The objective of this paper is to outline challenges associated with the inclusion of welfare issues in breeding goals for farm animals and to review the currently available methodologies and discuss their potential advantages and limitations to address these challenges. The methodology for weighing production traits with respect to cost efficiency and market prices are well developed and implemented in animal breeding goals. However, these methods are inadequate in terms of assessing proper values of traits with social and ethical values (...) such as animal welfare, because such values are unlikely to be readily available from the product prices and costs in the market. Defining breeding goals that take animal welfare and ethical concerns into account, therefore, requires new approaches. In this paper we suggest a framework and an approach for defining breeding goals, including animal welfare. The definition of breeding goals including values related to animal welfare requires a multidisciplinary approach with a combination of different methods such as profit equations, stated preference techniques, and selection index theory. In addition, a participatory approach involving different stakeholders such as breeding organizations, food authorities, farmers, and animal welfare organizations should be applied. We conclude that even though these methods provide the necessary tools for considering welfare issues in the breeding goal, the practical application of these methods is yet to be achieved. (shrink)
Reason and quest for revelation, by P. Tillich.--On the ontological mystery, by G. Marcel.--The problem of non-objectifying thinking and speaking, by M. Heidegger.--The problem of natural theology, by J. Macquarrie.--Metaphysical rebellion, by A. Camus.--Psychoanalysis and religion by E. Fromm.--Why I am not a Christian, by B. Russell.--The quest for being, by S. Hook.--The sacred and the profane; a dialectical understanding of Christianity, by T. J. J. Altizer.--Three strata of meaning in religious discourse by C. Hartshorne.--The theological task, by J. B. (...) Cobb.--Theology and objectivity, by S. A. Ogden.--Can faith validate God-talk? by K. Nielsen.--The logic of God, by J. Wisdom.--Mapping the logic of models in science and theology, by F. Ferré.--On understanding mystery, by I. T. Ramsey.--Teilhard de Chardin; a philosophy of precession, by E. R. Baltazar.--The nature of apologetics, by H. Bouillard.--Metaphysics as horizon, by B. Lonergan.--Deciding whether to believe, by M. Novak. (shrink)
This lecture is divided, roughly, into three parts. First, there is a general and perhaps rather simple-minded discussion of what are the ‘facts’ that social anthropologists study; is there anything special about these ‘facts’ which makes them different from other kinds of facts? It will be useful to start with the common-sense distinction between two kinds or, better, aspects of social facts; first—though neither is analytically prior to the other—and putting it very crudely, ‘what people do’, the aspect of social (...) interaction, and second, ‘what—and how—people think’, the conceptual, classifying, cognitive component of human culture. Now in reality, of course , these two aspects are inextricably intertwined. But it is essential to distinguish them analytically, because each aspect gives rise to quite different kinds of problems of understanding for the social anthropologist. We shall see that the problem of how to be ‘objective’, and so to avoid ethnographic error, arises in both contexts, but in rather different forms in each. (shrink)
Commentators are divided on the interpretation of Metaphysics Z4 1029b13–22. For one thing, it is unclear whether the passage rejects a claim about the essence of surface, or about the essence of pale. It is usually thought that the claim is disavowed because it involves a circular definition. However, this is conjectural, since Aristotle does not explicitly say anything about circularity in the lines in question. I argue here for an alternative account, which reads the disputed lines as an extension (...) of the immediately preceding remarks. If correct, this also solves the problem as to just what Aristotle is denying. As will emerge, my story is helped by St. Thomas’ reading of lines 21–22, an account that has been curiously ignored in the recent literature. (shrink)
In this paper, we will explain and analyse a phenomenological distinction between two kinds of actions. The distinction we have in mind is the difference between those actions that actors try, or are satisfied, to carry out, in like situations, ‘in the same way’, and all other actions. We call the first kind ‘mimeomorphic actions’ and the second kind ‘polimorphic actions’. We will define these two kinds of actions, and their species, on the basis of their characteristic intentions and experiences, (...) and thus our inquiry falls broadly into the phenomenology of action. The latter has been defined by D. W. Smith as the “description of the experience of acting, or doing something”. (shrink)
ISBN-13: 978-0-226-11360-9 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-226-11360-4 ... HM651.C64 2007 158.1—dc22 2007022671 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information ...
This book consists of four major papers written by Peter Achinstein, Peter Geach, Wesley Salmon, and J. L. Mackie. Each of the papers has two commentaries. Achinstein’s paper is commented on by Mary Hesse and R. Harré; Geach’s paper, by Peter Winch and Grete Henry; Salmon’s paper, by D. H. Mellor and L. Jonathan Cohen; Mackie’s paper, by Renford Bambrough and Martin Hollis. Each author of the original paper then replies to his two commentators. All four papers are concerned with (...) some aspect of the concept of explanation. Achinstein’s and Salmon’s papers are extensions and justifications of their previous work. For example, Salmon has argued against Hempel’s account of scientific explanation and has maintained that certain scientific explanations are not arguments of any kind, and that consequently they need not embody the high probabilities that would be required to provide reasonable ground for expectation of the event to be explained. He argues instead that a statistical explanation of a particular event "consists of an assemblage of factors relevant to the occurrence or non-occurrence of the event to be explained, along with the associated probability values". He indicates in the present volume that he does not wish to create the impression "that ability to transmit a mark is any mysterious kind of necessary connection or ‘power’ of the sort Hume criticized in Locke". There is little likelihood that Salmon would be misconstrued in this way. Also there is recent literature to the effect that Locke was clearer on the issues of causality than Hume and that there is nothing "mysterious" in Locke’s notion of powerful particulars. Why are they any more mysterious than the passive particulars preferred by Humeans? (shrink)