Since the introduction of EMD by Dr. Shapiro in 1987, which led to the development of EMDR Therapy, clinical experiences and research contributed to a variety of protocols and procedures. While this dynamic evolution within EMDR Therapy is offering more options to treat a variety of patients suffering from various disorders, there is a greater risk of deviations from the core framework of this approach that would no longer be understood as EMDR Therapy. While research shows that following Shapiro’s standard (...) protocols and procedural steps is important to achieve positive treatment effects, it seems prudent to define the core elements in EMDR Therapy beyond adherence to the standard protocol given the complexity of clinical demands in a variety of treatment contexts. The author proposes that best practices requires not only an adherence to the fidelity of the model, but a willingness to adapt the model in order to best meet the needs of our clients in a variety of clinical contexts. Defining the core elements that constitute EMDR Therapy offers both a structure that has been well established and offers a foundation from which clinical adaptations can be made that are within the realm of what is widely accepted as EMDR Therapy. Such a structure could also be used to define research as well as clinical applications. Additionally EMDR Therapy as a comprehensive psychotherapy approach implies that the therapeutic relationship is an important component and should be considered a core element of this methodology. (shrink)

This short and highly accessible volume opens up the subject of the philosophy of biology to professionals and to students in both disciplines. The text covers briefly and clearly all of the pertinent topics in the subject, dealing with both human and non-human issues, and quite uniquely surveying not only scholars in the English-speaking world but others elsewhere, including the Eastern block. As molecular biologists peer ever more deeply into life’s mysteries, there are those who fear that such ‘reductionism’ conceals (...) more than it reveals, and there are those who complain that the new techniques threaten the physical safety of us all. As students of evolution apply their new-found understanding to our own species, some people think that this is merely an excuse for racist and sexist propaganda, and others worry that the whole exercise blatantly violates the religious beliefs many of us hold dear. These controversies are the joint concern of biologists and philosophers—of those whose task it is to study the theoretical and moral foundations of knowledge. The comprehensive and fully up-to-date bibliography makes this an invaluable and indispensable guide. (shrink)

While the WHO, public health experts, and political leaders have referenced solidarity as an important part of our responses to COVID‐19, I consider how we build solidarity during pandemics in order to improve the effectiveness of our responses. I use Prainsack and Buyx's definition of solidarity, which highlights three different tiers: (1) interpersonal solidarity, (2) group solidarity, and (3) institutional solidarity. Each tier of solidarity importantly depends on the actions and norms established at the lower tiers. Although empathy and solidarity (...) are distinct moral concepts, I argue that the affective component of solidarity is important for motivating solidaristic action, and empathetic accounts of solidarity help us understand how we actually build solidarity from tier to tier. During pandemics, public health responses draw on different tiers of solidarity depending on the nature, scope, and timeline of the pandemic. Therefore, I analyze both COVID‐19 and HIV/AIDS using this framework to learn lessons about how solidarity can more effectively contribute to our ongoing public health responses during pandemics. Whereas we used institutional solidarity during COVID‐19 in a top‐down approach to building solidarity that often overlooked interpersonal and group solidarity, we used those lower tiers during HIV/AIDS in a bottom‐up approach because governments and public health institutions were initially unresponsive to the crisis. Thus, we need to ensure that we have a strong foundation of respect, trust, and so forth, on which to build solidarity from tier to tier and promote whichever tiers of solidarity are lacking during a given pandemic to improve our responses. (shrink)

Humans are fundamentally social and tend to create emergent organizations when interacting with each other; from dyads to families, small groups, large groups, societies and civilizations. The study of the neuronal substrate of human social behavior is currently gaining momentum in the young field of social neuroscience. Hyperscanning is a neuroimaging technique by which we can study two or more brain simultaneously while participants interact with each other. The aim of this article is to discuss several factors that we deem (...) important in designing hyperscanning experiments. We first review hyperscanning studies performed by means of electroencephalography (EEG) that have been relying on a continuous interaction paradigm. Then, we provide arguments for favoring ecological paradigms, for studying the emotional component of social interactions and for performing longitudinal studies, the last two aspects being largely neglected so far in the hyperscanning literature despite their paramount importance in social sciences. Based on these premises we argue that music performance is a suitable experimental setting for hyperscanning and that for such studies EEG is an appropriate choice as neuroimaging modality. (shrink)

This paper proposes a novel distinction between accounts of scientific representation: it distinguishes thin accounts from thick accounts. Thin accounts focus on the descriptive aspect of representation whereas thick accounts acknowledge the evaluative aspect of representation. Thin accounts focus on the question of what a representation as such is. Thick accounts start from the question of what an adequate representation is. In this paper, I give two arguments in favor of a thick account, the Argument of the Epistemic Aims of (...) Modeling and the Argument of the Normativity of the Practice of Modeling. I also discuss possible objections to a thick account: the Argument from Misrepresentation and the Objections from Model Testing. The conclusion will be that the arguments on balance support a thick account of representation. (shrink)

The East Asian notion of a heart-mind is arguably more accurate to our psychology than the Western term “mind” and its equivalents are: the latter term implies the possibility of psychological functioning in the absence of all emotion, and it can be shown that that is impossible. But then it turns out that we can update the traditional Chinese notions of yin 陰 and yang 陽 in such a way as to help us philosophically explain how our functioning psychology involves (...) emotion and why any possible psychology has to rest on such a basis. Yin-yang is the essence of heart-mind, and heart-mind is essential to any functioning psychology. (shrink)

German language. Michael Gottlieb Hansch (1683-1749) reprint. Deals with Leibnitz Metaphysik.

Philosophical Issues, Volume 31, Issue 1, Page 280-298, October 2021.

This essay describes a general approach to building perturbation-tolerant autonomous systems, based on the conviction that artificial agents should be able to notice when something is amiss, assess the anomaly, and guide a solution into place. This basic strategy of self-guided learning is termed the metacognitive loop; it involves the system monitoring, reasoning about, and, when necessary, altering its own decision-making components. This paper (a) argues that equipping agents with a metacognitive loop can help to overcome the brittleness problem, (b) (...) details the metacognitive loop and its relation to our ongoing work on time-sensitive commonsense reasoning, (c) describes specific, implemented systems whose perturbation tolerance was improved by adding a metacognitive loop, and (d) outlines both short-term and long-term research agendas. (shrink)

Anthropology of Consciousness, Volume 32, Issue 2, Page 154-181, Autumn 2021.

∗Thanks to J. C. Beall, Alex Byrne, Jason Decker, Tyler Doggett, Paul Elbourne, Adam Elga, Warren Goldfarb, Delia Graff, Richard Heck, Charles Parsons, Mark Richard, Susanna Siegel, Jason Stanley, Judith Thomson, Carol Voeller, Brian Weatherson, Ralph Wedgwood, Steve Yablo, Cheryl Zoll, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments and discussions. Versions of this material were presented in my seminar at MIT in the Fall of 2000, and at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. Parts of this paper also derive from (...) my comments on a paper of Scott Soames at the ‘Liars and Heaps’ conference at the University of Connecticut in the Fall of 2002. I am grateful for the help of these audiences, and especially to Prof. Soames. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that the protocols of subjects recalling the names of their high school classmates, as well as an army of traditional memory phenomena, can be understood from an information processing analysis which interprets retrieval as a problem‐solving process. This characterization of retrieval focuses on the reconstructive and recursive nature of the process of remembering. Retrieval is viewed as a process in which some information about a target item is used to construct a description of the item (...) and this description is used in attempts to recover new fragments of information. A new description i s formed and the process continues recursively. Three subprocesses are identified: FIND A CONTEXT, in which a proper environment for conducting a search i s established: SEARCH, in which bits and pieces of information appropriate to the context are recovered until an adequate description can be formed within the search context; and VERIFY, in which recovery information is checked for consistency.From the perspective this characterization, we examine the protocols of subjects asked to think aloud while recalling the names of their classmates. Subjects' retrievals continued for a surprisingly long period and were characterized by the phenomena of overshoot, systematic hypothesizing, fabrications, establishment of search contexts, self‐corrections, and the use of a number of basic search strategies. The view of memory as a problem‐solving process not only leads us to the identification of these phenomena but also to a framework for a coherent interpretation for them. (shrink)

This essay examines the critical role played by comedy and laughter in Plato. It begins by taking seriously Plato's critique of comedy and his concerns about the negative effects of laughter in dialogues such as Republic and Laws. It then shows how Plato, rather than simply rejecting comedy and censuring laughter, attempts to put these into the service of philosophy by rethinking them in philosophical terms. Accordingly, the laughable or the ridiculous is understood not just in relation to the ugly (...) or the ignoble, as it is in Homer, but in relation of blindness, ignorance, and falsity. By taking up such a philosophical perspective, one can then distinguish what truly is laughable from what merely appears so. It is in this way that Plato is able to explain why Socrates appeared so ridiculous to the multitude but was known to be anything but to those who were able to see him with philosophical eyes, that is, those who were able to attend to what I call the spectacle of laughter. The paper concludes... (shrink)

Michael B. Gill offers a new account of Humean moral pluralism: the view that there are different moral reasons for action, which are based on human sentiments. He explores its historical origins, and argues that it offers the most compelling view of our moral experience. Together, pluralism and Humeanism make a philosophically powerful couple.

In “The Ascription of Responsibilities and Rights,” H. L. A. Hart introduces two ideas, which he takes to be importantly related: ascriptive sentences and defeasible concepts. Hart's purpose is to dispel certain confusions that he nds in the philosophy of action; but I argue that Hart's ideas are equally pertinent to epistemology. Knowledge is a matter of epistemic authority; and authority is a matter of rights and responsibilities. But Hart's “ascriptivism” has attracted serious criticism and stands in need of clarification, (...) elaboration and even correction. The overall aim of the paper is to present a form of epistemic ascriptivism, in which justification emerges as a defeasible concept in Hart's sense. (shrink)

Contemporary argumentation theories highlight the importance of Others for contributing to and critiquing an individual’s reasoning and/or argumentation. Reasoners and arguers are encouraged to interact with imagined constructs such as a community of model interlocutors or universal audience. These model interlocutors are theoretically meant to bring to mind reasons and counter-considerations that may not have been conceived of otherwise so as to improve the overall quality of an instance of reasoning or argumentation. Overlooked, however, is the impact of differing individual’s (...) imaginative abilities. This paper argues that more important than relying on an Other, real or imagined, reasoners and arguers would do just as well to improve their own creative abilities first. Consulting a real or imagined Other may help in some cases help, but such a strong reliance on Others comes with serious limitations. (shrink)

In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari critique the relationship between formal logic and philosophy. They argue that since philosophy is the creation of concepts that are intensional, and formal logic reduces concepts to their extension, formal logic then has no special providence to decide philosophical questions. This may strike the logic-inclined philosopher as outdated given that there are now formal intensional logics designed to model meaning rather than reference. However, it will be shown that these logics too fail to (...) express the concept in a way that preserves its philosophical import. Doing so requires contrasting Deleuze and Guattari's account of the concept with Frege's to show how the latter persists even in intensional logics in the form of mathematical functions that are ultimately referential. This then results in support for Deleuze and Guattari's claim that formal logic is a useful tool, but that it is incapable of adjudicating philosophical disputes. (shrink)

I distinguish restrictive and permissive multiverse solutions to the problems of evil and no best world. Restrictive multiverses do not admit a single instance of gratuitous evil and they are not improvable. I show that restrictive multiverses unacceptably entail that all modal distinctions collapse. I consider Timothy O’Connor’s permissive multiverse. I show that a perfect creator minimizes aggregative suffering in permissive multiverses only if the actual universe is not included in any actualizable multiverse. I conclude that permissive multiverses do not (...) offer a credible solution to the problems of evil and no best world. (shrink)

Michael Woods; XIV*—Scepticism and Natural Knowledge, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 80, Issue 1, 1 June 1980, Pages 231–248, https://doi.org/1.

We present a new road map for research on “How the Brain Got Language” that adopts an EvoDevoSocio perspective and highlights comparative neuroprimatology – the comparative study of brain, behavior and communication in extant monkeys and great apes – as providing a key grounding for hypotheses on the last common ancestor of humans and monkeys and chimpanzees and the processes which guided the evolution LCA-m → LCA-c → protohumans → H. sapiens. Such research constrains and is constrained by analysis of (...) the subsequent, primarily cultural, evolution of H. sapiens which yielded cultures involving the rich use of language. (shrink)