22 found
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  1.  82
    How is Recalcitrant Emotion Possible?Hagit Benbaji - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):577-599.
    A recalcitrant emotion is an emotion that we experience despite a judgment that seems to conflict with it. Having been bitten by a dog in her childhood, Jane cannot shake her fear of dogs, including Fido, the cute little puppy that she knows to be in no way dangerous. There is something puzzling about recalcitrant emotions, which appear to defy the putatively robust connection between emotions and judgments. If Jane really believes that Fido cannot harm her, what is she afraid (...)
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  2.  81
    Is Thomas Reid a Direct Realist About Perception?Hagit Benbaji - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):1-29.
    The controversy over the interpretative issue—is Thomas Reid a perceptual direct realist?—has recently had channelled into it a host of imaginative ideas about what direct perception truly means. Paradoxically enough, it is the apparent contradiction at the heart of his view of perception which keeps teasing us to review our concepts: time and again, Reid stresses that the very idea of any mental intermediaries implies scepticism, yet, nevertheless insists that sensations are signs of objects. But if sensory signs are not (...)
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  3. Constitution and the Explanatory Gap.Hagit Benbaji - 2008 - Synthese 161 (2):183-202.
    Proponents of the explanatory gap claim that consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account of how a physical thing could be identical to a phenomenal one. We fully understand the identity between water and H2O but the identity between pain and the firing of C-fibers is inconceivable. Mark Johnston [Journal of philosophy , 564–583] suggests that if water is constituted by H2O, not identical to it, then the explanatory gap becomes a pseudo-problem. This is because all (...)
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  4.  52
    The Charitable Perspective: Forgiveness and Toleration as Supererogatory.Hagit Benbaji & David Heyd - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):567-586.
  5.  22
    Reid on Causation and Action.Hagit Benbaji - 2003 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 1 (1):1-19.
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  6.  11
    On the Asymmetry Between Twin Earth and Inverted Earth.Hagit Benbaji - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):137-150.
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  7. Reid's View of Aesthetic and Secondary Qualities.Hagit Benbaji - 1999 - Reid Studies 2:31-46.
     
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  8.  46
    Why Colour Primitivism?Hagit Benbaji - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):243-265.
    Primitivism is the view that colors are sui generis properties of physical objects. The basic insight underlying primitivism is that colours are as we see them, i.e. they are categorical properties of physical objects—simple, monadic, constant, etc.—just like shapes. As such, they determine the content of colour experience. Accepting the premise that colours are sui generis properties of physical objects, this paper seeks to show that ascribing primitive properties to objects is, ipso facto, ascribing to objects irreducible dispositions to look (...)
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  9.  37
    What Can We Not Do at Will and Why.Hagit Benbaji - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1941-1961.
    Recently it has been argued that we cannot intend at will. Since intentions cannot be true or false, our involuntariness cannot be traced to “the characteristic of beliefs that they aim at truth”, as Bernard Williams convincingly argues. The alternative explanation is that the source of involuntariness is the shared normative nature of beliefs and intentions. Three analogies may assimilate intentions to beliefs vis-à-vis our involuntariness: first, beliefs and intentions aim at something; second, beliefs and intentions are transparent to the (...)
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  10.  48
    Emotional Insight, by Michael S. Brady.Hagit Benbaji - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):173-175.
  11.  90
    Two-Dimensionalism and the “Knowing Which” Requirement.Hagit Benbaji - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (1):55-67.
    Two-dimensional semantics aims to eliminate the puzzle of necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori truths. Recently many argue that even assuming two-dimensional semantics we are left with the puzzle of necessary and a posteriori propositions. Stephen Yablo (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 81, 98–122, 2000) and Penelope Mackie (Analysis, 62(3), 225–236, 2002) argue that a plausible sense of “knowing which” lets us know the object of such a proposition, and yet its necessity is “hidden” and thus a posteriori. This paper answers (...)
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  12.  74
    Token Monism, Event Dualism and Overdetermination.Hagit Benbaji - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):pp. 63-81.
  13.  53
    Material Objects, Constitution, and Mysterianism.Hagit Benbaji - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):1-26.
    It is sometimes claimed that ordinary objects, such as mountains and chairs, are not material in their own right, but only in virtue of the fact that they are constituted by matter. As Fine puts it, they are “onlyderivatively material”. In this paper I argue that invoking “constitution” to account for the materiality of things that are not material in their own right explains nothing and renders the admission that these objects are indeed material completely mysterious. Although there may be (...)
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  14.  3
    The Charitable Perspective: Forgiveness and Toleration as Supererogatory.Hagit Benbaji & David Heyd - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):567-586.
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  15.  28
    Primitivism and the Analogy Between Colors and Values.Hagit Benbaji - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (5):621-639.
    The analogy between colors and values is strongly interlinked with the idea that these properties are by nature dispositions or response-dependent properties. Indeed, that colors are essentially visible, and values are inherently motivational, cries out for a dispositional or a response-dependent account. Recently, Primitivism has challenged the viability of the dispositional account of colors, taking the apple, for instance, to be “gloriously, perfectly, and primitively red.” Unsurprisingly, the attack on the dispositional account of colors has found a moral analogue in (...)
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  16.  31
    On the Pragmatic Explanation of Concessive Knowledge Attributions.Hagit Benbaji - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):225-237.
    On Lewis’s reading, fallibilism is the contradictory view that it is possible that S knows that p, even though S cannot eliminate some remote scenarios in which not-p. The pragmatic strategy is to make the alleged contradiction a mere pragmatic implicature, which is explained by false conversational expectations. I argue that the pragmatic strategy fails.
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  17.  10
    Two Uses of the Analogy Between Colors and Values.Hagit Benbaji - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Research 40:171-188.
    This paper distinguishes two different uses of the analogy between colors and values, the projectivist and the objectivist. The projectivist use of the analogy has a long history, which goes back to Hume. The objectivist use of the analogy is a fairly recent addition. The core contention of this paper is that the projectivist’s use fails, and that only the objectivist offers a genuine use for the analogy between colors and values.
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  18.  13
    Persons and Mysterianism.Hagit Benbaji - 2013 - Dialogue 52 (1):165-188.
    The aim of this paper is to argue against the widely held view that our concept of person is purely mental. Utilizing an Anscombian scenario, in which reports on one’s own actions are made on the basis of observation, I argue that such “pilots in their ships,” as it were, cannot self-ascribe bodily properties. The mere fact that we feel in our bodies unlike pilots in their ships cannot generate the intuition that we are bodily: as long as we conceive (...)
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  19.  22
    Is There a Puzzle About Water?Hagit Benbaji - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (2):207-218.
    Mark Johnston argues that the identity between water and H2O generates a puzzle: Ice is related to H2O just as water is related to H2O. If water is identical to H2O, so is ice, and we end up with an absurdity: water is ice. This paper suggests a way to preserve the identity between water and H2O without this absurd result.
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  20. The Nomological Principle and the Argument for Anomalous Monism.Hagit Benbaji - 2005 - Iyyun 54 (January):90-108.
  21.  1
    Token Monism, Event Dualism and Overdetermination.Hagit Benbaji - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):63-81.
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  22. What Colors Look Like.Hagit Benbaji - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 10.
     
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