The family is hotly contested ideological terrain. Some defend the traditional two-parent heterosexual family while others welcome its demise. Opinions vary about how much control parents should have over their children's upbringing. Family Values provides a major new theoretical account of the morality and politics of the family, telling us why the family is valuable, who has the right to parent, and what rights parents should—and should not—have over their children. Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift argue that parent-child relationships (...) produce the "familial relationship goods" that people need to flourish. Children's healthy development depends on intimate relationships with authoritative adults, while the distinctive joys and challenges of parenting are part of a fulfilling life for adults. Yet the relationships that make these goods possible have little to do with biology, and do not require the extensive rights that parents currently enjoy. Challenging some of our most commonly held beliefs about the family, Brighouse and Swift explain why a child's interest in autonomy severely limits parents' right to shape their children's values, and why parents have no fundamental right to confer wealth or advantage on their children. Family Values reaffirms the vital importance of the family as a social institution while challenging its role in the reproduction of social inequality and carefully balancing the interests of parents and children. (shrink)

Commonsense morality holds that monogamy is morally permissible. In this paper I will challenge this, arguing that monogamy is in fact morally impermissible. First I’ll argue that monogamy’s restriction on having additional partners seems analogous to a morally troubling restriction on having additional friends. Faced with this apparent analogy, the defender of monogamy must find a morally relevant difference between the two kinds of restriction. Yet, as I’ll argue, there seems to be no such morally relevant difference, for the standard (...) defenses of monogamy all fail. I take this to be evidence that monogamy’s restriction on having additional partners is in fact morally analogous to a restriction on having additional friends. Just as a restriction on having additional friends is immoral, so, too, is monogamy’s restriction on having additional partners. (shrink)

In this book Harry Heft examines the historical and theoretical foundations of James J. Gibson's ecological psychology in 20th century thought, and in turn, integrates ecological psychology and analyses of sociocultural processes. A thesis of the book is that knowing is rooted in the direct experience of meaningful environmental objects and events present in individual-environment processes and at the level of collective, social settings. Ecological Psychology in Context: *traces the primary lineage of Gibson's ecological approach to William James's philosophy (...) of radical empiricism; *illuminates how the work of James's student and Gibson's mentor, E.B. Holt, served as a catalyst for the development of Gibson's framework and as a bridge to James's work; *reveals how ecological psychology reciprocally can advance Jamesian studies by resolving some of the theoretical difficulties that kept James from fully realizing a realist philosophy; *broadens the scope of Gibson's framework by proposing a synthesis between it and the ecological program of Roger Barker, who discovered complex systems operating at the level of collective, social processes; *demonstrates ways in which the psychological domain can be extended to properties of the environment rendering its features meaningful, publicly accessible, and distributed across person-environment processes; and *shows how Gibson's work points the way toward overcoming the gap between experimental psychology and the humanities. Intended for scholars and students in the areas of ecological and environmental psychology, theoretical and historical psychology, cognitive science, developmental psychology, anthropology, and philosophy. (shrink)

From the author of the #1 New York Times bestseller On Bullshit, the case for worrying less about the rich and more about the poor Economic inequality is one of the most divisive issues of our time. Yet few would argue that inequality is a greater evil than poverty. The poor suffer because they don't have enough, not because others have more, and some have far too much. So why do many people appear to be more distressed by the rich (...) than by the poor? In this provocative book, the #1 New York Times bestselling author of On Bullshit presents a compelling and unsettling response to those who believe that the goal of social justice should be economic equality or less inequality. Harry Frankfurt, one of the most influential moral philosophers in the world, argues that we are morally obligated to eliminate poverty—not achieve equality or reduce inequality. Our focus should be on making sure everyone has a sufficient amount to live a decent life. To focus instead on inequality is distracting and alienating. At the same time, Frankfurt argues that the conjunction of vast wealth and poverty is offensive. If we dedicate ourselves to making sure everyone has enough, we may reduce inequality as a side effect. But it’s essential to see that the ultimate goal of justice is to end poverty, not inequality. A serious challenge to cherished beliefs on both the political left and right, On Inequality promises to have a profound impact on one of the great debates of our time. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn Freedom’s Right, Axel Honneth articulates the social freedom of friendship with reference to its institutionalised norms. These action norms, however, are not specific to friendship; they apply to modern intimacy per se. Such non-specificity cannot adequately account for the experience of social freedom in friendship. Addressing this issue, I evaluate friendship as a form of recognition and identify a generative recognition deficit functional to its relational autonomy. Then, taking Honneth’s institutional approach to friendship as a point of departure, I (...) ascertain an institutional deficit that both sustains friendship’s autonomy and constrains the generalisability of its social freedom by way of institutional connectivity to heterosexuality. I suggest that only a differentiating approach to friendship that fathoms its extraordinary position among interpersonal relationships can yield new insights. That done, friendship can in turn provide a prism through which to assess the conceptual approach... (shrink)

We propose a research program grounded in cultural theory and believe that this theory enables researchers to gain traction in Business and Society research. Grid-group cultural theory is a useful tool for examining organizational behavior. Organizational culture governs organizational social expression. Corporate Social Responsibility is a specific domain which benefits from exploration using cultural theory. Finally, objectives and aspirations of this research program are outlined.

Gardner, Harry On 6 December 2012, a meeting was held of people of several faiths and philosophical traditions in the Victorian State Office of Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship, located in Melbourne, to discuss 'the need for more education about diverse religious and non-religious beliefs in Victorian schools.'.

This paper repudiates Manuel Vargas’s attempt to supplant the traditional moral influence theory of responsibility with his ‘agency cultivation model’. By focusing on fostering responsiveness to moral considerations, ACM purports to avoid the chief pitfalls of MIT. However, I contend that ACM is far less distinctive than it initially appears and so possesses all of MIT’s defects. I also assail Vargas’s counterfactual test for assessing whether a wrongdoer can respond to moral considerations. It is argued that the counterfactual test is (...) epistemically redundant because it can only be fleshed out once we have settled the issues it is supposed to resolve. Moreover, it tacitly inverts the relation between freedom and responsibility—we cannot attribute free will to wrongdoers unless we have already established their blameworthiness. The upshot of this is that enquiries into an agent’s freedom are irrelevant to the ethics of holding her responsible. (shrink)

In a period in which capital has been on the offensive for many years, using debt and financial crises as rationales for wielding austerity to hammer down wages and social services and terrorism as an excuse for attacking civil liberties, it is important to realize that the origins of this long period of crisis lay in the struggles of people to free their lives from the endless subordination to work within a society organized as a gigantic social factory. In both (...) the self-proclaimed capitalist West and socialist East the managers of that subordination, whether in private enterprise or the state, repeatedly found their plans undermined by people who refused to play by their rules and who elaborated activities and social relationships that escaped their control. The refusal of their rules meant crisis for the managers; the elaboration of other ways of being—whether characterized as the crafting of civil society or as autonomous self-valorization—meant crisis for and freedom from society-as-work-machine. As always, the capitalist response has involved instrumentalization and repression; basically its managers have sought to harness what they could and eliminate what they could not. For a long time instrumentali-zation was most obvious in the West and repression was most obvious in the East, yet both were always at play everywhere, and everywhere those responses were resisted and often escaped. It was that resistance and those escapes that led to the unleashing of the monetary weapons of financialization and their current employment to convert crisis-for-capital into crisis-for-us. It is in past and present resistance and escapes that we must discover both our weaknesses and our strengths in order to overcome capital’s current offensive and to elaborate new worlds. It is the overall thesis of this paper that Marx’s labor theory of value still provides vital aid in helping us understand these historical developments. (shrink)

The ontological presupposition of artificial intelligence (AI) is the liberal autonomous human subject of Locke and Kant, and the ideology of AI is the automation of this particular conception of intelligence. This is demonstrated in detail in classical AI by the work of Simon, who explicitly connected his work on AI to a wider programme in cognitive science, economics, and politics to perfect capitalism. Although Dreyfus produced a powerful Heideggerian critique of classical AI, work on neural networks in AI was (...) ultimately based on the individual as the locus of intelligence. Yet this conception of AI both fails to grasp the essence of large language models, which are a statistical model of human language on the Web. The training data that enables AI is the surveillance and capture of data, where the data creates a model to approximate the entire world. However, there is a more hidden ideology inherent in AI where the goal is not to perfect a model but to control the world. As prompted by an argument between Mead and Bateson, social change is prevented by the application of cybernetics to society as a whole. The goal of AI is not just to replace human beings, but to manage humans to preserve existing power relations. As the source of intelligence in AI is distributed cognition between humans and machines, the alternative to AI is collective intelligence. As theorized by Licklider and Engelbart at the dawn of the Internet, collective intelligence explains how computers weave together both human and non-human intelligence. Rather than replace human intelligence, this produces ever more complex collective forms of intelligence. Rather than meta-stabilize a society of control, collective intelligence can go outside individualist capitalist ontology by incorporating the open world of the pluriverse, as theorized by Escobar. Collective intelligence then stands as an alternative ontological path for AI which puts intelligence at the service of humanity and the world rather than a technocratic elite. (shrink)

Eugene Anderson (2001) suggests that Western ethical codes be supplemented with eastern non-anthropocentrism in order for Westerners to consider the fate of non-human beings as seriously as we consider our own. In this note I build on the work of Anderson, suggesting points for intersection between the alterity of Emmanuel Levinas with the Daoist reverence for all beings.

The Gestalt psychologist Kurt Lewin called for a “psychological ecology” that would bring to light the social structures serving as the context for individual action and choice in everyday life. He envisioned social and physical environmental structures affecting the individual at a “boundary” within psychological experience. But how are we to conceptualize the manner in which such environmental structures influence individual experience and action? After all, the “nonpsychological” and the psychological domains are typically framed in quite different conceptual language, and, (...) in some cases, at different levels of analysis. This paper examines this question with respect to two bodies of work. In the case of perception, Fritz Heider’s pioneering analysis of perception, followed decades later by James Gibson’s ecological approach to perception, illuminated the significance of a medium for perceiving that conveys structure specific to environmental entities. As for action among community structures, Roger Barker’s research revealed the significance of the hierarchical structure of the environment of community life, and how some higher-order structures can influence and constrain individual constituent actions nested within them. Recent treatment of the psychological boundary within the 4E cognition literature is also briefly and critically examined. (shrink)

This book presents and defends the version of objectivistic ethics, and applies it to the areas of social justice and medical ethics. Contents: Moral Judgment: Knowledge or Opinion? Back to Basics; Materialism in Ethics; Sexuality; Pornography; The Family; Actions and Long-Range Consequences: The Aged and Elderly; Biomedical Research; Abortion, Sterilization, and Euthanasia; Lying: Never or Hardly Never? The Assumption and Society-at-Large: Equality of Opportunity.

A number of philosophers have accepted the thesis that reasons for action are 'universalizable' in the sense that every such reason commits one to a universal prescription or practical judgment. The purpose of the present paper is to refute this thesis. The author presents and defends counterexamples to both strong and weak versions of the thesis, And shows that the thesis can be given up without denying the general contention that 'reason'-Statements imply universals.

The aim of Massimiliano Tomba’s Insurgent Universality is to return to Marxism’s original historical vocation by freeing it from the hegemony of the exchange system and the encompassing agency of value. At the heart of this project appears the recognition that time, space and thus history have been captured by capitalism and transformed into categories of its own to organise people and social relationships for capital’s programme of accumulation. In this way, capital has been able to hijack history and invert (...) it into a representation of the real, into a historical trompe-l’œil instead of ‘presentify(ing) the past’. In this regard contemporising the past is an act of intervening in history and actualising it rather than representing it. Through this operation Tomba is able to retrieve an inventory of repressed and forgotten histories, which will unveil the sources of an ‘alternate legacy of modernity’ and radical political possibilities for the present. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article discusses a particular problem with the race relations legislation: the fact that to show that discrimination has taken place one must prove not only that a person was unfavourably treated but that this was on the grounds of race. The article considers first whether grounds should be interpreted subjectively or objectively, and argues for an objective interpretation, partly to make proof easier, partly because no obvious injustice is done. Then it considers the kinds of evidence relevant to (...) such a proof, and argues that in many cases, although not all, it is in fact available, at least for the level of proof on the balance of the probabilities, required for civil, as opposed to criminal, proceedings. It is concluded that difficult cases remain, but not as many, or as difficult, as might appear at first sight. (shrink)

In the reckoning of historian Enzo Traverso, the accumulative inventory of the past’s crimes has exceeded the ‘frontiers of historical research’ and colonised the public sphere to ‘interpellate our present’. The quarrel over the crisis of historicism before World War ii has been superseded by postwar debates that have now spilled over into everyday life that demand recognition as instances of the continuing collision of claims of a past that refuses to pass and the formation of a new historical consciousness (...) in which collective memory of the crimes occupies a central position. Traverso’s purpose has been to repair this emergent dichotomy between historical practice and memoration, event and experience, as well as to overcome attending binary couplings like subjective and objective, individual and group in order to avoid falling into an unbridgeable antinomy that risks collapsing into contradiction. (shrink)