One of the major problems posed by the human rights issue to philosophy is its philosophical foundation. The background of this discussion raises questions such as: how can one philosophically explain / justify the demand for human rights recognition? This paper focuses on the argumentative basis on which Höffe structures his proposal. For him human rights are closely connected to the concept of justice. This concept must be understood primarily as an exchange (Gerechtigkeit als Tausch). Although the concept seems (...) simple, it offers many difficulties regarding its foundation. (shrink)
Esse texto tem por objetivo apresentar em linhas gerais a proposta de OtfriedHöffe sobre a república mundial. Para tanto, iniciar-se-á com o ponto de partida de Höffe, a saber, o fenômeno da globalização, de onde são apontadas as principais atividades e problemas da república mundial. Em seguida, passa-se a analisar os dois níveis da proposta, o nível nacional e o nível internacional ou global da república mundial. Por fim, concluir-se-á com uma tentativa de comparação da proposta (...) de Höffe com a ideia de uma federação de Estados livres apresentada por Immanuel Kant em À paz perpétua. (shrink)
This interview explores the extent to which Kant’s philosophy, which postulates certain moral principles categorically, has influenced the contemporary theory of justice. Many academics believe such principles to be relative and emphasise that justice lies beyond the remit of science. OtfriedHöffe is convinced that categorical legal principles remain a valid subject for an academic discussion. In his works, he often appeals to Kantian philosophy. In the interview, Prof. Dr. О. Höffe refers to such famous German Neo-Kantian (...) philosophers of law as R. Stammler and G. Radbruch. He also mentions J. Rawls and J. Habermas — self-confessed adherents of the Kantian tradition in moral philosophy. Prof. Dr. Höffe expounds his views on the problems discussed by these authors. He dismisses G. W. F. Hegel’s criticism of Kant and denies the dependence of the fundamental principles of justice on the Zeitgeist and the opinions of the masses. The interviewee calls freedom the supreme human value, advocates the idea of a democratic constitutional state (he considers the principles of a social state as a mission of the state rather than a subjective right of citizens), and argues that dictatorship and tyranny deserve resistance. Prof. Dr. Höffe gives detailed definitions of the notions of transcendental exchange, categorical legal principles, enlightened liberal democracy, and a world republic. This interview will supplement the body of Prof. Dr. Höffe’s works that have already been translated into Russian. (shrink)
Chapters 17 and 18 of the TTP constitute a textual unit in which Spinoza submits the case of the ancient Hebrew state to close examination. This is not the work of a historian, at least not in any sense that we, twenty-first century readers, would recognize as such. Many of Spinoza’s claims in these chapters are highly speculative, and seem to be poorly backed by historical evidence. Other claims are broad-brush, ahistorical generalizations: for example, in a marginal note, Spinoza refers (...) to his Jewish contemporaries as if they were identical with the ancient Hebrews. Projections from Spinoza’s own experience of his Jewish and Dutch contemporaries are quite common, and the Erastian lesson that Spinoza attempts to draw from his “history” of the ancient Hebrew state is all too conspicuous. Even Spinoza’s philosophical arguments in these two chapters are not uniformly convincing, as I will attempt to show. Yet in spite of all these faults, the two chapters are a masterpiece of their own kind: a case study of the psychological foundations of politics and religion. The work that comes closest in my mind is Freud’s 1939 Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion. The two works are similar not only in terms of their chronological subject matter – the Hebrews of Moses’s time – but also in their attempt to reconstruct the communal psyche of the Hebrews in order to demonstrate their respective social theories about the foundation of civilization. Needless to say, there are numerous differences between the two works, not the least of which are their distinct aims and the very different political contexts in which they were produced. We will return to this comparison with Freud’s Moses and Monotheism toward the end of the essay, but let me first stage the background for our discussion. Chapter 16 of the TTP begins a new section of the book which primarily deals with the relation between religion and the state. In this chapter Spinoza presents an outline of his political theory and his understanding of key notions such as right, power, the state of nature, the social contract, sovereignty, democracy, and justice. The title of chapter 17 announces its aim and focus: “showing that no one can transfer everything to the Supreme Power, and that this is not necessary; on the Hebrew Republic, as it was during the life of Moses, and after his death, before they elected Kings, and on its excellence; and finally, on the causes why the divine Republic [Respublica divina] could perish, and could hardly survive without rebellions” (III/201). The far less ambitious title of eighteenth chapter states that in it “certain Political doctrines are inferred from the Republic and history of the Hebrews” (III/221). Essentially, the two chapters present a surprising, ironic, and penetrating reading of the story of the divine Hebrew Republic, a reading which highlights both how much and how little was achieved by the use of the fantastic political device of attributing divine sanctification to the state and its sovereign. (shrink)
Este artigo discute um dos pontos fundamentais da Ética de Otíried Hifi: a questão da troca transcendental. O autor, após a reconstrução da argumentação de Höffe no tocante à fundamentação dos direitos humanos, procura relacionar essa questão com o debate sobre o comunitarismo. Sustenta a tese de que nem o liberalismo nem o comunitanismo servem de base para a fundamentação de tais direitos.
This article offers a critical appreciation of a theory of justice puttoward by 0. Höffe. Höffe suggests that commutative justice forms the basis for every understanding of justice, not only in market relationships but also in the legal and social state. Beginning with Räffes' application of his theory to the health system, this article argues that Höffes' theory is not empirically sufficent; nor does it suffice in the discourse of Iegitimation for law and state. Distributive justice can only (...) be excluded as the fundamental justice for legal and state function at the cost of participation and solidarity. The paradigm change for which Höffe calls cannot, therefore, count upon the support of Christian social ethics. (shrink)