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Harold Langsam
University of Virginia
  1.  73
    Why Colours Do Look Like Dispositions.Harold Langsam - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):68-75.
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  2. The Theory of Appearing Defended.Harold Langsam - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 87 (1):33-59.
  3.  5
    Why Colours.Harold Langsam - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):68-75.
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  4.  24
    The Wonder of Consciousness: Understanding the Mind Through Philosophical Reflection.Harold Langsam - 2011 - MIT Press.
    In this book, Harold Langsam argues that consciousness is intelligible -- that there are substantive facts about consciousness that can be known a priori -- and that it is the intelligibility of consciousness that is the source of its ...
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  5. The Ontology of Mind. [REVIEW]Harold Langsam - 1999 - Philosophical Books 40 (4):127-128.
     
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  6.  42
    Why Intentionalism Cannot Explain Phenomenal Character.Harold Langsam - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (2):375-389.
    I argue that intentionalist theories of perceptual experience are unable to explain the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. I begin by describing what is involved in explaining phenomenal character, and why it is a task of philosophical theories of perceptual experience to explain it. I argue that reductionist versions of intentionalism are unable to explain the phenomenal character of perceptual experience because they mischaracterize its nature; in particular, they fail to recognize the sensory nature of experience’s phenomenal character. I argue (...)
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  7.  9
    Risks and Wrongs.Harold Langsam & Jules L. Coleman - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (3):477.
  8.  55
    Nietzsche and Value Creation: Subjectivism, Self-Expression, and Strength.Harold Langsam - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (1):100-113.
    For Nietzsche, the creation of value is of such great importance because it is the only means by which value can come to exist in the world. In this paper, I examine Nietzsche’s views about how value is created. For Nietzsche, value is created through valuing, and in section ‘Valuing’, I provide a Nietzschean account of valuing. Specifically, I argue that those who share Nietzsche’s view that there are no objective values can value things by representing them to have relative (...)
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  9.  82
    The Intuitive Case for Naïve Realism.Harold Langsam - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):106-122.
    Naïve realism, the view that perceptual experiences are irreducible relations between subjects and external objects, has intuitive appeal, but this intuitive appeal is sometimes thought to be undermined by the possibility of certain kinds of hallucinations. In this paper, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism, and explain why this intuitive case is not undermined by the possibility of such hallucinations. Specifically, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism as arguing that the only way to make sense of (...)
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  10. 11 The Theory of Appearing Defended.Harold Langsam - 2009 - In Heather Logue & Alex Byrne (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press. pp. 181.
  11. Rationality, Justification, and the Internalism/Externalism Debate.Harold Langsam - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (1):79-101.
    In this paper, I argue that what underlies internalism about justification is a rationalist conception of justification, not a deontological conception of justification, and I argue for the plausibility of this rationalist conception of justification. The rationalist conception of justification is the view that a justified belief is a belief that is held in a rational way; since we exercise our rationality through conscious deliberation, the rationalist conception holds that a belief is justified iff a relevant possible instance of conscious (...)
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  12. Why Pains Are Mental Objects.Harold Langsam - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (6):303-13.
  13.  68
    How to Combat Nihilism: Reflections on Nietzsche's Critique of Morality.Harold Langsam - 1997 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 14 (2):235 - 253.
  14.  3
    McDowell’s infallibilism and the nature of knowledge.Harold Langsam - forthcoming - Synthese:1-15.
    According to John McDowell’s version of disjunctivism, a perceptual experience has both a property that it shares with a subjectively indistinguishable illusory experience as well as a property that it does not share with a subjectively indistinguishable illusory experience. McDowell is also an infallibilist about justification; accordingly, he holds that a perceptual experience justifies a belief in virtue of the latter property. In this paper, I defend McDowell against an argument that purports to show that perceptual experiences justify beliefs only (...)
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  15. Experiences, Thoughts, and Qualia.Harold Langsam - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (3):269-295.
  16. Why I Believe in an External World.Harold Langsam - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (5):652-672.
  17. Pain, Personal Identity, and the Deep Further Fact.Harold Langsam - 2001 - Erkenntnis 54 (2):247-271.
  18.  87
    Strategy for Dualists.Harold Langsam - 2001 - Metaphilosophy 32 (4):395-418.
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  19.  55
    Consciousness, Experience, and Justification.Harold Langsam - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):1-28.
    I think it is important to try to make sense of these thoughts concerning the justificatory role of experiences, for I suspect that we are losing the ability to see why philosophers have traditionally been attracted to such thoughts. Coherentism and reliabilism, perhaps the two most currently popular theories of epistemic justification, appear simply to reject the idea that experiences can justify beliefs. Thus according to coherentism, the view that ‘a belief is justified by its coherence with other beliefs one (...)
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  20.  29
    Why Pains Are Mental Objects.Harold Langsam - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (6):303.
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  21.  80
    A Defense of McDowell’s Response to the Sceptic.Harold Langsam - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):43-59.
    Crispin Wright argues that John McDowell’s use of disjunctivism to respond to the sceptic misses the point of the sceptic’s argument, for disjunctivism is a thesis about the differing metaphysical natures of veridical and nonveridical experiences, whereas the sceptic’s point is that our beliefs are unjustified because veridical and nonveridical experiences can be phenomenally indistinguishable. In this paper, I argue that McDowell is responsive to the sceptic’s focus on phenomenology, for the point of McDowell’s response is that it is the (...)
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  22.  72
    Mental Reality.Harold Langsam - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (1):99.
    Materialism does not function in philosophy simply as a popular metaphysical thesis about the nature of the world; it is also often put forward as a solution to some alleged problem involving the relation between mind and body. Galen Strawson is a professed materialist, but it is a defining theme of his book that materialism, as presently understood, cannot serve in this latter function: not only does it not solve the mind-body problem, it exacerbates it. Not that Strawson’s purpose is (...)
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  23.  79
    Kant, Hume, and Our Ordinary Concept of Causation.Harold Langsam - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):625-647.
  24. Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Inner Observation.Harold Langsam - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):42-61.
    There is a continuing debate as to whether externalism about mental content is compatible with certain commonly accepted views about the nature of self-knowledge. Both sides to this debate seem to agree that externalism is _not compatible with the traditional view that self-knowledge is acquired by means of observation. In this paper, I argue that externalism is compatible with this traditional view of self-knowledge, and that, in fact, we have good reason to believe that the self-knowledge at issue is acquired (...)
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  25.  48
    Kant's Theory of Knowledge: An Analytical Introduction - By Georges Dicker. [REVIEW]Harold Langsam - 2006 - Philosophical Books 47 (4):357-359.
  26.  54
    Kant's Compatibilism and His Two Conceptions of Truth.Harold Langsam - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2):164–188.
    In this paper, I explain how Kant's views can be reconciled, and I argue that the relevance of transcendental idealism here is that it shows that determinism is known to be true, not in accordance with the familiar correspondence notion of truth, but only in accordance with a weaker notion of truth, Kant's empirical notion of truth, which is a kind of coherence notion of truth. (edited).
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  27.  17
    Kant, Hume, and Our Ordinary Concept of Causation.Harold Langsam - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):625-647.
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  28.  59
    A Defense of Restricted Phenomenal Conservatism.Harold Langsam - 2013 - Philosophical Papers 42 (3):315 - 340.
    In this paper, I criticize Michael Huemer's phenomenal conservatism, the theory of justification according to which if it seems to S that p, then in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. Specifically, I argue that beliefs and hunches provide counterexamples to phenomenal conservatism. I then defend a version of restricted phenomenal conservatism, the view that some but not all appearances confer prima facie justification on their propositional contents. Specifically, I (...)
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  29.  5
    Consciousness, Experience, and Justification.Harold Langsam - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):1-28.
    I think it is important to try to make sense of these thoughts concerning the justificatory role of experiences, for I suspect that we are losing the ability to see why philosophers have traditionally been attracted to such thoughts. Coherentism and reliabilism, perhaps the two most currently popular theories of epistemic justification, appear simply to reject the idea that experiences can justify beliefs. Thus according to coherentism, the view that ‘a belief is justified by its coherence with other beliefs one (...)
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  30.  21
    INDEX for Volume 80, 2002.Eric Barnes, Neither Truth Nor Empirical Adequacy Explain, Matti Eklund, Deep Inconsistency, Barbara Montero, Harold Langsam, Self-Knowledge Externalism, Christine McKinnon Desire-Frustration, Moral Sympathy & Josh Parsons - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):545-548.
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  31. Towards a Kantian Theory of Intentionality.Harold Langsam - 1994 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    Thoughts have content; for instance, the content of the thought that Plato is a great philosopher is that a certain person, Plato, has a certain property, the property of being a great philosopher. In thinking this thought, I become related in a certain manner to this person, Plato, and to the property of being a great philosopher. In this dissertation, I begin to develop a theory of how such relations come to obtain. ;In chapter 1, I examine and ultimately reject (...)
     
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