Although there are numerous and significant differences between the theories of scientific growth and change proposed by Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan, they all hold that specific scientific theories should be viewed as constitutive of more comprehensive theories. Kuhn calls those more general theories ‘paradigms’, Lakatos labels them ‘research programmes’ and Laudan refers to them as ‘research traditions’. They all argue that scientists are much more willing to give up the specific theory within a given research programme rather than the programme (...) itself, and that individual theories should be viewed as attempts to increase the overall explanatory power of the more general theories, since the ultimate concern of the scientist is with the success of the general rather than the specific theory. When a basic theory or research programme is confronted with severe criticism, proponents attempt to protect the hard core or central elements of their programme through the invention of auxiliary hypotheses. Good auxiliary hypotheses adequately answer the objections for which they are designed, and suggest new avenues of research. In 1928, Arthur Holmes provided proponents of continental drift theory with an auxiliary hypothesis which afforded them a badly needed account of the forces responsible for continental drift. Although Holmes' proposal was not ultimately correct, it was the first plausible alternative offered by an exponent of the continental drift research programme. (shrink)

It is without doubt that the earth sciences were rocked to the core by a revolution in the late sixties with the initial acceptance of Harry Hess’s hypothesis of seafloor spreading and subsequent development and acceptance of plate tectonics. The major aim of this essay is to show precisely why this revolution is not Kuhnian. However, my reasons for claiming that Kuhn’s model fails to apply are at variance with Ruse [27] but in much agreement with R. Laudan [18]. I (...) shall highlight our differences as space permits.There are two general accounts of the rise of continental drift and plate tectonics which satisfy Kuhn’s model of scientific growth and change. (1) The geosciences prior to the acceptance of seafloor spreading and plate tectonics were in a pre-paradigm state. Earth scientists solved no problems within geological domains, but only argued among themselves about which of the various schools of thought provided the best framework for attacking geological problems. (shrink)

The general thesis that science is essentially a problem-solving activity is extended to the development of new fields. Their development represents a research strategy for generating and solving new unsolved problems and solving existing ones in related fields. The pattern of growth of new fields is guided by the central problems within the field and applicable problems in other fields. Proponents of existing research traditions welcome work in new fields, if they believe it will increase the problem-solving effectiveness of their (...) tradition. Correspondingly, researchers in new fields will graft their work onto established traditions, if they believe it will augment the problem-solving effectiveness of their work. The above claims are defended through using the development of paleomagnetism as a case study. (shrink)