I present a discussion of some issues in the ontology of spacetime. After a characterisation of the controversies among relationists, substantivalists, eternalists, and presentists, I offer a new argument for rejecting presentism, the doctrine that only present objects exist. Then, I outline and defend a form of spacetime realism that I call event substantivalism. I propose an ontological theory for the emergence of spacetime from more basic entities. Finally, I argue that a relational theory of pre-geometric entities can give rise (...) to substantival spacetime in such a way that relationism and substantivalism are not necessarily opposed positions, but rather complementary. In an appendix I give axiomatic formulations of my ontological views. (shrink)

I present a formal ontological theory where the basic building blocks of the world can be either things or events. In any case, the result is a Parmenidean worldview where change is not a global property. What we understand by change manifests as asymmetries in the pattern of the world-lines that constitute 4-dimensional existents. I maintain that such a view is in accord with current scientific knowledge.

This brief review of Mario Bunge’s research on physics begins with an analysis of his masterpiece Foundations of Physics, and then it discusses his other contributions to the philosophy of physics. Following that is a summary of his more recent reactions to scientific discoveries in physics and a discussion of his position about non-locality in quantum mechanics, as well as his changing opinions on the nature of spacetime. The paper ends with a brief assessment of Bunge’s legacy concerning the foundations (...) of physics. (shrink)

A supertask consists in the performance of an infinite number of actions in a finite time. I show that any attempt to carry out a supertask will produce a divergence of the curvature of spacetime, resulting in the formation of a black hole. I maintain that supertaks, contrarily to a popular view among philosophers, are physically impossible. Supertasks, literally, collapse under their own weight.

The idea of a moving present or ‘now’ seems to form part of our most basic beliefs about reality. Such a present, however, is not reflected in any of our theories of the physical world. I show in this article that presentism, the doctrine that only what is present exists, is in conflict with modern relativistic cosmology and recent advances in neurosciences. I argue for a tenseless view of time, where what we call ‘the present’ is just an emergent secondary (...) quality arising from the interaction of perceiving self-conscious individuals with their environment. I maintain that there is no flow of time, but just an ordered system of events. (shrink)

I argue that there are no physical singularities in space–time. Singular space–time models do not belong to the ontology of the world, because of a simple reason: they are concepts, defective solutions of Einstein’s field equations. I discuss the actual implication of the so-called singularity theorems. In remarking the confusion and fog that emerge from the reification of singularities I hope to contribute to a better understanding of the possibilities and limits of the theory of general relativity.

I argue for a four dimensional, non-dynamical view of space-time, where becoming is not an intrinsic property of reality. This view has many features in common with the Parmenidean conception of the universe. I discuss some recent objections to this position and I offer a comparison of the Parmenidean space-time with an interpretation of Heraclitus’ thought that presents no major antagonism.

I discuss the ontological assumptions and implications of General Relativity. I maintain that General Relativity is a theory about gravitational fields, not about space-time. The latter is a more basic ontological category, that emerges from physical relations among all existents. I also argue that there are no physical singularities in space-time. Singular space-time models do not belong to the ontology of the world: they are not things but concepts, i.e. defective solutions of Einstein’s field equations. I briefly discuss the actual (...) implication of the so-called singularity theorems in General Relativity and some problems related to ontological assumptions of Quantum Gravity. (shrink)

We present a formal analysis of the Cosmological Argument in its two main forms: that due to Aquinas, and the revised version of the Kalam Cosmological Argument more recently advocated by William Lane Craig. We formulate these two arguments in such a way that each conclusion follows in first-order logic from the corresponding assumptions. Our analysis shows that the conclusion which follows for Aquinas is considerably weaker than what his aims demand. With formalizations that are logically valid in hand, we (...) reinterpret the natural language versions of the premises and conclusions in terms of concepts of causality consistent with (and used in) recent work in cosmology done by physicists. In brief: the Kalam argument commits the fallacy of equivocation in a way that seems beyond repair; two of the premises adopted by Aquinas seem dubious when the terms ‘cause’ and ‘causality’ are interpreted in the context of contemporary empirical science. Thus, while there are no problems with whether the conclusions follow logically from their assumptions, the Kalam argument is not viable, and the Aquinas argument does not imply a caused origination of the universe. The assumptions of the latter are at best less than obvious relative to recent work in the sciences. We conclude with mention of a new argument that makes some positive modifications to an alternative variation on Aquinas by Le Poidevin, which nonetheless seems rather weak. (shrink)

Presentism is, roughly, the metaphysical doctrine that maintains that whatever exists, exists in the present. The compatibility of presentism with the theories of special and general relativity was much debated in recent years. It has been argued that at least some versions of presentism are consistent with time-orientable models of general relativity. In this paper we confront the thesis of presentism with relativistic physics, in the strong gravitational limit where black holes are formed. We conclude that the presentist position is (...) at odds with the existence of black holes and other compact objects in the universe. A revision of the thesis is necessary, if it is intended to be consistent with the current scientific view of the universe. (shrink)

It is a remarkable fact that all processes occurring in the observable universe are irre- versible, whereas the equations through which the fundamental laws of physics are formu- lated are invariant under time reversal. The emergence of irreversibility from the funda- mental laws has been a topic of consideration by physicists, astronomers and philosophers since Boltzmann's formulation of his famous \H" theorem. In this paper we shall discuss some aspects of this problem and its connection with the dynamics of space-time, (...) within the framework of modern cosmology. We conclude that the existence of cosmological horizons allows a coupling of the global state of the universe with the local events deter- mined through electromagnetic processes. (shrink)

A realistic axiomatic formulation of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics for a single microsystem with spin is presented, from which the most important theorems of the theory can be deduced. In comparison with previous formulations, the formal aspect has been improved by the use of certain mathematical theories, such as the theory of equipped spaces, and group theory. The standard formalism is naturally obtained from the latter, starting from a central primitive concept: the Galilei group.

We present a deductive theory of space-time which is realistic, objective, and relational. It is realistic because it assumes the existence of physical things endowed with concrete properties. It is objective because it can be formulated without any reference to cognoscent subjects or sensorial fields. Finally, it is relational because it assumes that space-time is not a thing but a complex of relations among things. In this way, the original program of Leibniz is consummated, in the sense that space is (...) ultimately an order of coexistents, and time is an order of succesives. In this context, we show that the metric and topological properties of Minkowskian space-time are reduced to relational properties of concrete things. We also sketch how our theory can be extended to encompass a Riemannian space-time. (shrink)

We present an axiomatization of non-relativistic Quantum Mechanics for a system with an arbitrary number of components. The interpretation of our system of axioms is realistic and objective. The EPR paradox and its relation with realism is discussed in this framework. It is shown that there is no contradiction between realism and recent experimental results.

There are several types of truths. In this paper I focus on semantic truths, and within these on factual truths. These truths are attributed to statements. I review the theory of the truth proposed by Bunge and discuss some problems that it presents. I suggest that a theory of truth of factual statements should be complemented by a theory of relevance, and propose the basic tenets of it. Finally, I briefly discuss the nature of propositions and the problem of scientific (...) truth in the light of the presented semantic theory. (shrink)

Macroscopic irreversible processes emerge from fundamental physical laws of reversible character. The source of the local irreversibility seems to be not in the laws themselves but in the initial and boundary conditions of the equations that represent the laws. In this work we propose that the screening of currents by black hole event horizons determines, locally, a preferred direction for the flux of electromagnetic energy. We study the growth of black hole event horizons due to the cosmological expansion and accretion (...) of cosmic microwave background radiation, for different cosmological models. We propose generalized McVittie co-moving metrics and integrate the rate of accretion of cosmic microwave background radiation onto a supermassive black hole over cosmic time. We find that for flat, open, and closed Friedmann cosmological models, the ratio of the total area of the black hole event horizons with respect to the area of a radial co-moving space-like hypersurface always increases. Since accretion of cosmic radiation sets an absolute lower limit to the total matter accreted by black holes, this implies that the causal past and future are not mirror symmetric for any spacetime event. The asymmetry causes a net Poynting flux in the global future direction; the latter is in turn related to the ever increasing thermodynamic entropy. Thus, we expose a connection between four different “time arrows”: cosmological, electromagnetic, gravitational, and thermodynamic. (shrink)

I discuss the recent claims made by Mario Bunge on the philosophical implications of the discovery of gravitational waves. I think that Bunge is right when he points out that the detection implies the materiality of spacetime, but I reject his identification of spacetime with the gravitational field. I show that Bunge’s analysis of the spacetime inside a hollow sphere is defective, but this in no way affects his main claim.

A chapter of the book Elogio del Cientificismo.

La representación científica del mundo se construye sobre un tejido de teorías en las cuales hay enunciados generales que representan leyes naturales. Estas leyes son patrones de sucesos regulares. Un presupuesto básico de la ciencia es que todo acontecimiento es legal: ocurre regido por leyes que son fijas. ¿Es compatible esa legalidad con la libertad de elección que creemos tener? ¿Cuáles son las implicaciones para la libertad política que debemos esperar en una sociedad organizada y racional? ¿Cuál es el rol (...) de la ética en todo esto? Trataré de responder a estas preguntas aquí, defendiendo la concepción de una sociedad abierta, democrática y plural, que maximice la libertad de elección y acción de las personas que la forman. (shrink)

“Seguramente, hasta hoy no creía que no aumentará de peso ni se achicará al aumentar la velocidad de la nave, ni que lo que es ahora para usted ya pasó para Fulano y aún no ocurrió para Zutano, ¿verdad? Desengáñese, porque el autor de este libro, nada menos que profesor de astrofísica relativista y autoridad mundial en agujeros negros y otros portentos, le hará dudar de todo eso” (del prólogo de Mario Bunge). -/- -/- “Como Borges —escribe el autor—, he (...) sentido que el del tiempo es el problema esencial de la metafísica de Occidente. Lo he estudiado durante más de 30 años. Me convertí en físico relativista por este problema. Y jamás rechacé la metafísica, como otros colegas, que, borrachos de ignorancia, desprecian lo que ignoran. Estudié lógica, semántica, ontología, epistemología. A veces los medios se transformaron en fines, y publiqué abundantemente filosofía. Siempre fui un outsider: un científico para los filósofos, un astrónomo para los físicos, un físico para los astrónomos. No me quejo: me evité lo peor de todos esos mundos”. -/- . (shrink)

Black holes are extremely relativistic objects. Physical processes around them occur in a regime where the gravitational field is extremely intense. Under such conditions, our representations of space, time, gravity, and thermodynamics are pushed to their limits. In such a situation philosophical issues naturally arise. In this chapter I review some philosophical questions related to black holes. In particular, the relevance of black holes for the metaphysical dispute between presentists and eternalists, the origin of the second law of thermadynamics and (...) its relation to black holes, the problem of information, black holes and hypercomputing, the nature of determinsim, and the breakdown of predictability in black hole space-times. I maintain that black hole physics can be used to illuminate some important problems in the border between science and philosophy, either epistemology and ontology. (shrink)

I present a discussion of some open issues in the philosophy of space-time theories. Emphasis is put on the ontological nature of space and time, the relation between determinism and predictability, the origin of irreversible processes in an expanding Universe, and the compatibility of relativity and quantum mechanics. In particular, I argue for a Parmenidean view of time and change, I make clear the difference between ontological determinism and predictability, propose that the origin of the asymmetry observed in physical processes (...) is related to the existence of cosmological horizons, and present a non-local concept of causality that can accommodate both special relativity and quantum entanglement. (shrink)

Scientific philosophy is that which is informed by science. It uses exact tools such as logic and mathematics and provides a framework for scientific activity to solve more general questions about nature, the language we use to describe it, and the knowledge we obtain thanks to it. Many of the scientific philosophy theories can be proven and evaluated using scientific evidence. In this paper, I focus on showing how several classical philosophy topics, such as the nature of space and time (...) or the dimensionality of the future, can be addressed philosophically using the tools from current astrophysics research and, in particular, from the study of black holes and gravitational waves. (shrink)

Este trabajo se propone dos objetivos, uno descriptivo y otro propositivo. El descriptivo consiste en el análisis de la crítica que realiza E. Cioran, a lo largo de su obra, a la concepción humanista del ser humano Nuestro filósofo pone en cuestión la arrogancia del hombre que se coloca en el lugar fundamental y de supremacía en el ámbito de la vida, lugar que le sirve de justificación para conquistar, apropiarse y aniquilar a la naturaleza y al resto de los (...) vivientes. Por otro lado, en términos propositivos, me interesa plantear la cuestión de la animalidad(el animal que es el ser humano, y los animales no humanos) porque permite poner en cuestión esa concepción humanista, y pensar nuevos modos de ser-con lo viviente. En este sentido, sostengo a lo largo del trabajo que la filosofía de Cioran permite pensar una noción de lo humano atravesada por la animalidad, noción cioraneana que desarma("descompone") la arrogancia de los humanismos. Para ello me serviré de la problemática de la muerte como inmanente a la vida y de la crítica de Cioran a la noción de propiedad. (shrink)

I offer a theory of art that is based on science. I maintain that, as any other human activity, art can be studied with the tools of science. This does not mean that art is scientific, but aesthetics, the theory of art, can be formulated in accord with our scientific knowledge. I present elucidations of the concepts of aesthetic experience, art, work of art, artistic movement, and I discuss the ontological status of artworks from the point of view of scientific (...) philosophy. (shrink)

I offer a formal ontological theory where the basic building blocks of the world are timeless events. The composition of events results in processes. Spacetime emerges as the system of all events. Things are construed as bundles of processes. I maintain that such a view is in accord with General Relativity and offers interesting prospects for the foundations of classical and quantum gravity.

Traducción del alemán de Irene Borges-Duarte.

Este artículo ofrece una evaluación de la relevancia de los conceptos de biopolítica y biopoder en la obra de Michel Foucault. Un análisis exhaustivo de la obra de Foucault es esencial para una evaluación de los diversos aspectos del concepto de biopolítica. Esto permite que sea posible concluir que la biopolítica pueda considerarse fundamental en el interior del marco conceptual de Foucault.

Este artículo ofrece una evaluación de la relevancia de los conceptos de biopolítica y biopoder en la obra de Michel Foucault. Un análisis exhaustivo de la obra de Foucault es esencial para una evaluación de los diversos aspectos del concepto de biopolítica. Esto permite que sea posible concluir que la biopolítica pueda considerarse fundamental en el interior del marco conceptual de Foucault.

Las teorías que usamos para representar el mundo pueden ser extremadamente complejas. Abordan temas tales como electrones, campos cuánticos, estrellas de neutrones, materia oscura, redes neuronales, mercados económicos, la atmósfera y muchas otras entidades que suponemos existen en el universo. Al formular nuestras teorías, recurrimos a lenguajes exactos que nos permiten minimizar la vaguedad y expresarnos lo más precisa y cuantitativamente posible. Recurrimos a la matemática. Cuando formulamos nuestras teorías fácticas en lenguaje matemático, estas se refieren no solamente a objetos (...) que nosotros interpretamos como materiales, tales como partículas o personas, sino también a entidades más raras de un mundo abstracto: conjuntos, números, funciones, espacios algebraicos, variedades, topologías, y otras entidades similares. Estos objetos no son materiales en el sentido en que nosotros decimos que una manzana es material. Ellos no existen en el espacio-tiempo, no interactúan, no cambian o evolucionan. Sin embargo, allí están, profundamente arraigados en nuestras teorías más apreciadas acerca del mundo. (shrink)

En este trabajo nos proponemos elucidar el concepto de bíos desarrollado por Foucault en su curso recientemente publicado, Subjectivité et vérité,estableciendo su desarrollo luego con la noción de "vida bella" presentada en su Historia de la sexualidad, para finalmente analizar un tipo específico de bíos, el de los cínicos, que transita entre la crudeza de la parresía y la animalidad.

Este trabajo se propone pensar las relaciones entre el ejercicio del gobierno y los regímenes de veridicción, teniendo como eje las problematizaciones planteadas por Michel Foucault en el curso titulado Du gouvernement des vivants.

En Les mots et les choses Foucault presenta y analiza el surgimiento del concepto de la vida en la ruptura epistémica que tiene lugar alrededor de 1800. De la ruptura de una determinada forma de saber van a surgir las condiciones de posibilidad para pensar la vida y, por lo tanto, "la vida" misma. En este artículo nos proponemos analizar la perspectiva de Foucault sobre la comprensión de la vida como fundamentalmente abierta a las determinaciones por parte de las constelaciones (...) del saber. Las ciencias de la vida operan con una noción de vida que se define desde un punto de vista negativo, es decir, por su relación con la muerte, a cuya amenaza está expuesta permanentemente. (shrink)

El artículo elabora un itinerario del lugar que tiene la muerte en el trabajo de Foucault. Para ello revisa y discute algunos de sus principales antecedentes como son las figuras de Bichat y Canguilhem. El problema de la muerte está atravesado por una serie de discusiones en torno a la vida tal y como la han desarrollado las ciencias de la vida durante la modernidad.