In this article we distinguish between philosophical bioethics (PB), descriptive policy orientated bioethics (DPOB) and normative policy oriented bioethics (NPOB). We argue that finding an appropriate methodology for combining empirical data and moral theory depends on what the aims of the research endeavour are, and that, for the most part, this combination is only required for NPOB. After briefly discussing the debate around the is/ought problem, and suggesting that both sides of this debate are misunderstanding one another (i.e. one side (...) treats it as a conceptual problem, whilst the other treats it as an empirical claim), we outline and defend a methodological approach to NPOB based on work we have carried out on a project exploring the normative foundations of paternal rights and responsibilities. We suggest that given the prominent role already played by moral intuition in moral theory, one appropriate way to integrate empirical data and philosophical bioethics is to utilize empirically gathered lay intuition as the foundation for ethical reasoning in NPOB. The method we propose involves a modification of a long-established tradition on non-intervention in qualitative data gathering, combined with a form of reflective equilibrium where the demands of theory and data are given equal weight and a pragmatic compromise reached. (shrink)

In Europe, telecare is the use of remote monitoring technology to enable vulnerable people to live independently in their own homes. The technology includes electronic tags and sensors that transmit information about the user's location and patterns of behavior in the user's home to an external hub, where it can trigger an intervention in an emergency. Telecare users in the United Kingdom sometimes report their unease about being monitored by a ?Big Brother,? and the same kind of electronic tags that (...) alert telecare hubs to the movements of someone with dementia who is ?wandering? are worn by terrorist suspects who have been placed under house arrest. For these and other reasons, such as ordinary privacy concerns, telecare is sometimes regarded as an objectionable extension of a ?surveillance state.? In this article, we defend the use of telecare against the charge that it is Orwellian. In the United States, the conception of telecare primarily as telemedicine, and the fact that it is not typically a government responsibility, make a supposed connection with a surveillance state even more doubtful than in Europe. The main objection, we argue, to telecare is not its intrusiveness, but the danger of its deepening the isolation of those who use it. There are ways of organizing telecare so that the independence and privacy of users are enhanced, but personal isolation may be harder to address. As telecare is a means of reducing the cost of publicly provided social and health care, and the need to reduce public spending is growing, the correlative problem of isolation must be addressed alongside the goal of promoting independence. (shrink)

Telecare is often regarded as a win/win solution to the growing problem of meeting the care needs of an ageing population. In this paper we call attention to some of the ways in which telecare is not a win/win solution but rather aggravates many of the long-standing ethical tensions that surround the care of the elderly. It may reduce the call on carers' time and energy by automating some aspects of care, particularly daily monitoring. This can release carers for other (...) caring activities. On the other hand, remote and impersonal monitoring seems to fall short of providing care. Monitoring may be used to help elderly users retain independence. But it may also increase the amount of information which flows from users to carers, which can result in a form of function-creep that actually undermines independence. (shrink)

When the benefits of surgery do not outweigh the harms or where they do not clearly do so, surgical interventions become morally contested. Cutting to the Core examines a number of such surgeries, including infant male circumcision and cutting the genitals of female children, the separation of conjoined twins, surgical sex assignment of intersex children and the surgical re-assignment of transsexuals, limb and face transplantation, cosmetic surgery, and placebo surgery.

Widespread obesity poses a serious challenge to health outcomes in the developed world and is a growing problem in the developing world. There has been a raft of proposals to combat the challenge of obesity, including restrictions on the nature of food advertising, the content of prepared meals, and the size of sodas; taxes on saturated fat and on calories; and mandated “healthy-options” on restaurant menus. Many of these interventions seem to have a greater impact on rates of obesity than (...) does simply providing information about health risks and healthier lifestyles. The more interventionist policy options have, however, been implemented only slowly, in large part because of criticisms that they are unjustified infringements on the liberty of consumers. Food industry groups, free-market think tanks, and the popular press regard measures that incentivize or penalize particular food and lifestyle choices as unjustifiable state regulation of purely self-regarding behavior. To counteract the liberty-oriented position, those who favor a more interventionist role for the state have recently argued for labeling obesity as a public health emergency. By labeling obesity as a public health emergency, policy-makers could override concerns about individual liberty in order to pursue more interventionist policies designed to guide consumer choices toward healthier lifestyles. In this paper, we argue that, contrary to initial appearances, obesity possesses some of the morally relevant features of public health emergencies, though we do not argue that it actually constitutes one. (shrink)

This paper argues that the convention of allocating donated gametes on a ‘first come, first served’ basis should be replaced with an allocation system that takes into account more morally relevant criteria than waiting time. This conclusion was developed using an empirical bioethics methodology, which involved a study of the views of 18 staff members from seven U.K. fertility clinics, and 20 academics, policy-makers, representatives of patient groups, and other relevant professionals, on the allocation of donated sperm and eggs. Against (...) these views, we consider some nuanced ways of including criteria in a points allocation system. We argue that such a system is more ethically robust than ‘first come, first served’, but we acknowledge that our results suggest that a points system will meet with resistance from those working in the field. We conclude that criteria such as a patient's age, potentially damaging substance use, and parental status should be used to allocate points and determine which patients receive treatment and in what order. These and other factors should be applied according to how they bear on considerations like child welfare, patient welfare, and the effectiveness of the proposed treatment. (shrink)

This article explores how the type of consent given for organ donation should affect the judgement of a patient's overall benefit with regards to donation of their organs and the pre-mortem interventions required to facilitate this. The findings of a qualitative study of the views of 10 healthcare professionals, combined with a philosophical analysis inform the conclusion that how consent to organ donation is given is a reliable indicator only of the strength of evidence about views on donation and subsequent (...) willingness to undergo pre-mortem interventions. It is not an indicator of the strength of actual desire to donate. Clinical management of living patients prior to donation after circulatory death must therefore respect the values, wishes and beliefs of the potential donation after circulatory death donor. Our participants, however, suggested that the information currently provided is sufficient to authorise donation and that this consent, however provided, was sufficient to proceed with pre-mortem interventions. Respect for autonomy underpinned this ‘all or nothing’ approach. Although the legal requirements for donation authorisation and the protection of patients without capacity are clear, practice and policy regarding consent in donation after circulatory death may be based on donation following brainstem death where the patient is already dead when the family is approached. Custom and practice in donation after circulatory death may need to be revised to protect the interests of the dying potential donor. (shrink)

In this article, it is argued that grandparents' obligations originate from parental obligations (i.e from the relationship they have with their children, the parents of their grandchildren) and not from the role of grandparent per se, and any entitlements flow from the extent to which these obligations are met. The position defended is, therefore, that grandparents qua grandparents are not entitled to form or continue relationships with their grandchildren. A continuation of grandparent-grandchildren relationships may be in the interests of children, (...) but the grandparental nature of the relationship is not decisive. What counts is the extent to which relationships children have with any adults who are not their parents are is significant to them. Sometimes, however, grandparents become parents or co-parents of their grandchildren. They then gain parental rights, and as such are as entitled, ceteris parius, as any parent to expect their relationship with the child to continue. The issue of grandparents' entitlements can come to the fore when parents separate, and grandparents are unhappy with the access they have to their grandchildren. Grandparents' obligations may become a particular issue when parents die, struggle, or fail to care for their children. This article focuses particularly on these kinds of circumstances. (shrink)

Conditional and directed deceased organ donations occur when donors attempt to influence the allocation of their donated organs. This can include asking that the organs are given to or withheld from certain types of people, or that they are given to specified individuals. Donations of these types have raised ethical concerns, and have been prohibited in many countries, including the UK. In this article we report the findings from a qualitative study involving interviews with potential donors, potential recipients and transplant (...) staff, and use these results as a springboard for further ethical commentary. We argue that although participants favoured unconditional donation, this preference was grounded in a false distinction between ‘medical’ and ‘non-medical’ allocation criteria. Although there are good reasons to maintain organ allocation based primarily upon the existing ‘medical’ criteria, it may be premature to reject all other potential criteria as being unacceptable. Part of participants' justification for allocating organs using ‘medical’ criteria was to make the best use of available organs and avoid wasting their potential benefit, but this can also justify accepting conditional donations in some circumstances. We draw a distinction between two types of waste – absolute and relative – and argue that accepting conditional donations may offer a balance between these forms of waste. (shrink)

The NHS differs from a private business in not aiming at profits and in being obliged to provide only the single product of health care. How radically does this affect the requirement to be “business‐like” and adopt business values? Dr Draper is Lecturer in Biomedical Ethics at The Medical School, The University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT. She wishes to thank Tom Sorell for his comments on the first draft of this article.

The NHS differs from a private business in not aiming at profits and in being obliged to provide only the single product of health care. How radically does this affect the requirement to be “business‐like” and adopt business values? Dr Draper is Lecturer in Biomedical Ethics at The Medical School, The University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT. She wishes to thank Tom Sorell for his comments on the first draft of this article.

In this article we explore some of the ethical dimensions of using social media to increase the number of living kidney donors. Social media provides a platform for changing non-identifiable ‘statistical victims’ into ‘real people’ with whom we can identify and feel empathy: the so-called ‘identifiable victim effect’, which prompts charitable action. We examine three approaches to promoting kidney donation using social media which could take advantages of the identifiable victim effect: institutionally organized campaigns based on historical cases aimed at (...) promoting non-directed altruistic donation; personal case-based campaigns organized by individuals aimed at promoting themselves/or someone with whom they are in a relationship as a recipient of directed donation; institutionally organized personal case-based campaigns aimed at promoting specific recipients for directed donation. We will highlight the key ethical issues raised by these approaches, and will argue that the third option, despite raising ethical concerns, is preferable to the other two. (shrink)