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  1. Personal Identity.Harold W. Noonan - 1989 - New York: Routledge.
    What is the self? And how does it relate to the body? In the second edition of Personal Identity, Harold Noonan presents the major historical theories of personal identity, particularly those of Locke, Leibniz, Butler, Reid and Hume. Noonan goes on to give a careful analysis of what the problem of personal identity is, and its place in the context of more general puzzles about identity. He then moves on to consider the main issues and arguments which are the subject (...)
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  2. Personal Identity.Harold W. NOONAN - 1989 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 58 (4):779-780.
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  3.  88
    Material Beings.Harold W. Noonan - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):239.
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  4. Indeterminate identity, contingent identity and Abelardian predicates.Harold W. Noonan - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (163):183-193.
  5. Animalism versus lockeanism: A current controversy.Harold W. Noonan - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):302-318.
  6. The New Aristotelian Essentialists.Harold W. Noonan - 2018 - Metaphysica 19 (1):87-93.
    In recent years largely due to the seminal work of Kit Fine and that of Jonathan Lowe there has been a resurgence of interest in the concept of essence and the project of explaining de re necessity in terms of it. Of course, Quine rejected what he called Aristotelian essentialism in his battle against quantified modal logic. But what he and Kripke debated was a notion of essence defined in terms of de re necessity. The new Aristotelian essentialists regard essence (...)
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  7. Relative Identity.Harold W. Noonan - 2015 - Philosophical Investigations 38 (1-2):52-71.
    Examples suggest that one and the same A may be different Bs, and hence that there is some sort of incompleteness in the unqualified statement that x and y are the same which needs to be eliminated by answering the question “the same what?” One way to make this more precise is by appeal to Geach's idea that identity is relative. In this paper I evaluate Geach's relative identity thesis.
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  8.  38
    Animalism Versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy.Harold W. Noonan - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):302-318.
    My purpose is to explore the possible lines of reply available to a defender of the neo‐Lockean position on personal identity in response to the recently popular ‘animalist’ objection. I compare the animalist objection with an objection made to Locke by Bishop Butler, Thomas Reid and, in our own day, Sydney Shoemaker. I argue that the only possible response available to a defender of Locke against the Butler–Reid–Shoemaker objection is to reject Locke's official definition of a person as a thinking, (...)
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  9.  46
    The Concept of Identity.Harold W. Noonan - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (135):175.
    In this book, Eli Hirsch focuses on identity through time, first with respect to ordinary bodies, then underlying matter, and eventually persons. These are linked at various points with other aspects of identity, such as the spatial unity of things, the unity of kinds, and the unity of groups. He investigates how our identity concept ordinarily operates in these respects. He also asks why this concept is so cental to our thinking and whether we can justify seeing the world in (...)
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  10. Presentism and Eternalism.Harold W. Noonan - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):219-227.
    How is the debate between presentism and eternalism to be characterized? It is usual to suggest that this debate about time is analogous to the debate between the actualist and the possibilist about modality. I think that this suggestion is right. In what follows I pursue the analogy more strictly than is usual and offer a characterization of what is at the core of the dispute between presentists and eternalists that may be immune to worries often raised about the substantiality (...)
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  11. Objects and identity: an examination of the relative identity thesis and its consequences.Harold W. Noonan - 1980 - The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
    In the first twelve chapters of this book, I am concerned with the Fregean notion of an object (the reference of a proper name) and its connection with the notion of identity. The rest of the book is devoted to a discussion of the problem of personal identity.
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  12. Identity, constitution and microphysical supervenience.Harold W. Noonan - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (3):273-288.
    The aim of the paper is to discuss some recent variants of familiar puzzles concerning the relations of parts to wholes put forward by Trenton Merricks and Eric Olson. The argument is put forward that so long as the familiar distinction between 'loose and popular' and 'strict and philosophical' senses of identity claims is accepted the paradoxical conclusions at which Merricks and Olson arrive can be resisted. It is not denied that accepting the distinction between 'loose and popular' and 'strict (...)
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  13. Object-dependent thoughts: A case of superficial necessity but deep contingency?Harold W. Noonan - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
  14. E. J. Lowe on Vague Identity and Quantum Indeterminacy.Harold W. Noonan - 1995 - Analysis 55 (1):14-19.
    The paper defends Gareth Evan's argument against vague identity "de re" from a criticism that quantum mechanics provides actual counter-examples to its validity. A more general version of Evans's argument is stated in which identity involving properties are not essential and it is claimed that the scientific facts as so far known are consistent with the Evansian thesis that indeterminacy in truth-value must always be due to semantic indecision.
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  15. Are there vague objects?Harold W. Noonan - 2004 - Analysis 64 (2):131-134.
  16. Russellian thoughts and methodological solipsism.Harold W. Noonan - 1986 - In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, mind and logic. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 67-91.
  17.  19
    No Trust is Hybrid: Reply to Faulkner.Harold W. Noonan - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (5):2189-2195.
    There is a well-developed literature on trust. In his important article Faulkner, 424−429, 2015) distinguishes three-place, two-place and one-place trust predicates. He then argues that our more basic notions of trust are expressed by the one-place and two-place predicates. Three-place trust, contractual trust, is not fundamental. This matters. Having a clear understanding of our concepts of trust is important. The most important assumption of Faulkner’s argument is that the notion of trust expressed by the three-place predicate is not attitudinal; it (...)
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  18.  16
    Substance, Identity and Time.E. J. Lowe & Harold W. Noonan - 1988 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 62 (1):61-100.
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  19. Non-branching and circularity - reply to Brueckner.Harold W. Noonan - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):163-167.
  20. Object-dependent thoughts and psychological redundancy.Harold W. Noonan - 1990 - Analysis 50 (1):1-9.
  21. Animalism versus Lockeanism: Reply to Mackie.Harold W. Noonan - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):83-90.
  22. The only X and Y principle.Harold W. Noonan - 1985 - Analysis 45 (1):79-83.
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  23.  39
    Object-dependent thoughts and psychological redundancy.Harold W. Noonan - 1991 - Analysis 51 (1):1-9.
  24. The closest continuer theory of identity.Harold W. Noonan - 1985 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 28 (1-4):195-229.
    A plausible principle governing identity is that whether a later individual is identical with an earlier individual cannot ever merely depend on whether there are, at the later time, any better candidates for identity with the earlier individual around. This principle has been a bone of contention amongst philosophers interested in identity for many years. In his latest book Philosophical Explanations Robert Nozick presents what I believe to be the strongest case yet made out for the rejection of this principle. (...)
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  25. Bird against the Humeans.Harold W. Noonan - 2010 - Ratio 23 (1):73-86.
    Debate between Humean contingentists and anti-Humean necessitarians in the philosophy of science is ongoing. One of the most important contemporary anti-Humeans is Alexander Bird. Bird calls the particular version of Humeanism he is opposed to 'categoricalism'. In his paper (2005) and in Chapter 4 of his book (2007) Bird argues against categoricalism about properties and laws. His arguments against categoricalism about properties are intended to support the necessitarian position he calls dispositional monism. His arguments against categoricalism about laws are intended (...)
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  26.  46
    Frege: A Critical Introduction.Harold W. Noonan - 2001 - Malden, MA: Polity.
    This new book offers a comprehensive and accessible introduction to Frege's remarkable philosophical work, examining the main areas of his writings and demonstrating the connections between them. Frege's main contribution to philosophy spans philosophical logic, the theory of meaning, mathematical logic and the philosophy of mathematics. The book clearly explains and assesses Frege's work in these areas, systematically examining his major concepts, and revealing the links between them. The emphasis is on Frege's highly influential work in philosophical logic and the (...)
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  27. Personal Identity (2nd edition).Harold W. Noonan - 2003 - Routledge.
    Personal Identity is a comprehensive introduction to the nature of the self and its relation to the body. Harold Noonan places the problem of personal identity in the context of more general puzzles about identity, discussing the major historical theories and more recent debates. The second edition of Personal Identity contains a new chapter on 'animalism' and a new section on vagueness.
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  28.  83
    Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hume on Knowledge.Harold W. Noonan - 1999 - New York: Routledge.
    David Hume was one of the most important British philosophers of the eighteenth century. The first part of his _Treatise on Human Nature_ is a seminal work in philosophy. _Hume on Knowledge_ introduces and assesses: * Humes life and the background of the _Treatise_ * The ideas and text in the _Treatise_ * Humes continuing importance to philosophy.
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  29. Vague Identity Yet Again.Harold W. Noonan - 1990 - Analysis 50 (3):157-162.
    The paper defends Gareth Evans's argument against vague identity. It appeals to a principle I name the principle of the diversity of the definitely dissimilar to defend the thesis that vague identity statements owe their indeterminacy to vagueness in language.
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  30. Vague objects.Harold W. Noonan - 1982 - Analysis 42 (1):3-6.
  31.  93
    Presentism, Endurance, and Object-Dependence.Harold W. Noonan - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (9-10):1115-1122.
    According to the presentist the present time is the only one that there is. Nevertheless, things persist. Most presentists think that things persist by enduring. Employing E. J. Lowe’s notion of identity-dependence, Jonathan Tallant argues that presentism is incompatible with any notion of persistence, even endurance. This consequence of Lowe’s ideas, if soundly drawn, is important. The presentist who chooses to deny persistence outright is a desperate figure. However, though Lowe’s notion is a legitimate and worthwhile one, this application is (...)
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  32.  40
    Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kripke and Naming and Necessity.Harold W. Noonan - 2012 - New York: Routledge.
    Saul Kripke is one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. His most celebrated work, Naming and Necessity , makes arguably the most important contribution to the philosophy of language and metaphysics in recent years. Asking fundamental questions – how do names refer to things in the world? Do objects have essential properties? What are natural kind terms and to what do they refer? – he challenges prevailing theories of language and conceptions of metaphysics, especially the descriptivist account (...)
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  33. Reply to Lowe on Ships and Structures.Harold W. Noonan - 1988 - Analysis 48 (4):221-223.
  34.  80
    Identity Over Time, Constitution and the Problem of Personal Identity.Benjamin L. Curtis & Harold W. Noonan - 2015 - In Steven M. Miller (ed.), The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness: Toward a Science and Theory. Philadelphia: John Benjamins. pp. 348-371.
    What am I? And what is my relationship to the thing I call ‘my body’? Thus each of us can pose for himself the philosophical problems of the nature of the self and the relationship between a person and his body. One answer to the question about the relationship between a person and the thing he calls ‘his body’ is that they are two things composed of the same matter at the same time (like a clay statue and the piece (...)
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  35.  70
    Tibbles the cat – reply to Burke.Harold W. Noonan - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (3):215-218.
    In his interesting article, Michael Burke (1996) offers a novel solution to the puzzle of Tibbles, the cat, a solution he says, which is based on Aristotelian essentialism. In what follows I argue that, despite its ingenuity, Burke’s solution can be seen to be too implausible to be accepted once we extend it to a variant of the puzzle Burke himself suggests. The conclusion must be that one of the other solutions to the puzzle must be correct. Or, perhaps, that (...)
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  36.  83
    Against Strong Pluralism.Harold W. Noonan - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1081-1087.
    Strong pluralists hold that not even permanent material coincidence is enough for identity. Strong pluralism entails the possibility of purely material objects -- even if not coincident -- alike in all general respects, categorial and dispositional, relational and non-relational, past, present and future, at the microphysical level, but differing in some general modal, counterfactual or dispositional repscts at the macrophysical level. It is objectionable because it thus deprives us of the explanatory resources to explain why evident absurdities are absurd. A (...)
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  37.  24
    There are More, or Fewer, Things than Most of us Think.Harold W. Noonan - forthcoming - Metaphysica.
    In Chapter 12 of his book Material Beings (Van Inwagen, Peter. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca: Cornell University Press) van Inwagen argues that there are no artefacts, or very few, certainly fewer than most people believe. Artisans very rarely create, at least in the sense of causing things to come into existence. The argument in Chapter 12 is a very powerful one. I do not think that it establishes van Inwagen’s conclusion, but it does, I think, given its (plausible) premise, establish (...)
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  38. Does ontic indeterminacy in boundaries entail ontic indeterminacy in identity?Harold W. Noonan - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):174-176.
  39.  31
    Animalism versus Lockeanism: Reply to Mackie.Harold W. Noonan - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):83-90.
    I respond to criticisms by David Mackie of my previous paper on animalism and Lockeanism. I argue that the ‘transplant intuition’, that a person goes where his brain (or cerebrum) goes, is compatible both with animalism and Lockeanism. I give three arguments for this conclusion, two of them developing lines of thought in Parfit's work. However, I accept that animalism and Lockeanism are incompatible, and I go on to consider the difficulties for Lockeanism that this raises. The principal difficulty, concerning (...)
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  40.  94
    Microphysical supervenience and consciousness.Harold W. Noonan - 1999 - Mind 108 (432):755-759.
  41.  86
    In Defence of the Sensible Theory of Indeterminacy.Harold W. Noonan - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (2):239-252.
    Can the world itself _be_ vague, so that rather than vagueness be a deficiency in our mode of describing the world, it is a necessary feature of any true description of it? Gareth Evans famously poses this question in his paper ‘Can There Be Vague Objects’ (Analysis 38(4):208, 1978 ). In his recent paper ‘Indeterminacy and Vagueness: Logic and Metaphysics’, Peter van Inwagen ( 2009 ) elaborates the account of vagueness and, in particular, in the case of sentences, consequent indeterminacy (...)
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  42.  74
    Moderate monism and modality.Harold W. Noonan - 2008 - Analysis 68 (1):88-94.
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  43.  71
    Supervenience.Harold W. Noonan - 1987 - Philosophical Quarterly 37 (January):78-85.
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  44. Reflections on Putnam, Wright and brains in vats.Harold W. Noonan - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):59-62.
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  45. Tollensing van Inwagen.Harold W. Noonan - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (4):1055-1061.
    Van Inwagen has an ingenious argument for the non-existence of human artefacts . But the argument cannot be accepted, since human artefacts are everywhere. However, it cannot be ignored. The proper response to it is to treat it as a refutation of its least plausible premise, i.e., to ‘tollens’ it. I first set out van Inwagen’s argument. I then identify its least plausible premise and explain the consequence of denying it, that is, the acceptance of a plenitudinous, pluralist ontology. I (...)
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  46. Presentism and Actualism.Harold W. Noonan - 2018 - Philosophia 47 (2):489-497.
    Presentism, some say, is either the analytic triviality that the only things that exist now are ones that exist now or the obviously false claim that the only things that have ever existed or will are ones that exist now. I argue that the correct understanding of presentism is the latter and so understood the claim is not obviously false. To appreciate this one has to see presentism as strictly analogous to anti-Lewisean actualism. What this modal analogue makes evident is (...)
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  47. Methodological solipsism.Harold W. Noonan - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 40 (September):269-274.
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  48.  25
    Persons, animals, and human beings.Harold W. Noonan - 2010 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. MIT Press.
    This chapter discusses the suggestion that a psychological approach must be mistaken, because, in fact, the correct account of personal identity is given by the biological approach, according to which we are human beings whose identity over time requires no kind of psychological continuity or connectedness whatsoever. A number of authors support this suggestion, including Paul Snowdon, Peter van Inwagen, and Eric Olson. This also presumes that humans, i.e. members of the species Homo sapiens, are animals of a certain kind. (...)
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  49. What is a one-level criterion of identity?Harold W. Noonan - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):274-277.
    Standardly, a one-level criterion of identity 1 is given in the form: ∀ x∀ y )where ‘ K’ denotes the kind of thing for which the criterion is being given and ‘ R’ denotes the criterial relation.Thus, we have, for example, the criterion of identity for sets: ∀ x∀ y))and for composites: ∀ x∀ y))and for events: ∀ x∀ y)). is equivalent to the conjunction of: ∀ x and ∀ x )),which just give two necessary 2 conditions for application of (...)
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  50. Personal Identity and the Hybrid View: A Middle Way.Harold W. Noonan - 2021 - Metaphysica 22 (2):263-283.
    Two of the main contenders in the debate about personal persistence over time are the neo-Lockean psychological continuity view and animalism as defended by Olson and Snowdon. Both are wrong. The position I shall argue for, which I call, following Olson, the hybrid view, takes psychological continuity as a sufficient but, pace the neo-Lockeans, not necessary condition for personal persistence. It sides with the animalist in allowing that mere biological continuity is also sufficient. So I am, in a sense, a (...)
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