In his critique of rational choice theory, Amartya Sen claims that committed agents do not (or not exclusively) pursue their own goals. This claim appears to be nonsensical since even strongly heteronomous or altruistic agents cannot pursue other people's goals without making them their own. It seems that self-goal choice is constitutive of any kind of agency. In this paper, Sen's radical claim is defended. It is argued that the objection raised against Sen's claim holds only with respect to individual (...) goals. Not all goals, however, are individual goals; there are shared goals, too. Shared goals are irreducible to individual goals, as the argument from we-derivativeness and the argument from normativity show. It is further claimed that an adequate account of committed action defies both internalism and externalism about practical reason. (shrink)
In my Mind and World I appeal to second nature, which, according to Hans-Peter Kr ger, plays a central role in Plessner's philosophical anthropology. But I think this convergence is less significant than Kr ger suggests.This note differentaties my purpose-to disarm the temptation to think perceptual experience, natural as it is, could not figure in what Sellars called “the space of reasons”-from Plessner's, which is to disarm the temptation to hope for an ahistorical insight into what is properly authoritative (...) over the shape of our lives. (shrink)
The concept of fairness as mutual advantage has been developed in the tradition of social contract theory. In this framework society is seen as an enterprise that coordinates the activities of its members in order to advance their interests. All acceptable social rules are in the interest of each member of society. Rules are agreed unanimously – no rules can be enforced against the interest of someone. It is assumed that individuals are basically self-interested and rational. Radical libertarianism claims that (...) individuals do not have to accept any a priori constraints on their behavior. “Libertarianism focuses on negative freedom”. (shrink)
Die Arbeit war von der Lykienforschung lange erwartet worden. Denn die wichtigen Entdeckungen lykischer Kirchen und Klöster durch M. R. Harrison in den 60er Jahren des vergangenen Jahrhundert boten nur eine kursorische Dokumentation dieser Denkmäler, die noch viele Fragen offen ließ. Daher versprachen die 1976 und 1977 durchgeführten Surveys der beiden Autoren entscheidende „Nachbesserungen“ und neue Erkenntnisse. Leider blieb das Manuskript ganze 20 Jahre liegen, ehe es zum Druck gegeben wurde, der dann noch einmal sechs Jahre auf sich warten ließ. (...) Es fußt auf einem Forschungsstand von 1997. Damit konnte der in den letzten Jahren erfolgte Schub jüngerer Forschung zu frühbyzantinischen Denkmälern Lykiens nicht mehr berücksichtigt werden. Es sei daher hier jeweils auf die jüngsten relevanten Arbeiten verwiesen. (shrink)
In recent years new findings in vertebrate neuroanatomy have challenged received views on the evolution of the brain. Established theories suggesting that new structures are added to older structures or that old structures are modified into new ones are being re-evaluated. Modification processes, such as invasion and parcellation, have proved to be less valid than originally assumed. Discoveries of neuroanatomical homologies add to the cladistic interpretation problems.