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Grundmann Thomas
Universität Köln
  1.  41
    Why Disagreement-Based Skepticism Cannot Escape the Challenge of Self-Defeat.Grundmann Thomas - 2019 - Episteme:1-18.
    Global meta-philosophical skepticism (i.e. completely unrestricted skepticism about philosophy) based upon disagreement faces the problem of self-defeat since it undercuts its motivating conciliatory principle. However, the skeptic may easily escape this threat by adopting a more modest kind of skepticism, that will be called “extensive meta-philosophical skepticism”, i.e., the view that most of our philosophical beliefs are unjustified, except our beliefs in epistemically fundamental principles. As I will argue in this paper, this kind of skepticism is well-motivated, does not undercut (...)
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  2.  34
    Conceptual Construction: Why the Content of Our Folk Terms Has Only Limited Significance.Grundmann Thomas - forthcoming - In Masaharu Mizumoto & Stephen Stich (eds.), Ethno-Epistemology.
    Standard Analytic Epistemology typically relies on conceptual analysis of folk epistemic terms such as ‘knowledge’ or ‘justification’. A cross-cultural and cross-linguistic perspective on this method leads to the worry that there might not be universally shared epistemic concepts, and that different languages might use folk notions that have different extensions. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that our epistemic common-sense terms pick out what is epistemically most significant or valuable. In my paper, I take these issues as a starting (...)
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  3. How to Respond Rationally to Peer Disagreement: The Preemption View.Grundmann Thomas - forthcoming - Philosophical Issues 29.
    In this paper, I argue that the two most common views of how to respond rationally to peer disagreement–the Total Evidence View (TEV) and the Equal Weight View (EWV)–are both inadequate for substantial reasons. TEV does not issue the correct intuitive verdicts about a number of hypothetical cases of peer disagreement. The same is true for EWV. In addition, EWV does not give any explanation of what is rationally required of agents on the basis of sufficiently general epistemic principles. I (...)
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  4. Preemptive Authority: The Challenge From Outrageous Expert Judgment.Grundmann Thomas - forthcoming - Episteme.
    Typically, expert judgments are regarded by laypeople as highly trustworthy. However, expert assertions that strike the layperson as obviously false or outrageous, seem to give one a perfect reason to dispute that this judgment manifests expertise. In this paper, I will defend four claims. First, I will deliver an argument in support of the preemption view on expert judgments according to which we should not rationally use our own domain-specific reasons in the face of expert testimony. Secondly, I will argue (...)
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