First-year university students have multiple motives for studying and these motives may interact. Yet, past research has primarily focused on a variable-centered, dimensional approach missing out on the possibility to study the joint effect of multiple motives that students may have. Examining the interplay between motives is key to better explain student differences in study success and wellbeing, and to understand different effects that interventions can have in terms of wellbeing and study success. We therefore applied a student-centered, multidimensional approach (...) in which we explored motivational profiles of first-year university students by combining three dimensions of motives for studying which have been shown to be differently related to academic functioning. Using cluster analysis in two independent, consecutive university student cohorts, we identified four meaningful profiles and coined them motivational mindsets. We validated the four mindset profiles not only within each student sample but also found almost identical profiles between the student samples. The motivational mindset profiles were labeled: high-impact mindset, low-impact mindset, social-impact mindset, and self-impact mindset. In addition to validating the paradigm, we developed a mindset classification tool to further use these mindsets in practice and in future research. (shrink)

Research on the joint effect of multiple motives for studying was recently given a push in a new direction with the introduction of the motivational mindset model. This model contributes to a better understanding of study success and student wellbeing in higher education. The aim of the present study is to validate the newly developed model and the associated mindset classification tool. To this end, 662 first-year university students were classified in one of the four types of motivational mindset using (...) the classification tool and three exploratory validation procedures were conducted through sense of purpose, study engagement, and students’ background characteristics in terms of gender and ethnicity. Both purpose and study engagement are central dimensions of student wellbeing and predictors of study success. The results show that sense of purpose and study engagement differ across the four types of mindset, students in the low-impact mindset show the least optimal pattern of study engagement and sense of purpose, sense of purpose and study engagement are positively related and this relationship is consistent across mindsets, and overall differences in purpose and study engagement between gender and ethnic subgroups stem from one specific type of motivational mindset. The results provide support for the validity of the MMM and the usefulness of the MCT. The implications of the findings are discussed as well as promising avenues for future research. (shrink)

In this chapter aimed at undergraduate philosophy students, I provide a brief and simple introduction to Kant's transcendental idealism and explain the argument of his First Antinomy.

This paper proposes a new perspective on the methodology of qualitative inquiry in ethics, especially the interaction between empirical work and theory development, and introduces standards to evaluate the quality of this inquiry and its findings. The kind of qualitative inquiry the authors are proposing brings to light what participants in practices of care and welfare do and refrain from doing, and what they undergo, in order to offer ‘stepping stones’, political-ethical insights that originate in the practice studied and enable (...) practitioners to deal with newly emerging moral issues. As the authors’ aim is to study real-life complexity of inevitably morally imprinted care processes, their empirical material typically consists of extensive and comprehensive descriptions of exemplary cases. For their research aim the number of cases is not decisive, as long as the rigorous analysis of the cases studied provides innovative theoretical insights into the practice studied. Another quality criterion of what they propose that should be called ‘N=N case studies’ is the approval the findings receive from the participants in the practice studied. (shrink)

According to the objection from positive duties, Kant's Formula of Universal Law is flawed because it cannot be used to derive any affirmative moral requirements. This paper offers a response to that objection and proposes a novel way to derive positive duties from Kant's formula. The Formula of Universal Law yields positive duties to adopt our own perfection and others’ happiness as ends because we could not rationally fail to will those ends as universal ends.

Learning to work as a relational caring professional in healthcare and social welfare, is foremost a process of transformative learning, of Building, of professional subjectification. In this article we contribute to the design of such a process of formation by presenting a structured map of five domains of formational goals. It is mainly informed by many years of care-ethical research and training of professionals in healthcare and social work. The five formational domains are:Relational Caring Approach,Perception,Knowledge,Interpretation, andPractical Wisdom. The formation process, (...) described as the recurring detour of a continuing practice, requires ‘exposure’, in-depth learning and learning communities. Relational caring—care consequently resulting from and structured by relational thinking, exploring, and steering—requires ‘inquiry’ as a continuous learning process in practice. The process is ultimately aimed at fostering mature, competent, and practically wise professional caregivers who are able to relationally connect with and attune to care receivers, and adequately navigate existential, moral, and political-institutional tensions in relational caring in complex organizations in Late-Modern society. (shrink)

In A Realist Theory of Science, Roy Bhaskar provides several transcendental arguments for critical realism – a position Bhaskar himself characterized as transcendental realism. Bhaskar provides an argument from perception and from the intelligibility of scientific experimentation, maintaining that transcendental realism is necessary for both. I argue that neither argument succeeds, and that transcendental idealism can better vindicate scientific practice than Bhaskar’s realism. Bhaskar’s arguments against the Kantian view fail, for they misrepresent the transcendental idealist position. I conclude that, if (...) they wish to retain their theoretical commitments, critical realists ought to be transcendental idealists. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic is a tragedy for those who have been hard hit worldwide. At the same time, it is also a test of concepts and practices of what good care is and requires, and how quality of care can be accounted for. In this paper, we present our Care-Ethical Model of Quality Enquiry and apply it to the case of residential care for older people in the Netherlands during the Covid-19 pandemic. Instead of thinking about care in healthcare and (...) social welfare as a set of separate care acts, we think about care as a complex practice of relational caring, crossed by other practices. Instead of thinking about professional caregivers as functionaries obeying external rules, we think about them as practically wise professionals. Instead of thinking about developing external quality criteria and systems, we think about cultivating reflective quality awareness. Instead of abstracting from societal forces that make care possible but also limit it, we acknowledge them and find ways to deal with them. Based on these critical insights, the CEMQUE model can be helpful to describe, interrogate, evaluate, and improve existing care practices. It has four entries: the care receiver considered from their humanness, the caregiver considered from their solicitude, the care facility considered from its habitability and the societal, institutional and scholarly context considered from the perspective of the good life, justice and decency. The crux is enabling all these different entries with all their different aspects to be taken into account. In Corona times this turns out to be more crucial than ever. (shrink)

Kant famously claims that there is only a single supreme principle of morality: the Categorical Imperative. This claim is often treated with skepticism. After all, Kant proceeds to provide no fewer than six formulations of this purportedly single supreme principle—formulations which appear to differ significantly. But appearances can be deceptive. In this paper, I argue that Kant was right. There is only a single Categorical Imperative, and each of its formulations expresses the very same moral principle.

Respect for personal autonomy and authenticity is a very important principle in late modern political and applied ethics. In the context of medicine and nursing, for example, a great deal of ethical research is devoted to this principle, both theoretical and empirical, raising many hotly debated questions, both conceptual – on the concepts of autonomy and authenticity – practical – on the application of the principle of respect for autonomy and authenticity – and methodological – on using empirical methods in (...) ethical research. In the present contribution I present two of the results of my doctoral research concerning personal autonomy and authenticity in the practice of personal pastoral care, using empirical methods.The first consists of a formulation of the goals of pastoral care as they were found in the cases analysed, the second of the different forms of personal autonomy and authenticity that were identified. Our primary aim is to argue for the importance of a) conducting empirical research into what is actually morally relevant and not just at the surface, and of b) assigning a privileged position in empirical ethical research to practices and the tacit knowing of advanced, reflective practitioners. (shrink)

I recently argued that critical realists ought to adopt transcendental idealism in favour of Bhaskar’s transcendental realism. In response, Dustin McWherter presents two arguments against transcendental idealism: it is inferior to transcendental realism because it cannot account for the epistemic significance of experimentation, and it is internally inconsistent because it affirms the existence of things-in-themselves. This brief reply defends transcendental idealism against both objections.

According to the Phenomenal Unity Thesis (“PUT”) – most prominently defended by Tim Bayne and David Chalmers – necessarily, any set of phenomenal states of a subject at a time is phenomenally unified. The standard formulation of this thesis is unacceptably vague because it does not specify what it is to be a subject. In this paper, I first consider possible meanings for ‘subject’ as used in PUT and argue that every plausible candidate definition renders the thesis trivially true. I (...) consider and reject Tim Bayne’s proposal that ‘subject’ means ‘human being’. Then I argue, contra Bayne and Chalmers, that PUT is not incompatible with any major theory of consciousness, and contra Michael Tye, that split-brain patients do not provide evidence against PUT. I close by considering some nontrivial alternatives to PUT. (shrink)

Extending a strategy previously used by Clancy, Schacter, McNally, and Pitman , we administered a neutral and a trauma-related version of the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm to a sample of women reporting recovered or repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse , women reporting having always remembered their abuse , and women reporting no history of abuse . We found that individuals reporting recovered memories of CSA are more prone than other participants to falsely recalling and recognizing neutral words that were never presented. (...) Moreover, our study is the first to show that this finding even held when trauma-related material was involved. Correlational analyses revealed that fantasy proneness, but not self-reported traumatic experiences and dissociative symptoms were related to false recall and false recognition. (shrink)

Three‐dimensional structured illumination microscopy (3D‐SIM) has opened up new possibilities to study nuclear architecture at the ultrastructural level down to the ∼100 nm range. We present first results and assess the potential using 3D‐SIM in combination with 3D fluorescence in situ hybridization (3D‐FISH) for the topographical analysis of defined nuclear targets. Our study also deals with the concern that artifacts produced by FISH may counteract the gain in resolution. We address the topography of DAPI‐stained DNA in nuclei before and after (...) 3D‐FISH, nuclear pores and the lamina, chromosome territories, chromatin domains, and individual gene loci. We also look at the replication patterns of chromocenters and the topographical relationship ofXist‐RNA within the inactive X‐territory. These examples demonstrate that an appropriately adapted 3D‐FISH/3D‐SIM approach preserves key characteristics of the nuclear ultrastructure and that the gain in information obtained by 3D‐SIM yields new insights into the functional nuclear organization. (shrink)

This brief essay responds to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bucklew v. Precythe. It contends that the argument relied upon by the Court in that decision, as well as in Glossip v. Gross, is either trivial or demonstrably invalid. Hence, this essay provides a nonmoral reason to oppose the Court’s recent capital punishment decisions. The Court’s position that petitioners seeking to challenge a method of execution must identify a readily available and feasible alternative execution protocol is untenable, and must (...) be revisited. (shrink)

In this historical contribution, we assess Duns Scotus’s analysis of atonement (Commentary on the Sentences bk. III). We also include a partial exploration of his analysis of penance (Sentences bk. IV), because certain topics which we tend to discuss within atonement-theory, for example the analysis of the virtue of punishment, pertained to the subject of penance for Scotus. In recent scholarship, Andrew Rosato has argued that Scotus adapted the Anselmian non-penal view of Christ’s substitutionary satisfaction to the penal understanding of (...) satisfaction operative in penance. In this contribution, however, we argue that Scotus’s understanding remained non-penal: his view of the atonement depends on meritorious supererogatory acts of love. Additionally, we harvest some valuable Scotistic insights for atonement-theory, some of them applicable to penal theories as well. (shrink)

In their target article, O'Regan & Noë (O&N) give convincing arguments for there being no elaborate internal representation of the outside world. We show two more categories of empirical results that can easily be understood within the view that the world serves as an outside memory that is probed only when specific information is needed.

An alternative multi-joint extension to the lambda model is proposed. According to this extension, the activity of a muscle depends not only on the difference between lambda and length of that muscle, but also on the difference between lambda and length of other muscles. This 2-D extension can describe more neurophysiological experiments than the extension proposed in the target article.

The visual prediction that Nijhawan proposes cannot explain why the flash-lag effect depends on what happens after the flash. Moreover, using a visual prediction based on retinal image motion to compensate for neuronal time delays will seldom be of any use for motor control, because one normally pursues objects with which one intends to interact with ones eyes.

Stoffregen & Bardy's target article is based on the assumption that our senses' ultimate purpose is to provide us with perfect information about the outside world. We argue that it is often more important that information be available quickly than that it be perfect. Consequently our nervous system processes different aspects of information about our surrounding as separately as possible. The separation is not between the senses, but between separate aspects of our surrounding. This results in inconsistencies between judgments: sometimes (...) because different frames of reference are used. Such inconsistencies are fundamental to the way the information is picked up, however, and hence cannot be avoided with clearer instructions to the subjects. (shrink)

Scotus’ theory of univocity is described: his exact definition of univocity and his view of transcendental concepts that are ‘simply simple’. These concepts are said to be univocally applied to God and creatures. Next, we describe Scotus’ views on univocity in ‘being’ and the precise meaning of the infinite and finite ‘mode’ of being. Finally, we apply these results to work of Heidegger and Marion. It appears that they had an insufficient grasp of the intricacies of Scotus’ theory of univocity (...) and that Marion’s religious phenomenology could have benefitted from these scotistic tools. (shrink)

With the aid of some Scotistic conceptual distinctions, I develop a way of meeting the apparent deterministic sway of neurobiology. I make a careful distinction between formal and material freedom. Formal freedom, the ability to will or not to will a certain state of affairs regardless of whether it can be effectuated, remains, even if our material freedom to effectuate it is hampered by neurobiological mechanisms. These conceptual findings are linked with contemporary empirical research on obsessive-compulsive disorder and the possibility (...) of volitional modulation of cerebral function. (shrink)

In this brief chapter aimed at undergraduates, I examine theories of punishment and provide an introduction to Kant's retributivism.

According to Kant, the supreme principle of morality is: “act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (G 4:421). This principle has come to be known as the Formula of Universal Law (“FUL”). Few philosophers believe it succeeds. But, I argue, few philosophers have understood what FUL means. This dissertation offers a full defense of FUL. It is, in fact, the supreme principle of morality—and it can successfully (...) derive a viable theory of permissible action and virtuous willing. Kant was right. Chapter 1 considers FUL’s role in relation to Kant’s subsequent formulations of the Categorical Imperative and the broader architectonic of duty he sets up in the Metaphysics of Morals. I argue that Kant’s formulations are equivalent insofar as they are each expressions of the very same moral principle. And I suggest that FUL’s two tests correspond to Kant’s later distinction between duties of right and duties of virtue. Thus, FUL’s contradiction-in-conception test can be used to derive duties governing permissible action, and FUL’s contradiction-in-the-will test can be used to derive duties governing virtuous willing. This sets up the framework for the remainder of the dissertation. Chapters 2 and 3 together interpret and defend Kant’s account of permissible action. In Chapter 2, I argue that we should fundamentally reconceive of the nature and purpose of Kant’s permissibility criterion. Kant’s contemporary interpreters have adopted too psychologistic an account of the maxim. Kantian maxims have little to do with the motivating principles of actual agents. Relying on Kant’s historical context and his account of maxims in rational agency, I argue that FUL tests means-end principles which describe act-types. When its permissibility test is applied to such principles, it can viably derive general duties. Chapter 3 continues this positive account of Kant’s permissibility test and defends it from common objections. I argue that the contradiction-in-conception test rejects an act-type when it would be inconceivable for all rational agents to be directly governed by the type’s means-end imperative as a universal practical law. So understood, FUL condemns act-types because: (1) they are hypocritically self-serving, (2) they inflict agential harm on other agents, or (3) they inflict self-harm motivated by self-love. I defend FUL’s derivations against such act-types against common criticisms, such as that they are circular or overbroad. Turning to prominent objections against Kant’s account of permissible action, I then argue that FUL correctly rules out all and only impermissible actions. Moreover, its conclusions are both nuanced and normatively defensible. In Chapter 4, I turn to Kant’s virtue ethics. I begin by considering the demands of Kantian virtue. I argue that we should reject accounts on which duties of virtue are merely less restrictive duties governing permissible action. Instead, I argue, they represent genuinely virtue-ethical requirements to promote morally worthy ends, namely, the ends of our own perfection and others’ happiness. I show that all of Kant’s duties of virtue can ultimately be traced back to one of these required ends. Then, I argue that FUL’s contradiction-in-the-will test can successfully derive our positive obligation to set the ends of virtue. I conclude that FUL is successful not only as a standard of permissibility, but also as the supreme principle of virtue. (shrink)

Research integrity is usually discussed in terms of responsibilities that individual researchers bear towards the scientific work they conduct, as well as responsibilities that institutions have to enable those individual researchers to do so. In addition to these two bearers of responsibility, a third category often surfaces, which is variably referred to as culture and practice. These notions merit further development beyond a residual category that is to contain everything that is not covered by attributions to individuals and institutions. This (...) paper discusses how thinking in RI can take benefit from more specific ideas on practice and culture. We start by articulating elements of practice and culture, and explore how values central to RI are related to these elements. These insights help identify additional points of intervention for fostering responsible conduct. This helps to build “cultures and practices of research integrity”, as it makes clear that specific times and places are connected to specific practices and cultures and should have a place in the debate on Research Integrity. With this conceptual framework, practitioners as well as theorists can avoid using the notions as residual categories that de facto amount to vague, additional burdens of responsibility for the individual. (shrink)

Traditionally, recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse have been classified as those emerging spontaneously versus those surfacing during the course of suggestive therapy. There are indications that reinterpretation of memories might be a third route to recovered memories. Thus, recovered memories do not form a homogeneous category. Nevertheless, the conceptual distinctions between the various types of recovered memories remain difficult for researchers and clinicians. With this in mind, the current study explored whether recovered memories can be reliably classified. We found (...) that classification is rather problematic in a subset of cases. To reduce potential bias, we urge for the development and subsequent use of a more reliable classification system and multiple expert raters in research on recovered memories. (shrink)

BackgroundResearch codes of conduct offer guidance to researchers with respect to which values should be realized in research practices, how these values are to be realized, and what the respective responsibilities of the individual and the institution are in this. However, the question ofhowthe responsibilities are to be divided between the individual and the institution has hitherto received little attention. We therefore performed an analysis of research codes of conduct to investigate how responsibilities are positioned as individual or institutional, and (...) how the boundary between the two is drawn.MethodWe selected 12 institutional, national and international codes of conduct that apply to medical research in the Netherlands and subjected them to a close-reading content analysis. We first identified the dominant themes and then investigated how responsibility is attributed to individuals and institutions.ResultsWe observed that the attribution of responsibility to either the individual or the institution is often not entirely clear, and that the notion ofcultureemerges as a residual category for such attributions. We see this notion of responsible research cultures as important; it is something that mediates between the individual level and the institutional level. However, at the same time it largely lacks substantiation.ConclusionsWhile many attributions of individual and institutional responsibility are clear, the exact boundary between the two is often problematic. We suggest two possible avenues for improving codes of conduct: either to clearly attribute responsibilities to individuals or institutions and depend less on the notion of culture, or to make culture a more explicit concern and articulate what it is and how a good culture might be fostered. (shrink)

In order to explain trauma resilience, previous research has been investigating possible risk and protective factors, both on an individual and a contextual level. In this experimental study, we examined narrative coherence and social support in relation to trauma resilience. Participants were asked to write about a turning point memory, after which they did the Maastricht Acute Stress Test, our lab analog of a traumatic event. Following, half of the participants received social support, whereas the other half did not. Afterwards, (...) all participants wrote a narrative on the traumatic event. Moment-to-moment fluctuations in psychological and physiological well-being throughout the experiment were investigated with state anxiety questionnaires and cortisol measures. Results showed that narratives of traumatic experiences were less coherent than narratives of turning point memories. However, contrary to our predictions, coherence, and, in particular, thematic coherence, related positively to anxiety levels. Possibly, particular types of thematic coherence are a non-adaptive form of coping, which reflect unfinished attempts at meaning-making and are more similar to continuous rumination than to arriving at a resolution. Furthermore, coherence at baseline could not buffer against the impact of trauma on anxiety levels in this study. Contrary to our hypotheses, social support did not have the intended beneficial effects on coherence, neither on well-being. Multiple explanations as to why our support manipulation remained ineffective are suggested. Remarkably, lower cortisol levels at baseline and after writing about the turning point memory predicted higher coherence in the trauma narratives. This may suggest that the ability to remain calm in difficult situations does relate to the ability to cope adaptively with future difficult experiences. Clinical and social implications of the present findings are discussed, and future research recommendations on the relations between narrative coherence, social support, and trauma resilience are addressed. (shrink)

Ancient Philosophy Today, Volume 3, Issue 1, Page 120-126, April, 2021.