Child poverty is one of the biggest challenges of today, harming millions of children. In this book, it is investigated from a philosophical social justice perspective, primarily in the context of modern welfare states. Based on both normative theory (particularly the capability approach) and empirical evidence, the authors identify the injustices of child poverty, showing how it negatively affects the well-being of children as well as their whole life course. But child poverty is not 'given by nature'. It is avoidable (...) and there is certainly the moral duty to alleviate it. Therefore, Graf and Schweiger develop a normative theory of responsibilities, which clarifies the moral role of different agents in the poor child's environment: the family, the state and many others, that have so far been neglected in philosophical theories. They conclude their book by sketching how their theory can be extended to global child poverty and what it means to show equal respect and concern for every child - no matter where and in which context they were born. (shrink)

GOTTFRIED SCHWEIGER,GUNTER GRAF | : In this paper, we want to examine the particular vulnerability of children from an ethical perspective. We want to defend three claims: Firstly, we will argue that children’s vulnerability is best understood as a dynamic quality, meaning that as children progress through childhood, their vulnerability also undergoes particular changes. To capture this, we want to discriminate among physical, mental, social, and symbolic vulnerability, which vary according to certain features, such as age, maturity, gender, and race. (...) These different traits are furthermore important in order to understand what we owe children from an ethical perspective. In a nutshell, children have moral claims not to be harmed and to be protected against threats to their well-being and well-becoming, and these claims have to be explicated via the dynamic vulnerability of children. Finally, we will argue that one of the main issues is to balance the protection of children and their autonomy claims, which both enhance and diminish their vulnerability. | : Cet article examine la vulnérabilité particulière des enfants d’un point de vue éthique. Nous défendrons trois thèses. Premièrement, nous soutiendrons que la vulnérabilité des enfants est mieux comprise en tant que qualité dynamique, ce qui signifie que lorsque les enfants progressent durant l’enfance, leur vulnérabilité subit également des changements particuliers. Pour le mettre en relief, nous distinguerons la vulnérabilité physique, mentale, sociale et symbolique, qui varie en fonction de certaines caractéristiques telles que l’âge, la maturité, le sexe et la race. Ces différents traits sont en outre importants pour comprendre ce que nous devons aux enfants d’un point de vue éthique. En un mot, les enfants ont des exigences morales à ne pas être blessés et à être protégés contre les menaces à leur bien-être et à leur bien-devenir, et ces revendications doivent être expliquées par la vulnérabilité dynamique des enfants. Enfin, nous soutiendrons que l’un des principaux enjeux est d’équilibrer la protection des enfants et leurs revendications d’autonomie, qui à la fois renforcent et diminuent leur vulnérabilité. (shrink)

This volume explores the questions related to the theory, practice, and policy of the well-being and well-becoming of children. It does so in a truly interdisciplinary way with a focus on the social sciences and philosophy, giving therefore justice to the growing insight that studying and promoting the well-being of children has a strong ethical component. It is dependent on the questions of good life, its conditions and cannot be separated from the concept of social justice and moral entitlements of (...) children and their families. In this book, philosophers and social scientists, in close dialogue, shed light on some of the most challenging matters involved. (shrink)

Both the capability and the recognition approach are influential and substantial theories in social philosophy. In this contribution, we outline their main assumptions in their assessment of poverty. The two approaches are set in relation to each other, focusing mainly on (a) their moral evaluation of poverty, (b) issues of justification of their central normative claims, and (c) the role that is attributed to subjective experiences, feelings and emotions in these theories. This comparison reveals that in spite of significant differences, (...) both lead to the claim that poverty can never be adequately assessed without putting it into the context of a comprehensive ethical theory about the nature and function of societies. Drawing on this result, we conclude that the critical function of social philosophy plays an irreducible role in the study and understanding of poverty. (shrink)

Health is certainly a valuable asset in the life of every human being and of particular relevance for a flourishing childhood. As empirical research concerning the social determinants of health shows, its distribution can, at least to a certain extent, be influenced by the way a society is arranged. Many philosophers now acknowledge that a fair distribution of health has to be a central part of a just society and they discuss to what extent a right to health can be (...) justified. However, they do not typically distinguish between physical and mental health and neglect the special problems arising from these distinct, though related, perspectives. In this paper, we argue in favour of such a distinction and ask whether a minimally just society ought to include mental health among the goods that are to be distributed in a fair way among its children. Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between mental health and happiness and ask whether making mental health a subject of justice implies that children are entitled not only to a healthy but also to a happy childhood. Despite the positive impact of happiness on the lives of children, we conclude that happiness cannot be incorporated into a functional theory of justice, since it does not fully meet the criteria of objectivity, measurability and influenceability. (shrink)

Justice for children and during childhood and the particular political, social and moral status of children has long been a neglected issue in ethics, and in social and political philosophy. The application of general, adult-oriented theories of justice to children can be regarded as particularly problematic. Philosophers have only recently begun to explore what it means to consider children as equals, what goods are especially valuable to them, and what are the obligations of justice different agents have toward children. In (...) addition, while philosophers have extensively written about global poverty and inequality, the issue of disadvantages during childhood, especially child poverty, has only been superficially addressed. This also applies to the Capability Approach (CA) as a normative theory. Although the socio-scientific and economic literature on how to conceptualize capabilities and functionings of children and how to measure them in the context of poverty and wellbeing is steadily growing, the normative aspects of these issues are still under-theorized. The CA offers a unique framework to engage with both the topic of justice for children and questions concerning what justice implies and demands with regard to children living and growing up in disadvantaged circumstances. Furthermore, justice and disadvantage during childhood is a compellingly interdisciplinary topic that invites the combination of ethical and philosophical reasoning together with socio-scientific theories and empirical knowledge. In this special issue of Ethical Perspectives we bring together theoretical and empirically informed discussions that explore the CA in relation to children and the many disadvantages they can face in their lives. (shrink)

The capability approach, which is closely connected to the works of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, is one possible theoretical framework that could be used to answer the question as to why poverty is a problem from a moral point of view. In this paper we will focus on the normative philosophical capability approach rather than the social scientific and descriptive perspective. We will show that the approach characterizes poverty mainly as a limitation of freedom and that it is precisely (...) this aspect, from its point of view, that makes poverty morally significant. This insight shifts the discussion away from questions regarding specific capabilities or lists of them-questions treated extensively in the literature-to the more general level of what constitutes the normative core of the capability approach. But as we will also discuss and argue, the role of freedom alone does not give us a complete picture of poverty but only presents us with one aspect relevant to evaluating it. A further aspect which we consider has not been adequately recognized and taken into account by most capability theorists is the experience of disrespect and humiliation, or to put it differently, a lack of recognition. (shrink)

Obesity and poverty in childhood are widely studied phenomena and despite mixed results, some findings are without doubt: they come with various experiences of mental, physical and social harm, have therefore negative effects on the well-being of children, and they intersect in relation with race, class and gender. In this contribution we analyze child obesity and poverty from a philosophical social justice perspective, which has, to a large extent, so far neglected this topic. We show how they compromise social justice (...) and argue that there is an obligation to implement structural changes to assist the affected children and their families. However, we make also clear that such interventions must not happen in accordance to the current neoliberal fitness and health ideology and its related narrow individualism. (shrink)

This volume contributes to the ongoing interdisciplinary controversies about the moral, legal and political status of children and childhood. It comprises essays by scholars from different disciplinary backgrounds on diverse theoretical problems and public policy controversies that bear upon different facets of the life of children in contemporary liberal democracies. The book is divided into three major parts that are each organized around a common general theme. The first part (“Children and Childhood: Autonomy, Well-Being and Paternalism”) focusses on key concepts (...) of an ethics of childhood. Part two (“Justice for Children”) contains chapters that are concerned with the topics of justice for children and justice during childhood. The third part (“The Politics of Childhood”) deals with issues that concern the importance of `childhood´ as a historically contingent political category and its relevance for the justification and practical design of political processes and institutions that affect children and families. (shrink)

Beschäftigt man sich systematisch mit der Konzeption von Gerechtigkeit für Kinder bzw. während der Kindheit, ist es hilfreich, drei verschiedene Fragen zu klären, die normalerweise in Hinblick auf Erwachsene diskutiert werden, doch auch für eine genauere Analyse der Ansprüche von Kindern relevant sind. Welche Güter sind für die Gerechtigkeitstheorie relevant? Nach welchen Prinzipien sollen diese Güter verteilt werden? Wer ist dafür verantwortlich, dass die angestrebte Güterverteilung verwirklicht wird? In dieser Einleitung umreißen wir kurz den gegenwärtigen Diskussionsstand, der in diesen drei (...) großen gerechtigkeitsrelevanten Themenfeldern hinsichtlich von Kindern besteht. Zunächst analysieren wir Ressourcen und Fähigkeiten als angemessene Metrik der Gerechtigkeit für Kinder. Hinsichtlich der Verteilungsprinzipien lassen sich vor allem egalitäre und suffizienztheoretische Herangehensweisen unterscheiden. Schließlich werden in Bezug auf die Frage nach den relevanten „Akteuren der Gerechtigkeit“ für Kinder hauptsächlich die Familie bzw. die Eltern und der Staat diskutiert. (shrink)

Empirical evidence clearly shows that child poverty is a growing concern in the industrialized world and that the well-being of children is deeply affected by growing up in poverty in at least two ways. On the one hand, a low socioeconomic status jeopardizes the access to goods and services that are necessary for the current well-being of children. On the other hand, growing up in poverty also, in various ways, negatively affects the well-being in later life. On the basis of (...) the capability approach, we will show that the systematic protection and advancement of the wellbeing of children, and hence the reduction of child poverty, is a key task of social justice, which should therefore guide policy design and implementation. However, we will also discuss the special composition of the well-being of children and point out how it poses difficulties for state action in this regard. In particular, we will argue that the importance of love and affection for a child’s well-being limits considerably the possible political measures to provide fair life chances to all children. This again reflects the insight that poverty should not be reduced to economic inequality. (shrink)

What significance should the subjective experiences of poor people have in a normative philosophical critique of poverty? In this paper, we take up this question and answer it by looking at two different normative theories: the capability approach of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum and the recognition approach of Axel Honneth. While Sen and Nussbaum are largely quite reluctant toward the role of subjective experiences of poor people, the recognition approach views them as central for its social critique of poverty. (...) We will defend the thesis that a more inclusive view on the role of the subjects of suffering and injustice is needed, that such subjective experiences and the unique first-hand knowledge it produces cannot be substituted by objective criteria, while such criteria are needed to bolster – and in some cases also criticize – the poverty knowledge of poor people. (shrink)

In diesem Beitrag wird das Verhalten des Papstes im europäischen Dialog der Religionen und Weltanschauungen kritisch erörtert. Am Anfang steht eine kurze Analyse der Sprache der Religionen bzw. Weltanschauungen, die in Anlehnung an Joseph Maria Bochenski durchgeführt ist. Es wird dabei die Auffassung vertreten, dass Religionen und manche Weltanschauungen Behauptungen über die Wirklichkeit aufstellen, Sprache in einer deskriptiv-kognitiven Funktion verwenden, dass ein solcher Sprachgebrauch eine epistemische Verpflichtung auf Bescheidenheit mit sich bringt und dass eine solche Verpflichtung wiederum eine Basis für (...) einen ernstgemeinten europäischen Dialog bieten könnte. Danach werden von einem theologischen Standpunkt ausgehend Bedingungen dafür untersucht, dass ein europäischer Dialog stattfinden kann. Anhand konkreter Beispiele, im Speziellen anhand der "Regensburger Rede" und der "Neuformulierung der Karfreitagsfürbitte für die Juden", wird gezeigt, wie sich der Papst im europäischen Dialog tatsächlich verhält und wie von Seiten der jeweiligen Religion auf dieses Verhalten eingegangen wird. Da er vor allem in der menschlichen Vernunft eine Brücke für einen europäischen Dialog sieht, wird anschließend auf seine Argumentation für eine Ausweitung der Vernunft und seinen Gebrauch der Wörter "Vernunft" und "Glauben" eingegangen. Dabei wird hauptsächlich auf Schriften, in denen der Papst seine Überzeugung ausdrückt, dass Religion und Vernunft sich gegenseitig korrigieren, begrenzen und unterstützen müssen, Bezug genommen. Abschließend wird ein bestimmtes Argument des Papstes für diese Überzeugung expliziert und bewertet. (shrink)

In this paper, we aim to clarify two central assumptions, which allow to specify what justice for children implies in the Capability Approach. First, we argue that an adequate currency of justice for children consists in a bundle of functionings, which develops into a bundle of capabilities in the course of childhood; the currency of justice for children is dynamic, not static. Second, we discuss how the respective functionings and capabilities should be selected. In particular, we suggest four criteria. They (...) imply that there is not only a change through time from a bundle of functionings to a bundle of capabilities as the currency of justice for children, but that the composition of the bundle itself gets modified. (shrink)