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  1.  14
    Challenges to empiricism.Harold Morick (ed.) - 1972 - Belmont, Calif.,: Wadsworth Pub. Co..
    Carnap, R. Empiricism, semantics, and ontology.--Quine, W. V. Two dogmas of empiricism. Meaning and translation.--Sellars, W. Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.--Putnam, H. Brains and behaviour.--Popper, K. R. Science: conjectures and refutations.--Feyerabend, P. K. Science without experience. How to be a good empiricist--a plea for tolerance in matters epistemological.--Kuhn, T. S. Incommensurability and paradigms.--Hesse, M. Duhem, Quine and a new empiricism.--Chomsky, N. Recent contributions to the theory of innate ideas.--Putnam, H. The innateness hypothesis and explanatory models in linguistics.--Goodman, N. The (...)
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  2.  15
    On the indispensability of intentionality.Harold Morick - 1972 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2 (September):127-133.
    In the last two decades, there has been a great deal of interest in providing an intentional criterion of the psychological. Of the various ones proferred, it seems to me that the best was the earliest, which was Chisholm’s initial criterion in his 1955 essay “Sentences about Believing.” In this present paper I first single out a basic misconception pervading the recent literature on intentionality and suggest that a consequence of this misconception has been the futile attempt to use the (...)
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  3. Intentionality, intensionality, and the psychological.Harold Morick - 1971 - Analysis 32 (2):39.
  4.  16
    Zettel.Harold Morick - 1969 - International Philosophical Quarterly 9 (1):151-152.
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  5.  1
    Scepticism and the First Person.Harold Morick - 1968 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (4):607-608.
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  6.  18
    Harman's Zoo Story.Harold Morick - 1979 - Philosophy 54 (208):223 - 226.
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  7.  20
    A Confirmation Criterion of Synonymy.Harold Morick - 1980 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 11 (1):13-21.
    Two declarative sentences are synonymous if, and only if, the statements they can be used to make are. given certain assumptions about the truth or falsity of other statements, confirmed or disconfirmed to the same degree by the same evidence. This criterion of synonymy is Quinean in that it treats confirmation holistically. But unlike Quine's criterion of synonymy, it conforms to and explains our intuitions of sentence synonymy.
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  8.  19
    A Confirmation Criterion of Synonymy.Harold Morick - 1980 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 11 (1):13-21.
    Two declarative sentences are synonymous if, and only if, the statements they can be used to make are. given certain assumptions about the truth or falsity of other statements, confirmed or disconfirmed to the same degree by the same evidence. This criterion of synonymy is Quinean in that it treats confirmation holistically. But unlike Quine's criterion of synonymy, it conforms to and explains our intuitions of sentence synonymy.
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  9. Comment on Ausonio Marras: Intentionality and Physicalism: a Resolvable Dispute.Harold Morick - 1980 - Analyse & Kritik 2 (2):190-193.
    Contrary to Marras: the third of Chisholm's Intentional criteria of sentences about mental states and events succeeds in highlighting an intuitive feature of Intentionality. If there ist such a thing as modality, it resides either in the way we speak of things or in the things, regardless of the way we speak of them. If the latter, modal sentences fail to satisfy Chisholm's criterion for mentalistic sentences; and if the former, modal sentences turn out to be mentalistic sentences. So either (...)
     
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  10.  85
    Cartesian privilege and the strictly mental.Harold Morick - 1971 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (4):546-551.
  11.  25
    Can we believe what we know?Harold Morick - 1980 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (3):406-410.
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  12.  9
    Diskussion/Discussion.Harold Morick - 1980 - Analyse & Kritik 2 (2):190-193.
    Contrary to Marras: (1) the third of Chisholm’s Intentional criteria of sentences about mental states and events succeeds in highlighting an intuitive feature of Intentionality. (2) If there is such a thing as modality, it resides either in the way we speak of things or in the things, regardless of the way we speak of them. If the latter, modal sentences fail to satisfy Chisholm’s criterion for mentalistic sentences; and if the former, modal sentences turn out to be mentalistic sentences. (...)
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  13.  18
    Extensionalizing the nonpsychological.Harold Morick - 1976 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (4):551-553.
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  14.  12
    Introduction to the philosophy of mind: readings from Descartes to Strawson.Harold Morick (ed.) - 1970 - Sussex: Harvester Press.
    Introductory essay: the privacy of physiological phenomena, by H. Morick.--Meditations I, II, and VI, by R. Descartes.--Descartes' myth, by G. Ryle.--I think, therefore I am, by A. J. Ayer.--Of personal identity, by D. Hume.--Hume on personal identity, by T. Penelhum.--Paralogisms of pure reason, by I. Kant.--Self, mind, and body, by P. F. Strawson.--Soul, by P. F. Strawson.--The distinction between mental and physical phenomena, by F. Brentano.--Brentano on descriptive psychology and the intentional, by R. Chisholm.--Note on the text, by R. Rhees.--Notes (...)
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  15.  16
    Is Ultimate Epistemic Authority a Distinguishing Characteristic of the Psychological?Harold Morick - 1971 - American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (3):292 - 295.
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  16.  30
    Intentionality without intensionality: Reply to Lithown and Marras.Harold Morick - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 28 (2):143 - 146.
  17.  19
    Lectures & Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief.Harold Morick - 1968 - International Philosophical Quarterly 8 (4):651-653.
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  18.  23
    Opacity and mentality: A reply to criticism.Harold Morick - 1981 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (1):128-129.
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  19.  1
    Observation and Subjectivity in Quine.Harold Morick - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 1 (2):109-127.
    “There ceases to be any reason to count awareness as an essential trait of observation.”-from “Stimulus and Meaning”As W. V. Quine sees it we must, in the interests of science, resist “the old tendency to associate observation sentences with a subjective sensory subject matter,” because such sentences are “meant to be the intersubjective tribunal of scientific hypotheses“; observation sentences are meant to be the independent and objective control of scientific theory. Accordingly, Quine has developed a behaviouristic operational definition of an (...)
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  20.  10
    Observation and Subjectivity in Quine.Harold Morick - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (sup2):109-127.
    “There ceases to be any reason to count awareness as an essential trait of observation.”-from “Stimulus and Meaning”As W. V. Quine sees it we must, in the interests of science, resist “the old tendency to associate observation sentences with a subjective sensory subject matter,” because such sentences are “meant to be the intersubjective tribunal of scientific hypotheses“; observation sentences are meant to be the independent and objective control of scientific theory. Accordingly, Quine has developed a behaviouristic operational definition of an (...)
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  21. Roderick Chisholm, The First Person: An Essay on Reference and Intentionality Reviewed by.Harold Morick - 1982 - Philosophy in Review 2 (2/3):74-75.
  22.  2
    Reply to Lycan's Reply to Morick on Intentionality.Harold Morick - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (4):701-704.
    My paper “On the Indispensability of Intentionality” is faulted on two counts by William Lycan:I fail to show that there are any non-intentional psychological verbsmy argument against eliminative materialism contains a false premiss.I intend to deal swiftly with Lycan's indictment, as I believe it to be patently insubstantial. The aim, in my paper, of pointing out that there are non-intentional psychological verbs was to show that Lycan and others have been mistaken in believing that every psychological verb is intentional.I shall (...)
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  23.  20
    Reply to Lycan.Harold Morick - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (4):701 - 704.
    My paper “On the Indispensability of Intentionality” is faulted on two counts by William Lycan:I fail to show that there are any non-intentional psychological verbsmy argument against eliminative materialism contains a false premiss.I intend to deal swiftly with Lycan's indictment, as I believe it to be patently insubstantial. The aim, in my paper, of pointing out that there are non-intentional psychological verbs was to show that Lycan and others have been mistaken in believing that every psychological verb is intentional.I shall (...)
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  24. Wittgenstein's Attack on the Privileged Access View of Thoughts and Feelings.Harold Morick - 1966 - Dissertation, Columbia University
     
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  25.  28
    Wittgenstein and the Problem of Other Minds.Harold Morick (ed.) - 1967 - [Brighton], Sussex: Humanities Press.
  26.  14
    Emotion and Object. By J.R.S. Wilson. Cambridge: at the University Press; Toronto: Macmillan of Canada. 1972. Pp. viii, 192. $8.95. [REVIEW]Harold Morick - 1973 - Dialogue 12 (2):338-340.
  27.  12
    S. Coval's "Scepticism and the First Person". [REVIEW]Harold Morick - 1968 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (4):607.
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  28.  26
    Book reviews and critical studies. [REVIEW]John F. Post, Harold Morick & Bruce Johnston - 1981 - Philosophia 9 (3-4):405-435.