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Harold I. Brown [91]Harold Irwin Brown [1]
  1.  17
    Science and Values.Harold I. Brown & Larry Laudan - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (3):439.
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  2.  41
    Rationality.Harold I. Brown - 1988 - Routledge.
  3.  81
    Perception, Theory and Commitment: The New Philosophy of Science.Harold I. Brown - 1977 - Precedent.
    " --Maurice A. Finocchiaro,Isis "The best and most original aspect of the book is its overall conception.
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  4.  82
    Incommensurability Reconsidered.Harold I. Brown - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (1):149-169.
    In his later writings Kuhn reconsidered his earlier account of incommensurability, clarifying some aspects, modifying others, and explicitly rejecting some of his earlier claims. In Kuhn’s new account incommensurability does not pose a problem for the rational evaluation of competing scientific theories, but does pose a problem for certain forms of realism. Kuhn maintains that, because of incommensurability, the notion that science might seek to learn the nature of things as they are in themselves is incoherent. I develop Kuhn’s new (...)
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  5. Rationality.Harold I. Brown - 1990 - Ethics 100 (3):672-673.
     
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  6. Observation And Objectivity.Harold I. Brown - 1987 - Oxford University Press.
    This book develops an explanation for the roles of observation and theory in scientific endeavor that occupies the middle ground between empiricism and rationalism, and captures the strengths of both approaches. Brown argues that philosophical theories have the same epistemological status as scientific theories and constructs an epistemological theory that provides an account of the role that theory and instruments play in scientific observation. His theory of perception yields a new analysis of objectivity that combines the traditional view of observation (...)
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  7. Sellars, Concepts, and Conceptual Change.Harold I. Brown - 1986 - Synthese 68 (August):275-307.
    A major theme of recent philosophy of science has been the rejection of the empiricist thesis that, with the exception of terms which play a purely formal role, the language of science derives its meaning from some, possibly quite indirect, correlation with experience. The alternative that has been proposed is that meaning is internal to each conceptual system, that terms derive their meaning from the role they play in a language, and that something akin to "meaning" flows from conceptual framework (...)
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  8.  91
    A Theory-Laden Observation Can Test the Theory.Harold I. Brown - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (3):555-559.
  9.  73
    Incommensurability.Harold I. Brown - 1983 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):3 – 29.
    The thesis that certain competing scientific theories are incommensurable was introduced by Kuhn and Feyerabend in 1962 and has been a subject of widespread critique. Critics have generally taken incommensurable theories to be theories which cannot be compared in a rational manner, but both Kuhn and Feyerabend have explicitly rejected this interpretation, and Feyerabend has discussed ways in which such comparisons can be made in a number of his writings. This paper attempts to clarify the incommensurability thesis through the examination (...)
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  10.  87
    Normative Epistemology and Naturalized Epistemology.Harold I. Brown - 1988 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):53 – 78.
    A number of philosophers have argued that a naturalized epistemology cannot be normative, and thus that the norms that govern science cannot themselves be established empirically. Three arguments for this conclusion are here developed and then responded to on behalf of naturalized epistemology. The response is developed in three stages. First, if we view human knowers as part of the natural world, then the attempt to establish epistemic norms that are immune to scientific evaluation faces difficulties that are at least (...)
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  11. Observation and Objectivity.Harold I. Brown - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (3):544-547.
     
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  12.  35
    Galileo on the Telescope and the Eye.Harold I. Brown - 1985 - Journal of the History of Ideas 46 (4):487.
  13. Reason, Judgement and Bayes's Law.Harold I. Brown - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (3):351-369.
    This paper argues that when used judiciously Bayes's law has a role to play in the evaluation of scientific hypotheses. Several examples are presented in which a rational response to evidence requires a judgement whether to apply Bayes's law or whether, for example, to redistribute prior probabilities. The paper concludes that reflection on Bayes's law illustrates how an adequate account of the rational evaluation of hypotheses requires an account of judgement--a point which several philosophers have noted despite few attempts to (...)
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  14.  58
    Incommensurability and Reality.Harold I. Brown - 2001 - In Paul Hoyningen-Huene & Howard Sankey (eds.), Incommensurability and Related Matters. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 123--142.
  15. Direct Realism, Indirect Realism, and Epistemology.Harold I. Brown - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):341-363.
  16.  21
    Space-Perception and the Philosophy of Science.Harold I. Brown - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (1):159-160.
  17.  32
    Prospective Realism.Harold I. Brown - 1990 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 21 (2):211.
  18.  27
    Circular Justifications.Harold I. Brown - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:406 - 414.
    The thesis of this paper is that philosophers are often too hasty in rejecting justifications because the argument that yields the justification is circular. Circularity is distinguished from vicious circularity and several examples are examined in which a proposed justification is circular in a precise sense, but not viciously circular. These include an observational procedure which could yield a velocity in excess of the velocity of light even though the impossibility of such velocities is assumed at a key step in (...)
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  19.  73
    Why Do Conceptual Analysts Disagree?Harold I. Brown - 1999 - Metaphilosophy 30 (1&2):33-59.
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  20.  28
    More About Judgment and Reason.Harold I. Brown - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (5):646-651.
    : This paper is a response to Siegel 2004. I take Siegel's remarks as a basis for clarifying, defending, and further developing my account of the role of judgment in a theory of rationality.
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  21.  94
    Book Review: Educating Reason. [REVIEW]Harold I. Brown - 1989 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 19 (4):509-512.
  22.  16
    Philosophy of Science Circa 1950–2000: Some Things We Learned.Harold I. Brown - 2014 - Diogenes 61 (2):45-58.
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  23. Perception, Theory and Communient: The New Philosophy of Science.Harold I. Brown - 1978 - Science and Society 42 (4):506-508.
     
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  24.  31
    Empirical Testing.Harold I. Brown - 1995 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):353 – 399.
    Three major views of the observation?theory relation are now extant: (1) Observation and theory are mutually independent and observation provides the basis for evaluating theories. (2) Observations are theory?dependent and do not provide objective grounds for evaluating theories. (3) The concept of observation should be extended in a way that includes many so?called ?theoretical?entities? among the observables. Analyses of these views set the stage for a new approach that incorporates lessons learned from discussions of earlier accounts. The central idea of (...)
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  25.  36
    A Functional Analysis of Scientific Theories.Harold I. Brown - 1979 - Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 10 (1):119-140.
    Scientific theories are analyzed in terms of the role that they play in science rather than in terms of their logical structure. It is maintained that theories: provide descriptions of the fundamental features of their domains; on the basis of 1, explain non-fundamental features of their domains; provide a guide for further research in their domains. Any set of propositions that carries out these functions with respect to some domain counts as a theory. This view of theories is developed and (...)
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  26.  8
    Reviewed Work: Science and Values by Larry Laudan. [REVIEW]Harold I. Brown - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (3):439-441.
  27.  29
    Problem Changes in Science and Philosophy.Harold I. Brown - 1975 - Metaphilosophy 6 (2):177–192.
  28.  30
    Response to Siegel.Harold I. Brown - 1983 - Synthese 56 (1):91 - 105.
  29.  81
    Responses to 'in Defense of Relativism'.Robert Ackermann, Brian Baigrie, Harold I. Brown, Michael Cavanaugh, Paul Fox-Strangways, Gonzalo Munevar, Stephen David Ross, Philip Pettit, Paul Roth, Frederick Schmitt, Stephen Turner & Charles Wallis - 1988 - Social Epistemology 2 (3):227 – 261.
  30.  64
    Scientific Realism.Harold I. Brown - 1988 - International Studies in Philosophy 20 (3):130-131.
  31.  33
    For a Modest Historicism.Harold I. Brown - 1977 - The Monist 60 (4):540-555.
    Recent work in the philosophy of science has taken a decidedly historicist turn. A number of writers have rejected the traditional thesis that science develops through the accumulation of firmly established truths, maintaining instead that scientific research is founded on beliefs which are presupposed without having been proven. Since these presuppositions are not established truths they are subject to revision, and a change in the presuppositions of a discipline results in a fundamental restructuring of that discipline, i.e., a scientific revolution. (...)
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  32.  9
    Epistemological Empiricism.Harold I. Brown - 2011 - In Michael J. Shaffer & Michael Veber (eds.), What Place for the a Priori? Open Court. pp. 137.
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  33. Conceptual Systems.Harold I. Brown - 2007 - Routledge.
    New concepts are constantly being introduced into our thinking. _Conceptual Systems_ explores how these new concepts are entered into our systems along with sufficient continuity with older ideas to ensure understanding. The encyclopedic breadth of this text highlights the many different aspects and disciplines that together present an insightful view into the various theories of concepts. Harold Brown, a reputable author in the philosophy of science examines several historically influential theories of concepts as well as presenting a clear view on (...)
     
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  34.  35
    Observation and the Foundations of Objectivity.Harold I. Brown - 1979 - The Monist 62 (4):470-481.
    Traditional empiricist analyses of the source of scientific objectivity were based on two guiding themes: that a claim can be objective only if it is tested against some independent touchstone, and that observation provides that touchstone. The issue of objectivity arises here only for beliefs that are formulated as propositions or sets of propositions, and the standard view demands that objective beliefs make claims about entities that exist independently of those beliefs, and whose properties can be determined and compared with (...)
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  35.  41
    Epistemic Concepts: A Naturalistic Approach.Harold I. Brown - 1991 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 34 (3-4):323 – 351.
    Several forms of naturalism are currently extant. Proponents of the various approaches disagree on matters of strategy and detail but one theme is common: we have not received any revelations about the nature of the world -- including our own nature. Whatever knowledge we have has been acquired through a fallible process of conjecture and revision. This common theme will bring to mind the writings of Karl Popper and, in many respects, Popper is the father of contemporary naturalism. Along with (...)
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  36.  33
    Conceptual Systems.Harold I. Brown - 2006 - London.
    New concepts are constantly being introduced into our thinking. Conceptual Systems explores how these new concepts are entered into our systems along with sufficient continuity with older ideas to ensure understanding. The encyclopaedic breadth of this text highlights the many different aspects and disciplines that together present an insightful view into the various theories of concepts. Harold Brown, a reputable author in the philosophy of science examines several historically influential theories of concepts as well as providing a clear view on (...)
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  37.  30
    Van Fraassen Meets Popper: Logical Relations and Cognitive Abilities.Harold I. Brown - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (2):381-385.
    Van Fraassen, like Popper before him, assumes that confirmation and disconfirmation relations are logical relations and thus hold only among abstract items. This raises a problem about how experience, for Popper, and observables, for van Fraassen, enter into epistemic evaluations. Each philosopher offers a drastic proposal: Popper holds that basic statements are accepted by convention; van Fraassen introduces his “pragmatic tautology.” Another alternative is to reject the claim that all evaluative relations are logical relations. Ayer proposed this option in responding (...)
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  38.  30
    Harold I. Brown. Reviewed Work: Knowledge in a Social World by Alvin I. Goldman. [REVIEW]Harold I. Brown - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (2):348-352.
  39.  96
    Cherniak on Scientific Realism.Harold I. Brown - 1990 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (3):415-427.
    In the final chapter of Minimal Rationality Christopher Cherniak offers three arguments to show that an agent with finite cognitive resources is not capable of arriving at a true and complete theory of the universe. I discuss each of these arguments and show that Cherniak has not succeeded in making his antirealist case.
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  40.  28
    Galileo, the Elements, and the Tides.Harold I. Brown - 1976 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 7 (4):337.
  41.  69
    Berkeley on the Conceivability of Qualities and Material Objects.Harold I. Brown - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 7:161-168.
    Berkeley’s “selective attention” account of how we establish general conclusions without abstract ideas—particularly in light of his denial of abstract ideas and rejection of the legitimacy of several subjects of scientific and philosophic study on the grounds that they presuppose abstract ideas—yields a puzzle: Why can’t we begin with ideas and use the method of selective attention to establish conclusions about qualities and material objects independently of their being perceived, even though we do not have ideas of these entities? I (...)
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  42.  13
    On Being Rational.Harold I. Brown - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (4):241 - 248.
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  43.  40
    Understanding Conceptual Innovation in Science: Nancy Nersessian: Creating Scientific Concepts. The MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 2008, Pp. Xiv + 251, US $20.95 HB.Harold I. Brown - 2010 - Metascience 19 (2):273-276.
  44. Naturalizing Observation.Harold I. Brown - 1987 - In Nancy J. Nersessian (ed.), The Process of Science: Contemporary Philosophical Approaches to Understanding Scientific Practice. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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  45.  69
    Conceptual Comparison and Conceptual Innovation.Harold I. Brown - manuscript
  46.  10
    Direct Realism, Indirect Realism, and Epistemology.Harold I. Brown - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):341-363.
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  47.  45
    How the Laws of Physics Lie. [REVIEW]Harold I. Brown - 1988 - International Studies in Philosophy 20 (3):102-103.
  48.  31
    1 The Case for Indirect Realism.Harold I. Brown - 2008 - In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. MIT Press. pp. 45.
  49.  32
    The Limits of Pragmatism.Harold I. Brown - 1988 - Review of Metaphysics 42 (1):166-167.
    The title of this book is misleading. Its topic is pragmatism according to Rorty, and Prado intends only "to consider the new pragmatism, as present in Rorty's views, in one particular but elemental dimension: that of truth". Prado seeks to offer a sympathetic reading of Rorty's attack on the correspondence theory of truth and the key conclusions Rorty draws from this attack: that we have no access to truth other than that found in specific forms of discourse, and that all (...)
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  50.  23
    Einstein Versus Bohr.Harold I. Brown - 1992 - International Studies in Philosophy 24 (1):130-130.
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