Since this book is an "invitation to religious studies," its content and style reflect the author's conception of what religious studies are. Religion he describes in several ways, though usually in a broad sense. "Religion is the acting out of a vision of personal identity and human community. Religion is constituted by the most ultimate, least easily surrendered, most comprehensive choices a person or a society acts out." Again, "religion is a conversion from the ordinary, given, secure world to a (...) world of nothingness, terror, risk--a world in which nevertheless there is strange healing and joy." In the light of this latter description, Novak describes religious studies as calling "for an attitude of fresh awareness, a new sensitivity to others, to nature and to oneself, and a series of conversions in one's way of life." The book begins with a consideration of religion as autobiography. Employing categories which will be familiar to readers of his other recent writings, Novak describes human life as the adoption of successive standpoints ; "a story links these points in time." This section concludes with provocative discussions of the aesthetic, moral and religious stages of human life, and of the meaning and range of reason. Convinced that human identity is cultural as well as personal, Novak then devotes the major part of his book to discussions of culture, institutions, and organizations. In regard to institutions he argues the proposition "that man is a political animal; and that institutions are both his natural habitat and the chief instruments of his growth in liberty." His discussion of organizations includes sections on liturgy, types of religious groupings, the place of sacred writings and of theologies within religions. One senses throughout the book the effort of a professor of religious studies to articulate what his task is and a concern to reach his students. For example, he argues often and at length for the importance of the subject in humanistic knowing, by contrast to the objective standpoint of the scientist. In this his arguments may seem a bit simplistic and repetitious to one familiar with contemporary philosophical thought. Similarly, there are enough summary generalizations that any reader is likely to find some to quarrel with. Finally, his prose style will at times strike some readers as somewhat overwrought. Nevertheless, the book is a provocative one, of interest to anyone concerned with religious studies or the philosophy of religion.--H. F. (shrink)

The argument of this book is that there is a form of Christian philosophy congruent with the contemporary philosophical climate. According to the author, a philosophy is Christian to the extent that it is elaborated within a Christian Weltanschauung, that is, insofar as its spirit and fundamental contents are guided by Christian revelation and bear the impress of Christian redemption. Christian philosophy is not a single system, but rather a tradition which approaches philosophical problems from a Christian perspective. Within this (...) tradition there can exist a considerable variety of philosophical opinion, since Christian revelation leaves many questions undecided. To show that such a Christian philosophy is possible today the author spends the major part of the book surveying a number of currents in recent philosophy. One purpose of this survey is to examine the resources and weaknesses of various philosophical methodologies. More importantly, the survey is used as the basis for arguing that existentialism, phenomenology, and analytic philosophy have recently developed in directions which suggest the possibility of formulating a new metaphysics which is at once contemporary and compatible with Christian philosophy as the author understands it. This new metaphysics is one which steers a middle ground between dogmatism and relativism. It is at once synoptic, in that it seeks a coherent understanding of the whole of reality by filling in the gaps in individual and collective experience; categorial, in that it forges categories which "picture the pervasive and formative characteristics of the world which are indicated by the large-scale structural aspects of experience and language rather than by particular observations or individual terms"; perspectival, in the sense that such a metaphysics elaborates a view of the world judged adapted to the philosopher's basic human commitments, to the empirical facts, and to formal laws of coherence and consistency, but in such a way that it remains open to changing attitudes and insights. Though its basic argument is not hard to grasp, this book is not easy to read. Partially this is due to a rather plodding style, but primarily it is the result of the structure of the book, which is such that the author discourses at a level of considerable generality on the doctrines of a great many different philosophers. He does this partially in order to illustrate his understanding of the dialogical character of philosophy. Nevertheless, the author's aims might well have been better served by a briefer, more sharply honed argument.--H. F. (shrink)

This book undertakes a twofold task: a theoretical examination of the foundations of human rights and an attempt to draw the practical implications of the resultant theory for contemporary society. There are, the author contends, three main traditions regarding human rights: The radical—humanistic tradition deduces rights from an uncritical veneration of man; its ground is a romantic view of man, its end, freedom, its regulatory principle, equality. The utilitarian tradition regards rights as pragmatic fictions; its ground is a hedonistic view (...) of man, its end, quantitative happiness, its regulatory principle, expediency. The metaphysical tradition derives rights from man’s place in a purposive order; its ground is a view of man related to something higher than himself, its end, a cosmic purpose, its regulatory principle, function. The first two traditions ultimately lack coherence. The metaphysical tradition has two subtypes: self-realization and theonomy. The author argues for a Calvinist version of the latter. Such a theory affirms man’s utter depravity, but affirms at the same time God’s righteous will as maintaining the destiny and, therefore, the rights of the elect. The ultimate ground of value and right is the gracious will of God. God owes nothing to man, but he does demand of man justice toward himself and toward other men. This is the foundation of values and of rights, which are claims that value be respected. Worth is the capacity of an entity to fulfill its proper end. The vocation of man has four dimensions: the unity of his moral will with God, creative perception, personal integration, and social communion. Empirically man is free, but totally depraved, and therefore unable to fulfill his function. By the atonement, God imputes to sinful man a value not inherent in him and makes man capable of fulfilling in principle the end for which he was created. This makes possible active love of neighbor, which, however, is a duty owed not to neighbors, but toward neighbor and to God. The practical conclusions drawn from this theory rest upon the fact that love of neighbor requires a universal context of impersonal justice and of freedom under law. Freedom is not an end in itself, but the political body has no higher purpose than assuring negative freedom—"reciprocal freedom from external constraint." From this basis the author proceeds to spell out in considerable detail "the implications of reciprocal freedom for particular areas of human conduct,... guided only by the evidence of social data and the rules of logical consistency." The general tenor of his conclusions is a fairly severe restriction on the scope of governmental action.—H. F. (shrink)

This introductory survey of Renaissance philosophy gives a clear outline of the major trends of European thought from Petrarch to Montaigne. The author emphasizes the discontinuity between the thought of this period and that of the middle ages. From the beginning, the Renaissance thinkers rightly emphasized not only their return to the classics but their originality as well. Rejecting the rigid systematic demarcations of later scholasticism, Renaissance thinkers syncretistically [[sic]] combined earlier positions in new ways. On two points the Renaissance (...) was radically innovative. First, it elaborated a new notion of man’s place in nature, which emphasized his creative power, his responsibility as citizen, and his right to freedom. Secondly, the Renaissance effected a transformation of man’s understanding of the cosmos, a transformation in which the critical and constructive thought of philosophers played a major role. The author begins her survey by outlining the two main varieties of Renaissance thought: the Platonism of Nicholas of Cusa, Ficino and Pico, and Northern Humanism and its relationships with the Protestant Reformation. This historical survey is followed by a consideration of two specific topics: the interaction between philosophy and science and the varieties of political thought. The book concludes by examining the skepticism of Montaigne with whom the Renaissance confidence in man, progress and learning, badly shaken by the Reformation and its aftermath, is spent. Finally, there are suggestions regarding the patrimony of achievements and problems which Renaissance philosophy bequeathed to modern times. In her exposition, the author achieves a commendable balance between generalization and discussions of specific thinkers and questions. Scholarly debates and minor figures are generally passed over. The literary and artistic aspects of the period are scarcely mentioned.—H. F. (shrink)

This book is part of a bibliographic series on the whole of philosophy by the author. Subsequent volumes will be Philosophy: Its Nature, Methods and Basic Sources and Philosophy: Its Histories, Systems and Specific Settings. The present volume aims at providing "selected and classified bibliographies in the fields of ethics, economics, law, politics, and sociology from the point of view of their relevance to philosophy." It contains a chapter on each of these subjects. Each chapter is in turn divided somewhat (...) as follows: general studies, particular periods and countries, special questions, and periodicals. Each subsection is introduced by a very brief description, when this is appropriate. There is a lengthy index of authors whose works are cited. The work is directed toward English-speaking students and so concentrates on studies in English. It is difficult to evaluate an undertaking of this scope, and one is almost inevitably disappointed when he turns to sections dealing with topics of special interest to him. One example will suffice. Those familiar with the sociology of religion will find that the listings under that heading include no works of Peter Berger, Thomas Luckmann or Thomas O'Dea, that of Weber's works on the sociology of religion only The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism is cited, and that none of the journals devoted to religious studies is mentioned among the specialized sociological periodicals. One cannot help but feel that the scope of this work is too ambitious for one man. Perhaps a collaborative effort or a select bibliography of bibliographies would have been a more feasible venture. On the other hand, this bibliography can, as the author intended, supply the student of philosophy with "selected writings which may lead to other treatises," and it may suggest to him "new fields for inquiry or research."--H. F. (shrink)

This compact and somewhat dense study seeks to probe several root ideas in Tillich’s thought, in the conviction that Tillich "is pre-eminent as ‘healer’ of rankling modern wounds—mental, moral, spiritual." In pursuing his aim, Professor Anderson views Tillich ironically, though not uncritically, from the standpoint of existential Thomism. Five pairs of ideas in Tillich’s thought provide the outline of the book. Symbol and faith as ultimate concern: "Tillichian symbols are objectively grounded analogies, revalatory of aspects of reality otherwise opaque to (...) us." Faith, a total act "wherein all the elements of one’s personality are ’synthesized’ and ‘transcended'," is expressible only in terms of revelatory analogies. The philosophy-theology duality: Both philosophy and theology are concerned with the meaning of Being, but they differ in three ways: philosophy probes the meaning of Being in itself, while theology considers its meaning for us; the attitude of the philosopher is intellectually detached, whereas that of the theologian is "personally committed in virtue of loving concern"; the content expressed by philosophy is "intelligible structure," whereas that of theology is "spiritual significance." Tillich’s conception of the philosophy of religion is dealt with in this context. Reason and Revelation: Ontological reason is a faculty for apprehending actual existence; technical reason is concerned with discovering means for ends. The divorce of these two functions of reason during the last one hundred years has been disastrous. By giving a truth which is both certain and of ultimate concern, revelation can reconcile the conflicts which reason experiences. Revelation is the unveiling of man’s personal ultimate concern in terms of symbols and myths. Anything can be the conveyor of revelation, since every being participates in Being-itself. Being and God: Being-itself is the Ground of Being, the Power of Being, the ineffable God. Though no thinker can avoid making God an object of knowledge, God transcends the subject-object structure. Being and Love: For Tillich, life is "being in actuality," and "love is the moving power of life," "the drive towards the unity of the separated." The highest form of love is agape, love of persons, and above all of God, for their own sake. All of this is well-trodden ground. However, Professor Anderson’s synthesis is careful, and his critical remarks are often helpful. His emphasis on the pervasiveness of love in Tillich’s understanding of being, reason, and faith, adds a dimension to which other commentators have paid less attention.—H. F. (shrink)

In this scholarly study, the author, a professor of theology at the University of Iowa, argues that Tillich's thought sought an answer to the problem posed by the questions: "What certainty is left for thought after men have become conscious that thinking itself is historical? If thinking is historically conditioned, can ontological thought ever achieve objective certainty and can theological thought ever achieve religious certainty?" Scharlemann endeavors to show that Tillich constructed his answer to these questions "with two basic ideas, (...) that of 'correlation' and that of a 'paradoxical reality and presence'." In the introduction the author establishes the critical terms which he will use to carry out his "constructive analysis." The first chapter sketches the historical development leading up to the question Tillich faced. The subsequent chapters present various contexts and aspects of Tillich's answer. In the final chapter the author indicates certain aspects of Tillich's thought which seem to be unclear or incomplete, certain contradictory motifs, an entirely new systematic structure which would retrace the same ground as did Tillich, but on a different and, the author believes, a more adequate analytic basis. This study will be of interest primarily to those who are already familiar with Tillich's thought. It is particularly thorough in its analysis of Tillich's early works. The author is quite conversant with the literature by and about Tillich and provides a useful bibliography.--H. F. (shrink)

The central concern of this erudite and lavish work is "to trace that part of the Lullian movement which was centered on Paris." The first part of the book sketches the life and character of Ramon Lull and his relationship to the politics of his age. Lull emerges as a fascinating person and thinker, whose life was intertwined in the thought and politics of the generation following the condemnation of 1277. Lull was a crusading yet irenic missionary to the Arabs. (...) At the same time he was a thinker whose thought was rooted in the traditional currents of Christian thought stemming from Anselm and Neo-Platonism, and quite opposed to Averroism. Yet he was also an impressively original theologian with great confidence in the demonstrative power of theological thought. The second part of Hillgarth’s study begins by showing that Paris was the most influential center for the diffusion of Lull’s thought in the fourteenth century. At Paris Thomas Le Myésier proves to have been a particularly influential Lullist. After chapters devoted to Le Myésier’s patrons and his manuscript collections, the central chapter of the book is devoted to a detailed discussion of Le Myésier’s compilations of Lull’s thought. In an epilogue, the subsequent fortunes of Lullism are traced in such figures as Heimeric van de Velde, Nicholas of Cusa, Ramon Sibiuda, Pier Leoni, Lefèvre d'Etaples and Ivo Salzinger. Considerable attention is given to Lullian manuscripts, both in the above mentioned chapters and in the appendices, which also include the Latin texts of some of Le Myésier’s works. This book, because of its price and its scholarly intent, will be of interest primarily to students with a special interest in Lull. However, the first part on Lull, the chapter on Le Myésier’s compilations, and the epilogue will also be helpful to anyone who wishes to bring himself abreast of recent scholarly study of Lull and his influence.—H. F. (shrink)

This volume is the second study of Sartre by the author, who is professor of French literature at the University of Leeds. It is part of a series designed for general readers and students whose "work at some time crosses the disciplines of psychology, literature, and philosophy." The approach is biographical, although the actual contents of the book are in large part a discussion, in chronological order of Sartre’s literary, philosophical, and political writings. The study is divided into three parts: (...) Sartre’s life and writings up to World War II; the period from 1940 through the early 1950’s; the most recent period, marked by Sartre’s growing political radicalism and disillusionment with literature. The author devotes considerable attention to Les Mots, Sartre’s autobiographical reflections on his childhood, in order to illustrate the threads of continuity and the basic reorientations in Sartre’s thought. What emerges is a three-pronged dialectic between Sartre’s early life, his social and political surroundings, and his own commitments. Professor Thody is quite appreciative of Sartre’s literary achievements, but more critical, though fair in his presentation, of Sartre’s philosophical and political writings. This book is a clear and accurate survey of Sartre’s writings. It is especially helpful regarding the last decade of Sartre’s career. There is a bibliography of Sartre’s works in French and some suggestions regarding books about Sartre.—H. F. (shrink)

This closely reasoned and clearly written volume presents an attempt to analyze and reassess the truth and validity of "the positions which the cosmological argument propounds and presupposes." Professor Reichenbach’s procedure is to begin by stating a plausible cosmological argument and then to defend it against criticism. The cosmological argument advanced begins with the existence of a contingent being and then argues, by means of principles of causality, to the existence of a necessary being. The first criticisms to be faced (...) are those against the principles of causality and sufficient reason. Here Hume is the principle antagonist. Secondly, the author argues, against analytic philosophers like A. J. Ayer, that propositions can be simultaneously both informative and necessary. Thirdly, Russell’s argument that the application of the causal principle in the cosmological argument involves the fallacy of composition is contested. Fourthly, the types of necessity in the conclusion of the author’s formulation of the cosmological argument are analyzed and defended. Finally, the author rejects Kant’s contention that the cosmological argument depends on the ontological argument and formulates some suggestions about how one could go beyond the cosmological argument proper to show how the necessary being to which the argument concludes could be identified with God. (shrink)

The author, who received his doctorate from Syracuse University and is head of the department of philosophy at Western Kentucky University, offers in this study "an interpretation of Augustine's doctrine of illumination that is significantly different from the ones proposed by scholars who belong to the Thomist tradition." Before addressing himself to the doctrine of illumination, he devotes more than half of the book to an overview of Augustine's epistemology. In these preliminary chapters he discusses the structure of St. Augustine's (...) theory of knowledge, and then Augustine's ideas on skepticism and truth, faith, sensation, and cogitation. The doctrine and texts covered in these chapters will be familiar to anyone who has devoted much time to the study of Augustine's thought. However, the author's treatment is noteworthy for its clear and succinct style. The sixth chapter broaches the question of man's knowledge of the rationes aeternae. Negatively, Augustine explicitly rejected some explanations of how man's mind can know the forms in the divine mind. Positively, "Augustine's theory of illumination includes at least three major points: God is light and illumines all men to different degrees; There are intelligible truths, the rationes aeternae, which God illumines; and the mind of man can know the divine truths only as God illumines him." The final two chapters are devoted to four interpretative theories of Augustine's notion of illumination. Three of these theories Dr. Nash rejects: that of St. Thomas which identifies the divine light and the agent intellect; the Franciscan theory which attributes the function of the agent intellect to God; the Formal approach, ascribed to Gilson and Copleston among others, which maintains that "the function of illumination... is not to give the human mind some definite content but simply to convey the quality of certainty and necessity to certain ideas." Arguing that all these theories are inadequate, the author then presents his own interpretation, a modified ontologism, which he feels provides a solution to the key paradoxes in Augustine's theory of illumination. Although one wishes that the author had discussed more fully man's knowledge of God, and although there may be need for a more careful scrutiny of Augustine's use of cogitatio, this book is to be recommended as a lucid discussion of a difficult subject. The index and notes are helpful, and the book well made.--H. F. (shrink)

The author, a tutor in philosophy at the University of Melbourne, attempts to take a fresh look at the traditional problem of theodicy: is the existence of an omnipotent and good God compatible with the presence of evil in the world? Focusing his attention primarily on the writings of English-speaking theists and their critics in the analytic tradition, he argues that "the main arguments of both theist and nontheist fail and that evil leaves God's existence an open question." The study (...) begins with the interesting and basic argument that there are, in fact, "three distinct kinds of problems about the logical compatibility of God and evil": the general, abstract question whether the existence of even one instance of any kind of evil logically excludes the existence of a good and omnipotent God; the specific abstract questions whether the existence of God is compatible with specific sorts, degrees, or numerical instances of evil; the specific concrete questions whether, granted possible conditions for the compatibility of theistic belief with evil in the world, these conditions are met in our world. In what is the most thorough section of the book, he argues regarding the general question that: "It cannot be shown that, if any evil exists, a wholly good, omnipotent being could not exist." "It seems possible to show that a wholly good, omnipotent being could exist, if some evil exists." Then he makes similar, but rather summary, claims regarding the specific abstract problems. Finally, regarding the specific concrete problems, he examines four theistic attempts to deal with them and concludes that all such attempts cannot be very successful. One might wish that the basic terms of the discussion--omnipotence, perfect goodness, and evil--had been more fully examined and that the abstract, logical questions with which the author deals had been related more directly to the lived experience of the theist and the atheist. However, within the limits he sets to his consideration, the author's work, especially his mapping of the problem, is careful and illuminating.--H. F. (shrink)

The thesis of this book is that "wonder is the foundation of the whole of philosophy.... It is not only the beginning but also the end; it guides and accompanies thought. It is not only the first but also the last word." This is because "wonder is man’s attitude in the face of the mystery of things." That is, "in wonder, things are no longer what they were and it can thus be said that they lose their identity.... Only when (...) we decide to think no further do things acquire an apparent identity." Thought and wonder live only in the distance between the trivial identity of things and their infinitely deferred divine identity. Wonder, and therefore philosophy, are threatened on many sides: by a complacency which takes things as simply thus and so, by general education which equips one to converse about many things but gives knowledge of nothing, by haste which rushes by things without noticing them, by systematization and certitude impatient with identity deferred. The study of philosophy as an academic discipline is no guarantee of wonder and can even be its enemy. The author’s intent is to excite wonder, to provide an incitement to philosophy. The ten chapters of the book orchestrate his theme from different starting points and by different paths. The starting points are as different as the symbolism of the noonday sun, Plato’s myths, poetic response to a rose in bloom, and the nature of gift and festivity. The paths are lyrical, etymological, phenomenological. The cumulative effects are not so much clear and distinct ideas as paradoxes. The result is a provocative and often obscure book, which makes considerable demands upon the reader. As such, it hardly seems like the sort of book one would hand to an undergraduate who wanted to know what philosophy is about. Rather, it might better be thought of as a book for people who think they know what philosophy is about, a book which could serve to make one wonder if he does know what philosophy and many other things are and are not.—H. F. (shrink)

This anthology contains ten selections on the philosophy of religion, all of which were written by English-speaking analytic philosophers. The opening selection contains the contributions of Antony Flew, R. M. Hare, and Basil Mitchell to the University discussion on theology and falsification. This first selection, written in 1951, establishes the basic problematic for the book, as indeed it has for much of the discussion of religion among analytic philosophers during the last twenty years. The next three chapters in the book (...) contain articles by I. M. Crombie, John Hick, and R. B. Braithwaite which further develop the question of the falsifiability of religious statements. These are followed by articles by J. L. Mackie and Alvin Plantinga which give contrary interpretations regarding the impact of the existence of evil upon the credibility of religious assertions. The remaining chapters contain discussions of religious belief by D. Z. Phillips and H. H. Price, and of the possibility of deciding the question of the existence of God by R. W. Hepburn and Terence Penelhum. The editor provides a helpful introduction which shows the relationships between the various articles and underscores the main contributions of each. The editor also provides a useful and ample bibliography of English-language books and articles on the philosophy of religion, most of them by analytic philosophers. The bibliography is arranged according to the subject-matter covered in the text. This is a representative and useful anthology of the analytic philosophy of religion. It makes clear what are the major questions which interest analytic philosophers of religion, what procedures these thinkers use to try to answer these questions, and what some of their answers are. The editor suggests that if there is a single lesson to be learned from his anthology, it is that the philosophy of religion demands both philosophical competence and a sympathetic understanding of the religious subject-matter. Another lesson one could easily draw from this collection is that the strength of analytic philosophy of religion lies in its logical exactitude and clarity of expression, while a major weakness is its neglect of the wealth of data regarding religion provided by phenomenology, the history of religions, and the social sciences.--H. F. (shrink)

The author intends this book to be a theoretical contribution to the sociology of knowledge. Her main effort is to isolate and describe what she takes to be four irreducible systems of knowledge which dictate, for those who share in them, "thinking and action concerned with the nature of the world." The four systems of knowledge, which she calls magical, religious, mystical and scientific, are connected to specific types of thought. There are three basic types of thought connection: empirical, rational, (...) and abstractive. Empirical thought establishes connections at the purely observational level, whereas rational thought, of which mathematical and metaphysical systems are examples, makes connections only at the theoretic level. By contrast, abstractive thinking connects the observational and theoretic levels. Magical thought is purely empirical. Mystical thought accepts the evidence of empirical observation, but seeks to abstract the individual's thought to a theoretic end state which is not rational. Religious knowledge combines rational connections among concepts with abstractive connection of concepts to observables, but the religious concepts are not identified with any empirical objects. Finally, scientific thought combines rational, empirical and abstractive thought. Each of these four systems of knowledge has a characteristic conception of power. In a magical system, power consists of the ability to gain observable ends. For mystical knowledge systems, power is the individual's achievement of escape from empiricism and rationalism. In religious systems individuals may have authority, but power belongs exclusively to "god." In scientific systems of knowledge, power "consists of ability to theoretically anticipate or explain empirical transformations." Likewise, each of the four systems of knowledge is related in some way to certain social situations. In the light of these theoretical distinctions, the author examines a number of theories and developments in social science and the history of thought. She finds Malinowski's distinctions between magic, religion and science quite inadequate. Weber's sociology of religion fares better. She invokes the development of planetary astronomy, of mechanics, and of evolutionary biology to illustrate her definition of science. Finally, the problem of knowledge in the modern world is seen to be due not to an overemphasis on science as she defines it, but to the persistence of magical thought in the political, economic and social spheres. Though the author's efforts at definition are interesting, this is in many ways a difficult and unsatisfying book. Written in a lapidary style, which is lacking both in grace and connectives, the book utilizes historical and sociological data very selectively. No reference is made to what has been done in the sociology of knowledge by Scheler, Mannheim, Berger and Luckmann. Finally, the book bristles with questionable epistemological assumptions and with statements which seem quite incompatible with the findings of recent work in the study of religion.--H. F. (shrink)

The author attempts a dispassionate philosophical evaluation of Ayn Rand's "objectivist" philosophy. Although Professor O'Neill's evaluation is generally negative, he takes great pains to be fair and accurate. For example, there are more than eight hundred footnote references to objectivist literature. The book is divided into two unequal parts. The first and shorter part presents a summary of the cardinal doctrines of objectivism, under three thematic headings: knowing and the knower; personal value and the nature of man; the ethics of (...) objectivism. In presenting the material pertinent to each of these themes, the author employs a great many direct quotations in order to avoid as much as possible the charge of misrepresenting Miss Rand's thought. The major portion of the book is then devoted to criticism of objectivist philosophy. Whenever possible the author employs a method of internal criticism the basic strategy of which is to ask whether objectivist principles are coherent in themselves and in relation to other aspects of the doctrine. Next the author asks whether the various tenets of objectivist theory are true. This means, he says, to ask whether these tenets are empirically verifiable in principle, and whether they are confirmed or disconfirmed by contemporary scientific findings. This book is the only such study available, and thus is useful for anyone interested in its subject matter. The author wisely tries to confine his discussion to basic philosophical issues and to avoid being diverted into arguments about economics and politics. Nevertheless, both of the book's major parts are somewhat unsatisfactory. The presentation of objectivist philosophy tends to be a disjointed collection of quotations and ideas, grouped together under various subheadings. It could be said that this disconnectedness merely reflects the character of objectivism itself, but it should be possible to formulate a more organic statement of the major objectivist tenets. One method would be to approach objectivism through Miss Rand's ethical preoccupation with laissez-faire capitalism, which, as Professor O'Neill recognizes, is her primary concern. Similarly, the evaluative part of the book is more of an arsenal of arguments against various objectivist assertions than an integrated critique.--H. F. (shrink)

In spite of its title, this work is primarily a study of Whitehead's philosophy of God. The author's purpose is limited to presenting Whitehead's thought regarding God, together with the most cogent arguments which can be advanced in support of it. Hence, he is not concerned with evaluating either Whitehead's philosophy of God or the metaphysical presuppositions underlying it. The book is divided into three parts. The first part begins with a consideration of the reasons why the world, as Whitehead (...) conceives of it, requires that a God exist. Then the author seeks to clarify what sort of entity God can be inferred to be, if he is to perform the functions which the world requires of him, and how God can act on the world to perform these functions. In the second part St. Thomas Aquinas' doctrine of God's creation of the world is used as a point of contrast to show why Whitehead rejects the traditional Christian teaching of creation ex nihilo and what is the Whiteheadian notion of divine creation. The final part of the study shows why Whitehead thought that the notion of God as a divine monarch is ethically repugnant and argues that Whitehead's alternative notion of God is morally relevant. Professor Thompson admirably succeeds in accomplishing his purpose. His synthesis of Whitehead's philosophy of God is lucid and cogent. Although portions of the book presuppose some acquaintance with Whitehead's philosophy, it generally does not require of the reader a detailed knowledge of Whiteheadian philosophy. An extensive bibliography of literature on Whitehead's thought is provided.--H. F. (shrink)

This book is part of a bibliographic series on the whole of philosophy by the author. Subsequent volumes will be Philosophy: Its Nature, Methods and Basic Sources and Philosophy: Its Histories, Systems and Specific Settings. The present volume aims at providing "selected and classified bibliographies in the fields of ethics, economics, law, politics, and sociology from the point of view of their relevance to philosophy." It contains a chapter on each of these subjects. Each chapter is in turn divided somewhat (...) as follows: general studies, particular periods and countries, special questions, and periodicals. Each subsection is introduced by a very brief description, when this is appropriate. There is a lengthy index of authors whose works are cited. The work is directed toward English-speaking students and so concentrates on studies in English. It is difficult to evaluate an undertaking of this scope, and one is almost inevitably disappointed when he turns to sections dealing with topics of special interest to him. One example will suffice. Those familiar with the sociology of religion will find that the listings under that heading include no works of Peter Berger, Thomas Luckmann or Thomas O'Dea, that of Weber's works on the sociology of religion only The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism is cited, and that none of the journals devoted to religious studies is mentioned among the specialized sociological periodicals. One cannot help but feel that the scope of this work is too ambitious for one man. Perhaps a collaborative effort or a select bibliography of bibliographies would have been a more feasible venture. On the other hand, this bibliography can, as the author intended, supply the student of philosophy with "selected writings which may lead to other treatises," and it may suggest to him "new fields for inquiry or research."--H. F. (shrink)