5 found
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  1. Phenomenalist Dogmatist Experientialism and the Distinctiveness Problem.Harmen8 Ghijsen - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1549-1566.
    Phenomenalist dogmatist experientialism (PDE) holds the following thesis: if $S$ has a perceptual experience that $p$ , then $S$ has immediate prima facie evidential justification for the belief that $p$ in virtue of the experience’s phenomenology. The benefits of PDE are that it (a) provides an undemanding view of perceptual justification that allows most of our ordinary perceptual beliefs to be justified, and (b) accommodates two important internalist intuitions, viz. the New Evil Demon Intuition and the Blindsight Intuition. However, in (...)
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  2.  42
    Perceptual Justification: Factive Reasons and Fallible Virtues.Christoph9 Kelp & Harmen8 Ghijsen - 2016 - In C. Mi, M. Slote & E. Sosa (eds.), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy. Routledge.
    Two different versions of epistemological disjunctivism have recently been upheld in the literature: a traditional, Justified True Belief Epistemological Disjunctivism (JTBED) and a Knowledge First Epistemological Disjunctivism (KFED). JTBED holds that factive reasons of the form “S sees that p” provide the rational support in virtue of which one has perceptual knowledge, while KFED holds that factive reasons of the form “S sees that p” just are ways of knowing that p which additionally provide justification for believing that p. We (...)
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  3.  66
    The Basis Problem for Epistemological Disjunctivism Revisited.Harmen8 Ghijsen - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1147-1156.
    Duncan Pritchard has defended a version of epistemological disjunctivism which holds that in a paradigmatic case of perceptual knowledge, one knows that \ in virtue of having the reflectively accessible reason that one sees that \. This view faces what is known as the basis problem: if seeing that \ just is a way of knowing that \, then that one sees that \ cannot constitute the rational basis in virtue of which one knows that \. To solve this problem, (...)
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  4.  20
    The Puzzle of Perceptual Justification: Conscious Experience, Higher-Order Beliefs, and Reliable Processes.Harmen8 Ghijsen - 2016 - Switzerland: Springer.
    This book provides an accessible and up-to-date discussion of contemporary theories of perceptual justification that each highlight different factors related to perception, i.e., conscious experience, higher-order beliefs, and reliable processes. The book’s discussion starts from the viewpoint that perception is not only one of our fundamental sources of knowledge and justification, but also plays this role for many less sophisticated animals. It proposes a scientifically informed reliabilist theory which can accommodate this fact without denying that some of our epistemic abilities (...)
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  5. Norman and Truetemp Revisited Reliabilistically: A Proper Functionalist Defeat Account of Clairvoyance.Harmen8 Ghijsen - 2015 - Episteme 13 (1):89-110.
    The cases of Norman the Clairvoyant and Mr. Truetemp form classic counterexamples to the process reliabilist's claim that reliability is sufficient for prima facie justification. I discuss several ways in which contemporary reliabilists have tried to deal with these counterexamples, and argue that they are all unsuccessful. Instead, I propose that the most promising route lies with an appeal to a specific kind of higher-order defeat that is best cashed out in terms of properly functioning monitoring mechanisms.
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