Resumo Neste artigo o autor apresenta cinco abordagens diferentes ao debate entre o platonismo e o nominalismo: a quantificacional, a reducionista, a dependência da mente / linguagem, a extensional versus intensional, a hierárquica. Cada uma apresenta suas vantagens e desvantagens que devem ser discutidas em detalhe. Palavras-chave : existência, meta-metafísica, nominalismo, platonismoIn this paper I present five different approaches to the debate between Platonism and Nominalism: the quantifier approach, the reductionist approach, the mind / language dependence approach, the extension versus (...) intension approach and the hierarchichal approach. Each one has its advantages and disadvantages that have to be discussed in detail. Keywords : existence, metametaphysics, nominalism, platonism. (shrink)

Imaguire-Guido_On-the-ontology-of-relations.

In this paper we analyse some misleading theses concerning the oldcontroversy over the relation between mind and body presented incontemporary medical literature. We undertake an epistemologicalclarification of the axiomatic structure of medical methods. Thisclarification, in turn, requires a precise philosophical explanation ofthe presupposed concepts. This analysis will establish two results: (1)that the mind-body dualism cannot be understood as a kind of biologicalvariation of the subject-object dichotomy in physics, and (2) that thethesis of the incompatibility between somatic and psychosomatic medicineheld by (...) naturalists and others lacks solid epistemologicalfoundation. (shrink)

Disputatio-Vol.-IV-No.-34_Logic-Norms-and-Ontology2.

Contra a concepção monista das relações que imputou a Leib-niz, Russell defendeu a realidade, externalidade e irredutibilidade das re-lações. Para Russell relações são entidades objetivas e não mentais; elas não são sempre essenciais para a individuação de uma entidade; e proposições relacionais não podem ser reduzidas a proposições da forma sujeito-predicado. Meu objetivo principal neste artigo é a análise dos argumentos de Russell para esta tripla tese. De modo geral, constata-se que devido à sua concentração em questões da lógica, Russell (...) não faz jus à perspectiva metafísica de Leibniz.Against the monistic conception of relations that he imputed to Leibniz, Russell defended the reality, externality and irreducibility of relations. For Russell, relations are objective and not merely mental entities; they are not always essential to the individuation of an entity; and propositions of the relational form cannot be reduced to subject-predicate propositions. My primary aim in this article is the analysis of Russell’s arguments for this triple thesis. We can say that Russell was primarily concerned with issues of logic, and because of this mis-understood Leibniz’ metaphysical perspective. (shrink)

There are different ways we use the expressions “extension” and “intension”. I specify in the first part of this paper two basic senses of this distinction, and try to show that the old metaphysical sense, by means of particular instance vs. universal, is more fundamental than the contemporary sense by means of substitutivity. In the second part, I argue that logic in general is essentially intensional, not only because logic is a rule-guided activity, but because even the extensional definition of (...) a logic system presupposes an intensional notion of logical consequence. DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n1p111. (shrink)

Este artigo pretende ser uma exposição crítica da teoria de ter-mos singulares de Russell. Nos seus textos sobre a semântica dos nomes próprios Russell defende uma forma mista de descritivismo . Infelizmente esses textos são extremamente imprecisos. Minha principal crítica será a con-fusão de Russell entre aspectos semânticos e epistemológicos.This paper is intended as a critical exposition of Russell’s theory of singular terms. In his texts about the semantics of proper names Rus-sell defends a mixted form of descritivism . Unfortunately (...) these texts are extremely imprecise. My main criticism aims Russell’s confusion between semantical and epistemological issues. (shrink)

In Logical Forms II Chateaubriand puts the simple question: Why should we accept Ockham’s razor? He blames the principle of reduction as an unjustified dogma of nominalism. In this paper I present a justification for it. Contrary to Russell`s conception of reduction as elimination, I propose the thesis that reduction is explanation.Em Logical Forms II, Chateaubriand levanta a questão: Por que deveríamos aceitar a navalha de Ockham? Ele critica esse princípio de redução como um dogma não justificado do nominalismo. Neste (...) artigo apresento uma justificativa para o princípio. Ao contrário da concepção de Russell de redução como eliminação, eu proponho a tese de que redução é explanação. (shrink)