Until very recently, feminist criticism has not had a theoretical basis; it has been an empirical orphan in the theoretical storm. In 1975, I was persuaded that no theoretical manifesto could adequately account for the varied methodologies and ideologies which called themselves feminist reading or writing.1 By the next year, Annette Kolodny had added her observation that feminist literary criticism appeared "more like a set of interchangeable strategies than any coherent school or shared goal orientation."2 Since then, the expressed goals (...) have not been notably unified. Black critics protest the "massive silence" of feminist criticism about black and Third-World women writers and call for a black feminist aesthetic that would deal with both racial and sexual politics. Marxist feminists wish to focus on class along with gender as a crucial determinant of literary production. Literary historians want to uncover a lost tradition. Critics trained in deconstructionist methodologies with to "synthesize a literary criticism that is both textual and feminist." Freudian and Lacanian critics want to theorize about women's relationship to language and signification.· 1. See my "Literary Criticism," Signs 1 : 435-60.· 2. Annette Kolodny, "Literary Criticism," Signs 2 : 420.Elaine Showalter is professor of English at Rutgers University. The author of A Literature of Their Own: British Women Novelists from Bronte to Lessing, she is currently completing The English Malady, a study of madness, literature, and society in England. (shrink)
We present an inferentialist account of collective rationality and intentionality, according to which beliefs and other intentional states are understood in terms of the normative statuses attributed to, and undertaken by, the participants of a discursive practice—namely, their discursive or practical commitments and entitlements. Although these statuses are instituted by the performances and attitudes of the agents, they are not identified with any physical or psychological entity, process or relation. Therefore, we argue that inferentialism allows us to talk of collective (...) intentionality and agency without needing to posit the existence of any sort of collective psychology or mind. (shrink)
Traditional expressivists want to preserve a contrast between the representational use of declarative sentences in descriptive domains and the non-representational use of declarative sentences in other areas of discourse. However, expressivists have good reasons to endorse minimalism about representational notions, and minimalism seems to threaten the existence of such a bifurcation. Thus, there are pressures for expressivists to become global anti-representationalists. In this paper I discuss how to reconstruct in non-representationalist terms the sort of bifurcation traditional expressivists were after. My (...) proposal is that the relevant bifurcation can be articulated by appeal to the contrast between relativistic and non-relativistic assertoric practices. I argue that this contrast, which can be specified without appeal to representational notions, captures the core intuitions behind the expressivist bifurcation. (shrink)
La narración común sobre la metafísica de Francisco Suárez entre un grupo diverso de pensadores es que el jesuita presenta una ontología «indiferente» que descuida la concepción medieval tradicional de Dios como absolutamente trascendente y única. Aunque las críticas dirigidas contra Suárez son legiones e igualmente diversas como las críticas de las que derivan, tal como yo lo entiendo, hay una convicción común a todas ellas, aunque no expresada, de que el pensamiento del jesuita finalmente resulta en la secularización de (...) la metafísica. Por «secularización» me refiero a que, como se afirma con frecuencia, el análisis de Suárez sobre la naturaleza del ser ocurre por completo sin la necesidad de advertir sobre ningún marco teológico general. En este ensayo, cuestiono ese punto de vista y sostengo que la metafísica de Suárez está completamente determinada por su visión teológica y su proyecto. (shrink)
This paper examines the meaning of what Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II calls “The Law of the Gift,” namely, “Man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself, can fully find himself only through a sincere gift of himself.” After explaining what it means to be “willed for itself,” I consider how “finding oneself only through a gift of self ” is justified. I then argue that in his theory of self-gift,Wojtyła/John Paul II espouses an “embodied” altruism. (...) Two objections to Wojtyła/John Paul II’s account are also addressed: (1) the idea that finding fulfillment (moral goodness) through self-giving is incompatible with altruism and (2) that reciprocal self-giving is incompatible with altruism. I defend Wojtyła/John Paul II’s notion of self-giving against these objections in several ways, but focus on evidence for the compatibility of subjective enrichment and altruism. (shrink)
Understanding how a nurse acts in a particular situation reveals how nurses enact their ethics in day-to-day nursing. Our ethical frameworks assist us when we experience serious ethical dilemmas. Yet how a nurse responds in situations of daily practice is contingent upon all the presenting cues that build the current moment. In this article, we look at how a home care nurse responds to the ethical opening that arises when the nurse enters a person’s home. We discuss how the home (...) presents the nurse with knowledge that informs the provision of ethical nursing care. The analysis is based on findings from an interpretive research study in palliative home care in Canada. Through interpretive analysis of a nursing situation we delineate how the nurse engages with the whole and acts inside the moment. The analysis shows how home care nurses are ethically determined to engage with whatever is going on in a patient’s home. (shrink)
In this paper I argue that defeasible inferences are occasion-sensitive: the inferential connections of a given claim depend on features of the circumstances surrounding the occasion of inference. More specifically, it is an occasion-sensitive matter which possible defeaters have to be considered explicitly by the premises of an inference and which possible defeaters may remain unconsidered, without making the inference enthymematic. As a result, a largely unexplored form of occasion-sensitivity arises in inferentialist theories of content that appeal to defeasible inferences.
Daniel Whiting has argued, in this journal, that Mark Schroeder’s analysis of knowledge in terms of subjectively and objectively sufficient reasons for belief makes wrong predictions in fake barn cases. Schroeder has replied that this problem may be avoided if one adopts a suitable account of perceptual reasons. I argue that Schroeder’s reply fails to deal with the general worry underlying Whiting’s purported counterexample, because one can construct analogous potential counterexamples that do not involve perceptual reasons at all. Nevertheless, I (...) claim that it is possible to overcome Whiting’s objection, by showing that it rests on an inadequate characterization of how defeat works in the examples in question. (shrink)
In the paper we obtain a new characterization of the BCK-algebras which are subdirect product of BCK-chains. We give an axiomatic algebraizable extension of the BCK-calculus, by means of a recursively enumerable set of axioms, such that its equivalent algebraic semantics is definitionally equivalent to the quasivariety of BCK-algebras generated by the BCK-chains. We propose the concept of "linearization of a system" and we give some examples.
This presentation aims to clarify the historical and theoretical background of the studies included in this issue of Philosophiques, which focus on the work of Husserl during the period of Halle . After a brief description of Husserl’s early years of apprenticeship in philosophy between 1876 and his studies with Brentano in Vienna, I identify several steps that marked the development of his philosophy from his arrival in Halle to the publication of the Logical Investigations : his studies (...) under the direction of C. Stumpf, the publication of the first volume of Philosophy of Arithmetic, the researches belonging to the project of the second volume of this work, the abandonment of this project and the development of the phenomenology of the Logical Investigations. The last part of this paper is an examination of the philosophical issues underlying the disputatio on D. W. Smith’s recent book on Husserl’s philosophy. (shrink)
This paper is an evaluation of C. S. Peirce’s late essay “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God”, based on the two logical values that he calls “productiveness” and “security.” After reviewing the unique logical form of “abduction” and noting that it is a formal fallacy—and so enjoys less “security” than deduction or induction—I turn to the extraordinary case of abduction that is found in “A Neglected Argument.” I argue that the productiveness of the Neglected Argument is found in (...) its ability to instigate practical results. The security of the Neglected Argument, on the other hand, is rooted in an activity Peirce calls “musement,” a kind of rational intuition. Moreover, I suggest that Peirce’s notion of “musement,” which has remained something of a mystery in Peirce studies, arose from hisearly reading of Friedrich von Schiller’s aesthetics. (shrink)
Este artículo sitúa el marco fenomenológico-hermenéutico en torno al otro y desarrolla la hipótesis de que la cuestión de la intersubjetividad es central para entender las categorías fundamentales relativas a todo pensar acerca de la alteridad que se plantean en filosofía, en literatura y en los discursos sociopolíticos, ya que implican una cuestión central acerca de la analogía. Asumiendo la obra de E. Husserl, y en especial los comentarios contemporáneos sobre Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, se avanza en un enfoque interdisciplinario del (...) “otro” y del “alter ego” --propias de una analítica de la experiencia humana--, demostrando que la experiencia de la sociabilidad se forja a partir de vivencias originarias que refieren a un determinado modo de entender el vínculo analógico entre el yo y el otro y los otros. This article situates the phenomenological-hermeneutical framework around the other and develops the hypothesis that the issue of intersubjectivity is central in understanding the fundamental categories related to any thought regarding alterity which are proposed in philosophy, in literatura, and in socio-political discourse, since it implies a central questioning about the analogy. Assuming the work of E. Husserl, and especially the contemporary comments on Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität,we advance toward an interdisciplinary focus of the “other” and the “alter ego” --proper to an analysis of the human experience--, demonstrating that the experience of sociability is forged from the original life experiences that refer to a determined way of understanding the analogic relationship between the self and the other and the others. (shrink)
In this paper I discuss Albert the Great’s notion of univocal analogy, which he raised in his Commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius’s De divinis nominibus. While other scholars such as Francis Ruello and Alain de Libera have addressed “analogy” as it pertains to Albert, I intend to treat the “univocal” aspect of “univocal analogy” so as to explain how it informs Albert’s teaching on analogy, and how it remains opposed to any pantheistic reduction of God to creature. While my own account remains (...) close to that of Ruello and De Libera, I hope to show how primacy is to be accorded to univocity in such a manner that, in actual reality, for Albert, it is analogy that qualifies univocity rather than vice versa. (shrink)
En este nuevo libro, del reconocido sociólogo portugués y perspicaz pensador de las grandes transformaciones socio-económicas y culturales de la globalización, se nos presenta -bajo un título provocativo- una relevante teoría de las ciencias sociales críticas. Esta elaboración teorética quiere dar efectivamente cuenta de la enorme complejidad de los procesos inherentes a la globalización hegemónica, y al mismo tiempo, a la rica dinámica de alternativas y resistencias plurales presentes en lo..
This article explores Bonaventure’s metaphysical account of creation, which holds that at the heart of every creature is a sort of metaphysical vanity. That vanity stems from the exigencies of a creation metaphysics in which the creator-God draws every creature out of nothingness into being. But, while God’s creative act sustains the creature in being, the nothingness from which God preserves creation, on Bonaventure’s view, always remains a feature of creation’s metaphysical constitution. In short, for the Seraphic Doctor, because nothingness (...) always resides in creation, creation itself is fundamentally vain. Since vanity is a central theme in the book of Ecclesiastes, concerning which Bonaventure has left us a commentary, I argue that the metaphysical vision he employs to illuminate the nature of vanity as it pertains to creation—both within his biblical commentary and beyond—can be properly described as a “metaphysic of Ecclesiastes.”. (shrink)
The dorsal and medial pallial formations of mammals, birds, and reptiles show overall functional striking similarities. Most of these similarities have been frequently considered examples of convergent evolution. However, a considerable amount of neurobiological comparative evidence suggests the presence of a common basic pattern of vertebrate forebrain organization. This common pattern can support functional conservation.
Collingwood's attitude toward literary sources is related to the method of selective excavation. But as an excavator, Collingwood came in for some criticism from his fellow archaeologists. Collingwood's treatment of four historical problems is considered: why Caesar invaded Britain, why Augustus did not, how the Claudian conquest proceeded, and why Hadrian built his wall and vallum. Collingwood concluded that Caesar intended to conquer, Augustus did not, and that the vallum served a civil rather than military purpose. In trying to identify (...) past thought Collingwood approaches literary sources and archaeological remains with particular questions in mind. Questions and answers being correlative, this often amounts to having made up his mind in advance. When he comes to the evidence itself, he sees what he expects to see ; occasionally what he sees is not in fact there. Where Collingwood creates a history, Peter Salway sometimes seems to be summarizing a subject. With Collingwood, however, we more than participate in processes of thought, we actually see the connections. Collingwood makes the real rational, and no historian of Roman Britain has done that better. (shrink)