This is the introduction to Seeing Wittgenstein Anew, eds. William Day & Victor J. Krebs (Cambridge UP, 2010), a collection of essays on Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect-seeing. Section 1: Why Seeing Aspects Now?; Section 2: The Importance of Seeing Aspects; Section 3: The Essays. (The front matter to Seeing Wittgenstein Anew appears above under "Books.").
This study investigated the extent to which people interpret real-life moral dilemmas in terms of an internal moral orientation, as Gilligan (1982, 1988) has suggested, or in terms of the content of the dilemma, as Wark and Krebs (1996, 1997) have reported. Thirty women and 30 men listed the issues they saw in descriptions of real-life prosocial, antisocial and social pressure types of moral dilemma. Results revealed that Gilligan's model underestimates the influence of dilemma content. Moral dilemmas differed in (...) the extent to which they were viewed in terms of the same issues by different participants. There was relatively little within-person consistency in moral orientation. There were four gender differences. Compared to men, women rated social pressure dilemmas as involving more care-orientated issues, and prosocial dilemmas as more significant. Compared to women, men viewed all dilemmas as involving more justice-based issues, and reported experiencing more antisocial dilemmas. (shrink)
Refinements in Darwin’s theory of the origin of a moral sense create a framework equipped to organize and integrate contemporary theory and research on morality. Morality originated in deferential, cooperative, and altruistic ‘‘social instincts,’’ or decision-making strategies, that enabled early humans to maximize their gains from social living and resolve their conflicts of interest in adaptive ways. Moral judgments, moral norms, and conscience originated from strategic interactions among members of groups who experienced confluences and conflicts of interest. Moral argumentation buttressed (...) by moral reasoning is equipped to generate universal and impartial moral standards. Moral beliefs and standards are products of automatic and controlled information-processing and decision making mechanisms. To understand how people make moral decisions, we must understand how early evolved mechanisms in the old brain and recently evolved mechanisms in the new brain are activated and how they interact. Understanding what a sense of morality is for helps us understand what it is. (shrink)
The National Library of Finland and the Von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Helsinki keep the collected correspondence of Georg Henrik von Wright, Wittgenstein’s friend and successor at Cambridge and one of the three literary executors of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. Among von Wright’s correspondence partners, Elizabeth Anscombe and Rush Rhees are of special interest to Wittgenstein scholars as the two other trustees of the Wittgenstein papers. Thus, von Wright’s collections held in Finland promise to shed light on the (...) context of decades of editorial work that made Wittgenstein’s later philosophy available to all interested readers. In this text, we present the letters which von Wright received from Anscombe and Rhees during the first nine months after Wittgenstein’s death. This correspondence provides a vivid picture of the literary executors as persons and of their developing relationships. The presented letters are beautiful examples of what the correspondence as a whole has to offer; it depicts – besides facts of editing – the story of three philosophers, whose conversing voices unfold the human aspects of inheriting Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. Their story does not only deal with editing the papers of an eminent philosopher, but with the attempt to do justice to the man they knew, to his philosophy and to his wishes for publication. (shrink)
Seeing Wittgenstein Anew is the first collection to examine Ludwig Wittgenstein’s remarks on the concept of aspect-seeing. These essays show that aspect-seeing was not simply one more topic of investigation in Wittgenstein’s later writings, but, rather, that it was a pervasive and guiding concept in his efforts to turn philosophy’s attention to the actual conditions of our common life in language. Arranged in sections that highlight the pertinence of the aspect-seeing remarks to aesthetic and moral perception, self-knowledge, mind and consciousness, (...) linguistic agreement, philosophical therapy, and “seeing connections,” the sixteen essays, which were specially commissioned for this volume, demonstrate the unity of not only Philosophical Investigations but also Wittgenstein’s later thought as a whole. They open up novel paths across familiar fields of thought: the objectivity of interpretation, the fixity of the past, the acquisition of language, and the nature of human consciousness. Significantly, they exemplify how continuing consideration of the interrelated phenomena and concepts surrounding aspect-seeing might produce a fruitful way of doing philosophy. The volume includes a concordance for the unnumbered remarks in the various editions of Philosophical Investigations, including the latest (4th) edition. (The front matter is posted here. The introduction - "Seeing Aspects in Wittgenstein" - appears below under "Published articles."). (shrink)
￼El Naturalismo Trascendental del Ultimo Wittgenstein The present article considers an internal tension in Wittgenstein's late philosophy. In what I call his 'naturalism', Wittgenstein circumscribes philosophical reflection to natural objects, to «making natural history». In his 'transcendentalism' he focuses on the «possibility of phenomena» and distinguishes philosophical method from the method of the natural sciences. I show that his 'transcendentalism' is present in his discussion of rules and prívate language, arguing for an interpretation in terms of a kantian type of (...) transcendental synthesis. But far from contradicting his 'naturalism', both tendencies are inseparable and essential to the main purpose of his Philosophical Investigations. (shrink)
Using the Remember/Know procedure, we compared the impact of a reflective repetition by refreshing and a perceptual repetition on subjective experience during recognition memory. Participants read aloud words as they appeared on a screen. Critical words were presented once , immediately repeated , or followed by a dot signalling the participants to think of and say the just-previous word . In Experiments 1 and 2, Remember responses benefited from refreshing a word . In Experiment 2, this benefit disappeared when participants (...) had to refresh one of three active items. Perceptual repetition increased Remember responses in Experiment 1, but not in Experiment 2 regardless of whether participants had just previously seen 1- or 3-items. These findings indicate that under some circumstances, reflective and perceptual repetition may have different consequences for later subjective experience during remembering, suggesting differences in their underlying functional mechanisms. (shrink)
In February 54 b.c. Cicero concludes a missive to his brother with a passing and – for us – tantalizing remark: Lucreti poemata ut scribis ita sunt, multis luminibus ingeni, multae tamen artis. sed cum veneris. virum te putabo si Sallusti Empedoclea legeris; hominem non putabo. Quintus had, it seems, read De rerum natura, or at least parts thereof, just before he left Rome for an undisclosed location nearby, and he shared his enthusiasm with his brother per codicillos. Meanwhile, he (...) was corresponding with Julius Caesar, whose staff in Gaul he was about to join. When, a few months later, he was stationed with Caesar, he was involved in another literary affair, this time concerning his brother who wrote to him, inquiring about his autobiographical De temporibus suis: quo modo nam, mi frater, de nostris versibus Caesar? nam primum librum se legisse scripsit ad me ante, et prima sic ut neget se ne Graeca quidem meliora legisse; reliqua ad quendam locum ῥᾳθυμότερα . dic mihi verum: num aut res eum aut χαρακτὴρ non delectat? (shrink)
Abstract People rarely make the types of moral judgement evoked by Kohlberg's test when they make moral decisions in their everyday lives. The anticipated consequences of real?life moral decisions, to self and to others, may influence moral choices and the structure of moral reasoning. To understand real?life moral judgement we must attend to its functions, which, although they occasionally involve resolving hypothetical moral dilemmas like those on Kohlberg's test, more often involve promoting good social relations, upholding favourable self?concepts and justifying (...) self?interested behaviour. We argue that a functional model of moral judgement and moral behaviour derived from evolutionary theory may supply a better account of real?life morality than the Kohlbergian model. (shrink)
Abstract Forty male and female adults responded to two forms of Kohlberg's test??one in the standard third?person form, and the other imagining themselves as the protagonists in Kohlberg's dilemmas. Females obtained slightly lower moral maturity scores than males across both forms, but there were no sex differences in moral orientation. There were no significant effects for the perspective from which Kohlberg's test was taken, on either moral maturity or moral orientation. Care?oriented moral judgements were more prevalent in dilemmas involving life (...) vs. law conflicts than in dilemmas involving conscience vs. punishment conflicts. Subjects did not consistently make either care? or justice?oriented moral judgements. There was a significant negative correlation between the frequency of care?oriented judgements and moral maturity for males, but not for females. Although these results are partially consistent with the possibility that Kohlberg's test and scoring system are biased against females, they do not support the assumption that females make more care?oriented moral judgements than males on Kohlberg's test, or, indeed, that members of either sex display enough consistency in care?and justice?based moral judgements on Kohlberg's test for such judgements to serve as the basis of moral orientations. (shrink)
¿Principio de caridad o hybris? La intuición de Wittgenstein, de que el significado lingüístico se constituye dentro de la trama de vida pareciera hacer posible un acercamiento entre la tradición hermenéutica continental y la filosofía analítica del lenguaje. En el presente artículo se sostiene que esta intuición debe ir acompañada de una revisión de la concepción del sujeto implícita en el principio de caridad de Donald Davidson. Sin esa reconcepción, el principio de caridad se convierte en una forma encubierta de (...) imperialismo conceptual incompatible con el espíritu de la hermenéutica continental. Se concluye el artículo con algunas observaciones sobre el relativismo a la luz de las consideraciones anteriores. (shrink)
The implications of game theory models of the evolution of strategies of exchange are explored with respect to the evolution of moral dispositions. I argue that dispositions to practice tit for tat strategies could have evolved, but the moral behaviours to which they give rise do not fare well on criteria of morality. Inasmuch as the strategy implicit in the Golden Rule is unconditional, it could not have evolved in environments containing strategies that exploit it. However, dispositions to invoke conditional (...) principles such as those that prescribe that people cooperate with those they observe cooperating and shun those they observe behaving selfishly, could have been selected in some conditions and may have given rise to the evolution of indirect reciprocity. The key to the evolution of morality is discrimination in favour of cooperators and against cheaters and selfish individualists. The limitations of game theory in the explanation of human morality are acknowledged. (shrink)
This paper reconstructs Van Parijs' core argument for an unconditional basic income and presents three objections against it. The first and most theoretical objection attacks the egalitarian basis of Van Parijs' argument and suggests an alternative, humanitarian theory of justice. The second and third more concrete objections accuse Van Parijs of selling-out the right to work as well as the right to recognition of work, for example of family work. The conclusion drawn from these three objections, however, is not that (...) an unconditional basic income cannot be defended. Instead the paper ends by indicating an alternative, humanitarian argument for an unconditional basic income. (shrink)
Die Verbindlichkeit von Patientenverfügungen (PV) wird kontrovers diskutiert. Dabei ist nicht bekannt, wie verbindlich PV von denen gewollt sind, die sie verfassen. Mit Hilfe eines anonymen Fragebogens wurden Verfasser von PV in bayerischen Palliativeinrichtungen und Beratungsstellen hierzu befragt. Von den 402 Befragten gaben 69,1% an, dass ihre PV auch für Bevollmächtigte und Betreuer strikt verbindlich sein soll. Demgegenüber räumten 23,9% ihrem Stellvertreter ein, von der PV abzuweichen. Die lebensbedrohlich Erkrankten unter den Befragten legten nicht weniger, sondern signifikant mehr Wert auf (...) hohe Verbindlichkeit. Für den Fall, dass die PV nicht anwendbar sein sollte, wünschen deren Verfasser eine Entscheidung durch ihren Vertreter. Abgelehnt wird die richterliche Entscheidung bei Dissens. (shrink)
Este artículo desarrolla la idea que subyace a la obra filosófica de Wittgenstein, por lo menos desde las Investigaciones, del lenguaje como “algo animal” y de nuestras palabras como principalmente expresivas. A partir de esta idea, se propone empezar a mostrar cómo los problemas filosóficos son para él, en última instancia, producto de una desconexión de la dimensión sensible de la cual derivan su sentido nuestras palabras. Se sugiere que el propósito de Wittgenstein es, por lo tanto, propiciar una reconexión (...) del lenguaje con el deseo, lo cual lleva a cabo ejemplificando en sus textos –y así obligándonos como lectores a asumir– una relación distinta con las palabras de aquella que define el pensamiento filosófico convencional. De esta manera, reivindica para la reflexión filosófica modos de saber y de conciencia radicalmente opuestos al tipo de conocimiento científico con el que aún se identifica la disciplina. (shrink)
Paying special attention to his reflections on a esthetics, it is held in this paper that the later Wittgenstein, far from rejecting the"transcendent" from his philosophical discourse as he is usually read, aims rather at recovering it and giving it a new meaning. He thus responds to a real need in the philosophical thought that continues to define itself, even in this century, in terms of criteria of knowledge that are alíen to it. Specifically, it is argued that the Wittgensteinian (...) recourse to the invention of "intermediatec ases" and fictional "natural histories" achieves this goal by activating other modes of awareness that relocate the transcendent within philosophical thinking without appealing neither to the supernatural realm nor to a mystical knowledge or insight. (shrink)
The personal computer has become the primary research tool in many scientific and engineering disciplines. The role of the computer has been extended to be an experimental and modelling tool both for convenience and sometimes necessity. In this paper some of the relationships between real models and virtual models, i.e. models that exist only as programs and data structures, areexplored. It is argued that the shift from experimenting with real objects to experimentation with computer models and simulations may also require (...) a new approach for evaluating scientific theories derived from these models. Accepting the additional sets of assumptions that are associated with computer models and simulations requires ‘leaps of faith’, which we may not want to make in order to preserve scientific rigor. There are problems in providing acceptable arguments and explanations as to why a particular computer model or simulation should be judged scientifically sound, plausible, or even probable. These problems not only emerge from models that are particularly complex, but also in models that suffer from being too simplistic. (shrink)
Abstract Twenty?four second? and third?grade children were given two cognitively?based role?taking tests developed by Flavell et al. (1968). The children's social behaviour was observed over a two?month period. It was coded according to a scheme introduced by the anthropologists Whiting and Whiting (1975) which produces composite scores of egoism and altruism. Teachers rated the children's social behaviour and role?taking ability. IQ scores were obtained from school records. Tests of the reliability and validity of the measures of role?taking and altruism were (...) positive. Role?taking ability was positively correlated with naturally?occurring altruistic behaviour and teacher's ratings of altruism. IQ was positively correlated with role?taking ability, and tended to be positively correlated with altruism. The correlation between role?taking and altruism was marginally significant with IQ partialled out. The results were consistent with the conclusion that role?taking ability increases the disposition to behave altruistically in third?grade children. (shrink)
Those who invoke the word self-deception to represent one phenomenon often argue that those who use it to represent another are misusing the construct. Better to recognize that self-deception is a fuzzy concept that may be used to represent a variety of mental processes and states, and to direct our energy toward distinguishing empirically among its forms and functions.
Should justice rule in close personal relationships, for example in the giving and taking between the sexes? Orare these relationships beyond justice? This paper defends the feminist call for justice (even) in close personal relationships against a common objection raised, among others, by Hugh LaFollette in 1996. According to this objection the call for justice undermines love; it tums close personal relationships into self-interested exchange relationships.