Teachers are urged to integrate grammar instruction with lessons on writer's craft, but what does that look like in real classrooms with real kids? In The Craft of Grammar, Jeff Anderson shows how he brings grammar and craft together meaningfully for student writers. Jeff and his sixth-grade students move easily from analyzing sentences to freewrites in writer's notebooks to "express-lane edits" of their writing in daily workshops. The lessons, individual conferences, and small-group activities on the video demonstrate how to use (...) high-quality children's and young adult literature as mentor texts and as an alternative to "Daily Oral Language." This sixty-minute DVD includes examples of: developing whole-class lessons focused on short mentor text; linking the writer's notebook to grammar instruction; assisting students in individual conferences as they test new writing strategies and analyze text; scaffolding learning through guided practice and small-group work; creating mnemonic devices to help students retain key rules; celebrating student success and tactfully correcting errors. Jeff presents simple and imaginative tools and memory devices—from the whoop of the AAAWWUBIS to the clever and catchy FANBOYS—that help students see the value of grammar and mechanics in crafting powerful writing and retain that knowledge. Filmed in his diverse, Title I classroom in San Antonio, Texas, and featuring Jeff's unique brand of energy, passion, and self-deprecating humor, The Craft of Grammar helps teachers of intermediate and adolescent writers find new and engaging ways to connect the writing process with grammar and mechanics. (shrink)

This posthumous work by Gustav Bergmann was essentially complete before his death in 1987.

In a recent article P. Henle gave an analysis of the notion of emergence. His inquiry deals with what he calls, quite appropriately, the emergence of characteristics. Such emergence, that is, the emergence of qualities and relations is undoubtedly the primary connotation of the term, and I feel that Henle has been very successful in clarifying it. The purpose of the present paper is to discuss in some detail one special aspect of Henle's analysis. This is done because the precise (...) formulation of this particular aspect sheds light on the notion of elementarism. And the opposite of this notion, holism or organicism, belongs undoubtedly to the variety of fused and confused meanings the idea of emergence has come to cover. (shrink)

The lucidity of Mr. Copilowish's argument makes the task of the reviewer very pleasant, even if he disagrees as completely as I do with the conclusion, which is the main thesis Mr. Copilowish attempts to prove. Only at one minor point does his exposition not quite suit my taste. He chose to preface his argument with a string of quotations supposedly supporting the position he wishes to defend. It seems to me that with the proper historical precautions these passages allow (...) for a very different interpretation. Yet I shall not pursue this matter, partly because I believe that Mr. Copilowish merely followed a literary stereotype, but mainly because the issue ought to be discussed on its merits rather than through the clouds of witness one could adduce on either side. (shrink)

The problem I shall discuss is specific, even minute. Yet, being philosophical, it arises and can be profitably discussed only in a context anything but minute, namely, that of a conception of philosophy and its proper method. I could not possibly unfold my conception once more for the sake of a minute problem. Nor do I believe that as things now stand this is necessary. I shall merely recall two propositions which are crucial in the context, and, in stating them, (...) shall freely use its vocabulary. The undefined descriptive terms of the ideal language all refer to phenomenal things wholly presented. These things all are either individuals or characters, and, if characters, either relational or nonrelational. These are the two propositions. It may throw light on another crucial point not always well understood if I imagine someone to ask: Wholly presented to whom? The answer is: To the person to whose world the philosopher, who, himself always speaks commonsensically, fits the ideal language. (shrink)

Positivists and phenomenalists of all sorts maintain, and long have maintained, some variant of the following thesis concerning the existence of physical objects: Such statements as ‘There is now a wall behind my back’ are synonymous with a class of statements of which the following is representative ‘If I shall turn my head, then I shall also have the visual experience called ‘seeing a wall'.’ This amounts to proposing what many of us call a philosophical analysis of ‘exist’ or, more (...) precisely, of one meaning of ‘exist'; for the thesis implies that this verb, in the sense in which we use it when we say ‘This wall exists', is dispensable in the sense of being definable. Realists, who oppose the thesis, hold that ‘exist', in the sense mentioned, is what I would call an undefined descriptive predicate; and then they go on to recommend that instead of defining existence in terms of what we see, we had better say that we shall, if we turn, see a wall because there is a wall. Thus one could say, perhaps, that the realists wish to convert the positivistic position; instead of founding existence upon experience, they want to found experience upon existence. To be sure, this is but a bare and crudely formulated schema of an issue that has been argued for a long time. Also, contemporary analysts for the most part do not discuss the issue directly; they give their attention to preliminary and, therefore, more fundamental questions. Like experienced chess players, who know to which characteristic situations in the middle game certain openings will eventually lead, we try to convince each other of the excellence of our respective openings. There is, in particular, one fundamental or opening move that is now widely discussed and which, I believe, most of us examine with a view to the position in which we shall find ourselves—in the middle game—with respect to the realism issue. I refer to the clarification of the relations between meaning and verification or, to put it the way positivists do, to the formulation of an adequate meaning criterion. Let me indicate the connection between these questions and the crude schema I have given for the realism issue. According to current garden varieties of positivism, a statement is meaningful if it is verifiable by experience. ‘There is a wall behind my back’ is, in this view, meaningful because it is synonymous with a class of statements each of which is verifiable by future experience. More pointedly, the familiar common sense statements about the existence of physical objects are considered as meaningful because they are verifiable. This has again the subjectivistic ring realists dislike so much; so they may again be inclined to convert the positivistic position, if only tentatively and because they feel that a piece of realistic common sense would thus be preserved. But to make the conversion is to say that ‘There is a wall behind my back’ is verifiable because it is meaningful. (shrink)

The recent philosophy of physics is confronted with the new ontology, as it emerges after philosophy proper has fully articulated the linguistic turn. The classical ontologists asserted or denied, controversially, that certain entities "existed." Rather than adding to these controversies, the new ontology uncovers their dialectics. The ontologically problematic entities of physics are of two kinds, represented by forces and particles, respectively. The dialectics has been dominated by eight patterns. Two of these, independence and realism, belong to philosophy proper. The (...) latter is here considered in order to relieve the philosophy of physics of a burden only philosophy proper can bear. That leaves six patterns: concreteness (including the orbit feature), acquaintance, simplicity, significance, process, and model. The paper sketches how each of these may be used and probably has been used, either explicitly or implicitly, in the recent controversies. (shrink)

Russell's book on Leibniz appeared in 1900. That it is important, because of its subject and because of its author, hardly needs to be argued. An examination of it, or of parts of it, after more than half a century is therefore in order. Yet the title I chose indicates only part of my intent. The other part is to examine certain ideas, irrespective of what either Leibniz or Russell thought and of what the latter thought about the thoughts of (...) the former. The title best suited to this part is Individuals, Natures, Relations, and Change. The mixed form of presentation, analytic and quasihistorical, has very great advantages. For the nature of the philosophical enterprise is such that an analyst is lost without some grasp or, at least, some image of “structural history.” The danger is that only very few, if any, are masters of two trades; in this case, logical analysis and historical scholarship. I, for one, make no pretense whatsoever of being a scholar. Naturally, I have read in Leibniz; and I did not skip or take lightly anything in the letters to Arnauld and Clarke; but I have by far not read everything that is available. Reading about Leibniz, aside from Russell, of which I did but little, I found Latta and, particularly, Joseph sometimes helpful. More often, though, I felt that the former's Hegelianism and the latter's Aristotelianism had got between them and their subject. (shrink)

Gustav Bergmann was one of the youngest members of the Vienna Circle when he fled Austria in 1938 to seek asylum in the United States. Prior to 1938 he had published eight papers in German, seven in mathematics and one on psychoanalysis published in Imago. In 1940–43 his published papers were mainly on topics in the philosophy of physics and psychology. In 1944–45 his published work reflected the beginning of an intellectual journey which, to borrow from Coffa’s striking title, would (...) take him from the positivism of the Vienna Station to Meinong’s Graz. The journey began in 1942 when he wrote a paper, published in 1944 in Mind, “Pure Semantics, Sentences and Propositions.” An earlier version had been sent to Church, as editor of the Journal of Symbolic Logic, and to Carnap for his reactions to Bergmann’s criticisms of Carnap’s recent Introduction to Semantics. (shrink)