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Guido Melchior
University of Graz
  1.  71
    Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation.Guido Melchior - 2019 - New York City, New York, USA: Routledge.
    This book is primarily about checking and only derivatively about knowing. Checking is a very common concept for describing a subject’s epistemic goals and actions. Surprisingly, there has been no philosophical attention paid to the notion of checking. In Part I, I develop a sensitivity account of checking. To be more explicit, I analyze the internalist and externalist components of the epistemic action of checking which include the intentions of the checking subject and the necessary externalist features of the method (...)
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  2.  58
    Sensitivity, Safety, and Impossible Worlds.Guido Melchior - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    Modal knowledge accounts that are based on standards possible-worlds semantics face well-known problems when it comes to knowledge of necessities. Beliefs in necessities are trivially sensitive and safe and, therefore, trivially constitute knowledge according to these accounts. In this paper, I will first argue that existing solutions to this necessity problem, which accept standard possible-worlds semantics, are unsatisfactory. In order to solve the necessity problem, I will utilize an unorthodox account of counterfactuals, as proposed by Nolan, on which we also (...)
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  3.  35
    A modal theory of discrimination.Guido Melchior - forthcoming - Synthese:1-24.
    Discrimination is a central epistemic capacity but typically, theories of discrimination only use discrimination as a vehicle for analyzing knowledge. This paper aims at developing a self-contained theory of discrimination. Internalist theories of discrimination fail since there is no compelling correlation between discriminatory capacities and experiences. Moreover, statistical reliabilist theories are also flawed. Only a modal theory of discrimination is promising. Versions of sensitivity and adherence that take particular alternatives into account provide necessary and sufficient conditions on discrimination. Safety in (...)
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  4. The Heterogeneity Problem for Sensitivity Accounts.Guido Melchior - 2015 - Episteme 12 (4):479-496.
    Offering a solution to the skeptical puzzle is a central aim of Nozick's sensitivity account of knowledge. It is well-known that this account faces serious problems. However, because of its simplicity and its explanatory power, the sensitivity principle has remained attractive and has been subject to numerous modifications, leading to a of sensitivity accounts. I will object to these accounts, arguing that sensitivity accounts of knowledge face two problems. First, they deliver a far too heterogeneous picture of higher-level beliefs about (...)
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  5. Skepticism: The Hard Problem for Indirect Sensitivity Accounts.Guido Melchior - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):45-54.
    Keith DeRose’s solution to the skeptical problem is based on his indirect sensitivity account. Sensitivity is not a necessary condition for any kind of knowledge, as direct sensitivity accounts claim, but the insensitivity of our beliefs that the skeptical hypotheses are false explains why we tend to judge that we do not know them. The orthodox objection line against any kind of sensitivity account of knowledge is to present instances of insensitive beliefs that we still judge to constitute knowledge. This (...)
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  6.  74
    Sensitivity has Multiple Heterogeneity Problems: A Reply to Wallbridge.Guido Melchior - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1741-1747.
    In this paper, I defend the heterogeneity problem for sensitivity accounts of knowledge against an objection that has been recently proposed by Wallbridge in Philosophia. I argue in, 479–496, 2015) that sensitivity accounts of knowledge face a heterogeneity problem when it comes to higher-level knowledge about the truth of one’s own beliefs. Beliefs in weaker higher-level propositions are insensitive, but beliefs in stronger higher-level propositions are sensitive. The resulting picture that we can know the stronger propositions without being in a (...)
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  7. A Generality Problem for Bootstrapping and Sensitivity.Guido Melchior - 2014 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):31-47.
    Vogel argues that sensitivity accounts of knowledge are implausible because they entail that we cannot have any higher-level knowledge that our beliefs are true, not false. Becker and Salerno object that Vogel is mistaken because he does not formalize higher-level beliefs adequately. They claim that if formalized correctly, higher-level beliefs are sensitive, and can therefore constitute knowledge. However, these accounts do not consider the belief-forming method as sensitivity accounts require. If we take bootstrapping as the belief-forming method, as the discussed (...)
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  8. Easy Knowledge, Closure Failure, or Skepticism: A Trilemma.Guido Melchior - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (2):214-232.
    This article aims to provide a structural analysis of the problems related to the easy knowledge problem. The easy knowledge problem is well known. If we accept that we can have basic knowledge via a source without having any prior knowledge about the reliability or accuracy of this source, then we can acquire knowledge about the reliability or accuracy of this source too easily via information delivered by the source. Rejecting any kind of basic knowledge, however, leads into an infinite (...)
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  9.  81
    Epistemic Luck and Logical Necessities: Armchair Luck Revisited.Guido Melchior - 2017 - In Smiljana Gartner Bojan Borstner (ed.), Thought Experiments between Nature and Society. A Festschrift for Nenad Miščević. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 137-150.
    Modal knowledge accounts like sensitivity or safety face a problem when it comes to knowing propositions that are necessarily true because the modal condition is always fulfilled no matter how random the belief forming method is. Pritchard models the anti-luck condition for knowledge in terms of the modal principle safety. Thus, his anti-luck epistemology faces the same problem when it comes to logical necessities. Any belief in a proposition that is necessarily true fulfills the anti-luck condition and, therefore, qualifies as (...)
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  10.  40
    The Persuasiveness Puzzle About Bootstrapping.Guido Melchior - 2020 - Ratio 33 (1):27-36.
    This paper aims at resolving a puzzle about the persuasiveness of bootstrapping. On the one hand, bootstrapping is not a persuasive method of settling questions about the reliability of a source. On the other hand, our beliefs that our sense apparatus is reliable is based on other empirically formed beliefs, that is, they are acquired via a presumably complex bootstrapping process. I will argue that when we doubt the reliability of a source, bootstrapping is not a persuasive method for coming (...)
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  11.  22
    Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology.Guido Melchior - 2020 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.
    Sensitivity is a modal epistemic principle. Modal knowledge accounts are externalist in nature and claim that the knowledge yielding connection between a true belief and the truthmaker must be spelled out in modal terms. The sensitivity condition was introduced by Robert Nozick. He suggests that if S knows that p, then S’s belief that p tracks truth. Nozick argues that this truth-tracking relation can be captured by subjunctive conditionals. As a first approximation, he provides the following modal analysis of knowledge: (...)
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  12. Is Epistemological Disjunctivism the Holy Grail?Guido Melchior - 2014 - Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 86-2012 90:335-346.
    Pritchard argues that epistemological disjunctivism seems plainly false at first sight, but if it were right, it would represent the “holy grail of epistemology” (1), a view that allows us “to have our cake and eat it too” (3). This prospect motivates Pritchard to develop and defend an account that prima facie might seem simply false. It is disputable whether ED really seems plainly false at first sight or whether this intuition is based on a particular philosophical tradition. However, in (...)
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  13. Epistemic Contextualism: A Defense, Written by Peter Baumann. [REVIEW]Guido Melchior - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien.
  14.  36
    Skeptical Doubting and Mindful Self-Reflection.Guido Melchior - 2013 - In Mind, Language and Action. Papers of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium. pp. 274-276.
    The skeptic argues that we cannot have any external world knowledge because we cannot know that we are not brains in a vat. The intuitive appeal of this skeptical argument is essentially based on the comprehensibility of the process of skeptical doubting, where we focus our attention on our experiences and experience-based beliefs and raise questions about the sources of these experiences. I propose that skeptical doubting is an instance of a mental attitude that contemporary psychology characterizes as mindfulness. I (...)
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  15. Skepticism: Lehrer Versus Mooreanism.Guido Melchior - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):47-58.
    I will compare Lehrer’s anti-skeptical strategy from a coherentist point of view with the anti-skeptical strategy of the Mooreans. I will argue that there are strong similarities between them: neither can present a persuasive argument to the skeptic and both face the problem of easy knowledge in one way or another. However, both can offer a complete and self-explanatory explanation of knowledge although Mooreanism can offer the more natural one. Hence, one has good reasons to prefer Mooreanism to Lehrer’s anti-skeptical (...)
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  16.  33
    Insensitive and Unsafe Knowledge.Guido Melchior - 2011 - In Epistemology: Context, Values, Disagreement. Papers of the 34th International Wittgenstein Symposium. pp. 196-198.
    Sensitivity and safety are modal concepts of knowledge. A person’s belief that p is sensitive if and only if in the closest possible world where p is false S does not believe that p. A person’s belief that p is safe if and only if in most near-by possible worlds in which S continues to form her belief that p in the same way as in the actual world the belief continues to be true. Robert Nozick claims that sensitivity is (...)
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  17. Baseless Knowledge.Guido Melchior - 2017 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (50):211-231.
    It is a commonly held view in contemporary epistemology that for having knowledge it is necessary to have an appropriately based belief, although numerous different views exist about when a belief’s base is appropriate. Broadly speaking, they all share the view that one can only have knowledge if the belief’s base is in some sense truth-related or tracking the truth. Baseless knowledge can then be defi ned as knowledge where the belief is acquired and sustained in a way that does (...)
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  18.  27
    Knowledge and Representations: Explaining the Skeptical Puzzle.Guido Melchior - 2017 - In C. Limbeck-Lilienau and F. Stadler (ed.), The Philosophy of Perception and Observation. Papers of the 40th International Wittgenstein Symposium. pp. 150-152.
    (*This paper was awarded the Elisabeth and Werner Leinfellner Award 2017 for outstanding contributions.) -/- This paper provides an explanation of the skeptical puzzle. I argue that we can take two distinct points of view towards representations, mental representations like perceptual experiences and artificial representations like symbols. When focusing on what the representation represents we take an attached point of view. When focusing on the representational character of the representation we take a detached point view. From an attached point of (...)
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  19.  89
    Privileges of First-Person Reference and of Third-Person Reference.Guido Melchior - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (1):37-52.
    It is a widely held view that persons have privileged knowledge about their own minds, although numerous different views on what this privilege exactly consists of exist. One possible way of interpreting it is to claim that persons can refer to their own mental states in a privileged way. I will argue that this view has to be extended. Our common-sense view about reference to mental states implies that besides privileges of first-person reference to one's own mental states, there also (...)
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  20.  63
    Knowledge-Closure and Inferential Knowledge.Guido Melchior - 2010 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):259-285.
    Closure is the principle that a person, who knows a proposition p and knows that p entails q, also knows q. Closure is usually regarded as expressing the commonplace assumption that persons can increase their knowledge through inference from propositions they already know. In this paper, I will not discuss whether closure as a general principle is true. The aim of this paper is to explore the various relations between closure and knowledge through inference. I will show that closure can (...)
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  21.  26
    Erratum To: Skepticism: The Hard Problem for Indirect Sensitivity Accounts. [REVIEW]Guido Melchior - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):255-255.
    Keith DeRose’s solution to the skeptical problem is based on his indirect sensitivity account. Sensitivity is not a necessary condition for any kind of knowledge, as direct sensitivity accounts claim, but the insensitivity of our beliefs that the skeptical hypotheses are false explains why we tend to judge that we do not know them. The orthodox objection line against any kind of sensitivity account of knowledge is to present instances of insensitive beliefs that we still judge to constitute knowledge. This (...)
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  22.  13
    Introduction.Martina Fürst & Guido Melchior - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):1-5.
    This special issue collects the results of the workshop “The Philosophy of Keith Lehrer” which was held in October 2010 at the University of Graz, Austria, where Keith Lehrer is Honorary Professor and Honorary Doctor of Philosophy. Over the last decades Lehrer has been a frequent visitor in Graz. As a much admired teacher and scholar, has decisively influenced generations of students and inspired many of them to choose an academic career. The guest-editors, who organized the workshop, want to thank (...)
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  23.  19
    Introduction.Martina Fürst & Guido Melchior - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (1):1-1.
    The aim of this paper is to reinforce anti-physicalism by extending the “hard problem” to a specific kind of intentional states. For reaching this target, I investigate the mental content of the new intentional states of Jackson’s Mary. I proceed in the following way: I start analyzing the knowledge argument, which highlights the “hard problem” tied to phenomenal consciousness. In a second step, I investigate a powerful physicalist reply to this argument: the phenomenal concept strategy. In a third step, I (...)
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  24. Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie: Ein Abriss.Martin Grajner & Guido Melchior - 2019 - In Martin Grajner & Guido Melchior (eds.), Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie. Stuttgart, Deutschland: pp. 3-10.
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  25. Außenweltskeptizismus.Guido Melchior - 2019 - In Martin Grajner & Guido Melchior (eds.), Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie. Stuttgart, Deutschland: J.B. Metzler. pp. 305-315.
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  26. A Privileged Access to Other Minds.Guido Melchior - 2009 - In Language and World. Papers of the 32nd International Wittgenstein Symposium. pp. 274-276.
    It is widely hold view that persons have privileged access to their own minds, although there are numerous different views, how it exactly looks like. One possible interpretation of this privilege of first-person-perspective is to regard reference to own mental states as privileged in comparison to reference to mental states of others. I will argue for the existence of an additional privilege of third-person-perspective: Other persons can refer to all mental states of a person in way the person herself cannot. (...)
     
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  27. Der totale Skeptizismus: Eine konsequente Ausweitung des Außenweltskeptizismus.Guido Melchior - 2004 - In Experience and Analysis. Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. pp. 231-234.
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  28. Getting Out From Inside: Why the Closure Principle Cannot Support External World Scepticism.Guido Melchior - 2008 - In A. Hieke and H. Leitgeb (ed.), Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences. Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium. pp. 218-220.
    The canonical version of external world scepticism has the following structure: Premise1: If P knows that she is not a brain in a vat, then P does not have knowledge of the external world. Premise2: P does not know that she is not a brain in a vat. Conclusion: Therefore, P does not have knowledge of the external world. Some philosophers attack premise1 by denying the underlying closure principle. I will investigate possible argumentations for and against premise2. I will show (...)
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  29. Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie.Martin Grajner & Guido Melchior (eds.) - 2019 - Metzler.
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  30. One Illusion of Becoming Rational: On the Premises of Successful Argumentation.Guido Melchior - 2008 - In Analysen, Argumente, Ansätze. Beiträge zum 8. Internationalen Kongress der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Philosophie in Graz. Frankfurt/Main: Ontos. pp. 137-147.
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  31. On the Limits of Intercultural Argumentation.Guido Melchior - 2006 - In Cultures: Conflict-Analysis-Dialogue. Papers of the 29th International Wittgenstein Symposium. pp. 195-197.
    I argue that intercultural argumentation can only succeed if the same views about rational argumentation dominate in the two cultures. Hence, I will show that the possibilities of successful intercultural argumentation are limited. I will proceed in the following way: First, I will define arguments and argumentation situations. Second, I will investigate the general cases of persons, who in fact are rational in argumentation situations and persons, who believe to be rational. Third, I will illustrate the consequences for both cases. (...)
     
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  32. Probleme der Selbsterkenntnis.Guido Melchior - 2009 - Dissertation, University of Graz
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