This paper studies Sentence 16 of Porphyry's Pathways to the Intelligible. It is argued that it should be understood against the background of Plotinus' discussions of the similes of the waxen block and the aviary from Plato's Theaetetus. The first part of the paper concentrates on Plotinus' reception of these similes. In the second part of the paper Plotinus' discussions of the two similes are used to shed light on Sentence 16, in particular on the term προχείρισις. Furthermore it is (...) argued that Porphyry does not reject Plotinus' claim that, pace Aristotle, intellection does not require imaging. (shrink)
Achille Nicolas Isnard an engineer with a keen interest in political economy, is best known for demonstrating the concept of market equilibrium using a system of simultaneous equations. The breadth and depth of his work undoubtedly established him as one of the forerunners of modern mathematical economics, yet his seminal contributions to the study of economics remained largely unrecognized until the latter half of the twentieth century. This pioneering new book, the first in English, examines Isnard’s life and illuminates his (...) major contributions to political economy. It contains substantial extracts from a number of his publications presented both in English translation and in the original French so Isnard can now finally achieve his place at the heart of discussion on the origins of mathematical economics. The diverse issues covered here will ensure that this book appeals not only to economists with an interest in the history of mathematical economics, but to anyone interested in the emergence of political economy and in wider social thought during the Enlightenment. (shrink)
This book explores the various views on language and its relation to philosophy in the Platonic tradition by examening the reception of Plato’s Cratylus in antiquity in general, and the commentary of the Neoplatonist Proclus in particular.
In this article, I respond to critiques of my book Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). I address issues that are raised concerning objectivity, the nature of the object, the role of transcendental apperception and the imagination, and idealism. More in particular I respond to an objection against my reading of the necessary existence of things in themselves and their relation to appearances. I also briefly respond to a question that relates to the debate (...) on Kantian nonconceptualism, more in particular, the question whether Kant allows animals objective intentionality. Lastly, I respond to one objection against my reading of Hegel’s critique of Kant. (The copy uploaded here is an English translation of the original Dutch version that is published in the journal.). (shrink)
L’article propose une réflexion autour de deux personnages qui, à deux moments-clés du xxe siècle, ont pratiqué un art du « faux », de façon quasi inversée sur les plans moral et artistique : Hans Van Meegeren et Elaine Sturtevant. Après un exposé de leurs pratiques comme de leurs destins, il tente de montrer comment ont fonctionné des systèmes de légitimation de formes artistiques a priori problématiques, en produisant des effets parfois logiques, parfois contradictoires ; et comment des contextes (...) idéologiques mais surtout une phraséologie bien précise à laquelle ont participé les protagonistes eux-mêmes, ont permis l’instauration d’œuvres profondément ambiguës où des valeurs telles que l’engagement, l’intégrité, voire l’authenticité, sont restées, en dernière analyse, essentielles. (shrink)
This paper aims at presenting the work of Dutch architecture Hans van der Laan through a comparison with the Renaissance architect Leon Battista Alberti by stating the similarity of the role assigned to proportion in architectural design by both architects. In particular, the study will show how both Van der Laan and Alberti understood proportion and the perceptive and aesthetic values of proportioned forms as the result of an intellectual appreciation.
In this paper we investigate Accardi's claim that the "quantum paradoxes" have their roots in probability theory and that, in particular, they can be evaded by giving up Bayes' rule, concerning the relation between composite and conditional probabilities. We reach the conclusion that, although it may be possible to give up Bayes' rule and define conditional probabilities differently, this contributes nothing to solving the philosophical problems which surround quantum mechanics.