Some health care organizations allow physicians to withhold cardiopulmonary resuscitation from a patient, despite patient or surrogate requests that it be provided, when they believe it will be more harmful than beneficial. Such cases usually involve patients with terminal diagnoses whose medical teams argue that aggressive treatments are medically inappropriate or likely to be harmful. Although there is state-to-state variability and a considerable judicial gray area about the conditions and mechanisms for refusals to perform CPR, medical teams typically follow a (...) set of clearly defined procedures for these decisions. The procedures are based on the principle of nonmaleficence and typically include consultation with hospital ethics committees, reflecting the guidelines of relevant professional associations. Ethical debates about when CPR can and should be limited tend to rely more on discussions of theory, principles, and case studies than systematic empirical study of the situations in which such limitations are applied. Sociologists of bioethics call for empirical study, arguing that what ethicists and health professionals believe they are doing when they draft policies or invoke principles does not always mirror what is happening on the ground. In this article, we begin the task of modeling the empirical analyses sociologists call for, focusing on a cohort at Massachusetts General Hospital. We inductively analyzed ethics committee notes and medical records of nineteen patients whose surrogates did not accept the decision to withhold CPR. (shrink)

One antidote to moral distress is stronger moral agency—that is, an enhanced ability to act to bring about change. The Clinical Ethics Residency for Nurses, an educational program developed and run in two large northeastern academic medical centers with funding from the Health Resources and Services Administration, intended to strengthen nurses’ moral agency. Drawing on Improving Competencies in Clinical Ethics Consultation: An Education Guide, by the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, and on the goals of the nursing profession, CERN (...) sought to change attitudes, increase knowledge, and develop skills to act on one's knowledge. One of the key insights the faculty members brought to the design of this program is that knowledge of clinical ethics is not enough to develop moral agency. In addition to lecture‐style classes, CERN employed a variety of methods based in adult learning theory, such as active application of ethics knowledge to patient scenarios in classroom discussion, simulation, and the clinical practicum. Overwhelmingly, the feedback from the participants (sixty‐seven over three years of the program) indicated that CERN achieved transformative learning. (shrink)

The remember/know procedure is the most widely used method to investigate recollection and familiarity. It uses trial-by-trial reports to determine how much recollection and familiarity contribute to different kinds of recognition. Few other methods provide information about individual memory judgements and no alternative allows such direct indications of recollection and familiarity influences. Here we review how the RK procedure has been and should be used to help resolve theoretical disagreements about the processing and neural bases of components of recognition memory. (...) Emphasis is placed on procedural weaknesses and a possible confound of recollection and familiarity with recognition memory strength. Recommendations are made about how to minimise these problems including using modified versions of the procedure. The proposals here are important for improving behavioural and lesion research, and vital for brain imaging work. (shrink)

The present organ procurement system in the United States has failed to alleviate the chronic shortage of organs. Neither policies that require request for organ donation, nor increased educational...

Documentary filmmakers have ethical responsibilities to the subjects of their films. Specifically, they have an ethical responsibility to prevent harm to their subjects if they are in a position to do so, even harm not directly related to being in the film. Justification for this comes from documentary's status as a practice of a social institution and can be supported by Utilitarian and Kantian considerations, as well as the Aristotelian discussion of practices. Three films, The Thin Blue Line, Dope Sick (...) Love , and Born Into Brothels , are used as examples for the requirement to prevent harm to subjects. These examples cover several different possibilities of how documentary filmmakers behave concerning the welfare of their subjects and are evaluated in light of ethical considerations offered. (shrink)

In Epistemology of the Closet, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick explores the connection between the binaries of heterosexuality/homosexuality and the utopian/apocalyptic. In doing so, she exposes the commonplace of a “fantasy trajectory toward a life after the homosexual.”1 In this narrative model, once the queer has completed its function of purging the symbolic of its sins, the character is eliminated from the text as part of the emergence of a postnarrative hetero-normative utopia. In a similar vein, Lee Edelman’s “Against Survival: Queerness in (...) a Time That’s Out of Joint,” an essay on the quintessential revenge tragedy, Hamlet, notes that the revenger’s death ensures a return of society’s idealized vision of the future.2... (shrink)

There are many strains in Heidegger’s thought to which he often refers, but one that he never mentions, Taoism. Otto Pöggeler has noted that Heidegger’s engagement with Chinese philosophy, and in particular with the Tao Te Ching of Lao-tzu, exerted a decisive effect on the form and direction of his later thinking. With Reinhard May’s careful comparisons of passages from Heidegger’s major texts with translations of the Tao Te Ching and various Zen Buddhist texts, there is now general agreement on (...) Heidegger’s indebtedness to Chinese philosophy. The recurrent themes of his later lectures can all be found in Taoist texts. Often these are points on which he is labeled a mystic or an irrationalist and taken to task by his Western critics. This essay examines some key facets of his thought and compares his position to that of the Tao Te Ching so as to determine the extent to which Heidegger has departed from the Western tradition to become a Taoist. (shrink)

Abstract:There is good reason to take a virtue-based approach to business ethics. Moral principles are fairly useful in assessing actions, but understanding how moral people behave and how they become moral requires reference to virtues, some of which are important in business. We must go beyond virtues and refer to character, of which virtues are components, to grasp the relationship between moral assessment and psychological explanation. Virtues and other character traits are closely related to (in technical terms, they supervene on) (...) personality traits postulated by personality psychologists. They may therefore be featured in respectable psychological explanations. But good character fits no familiar psychological pattern. A person of good character is sufficiently self-aware and rational that his or her virtues are not accompanied by the vices that psychologists find usually associated with them. A course in business ethics can help develop this self-awareness, which a good life in business requires. (shrink)

Revolutions in semiconductor device miniaturization, bioelectronics, and applied neural control technologies are enabling scientists to create machine-assisted minds, science fiction's “cyborgs.” In a paper published in 1999, we sought to draw attention to the advances in prosthetic devices, to the myriad of artificial implants, and to the early developments of this technology in cochlear and retinal implants. Our concern, then and now, was to draw attention to the ethical issues arising from these innovations. Since that time, breakthroughs have occurred at (...) a breathtaking pace. Scientists, researchers, and engineers using differing methodologies are pursuing the possibilities of direct interfaces between brains and machines. Technological innovations as such are neither good nor evil; it is the uses devised for them that create moral implications. As there can be ethical problems inherent in the proper human uses of technologies and because brain chips are a very likely future technology, it is prudent to formulate policies and regulations that will mitigate their ill effects before the technologies are widespread. Unlike genetic technologies, which have received widespread scrutiny within the scientific community, national governments, and international forums, brain–machine interfaces have received little social or ethical scrutiny. However, the potential of this technology to change and significantly affect humans is potentially far greater than that of genetic enhancements, because genetic enhancements are inherently limited by biology and the single location of an individual, whereas hybrids of human and machine are not so restricted. Today, intense interest is focused on the development of drugs to enhance memory; yet, these drugs merely promise an improvement of normal memory, not the encyclopedic recall of a computer-enhanced mind combined with the ability to share information at a distance. The potential of brain chips for transforming humanity are astounding. This paper describes advances in hybrid brain–machine interfaces, offers some likely hypotheses concerning future developments, reflects on the implications of combining cloning and transplanted brain chips, and suggests some potential methods of regulating these technologies. (shrink)

In online lectures, unlike in face-to-face lectures, teachers lack access to (nonverbal) cues to check if their students are still “with them” and comprehend the lecture. The increasing availability of low-cost eye-trackers provides a promising solution. These devices measure unobtrusively where students look and can visualize these data to teachers. These visualizations might inform teachers about students’ level of “with-me-ness” (i.e., do students look at the information that the teacher is currently talking about) and comprehension of the lecture, provided that (...) (1) gaze measures of “with-me-ness” are related to comprehension, (2) people not trained in eye-tracking can predict students’ comprehension from gaze visualizations, (3) we understand how different visualization techniques impact this prediction. We addressed these issues in two studies. In Study 1, 36 students watched a video lecture while being eye-tracked. The extent to which students looked at relevant information and the extent to which they looked at the same location as the teacher both correlated with students’ comprehension (score on an open question) of the lecture. In Study 2, 50 participants watched visualizations of students’ gaze (from Study 1), using six visualization techniques (dynamic and static versions of scanpaths, heatmaps, and focus maps) and were asked to predict students’ posttest performance and to rate their ease of prediction. We found that people can use gaze visualizations to predict learners’ comprehension above chance level, with minor differences between visualization techniques. Further research should investigate if teachers can act on the information provided by gaze visualizations and thereby improve students’ learning. (shrink)

It may be nearly impossible to use standard principles to make a decision about a complex ethical case. The best decision, say virtue ethicists in the Aristotelian tradition, is often one that is made by a person of good character who knows the salient facts of the case and can frame the situation appropriately. In this respect ethical decisions and strategic decisions are similar. Rationality plays a role in good ethical decision-making, but virtue ethicists emphasize the importance of intuitions and (...) emotions as well.Virtue ethics suggests a reconciliation of the factual and the normative. Virtues may explain as well as justify actions. The same is true of other psychological states and events. That psychological terms have normative implications does not render them useless in explanation. As Aristotle does not distinguish cleanly between the normative and empirical, so many moral philosophers today reject the is-ought dichotomy. They are prepared to learn from economists, psychologists, and other empirical scientists who offer information about the nature of the good life and of values. Social psychologists who study community or corporate culture suggest a close relationship between organizational and ethical features, much as Aristotle saw a close relationship between politics and ethics. We should infer from all this that in business ethics there is good reason for philosophers and organization scholars to work closely together. (shrink)

To teach that being ethical requires knowing foundational ethical principles – or, as Socrates claimed, airtight definitions of ethical terms – is to invite cynicism among students, for students discover that no such principles can be found. Aristotle differs from Socrates in claiming that ethics is about virtues primarily, and that one can be virtuous without having the sort of knowledge that characterizes mathematics or natural science. Aristotle is able to demonstrate that ethics and self-interest may overlap, that ethics is (...) largely compatible with common sense, and that Aristotle’s virtuous person can make ethical decisions rationally. Case studies can help students improve their ethical perception and keep their values from being overwhelmed by corporate culture. (shrink)

A current issue in environmental ethics concerns the role of scientists as advocates for environmental policy. Some have argued that scientists should not be permitted to be policy advocates. I will argue that it is morally permissible for scientists to be advocates for environmental policies for four reasons. First, since scientists are also citizens it is improper to deny them the opportunity to advocate for certain policies. Second, scientists possess some expertise in these areas should be sought out to advocate (...) for these positions precisely because they are the ones with the knowledge, understanding and access to objective studies relating to policy issues. Third, I will argue that while objectivity is required for research, advocacy for policy issues does not entail the failure of objectivity. Last, scientists advocating for environmental policy meets the ethical requirements for advocacy generally offered by Robert Audi. These give us good reason to think it is morally permissible for scientists to act as advocates for environmental policy. (shrink)

Regarding Equality offers an innovative and controversial analysis of the relationship between equality and pluralism. Tackling an issue central to modern political thought, Freeberg highlights the struggle to characterize citizens as equals while respecting their moral, religious, and cultural diversity. The work ably contrasts and critiques the prevailing models for balancing equality with pluralism from thinkers Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum, John Rawls, Amy Gutmann, Dennis Thompson, Michael Oakeshott, and Drucilla Cornell. From these liberal, democratic, and conservative approaches to equality and (...) pluralism, Freeberg builds a theory of responsive regard: reciprocal civility between citizens that forms a chastened conception of what we share as free and equal persons. This work will greatly add to political theorists' and philosophers' arsenals of concepts for egalitarian and democratic theory. (shrink)

It may be nearly impossible to use standard principles to make a decision about a complex ethical case. The best decision, say virtue ethicists in the Aristotelian tradition, is often one that is made by a person of good character who knows the salient facts of the case and can frame the situation appropriately. In this respect ethical decisions and strategic decisions are similar. Rationality plays a role in good ethical decision-making, but virtue ethicists emphasize the importance of intuitions and (...) emotions as well.Virtue ethics suggests a reconciliation of the factual and the normative. Virtues may explain as well as justify actions. The same is true of other psychological states and events. That psychological terms have normative implications does not render them useless in explanation. As Aristotle does not distinguish cleanly between the normative and empirical, so many moral philosophers today reject the is-ought dichotomy. They are prepared to learn from economists, psychologists, and other empirical scientists who offer information about the nature of the good life and of values. Social psychologists who study community or corporate culture suggest a close relationship between organizational and ethical features, much as Aristotle saw a close relationship between politics and ethics. We should infer from all this that in business ethics there is good reason for philosophers and organization scholars to work closely together. (shrink)

Numerous articles in the popular press together with an examination of websites associated with the medical, legal, engineering, financial, and other professions leave no doubt that the role of professions has been impacted by the Internet. While offering the promise of the democratization of expertise – expertise made available to the public at convenient times and locations and at an affordable cost – the Internet is also driving a reexamination of the concept of professional identity and related claims of expertise (...) and standards of integrity. This paper begins with a presentation of case studies illustrating the ease by which impostors infiltrate the ranks of professionals. Reports of individuals masquerading as professionals via the Internet often reveal that these imposters cause harm to the unwary victims who rely on assertions of professional expertise. Such reports motivated the authors to examine the origins and evolution of the traditional roles of professions and professionals in today’s society, as well as question how, or whether, the standards for professional practice have been adapted to the challenges posed by technology, i.e., do statements of professional ethics provide a ‘guiding light’ for practitioners and their clients in the cyber age? The authors challenge the professions to consider the notion that technology forces a confrontation between the guild-like aspects of a profession that have served, on the one hand, to protect a profession from encroachment and, on the other hand, have purportedly protected the public. (shrink)

This qualitative study explored how 10 first-year peer educators understood and utilized their own socilal identities (e.g., their race, gender, sexual orientation, etc.) in their diversity education efforts. All participants saw their identities as having a profound impact on their teaching, although they identified many different, and sometimes contradictory influences. Their identities influenced their credibility as educators, use of emotion, and relationships with dominant and target group member students. Educators sometimes chose to discuss their own experiences with oppression and privilege, (...) and sometimes kept their identities hidden. Participants noted, in conclusion, the importance of considering the influence of their own identity, as awareness influenced how they approached their qork as diversity educators. (shrink)

This qualitative study explored how 10 first-year peer educators understood and utilized their own socilal identities (e.g., their race, gender, sexual orientation, etc.) in their diversity education efforts. All participants saw their identities as having a profound impact on their teaching, although they identified many different, and sometimes contradictory influences. Their identities influenced their credibility as educators, use of emotion, and relationships with dominant and target group member students. Educators sometimes chose to discuss their own experiences with oppression and privilege, (...) and sometimes kept their identities hidden. Participants noted, in conclusion, the importance of considering the influence of their own identity, as awareness influenced how they approached their qork as diversity educators. (shrink)

Abstract:Phillips and Margolis argue that moral philosophy is a poor basis for business ethics, but their narrow view of moral philosophy would exclude Aristotle, for one. They criticize me for assimilating states and organizations in using the Rawlsian device, but they put too much faith in Rawls’s distinction between states and voluntary organizations and pay too little attention to the continuities between them. Their plea for a conceptually autonomous ethics for organizations I interpret as reasonable and largely compatible with my (...) own stated opinion. (shrink)

Behaviorism is consistent with the assumptions of perfect competition, with the homo economicus model, and with a form of ethics that enshrines market-based notions of utility, justice, and rights and encourages rational maximizing. Economics and business courses foster this deficient form of ethics, assuming an overriding desire for money, which, according to MacIntyre and Aristotle, crowds out the associative virtues. These beliefs, often associated with Taylor and Friedman, lead to such practices as incentive compensation, which would be effective only if (...) employees were homines economici and thus rational in the sense of knowing how to satisfy whatever desires they have. Against Davidson’s view that psychology cannot be a natural science, Aristotle believes that there can be a teleological, if not exact, science of behavior. Aristotle believes that emotions and objectives may be rational or irrational. But rationality—phronesis, practical wisdom—is not a matter of applying algorithms. Doris questions whether character generates the first premises of an agent’s practical syllogisms, while Haidt has argued that we often act on emotions rather than on the basis of the reasons that we claim motivate us. Aristotle agrees that many people are not virtuous and that weakness of the will is a common occurrence, and he agrees that emotion drives actions. But if you are virtuous, your emotions and desires support your rationality. Aristotle gives us reason to reject the notion that people are homines economici and to treat them as rational deliberators, in part by creating an appropriate culture. The claim that it is in the nature of human beings to deliberate rationally is in part aspirational, but also in part scientific—in Aristotle’s modest sense. (shrink)

Abstract:Phillips and Margolis argue that moral philosophy is a poor basis for business ethics, but their narrow view of moral philosophy would exclude Aristotle, for one. They criticize me for assimilating states and organizations in using the Rawlsian device, but they put too much faith in Rawls’s distinction between states and voluntary organizations and pay too little attention to the continuities between them. Their plea for a conceptually autonomous ethics for organizations I interpret as reasonable and largely compatible with my (...) own stated opinion. (shrink)