‘According to informational semantics, if it's necessary that a creature can't distinguish Xs from Ys, it follows that the creature can't have a concept that applies to Xs but not Ys.’ There is, indeed, a form of informational semantics that has this verificationist implication. The original definition of information given in Dretske'sKnowledge and the Flow of Information, when employed as a base for a theory of intentional representation or ‘content,’ has this implication. I will argue that, in fact, most of (...) what an animal needs to know about its environment is not available as natural information of this kind. It is true, I believe, that there is one fundamental kind of perception that depends on this kind of natural information, but more sophisticated forms of inner representation do not. It is unclear, however, exactly what ‘natural information’ is supposed to mean, certainly in Fodor's, and even in Dretske's writing. In many places, Dretske seems to employ a softer notion than the one he originally defines. I will propose a softer view of natural information that is, I believe, at least hinted at by Dretske, and show that it does not have verificationist consequences. According to this soft informational semantics, a creature can perfectly well have a representation of Xs without being able to discriminate Xs from Ys. (shrink)

This paper highlights the corrective and complementary role that historically informed philosophy can play in contemporary discussions. What it takes for an experience to count as genuinely mystical has been the source of significant controversy; most current philosophical definitions of ‘mystical experience’ exclude embodied, non-unitive states -- but, in so doing, they exclude the majority of reported mystical experiences. I use a re- examination of the full range of reported medieval mystical experiences (both in the apophatic tradition, which excludes or (...) denigrates embodied states, and in the affective tradition, which treats such states as fully mystical) to demonstrate how a better understanding of the historical medieval mystic tradition can serve as a valuable complement to ongoing philosophical discussions of religious and mystical experience. (shrink)

This paper critically evaluates Amie Thomasson’s (2003; 2005; 2006) view of the conscious mind and the interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction that it adopts. In Thomasson’s view, the phenomenological method is not an introspectionist method, but rather a “transparent” or “extrospectionist” method for acquiring epistemically privileged self-knowledge. I argue that Thomasson’s reading of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction is correct. But the view of consciousness that she pairs with it—a view of consciousness as “transparent” in the sense that first-order, world-oriented experience is (...) in no way given to itself—is not compatible with it. Rather, Thomasson’s view is, from a Husserlian vantage point, self-undermining in the same way that any genuinely skeptical view is self-undermining: it undermines the conditions of its own possibility. This is one of the motives Husserl has for developing a same-order view of self-consciousness as the complement to his transparent method for self-knowledge acquisition. (shrink)

Recent interest in the problem of verisimilitude stemmed originally from Popper's desire to provide a non-inductive criterion of merit that will select between two false theories) But the problem has also been taken up by others who are not committed to Popper's anti-inductivism. Indeed Ilkka Niiniluoto has argued that the estimated degree of truthlikeness of a generalisation g which is compatible with evidence e can be equated with the inductive probability of g on e, wherever g is a constituent in (...) Hintikka's sense. It might therefore be worth while to approach the problem afresh, in order to determine quite generally whether a measure of verisimilitude is what is principally needed for the evaluation of scientific progress. I shall argue that it is not. (shrink)

In this chapter I consider the relation of history of philosophy to the history of science. I argue that though these two disciplines are naturally linked, they also have special commitments that distinguish each from the other. I begin with the history of the history of science, a discipline that was once allied with philosophy of science but that has increasingly evolved toward social history. Then I consider the debate over whether the history of philosophy is essential for, or rather (...) largely irrelevant to, contemporary “analytic” philosophy. My conclusion is that the relation of history of philosophy to philosophy is best conceived in terms of the relation of history of science to history. Finally, I consider a particular case study of the relation of history of science to history of philosophy that concerns contextualist scholarship on early modern philosophy and science. (shrink)

Coronavirus disease 2019 escalated into a real pandemic within 3.5 months and had caused 183 000 deaths in 2020. The complexities of COVID-19 since the end of 2019 and throughout 2020 left a mouth full and the second wave has not least to be said. The purpose of this article is to challenge the response of the church in a time when her voice is mostly needed. During the lockdown Level 5, churches were amongst the many trends that had to (...) close their doors to the believers and the community. This was a great shock because churches throughout history have been known as safe havens and anchorages. Churches helped with answers to unanswered questions, and in some instances, confessional statements and creeds were born. In the case of COVID-19, a lot of conspiracy theories went viral about COVID-19 and the vaccines that were still in their research stage. Lots of speculations rose as to the cause of this pandemic. The implementation of 5G was viewed as the cause of the coronavirus at the beginning of 2020, and much had to be done to correct this fallacy. Another controversial fallacy was the link of the vaccination with the beast's mark, as was recently also insinuated in Chief Justice's prayer. Questions have already been asked, what is the voice of the church in this regard? Congregation deals with this in different ways. Hence the relevance to the question, how timely can exegesis be to contemporary ecclesiology? What would be relevant hermeneutics that could assist in embodying faith in a corona-defined world? CONTRIBUTION: This article strives to develop an interpretation of 666 that could be relevant to the questions asked and suggest a way forward in embodying faith in a corona-defined world and beyond. (shrink)

"According to informational semantics, if it's necessary that a creature can't distinguish Xs from Ys, it follows that the creature can't have a concept that applies to Xs but not Ys." (Jerry Fodor, The Elm and the Expert, p.32).

Abstractabstract:This essay offers some insights that "hybridity" utilized as a hermeneutical paradigm might contribute to the wider theological conversations going on about the global ecological crisis. The hybridity in question here is—what can be expressed as a—"Christian-Buddhist hybridity." That refers to a sensibility that seriously takes into consideration the two spiritual–religious traditions of Christianity and Buddhism as a "hybrid way" to view the world in general and spiritual–religious–theological themes in particular.This study will argue that, despite the significant gains in the (...) Catholic Christian reflection on ecology achieved through Pope Francis' Laudato Si', it cannot be denied that Christian theology in general, as well as how it treats ecological themes in particular, is still fundamentally characterized by an anthropocentric focus that dualistically distinguishes too strongly between humans, on the one hand, and nature, on the other. Thus, Christian theological reflection on ecology might be helped and complemented by utilizing a nondual and unitive paradigm. One such paradigm is the Buddhist teaching on interbeing as expressed, for example, by teachers such as Thich Nhat Hanh.Moreover, the goal of hybridity (as a hermeneutical tool) is to build a world in which the thick wall between "us" and "them" can be hammered and broken down in favor of a new worldview in which the intimate connections among different worlds are highlighted and in which the presence of what we typically consider "other" is increasingly found within our very own selves. In that sense, Buddhism and aspects of the Dharma about Sunyata or Emptiness do seem to be a more effective means to realize hybridity's goal of overcoming and transcending the radical divide between "us" and "them" (with "them" in this case being "Nature"). (shrink)

We have been studying cognition and learning in research laboratories in the field of biomedical engineering. Through our combining of ethnography and cognitive-historical analysis in studying these settings we have been led to understand these labs as comprising evolving distributed cognitive systems and as furnishing agentive learning environments. For this paper we develop the theme of 'models-in-action,' a variant of what Knorr Cetina has called 'knowledge-in-action.' Among the epistemically most salient objects in these labs are so called "model systems," which (...) are designs that blend engineering with the study and use of biological systems for purposes of simulative model-based reasoning. We portray the prevalent design-orientation in this engineering specialty and how the prevailing activity of cell-culturing in these labs transitions into a design activity for the bio-medical engineers, leading them to work with 'wet' devices. We discuss how devices, 'wet' and 'dry,' situate model-based understandings and how they participate in model systems in these labs. Models tend to come in clusters or configurations, and the model systems in these labs are epistemically salient junctures of interlocking models. Model systems in these labs evolve thereby consolidating what we want to call a 'fabric of interlocking models,' which functions as point of stability and departure in these labs. We convey a taste of such a 'fabric' for a tissue-engineering lab. We conjecture that through this 'fabric' extended developments in technology and methodology have a 'situated' presence in the workings of these labs. (shrink)

The recent debate over “republican” conceptions of freedom as non-domination has re- invigorated philosophical discussions of freedom. However, “neo-Roman” republicanism, which has been characterized as republicanism that respects equality, has largely ignored the work of Alexis de Tocqueville, although he too took his task to be crafting a republicanism suited to equality. I therefore provide a philosophical treatment of the heart of Tocqueville’s republicanism, including an analysis of his conception of freedom as freedom in combined action and a philosophical reconstruction (...) of his primary argument for the importance of this kind of freedom. A comparison of Philip Pettit’s and Tocqueville’s republicanism exposes limitations in the neo-Roman conception of freedom as non-domination and its ideal of the free citizen and shows why neo-Roman republicanism, to live up to its motivating ideals, should accommodate elements of “neo- Athenian” republicanism and freedom in combined action. (shrink)

Circunscrever de modo consensual e rigoroso aquilo a que se convencionou chamar “filosofia antiga” não é tarefa que levante dificuldade. Com efeito, se encararmos este conceito de um ponto de vista histórico, imediatamente se perfila um determinado quadro temporal, decorrendo grosso modo entre os séculos VII a.C. e VI d.C., mediando a emergência da primeira especulação em moldes filosóficos, com Tales de Mileto, e os últimos testemunhos de um pensamento especificamente grego ou “pagão”, com o neoplatonismo, dentro do qual é (...) possível reconhecer uma sucessão de determinados períodos, fases e épocas, bem como o florescimento de outras tantas correntes e escolas, que esgotam e estruturam a filosofia antiga. Todavia, o que assim se encontra exposto é simplesmente a filosofia antiga enquanto conceito historiográfico, ou, se se preferir, é a história da filosofia antiga: e enquanto conceito historiográfico, a filosofia antiga deixa-se, de facto, retratar nestes termos, convergindo numa larga periodização de conjunto, que todos reconhecem e respeitam. Ora, se é de admitir um consenso em torno da circunscrição histórica da filosofia antiga, o mesmo não é possível dizer da sua caracterização filosófica. E não o é, desde logo, porque não existe sequer consenso quanto à tese preliminar segundo a qual, para além da sua descrição histórica, a filosofia antiga é também passível de uma perspectivação filosófica, isto é, a tese segundo a qual, longe de ser apenas um período histórico-filosófico, ela configura antes de mais um modo de consciência particular, cujo reconhecimento como tal modo de consciência constituiria justamente a aludida caracterização filosófica do conceito de filosofia antiga. É nesta segunda direcção que segue o presente texto. E, ao prossegui-la, a resposta à questão enunciada no título, “há filosofia antes dos gregos?”, impor-se-á, assim o esperamos, por si mesma. (shrink)

Although contemporary Western culture and criticism has usually valued composition over improvisation and placed the authority of a musical work with the written text rather than the performer, this essay posits these divisions as too facile to articulate the complex dynamics of making music in any genre or form. Rather it insists that music should be understood as pieces that are created with specific intentions by composers but which possess possibilities of interpretation that can only be brought out through performance.

Em consideração às posturas de Kuhn e seus críticos, voltaremos nossa atenção para refletirmos sobre a possibilidade de uma ciência normal. A pergunta motivadora do problema central deste texto será: Há realmente uma ciência normal no sentido proposto por Kuhn? Pretendemos oferecer uma resposta que anuirá parcialmente com o ideal kuhniano de ciência normal.

O presente trabalho utiliza a chamada “concepção semântica” das teorias físicas para examinar o estudo realizado por Descartes sobre o fenômeno do arco-íris. Essa concepção parece ser a mais adequada para esse caso, tendo em vista o privilégio dos modelos na abordagem cartesiana. Nesse sentido, não parece ser possível concluir que esse estudo se configure como uma teoria física, como estimam alguns autores, embora Descartes tenha obtido valores corretos para o raio do arco-íris,ao fazer uso da lei de refração.

The debate about how to solve the paradox of fiction has largely been a debate between Kendall Walton and the so-called thought theorists. In recent years, however, Jenefer Robinson has argued, based on her affective appraisal theory of emotion, for a noncognitivist solution to the paradox as an alternative to the thought theorists’ solution and especially to Walton's controversial solution. In this article, I argue that, despite appearances to the contrary, Robinson's affective appraisal theory is compatible with Walton's solution, at (...) the core of which lies the thesis that there are quasi-emotions. Moreover, since Robinson's theory is compatible with Walton's solution, I show how it can be used as a model to empirically test whether quasi-emotions exist. (shrink)

Amidst a crowded field of contenders, the Scopes trial retains a powerful claim to the title Trial of the Past Century, with repercussions that have already extended well into the next. As an acutely divisive event in American scientific, legal, political, educational and religious life, the Scopes trial has persistently attracted commentators intent on mapping the dense network of persons and interests forcefully drawn together in Dayton, Tennessee in the often hotly contentious proceedings of July 10–21, 1925. These commentators have (...) been keen to explore both the foundations and the far-reaching consequences of courtroom polemics, sometimes with their own polemical intentions laid bare: from journalist H. L. .. (shrink)

This article discusses how the words 'necessary' and 'analytic' are suitably used in philosophy. It is argued that analytic statements should not be called 'necessary'.

Conventional wisdom holds two seemingly opposed beliefs. One is that communities are often much better than individuals at dealing with certain situations or solving certain problems. The other is that crowds are usually, and some say always, at best as intelligent as their least intelligent members and at worst even less. Consistency would seem to be easily re-established by distinguishing between advanced, sophisticated social organizations which afford the supporting communities a high level of collective performance, and primitive, mob-like structures which (...) pull the group towards the lower end of the achievement scale. But this reconciliation meets with some objections. The most familiar ones concern the mixed record of elaborate social systems, which are said to occasionally or even, according to some accounts, systematically produce wrong decisions, poor assessments, disastrous plans, counterproductive measures, etc. A more recent set of objections rests on cases where ‘crowds’, i,e, groups not organized in a sophisticated way, produce good results, in fact, results which better those of most, or even all, members of the group. Such cases are collected in James Surowiecki’s book The Wisdom of Crowds, which argues more generally in favor of an ‘order out of chaos’ view of collective thinking: whether sophisticated or simple, social organizations for the production of knowledge or problem-solving can benefit from the absence of certain individualistc constraints which are traditionally thought to foster excellence in cognitive tasks. This flavor of paradox is enhanced by Surowiecki’s choice of phrase: at the surface level, ‘wisdom of crowds’ conflicts with the well-entrenched cliché of the folly1 of crowds; but at a deeper level, Surowiecki seems to appeal to one frequent connotation of ‘wisdom’ which is precisely its paradoxical character. Whether Surowiecki actually intended to exploit this.. (shrink)

In the first chapter of Confucius: The Secular as Sacred, Herbert Fingarette argues that in the Analects Confucius holds the essence of human virtue to be a kind of magic power and this magic can be explained in terms of J. L. Austin’s analysis of the “performative utterance.” This paper attempts to explicate what Fingarette’s claims concerning magic and the “performative” amount to. I will argue that even though there is something to the underlying spirit of Fingarette’s project, he either (...) misused or simply misunderstood Austin and, because of this misuse or misunderstanding, he has possibly misunderstood Confucius as well. (shrink)

In the Tractatus Russell’s caveat against linguistic reflexivity becomes a caveat against reflective thought. The paper explores the relation between these. There is a connection, perhaps exemplified by 1789, between reflection on one’s assumptions and change. The same connection may be exemplified by violation of Russell’s system of levels. Even though Russell never explored this area, they will be violated by interactions of the macroscopic and microscopic. These interactions, like the philosophical questioning of assumptions, are a source of change and (...) instability, of the failure of assumptions or presuppositions, and with it of aporia. Russell’s system of levels precludes these. An aim of avoiding presupposition failure links type theory to “On Denoting.” It is likely that the resistance to reflexivity has its origin in Russell’s rejection of the philosophy of Hegel where reflective thought is the motor of historical development. (shrink)

Background In end-of-life situations, the phrase “do everything” is sometimes invoked by physicians, patients, or substitute decision-makers, though its meaning is ambiguous. We examined instances of the phrase “do everything” in the archive of the Ontario Consent and Capacity Board in Canada, a tribunal with judicial authority to adjudicate physician–patient conflicts in order to explore its potential meanings. Methods We systematically searched the CCB’s online public archive from its inception to 2018 for any references to “do everything” in the context (...) of critical care medicine and end-of-life care. Two independent assessors reviewed decisions, collected characteristics, and identified key themes. Results Of 598 cases in the archive, 41 referred to “do everything” in end-of-life situations. The phrase was overwhelmingly invoked by SDMs, typically to advocate for life-prolonging measures that contradicted physician advice. Physicians generally related “doing everything” to describe the interventions they had already performed, using it to recommend focusing on patients’ quality of life. SDMs were generally reluctant to accept death, whereas physicians found prolonging life at all costs to be morally distressing. The CCB did not interpret appeals to “do everything” legally but followed existing laws by deferring to patients’ prior wishes whenever known, or to concepts of “best interests” when not. The CCB generally recommended against life-prolonging measures in these cases, focusing on patients’ “well-being” and “best interests.” Conclusions In this unique sample of cases involving conflict surrounding resuscitation and end-of-life care, references to “do everything” highlighted conflicts over quantity versus quality of life. These appeals were associated with signs of cognitive distress on the behalf of SDMs who were facing the prospect of a patient’s death, whereas physicians identified moral distress related to the prolongation of patients’ suffering through their use of life-sustaining interventions. This divergence in perspectives on death versus suffering was consistently the locus of conflict. These findings support the importance of tools such as the Serious Illness Conversation Guide that can be used by physicians to direct conversations on the patients’ goals, wishes, trade-offs, and to recommend a treatment plan that may include palliative care. Trial Registration Not applicable. (shrink)

The word “autonomy” has many uses in contemporary philosophy and culture, some of them helpful. But Joel Feinberg says, “I am autonomous if I rule me, and no one else rules I.” Certain philosophers turn this sort of sentiment into an argument against religion. A principle of obedience to God—so they say—violates one’s personal autonomy. In the present paper, I reply to such arguments and try to sort out what is acceptable and what is unacceptable about autonomy.

Security cameras have become a ubiquitous part of everyday life in most major cities, yet each new camera seems to come with cries of foul play by defenders of privacy rights. Our long history with these cameras and CCTV networks does not seem to have alleviated our concerns with being watched, and as we feel ourselves losing privacy in other areas the worry generated by security cameras has remained. Our feelings of disquiet, however, are unnecessary as they stem from an (...) erroneous view of the self. The following argues that this view of an autonomous and atomistic self is both detrimental and inaccurate. (shrink)

O discurso didático que a escola vem construindo ao longo da história da educação brasileira tem em seu bojo o centralismo epistemológico eurocêntrico institucionalizado. Sendo assim, entendemos ser necessário a constante problematização em torno desses discursos na ação docente. Neste artigo, temos como objetivo analisar a forma como são discursivizadas a História e Cultura Afro-Brasileiras, Africanas, e Indígenas no discurso didático do livro de Física do Ensino Médio Integrado ao Técnico em uso no IFBA, campus Eunápolis. Realizamos uma pesquisa bibliográfica (...) por meio da análise de um corpus constituído de materialidades advindas da coleção, Compreendendo a Física, Alberto Gaspar – 3. ed. – São Paulo: Ática, 2016. Para isso mobilizamos a análise do discurso de linha francesa, as teorias fundantes desta pesquisa de perspectiva multicultural e decolonial, bem como discussões acerca do Livro Didático, esse aparato didático tão presente nas salas de aula e tão pouco consensual. Os resultados apontam que o discurso didático da coleção analisada, não se movimenta para a efetivação de fato da legislação específica do Ensino de História e Cultura Afro-brasileira na rede regular de educação básica. Por isso podemos afirmar que há necessidade de ampliação no plano conceitual e epistemológico do que significa construir uma proposta didática sob a perspectiva racial, que considere para o ensino de Física, as epistemologias africanas e indígenas que potencializam a descolonização deste artefato cultural. Palavras-chave: Relações étnico-raciais. Livro didático. Descolonização. Discurso didático. (shrink)

Social-cognitive psychologists' problem orientation is, in itself, no threat to the generation of normatively neutral general theory. What would put general theory at risk is, rather, the reliance on a valence-balancing explanatory heuristic. Fortunately, social-cognitive research communities have resources to override this heuristic and utilize more epistemically effective cultural tools.

We are surrounded by threats of environmental harm whose actual dangers to public health are scientifically unverified. It is widely presumed that under conditions of uncertainty, when it is not possible to foresee the outcomes of our actions, or to calculate the probability they will actually cause harm, we cannot be held culpable for the risks and harms our actions impose on others. It is commonly presumed, that is, that exposing others to what this paper terms ‘uncertain threats’ is permissible, (...) because conventional theories of moral responsibility understand uncertainty as implying that the effects of our actions are out of our control and, therefore, beyond our fault. In contrast, in rejecting arguments from moral luck, this paper denies that authors of uncertain threats of environmental harm are excusably ignorant, and denies that prevailing uncertainty diminishes their moral obligations or attenuates their culpability. For under conditions of uncertainty, culpability turns on the lack of due regard for others as moral equals – a consideration that neither luck nor ignorance excuses. To expose others to unconsented-to uncertain threats of harm without exercising due care to prevent possible injury is to wrongfully gamble with their welfare and their capacity for self-authorship. (shrink)

There is disagreement concerning the relevance of scientific data to a theological account of the nature of human beings. I contend that science is indeed relevant, but not in a way that should lead us to discount philosophical and theological ideas about human nature. I mention five different findings of science that have significant implications for our understanding of the mind-body relationship.