper shows that recent arguments from group problem solving and task performance to emergent group level cognition that rest on the social parity and related principles are invalid or question begging. The paper shows that standard attributions of problem solving or task performance to groups require only multiple agents of the outcome, not a group agent over and above its members, whether or not any individual member of the group could have accomplished the task independently.
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  28.  93
    Group Mind.Georg Theiner & Wilson Robert - 2013 - In Byron Kaldis (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences. Sage Publications. pp. 401-04.
    Talk of group minds has arisen in a number of distinct traditions, such as in sociological thinking about the “madness of crowds” in the 19th-century, and more recently in making sense of the collective intelligence of social insects, such as bees and ants. Here we provide an analytic framework for understanding a range of contemporary appeals to group minds and cognate notions, such as collective agency, shared intentionality, socially distributed cognition, transactive memory systems, and group-level (...)
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  29. Thinking Things and Feeling Things: On an Alleged Discontinuity in Folk Metaphysics of Mind.Mark Phelan, Adam Arico & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):703-725.
    According to the discontinuity view, people recognize a deep discontinuity between phenomenal and intentional states, such that they refrain from attributing feelings and experiences to entities that do not have the right kind of body, though they may attribute thoughts to entities that lack a biological body, like corporations, robots, and disembodied souls. We examine some of the research that has been used to motivate the discontinuity view. Specifically, we focus on experiments that examine people's aptness judgments for various mental (...)
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  30.  80
    The Emergence of Group Cognition.Georg Theiner & Tim O'Connor - 2010 - In A. Corradini & T. O'Connor (eds.), Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 6--78.
    What drives much of the current philosophical interest in the idea of group cognition is its appeal to the manifestation of psychological properties—understood broadly to include states, processes, and dispositions—that are in some important yet elusive sense emergent with respect to the minds of individual group members. Our goal in this paper is to address a set of related, conditional questions: If human mentality is real yet emergent in a modest metaphysical sense only, then: (i) What would (...)
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  31.  28
    Is the United States Phenomenally Conscious? Reply to Kammerer.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):877-883.
    In Schwitzgebel I argued that the United States, considered as a concrete entity with people as some or all of its parts, meets plausible materialistic criteria for consciousness. Kammerer defends materialism against this seemingly unintuitive conclusion by means of an “anti-nesting principle” according to which group entities cannot be literally phenomenally conscious if they contain phenomenally conscious subparts who stand in a certain type of functional relation to the group as a whole. I raise three concerns about Kammerer’s (...)
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  32.  82
    Collective Responsibility in a Hollywood Standoff.Sara Rachel Chant - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):83-92.
    In this paper, I advance a counterexample to the collective agency thesis.
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  33.  48
    The Neural Bases of Directed and Spontaneous Mental State Attributions to Group Agents.Anna Jenkins, David Dodell-Feder, Rebecca Saxe & Joshua Knobe - 2014 - PLoS ONE 9.
    In daily life, perceivers often need to predict and interpret the behavior of group agents, such as corporations and governments. Although research has investigated how perceivers reason about individual members of particular groups, less is known about how perceivers reason about group agents themselves. The present studies investigate how perceivers understand group agents by investigating the extent to which understanding the ‘mind’ of the group as a whole shares important properties and processes with understanding the (...) of individuals. Experiment 1 demonstrates that perceivers are sometimes willing to attribute a mental state to a group as a whole even when they are not willing to attribute that mental state to any of the individual members of the group, suggesting that perceivers can reason about the beliefs and desires of group agents over and above those of their individual members. Experiment 2 demonstrates that the degree of activation in brain regions associated with attributing mental states to individuals—i.e., brain regions associated with mentalizing or theory-of-mind, including the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), and precuneus—does not distinguish individual from group targets, either when reading statements about those targets' mental states (directed) or when attributing mental states implicitly in order to predict their behavior (spontaneous). Together, these results help to illuminate the processes that support understanding group agents themselves. (shrink)
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  34.  58
    Systematic Minds, Unsystematic Models: Learning Transfer in Humans and Networks. [REVIEW]Steven Phillips - 1999 - Minds and Machines 9 (3):383-398.
    Minds are said to be systematic: the capacity to entertain certain thoughts confers to other related thoughts. Although an important property of human cognition, its implication for cognitive architecture has been less than clear. In part, the uncertainty is due to lack of precise accounts on the degree to which cognition is systematic. However, a recent study on learning transfer provides one clear example. This study is used here to compare transfer in humans and feedforward networks. Simulations and analysis (...)
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  35.  23
    Group Think: The Law of Conspiracy and Collective Reason.Jens David Ohlin - unknown
    Although vicarious liability for the acts of co-conspirators is firmly entrenched in federal courts, no adequate theory explains how the act and intention of one conspirator can be attributed to another, simply by virtue of their criminal agreement. This Article argues that the most promising avenue for solving the Pinkerton paradox is an appeal to the collective intention of the conspiratorial group to commit the crime. Unfortunately, misplaced skepticism about the notion of a group will has prevented criminal (...)
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  36.  9
    Self-Concept in Intensive Care Nurses and Control Group Women.Suzana Mlinar, Matej Tušak & Damir Karpljuk - 2009 - Nursing Ethics 16 (3):328-339.
    Our self-concept is how we see ourselves in our minds. The goal of this research was to discover any significant differences in the dimensions of self-concept between clinical nurses employed in an intensive care unit in Slovenia and Slovenian women from the general population, who represented the control group. The research included 603 women aged 20—40 years (mean 29.94; standard deviation ±6.0) who had a high-school education. To determine the differences between the groups statistically we used one-way analysis (...)
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  37.  8
    Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory.Adrian Vermeule - manuscript
    Many-minds arguments are flooding into legal theory. Such arguments claim that in some way or another, many heads are better than one; the genus includes many species, such as arguments about how legal and political institutions aggregate information, evolutionary analyses of those institutions, claims about the benefits of tradition as a source of law, and analyses of the virtues and vices of deliberation. This essay offers grounds for skepticism about many-minds arguments. I provide an intellectual zoology of such (...)
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  38. Combining Minds: How to Think About Composite Subjectivity.Luke Roelofs - forthcoming - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    This book explores a neglected philosophical question: How do groups of interacting minds relate to singular minds? Could several of us, by organizing ourselves the right way, constitute a single conscious mind that contains our minds as parts? And could each of us have been, all along, a group of mental parts in close cooperation? Scientific progress seems to be slowly revealing that all the different physical objects around us are, at root, just a matter of (...)
     
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  39.  5
    Some Implications of Analytical Behaviourism.C. A. Mace - 1949 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 49:1-16.
  40.  24
    The Dynamics of Group Cognition.S. Palermos - 2016 - Minds and Machines 26 (4):409-440.
    The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the postulation of irreducible, distributed cognitive systems is necessary for the successful explanatory practice of cognitive science and sociology. Towards this end, and with an eye specifically on the phenomenon of distributed cognition, the debate over reductionism versus emergence is examined from the perspective of Dynamical Systems Theory. The motivation for this novel approach is threefold. Firstly, DST is particularly popular amongst cognitive scientists who work on modelling collective behaviors. Secondly, DST (...)
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  41.  19
    Indispensability, the Discursive Dilemma, and Groups with Minds of Their Own.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2014 - In Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 137-162.
  42.  48
    Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality.Bryce Huebner - 2014 - Oxford University Press USA.
    This book develops a novel approach to distributed cognition and collective intentionality. It is argued that collective mentality should be only be posited where specialized subroutines are integrated in a way that yields skillful, goal-directed behavior that is sensitive to concerns that are relevant to a group as such.
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  43.  79
    Understanding Minds and Understanding Communicated Meanings in Schizophrenia.Robyn Langdon, Martin Davies & Max Coltheart - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (1-2):68-104.
    Cognitive neuropsychology is that branch of cognitive psychology that investi- gates people with acquired or developmental disorders of cognition. The aim is to learn more about how cognitive systems normally operate or about how they are normally acquired by studying selective patterns of cognitive break- down after brain damage or selective dif?culties in acquiring particular cogni- tive abilities. In the early days of modern cognitive neuropsychology, research focused on rather basic cognitive abilities such as speech comprehension or production at the (...)
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  44.  24
    Body-Subjects and Disordered Minds: Treating the 'Whole' Person in Psychiatry.Eric Matthews - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    How should we deal with mental disorder - as an "illness" like diabetes or bronchitis, as a "problem in living", or what? This book seeks to answer such questions by going to their roots, in philosophical questions about the nature of the human mind, the ways in which it can be understood, and about the nature and aims of scientific medicine. The controversy over the nature of mental disorder and the appropriateness of the "medical model" is not just an abstract (...)
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  45.  4
    Mapping the Minds of Others.Alexandria Boyle - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21.
    Mindreaders can ascribe representational states to others. Some can ascribe representational states – states with semantic properties like accuracy-aptness. I argue that within this group of mindreaders, there is substantial room for variation – since mindreaders might differ with respect to the representational format they take representational states to have. Given that formats differ in their formal features and expressive power, the format one takes mental states to have will significantly affect the range of mental state attributions one can (...)
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  46.  70
    Review of Stefano Franchi & Guven Guzeldere (Eds.), Mechanical Bodies, Computational Minds[REVIEW]John Sutton - 2006 - Philosophy in Review / Comptes Rendus Philosophiques:420-422.
    The editors of this bulky volume tell us that an issue of the Stanford Humanities Review ‘constituted the seed of the project that culminated in this book’ (vii). They don’t say that it was the Spring 1995 issue of that pioneering open-access e-journal, nor do they tell us how many or which of the 19 papers in this book derive from it. But since that issue is still online (as at August 28, 2006), at http://www.stanford.edu/group/SHR/4-2/text/toc.html, any reader can see (...)
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  47.  18
    The Separate Minds of Church and State: Collective Mental States and Th Eir Unsettling Implications.H. M. Giebel - 2006 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:141-150.
    Claims regarding collective or group mental states are fairly commonplace: we speak of things like the belief of the Church, the will of the faculty, and the opinion of the Supreme Court, often without considering what such claims really mean and whether they are true in any interesting sense. In this paper I take a threefold approach: first, I articulate several ways in which a group might be said to have beliefs and other mental states. Second, I explore (...)
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  48.  42
    Douglas Hofstadter and the Fluid Analogies Research Group, Fluid Concepts and Creative Analogies: Computer Models of the Fundamental Mechanisms of Thought. [REVIEW]Margaret Boden - 1997 - Minds and Machines 7 (3):460-464.
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  49.  7
    The Problem of Wild Minds: Knowing Animals in Grizzly Man and Ming of Harlem.Mathew Abbott - 2016 - Substance 45 (3):137-154.
    Near the end of W. G. Sebald’s Austerlitz, the book’s eponymous protagonist recalls visiting the zoo of the Jardin des Plantes with his friend Marie.1 The zoo is in bad shape; the pair overhear children questioning their parents: “Mais il est où? Pourquoi il se cache? Pourquoi il ne bouge pas? Est-ce qu’il est mort?” Sebald writes:I recollect that I myself saw a family of fallow deer gathered together by a manger of hay near the perimeter fence of a dusty (...)
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  50.  12
    The Separate Minds of Church and State.H. M. Giebel - 2006 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:141-150.
    Claims regarding collective or group mental states are fairly commonplace: we speak of things like the belief of the Church, the will of the faculty, and the opinion of the Supreme Court, often without considering what such claims really mean and whether they are true in any interesting sense. In this paper I take a threefold approach: first, I articulate several ways in which a group might be said to have beliefs and other mental states. Second, I explore (...)
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