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Hans Peters [5]Hans Peter Peters [1]
  1.  99
    On Loss Aversion in Bimatrix Games.Bram Driesen, Andrés Perea & Hans Peters - 2010 - Theory and Decision 68 (4):367-391.
    In this article three different types of loss aversion equilibria in bimatrix games are studied. Loss aversion equilibria are Nash equilibria of games where players are loss averse and where the reference points—points below which they consider payoffs to be losses—are endogenous to the equilibrium calculation. The first type is the fixed point loss aversion equilibrium, introduced in Shalev (2000; Int. J. Game Theory 29(2):269) under the name of ‘myopic loss aversion equilibrium.’ There, the players’ reference points depend on the (...)
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  2. Mass-Mediated Expertise as Informal Policy Advice.Hans Peter Peters, Harald Heinrichs & Imme Petersen - 2010 - Science, Technology, and Human Values 35 (6):865-887.
    Scientific policy advice is usually perceived as a formalized advisory process within political institutions. Politics has benefited from this arrangement because the science-based rationalization of policy has contributed to its legitimacy. However, in Western democratic societies, scientific expertise that is routinely mobilized to legitimate political positions has increasingly lost its power due to controversial expertise in the public sphere in particular within the mass media. As a consequence of the medialization of science, political decision makers are increasingly confronted with mass-mediated (...)
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  3.  39
    On the Effect of Risk Aversion in Bimatrix Games.Caroline Berden & Hans Peters - 2006 - Theory and Decision 60 (4):359-370.
    Nash equilibria with identical supports are compared for bimatrix games that are different with respect to the risk aversion of player 2. For equilibria in 2× 2-bimatrix games and for equilibria with efficient supports in coordination games it is established for which cases increased risk aversion of player 2 benefits or hurts player 2.
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  4. Euklid Elemente, Buch X. Nach Heibergs Text übertragen von Theodor.Hans Peters - 1936 - Kant-Studien 41:127.
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  5.  25
    Risk Aversion in N-Person Bargaining.Hans Peters & Stef Tijs - 1985 - Theory and Decision 18 (1):47-72.
  6.  5
    Set and Revealed Preference Axioms for Multi-Valued Choice.Hans Peters & Panos Protopapas - 2021 - Theory and Decision 90 (1):11-29.
    We consider choice correspondences that assign a subset to every choice set of alternatives, where the total set of alternatives is an arbitrary finite or infinite set. We focus on the relations between several extensions of the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives on one hand, and conditions on the revealed preference relation on sets, notably the weak axiom of revealed preference, on the other hand. We also establish the connection between the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives and so-called (...)
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