Loneliness—perceived social isolation—is defined as a discrepancy between existing social relationships and desired quality of relationships. Whereas most research has focused on existing relationships, we consider the standards against which people compare them. Participants who made downward social or temporal comparisons that depicted their contact with others as better reported less loneliness than participants who made upward comparisons that depicted their contact with others as worse. Extending these causal results, in a survey of British adults, upward social comparisons predicted current (...) loneliness, even when controlling for loneliness at a previous point in time. Finally, content analyses of interviews with American adults who lived alone showed that social and temporal comparisons about contact with others were both prevalent and linked to expressed loneliness. These findings contribute to understanding the social cognition of loneliness, extend the effects of comparisons about social connection to the important public health problem of loneliness, and provide a novel tool for acutely manipulating loneliness. (shrink)

In a deterministically evolving world, the usefulness of nontrivial probabilities can seem mysterious. I use the ‘Mentaculus’ machinery developed by David Albert and Barry Loewer to show how all probabilities in such a world can be derived from a single, initial chance event. I go on to argue that this is the only genuine chance event. Perhaps surprisingly, we have good evidence of its existence and nature. I argue that the existence of this chance event justifies our epistemic reliance (...) on nontrivial probabilities. (shrink)

Detlef Dürr was inspirational to many who write about issues in the philosophical foundations of physics and probability. For many years I have been interested in his work on statistical mechanics and Bohmian mechanics and especially by the role of typicality in these theories. In my contribution I will say a few words comparing typicality and probability approaches to statistical mechanics and ask whether the approaches are friends or foes.

This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.

A collection of newly commissioned papers on themes from David Albert's Time and Chance (HUP, 2000), with replies by Albert. Introduction [Barry Loewer, Brad Weslake, and Eric Winsberg] I. Overview of Time and Chance 1. The Mentaculus: A Probability Map of the Universe [Barry Loewer] II. Philosophical Foundations 2. The Metaphysical Foundations of Statistical Mechanics: On the Status of PROB and PH [Eric Winsberg] 3. The Logic of the Past Hypothesis [David Wallace] 4. In What Sense Is the (...) Early Universe Fine-Tuned? [Sean M. Carroll] 5. The Meta-Reversibility Objection [Christopher J. G. Meacham] 6. Typicality versus Humean Probabilities as the Foundation of Statistical Mechanics [Dustin Lazarovici] 7. The Past Hypothesis and the Nature of Physical Laws [Eddy Keming Chen] 8. On the Albertian Demon [Tim Maudlin] III. Underwriting the Asymmetries of Knowledge and Intervention 9. Reading the Past in the Present [Nick Huggett] 10. Causes, Randomness, and the Past Hypothesis [Mathias Frisch] 11. Time, Flies, and Why We Can’t Control the Past [Alison Fernandes] 12. The Concept of Intervention in Time and Chance [Sidney Felder] Conclusion [David Albert]. (shrink)

The individual self and its critics -- The individualist assumptions of bioethical frameworks -- The genetic self is the connected self -- The failures of individual ethics in the genetic era -- The communal turn -- Developing alternatives: benefit sharing -- Developing alternatives: trust -- The ethical toolbox part one: recognising goods and harms -- The ethical toolbox part two: applying appropriate practices -- Possible futures.

Barry Dainton presents a fascinating new account of the self, the key to which is experiential or phenomenal continuity. Provided our mental life continues we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic physical alterations, or even moving from one body to another. It was this fact that led John Locke to conclude that a credible account of our persistence conditions - an account which reflects how we actually conceive of ourselves - should be framed in terms of mental (...) rather than material continuity. But mental continuity comes in different forms. Most of Locke's contemporary followers agree that our continued existence is secured by psychological continuity, which they take to be made up of memories, beliefs, intentions, personality traits, and the like. Dainton argues that that a better and more believable account can be framed in terms of the sort of continuity we find in our streams of consciousness from moment to moment. Why? Simply because provided this continuity is not lost - provided our streams of consciousness flow on - we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic psychological alterations. Phenomenal continuity seems to provide a more reliable guide to our persistence than any form of continuity. The Phenomenal Self is a full-scale defence and elaboration of this premise. The first task is arriving at an adequate understanding of phenomenal unity and continuity. This achieved, Dainton turns to the most pressing problem facing any experience-based approach: losses of consciousness. How can we survive them? He shows how the problem can be solved in a satisfactory manner by construing ourselves as systems of experiential capacities. He then moves on to explore a range of further issues. How simple can a self be? How are we related to our bodies? Is our persistence an all-or-nothing affair? Do our minds consist of parts which could enjoy an independent existence? Is it metaphysically intelligible to construe ourselves as systems of capacities? The book concludes with a novel treatment of fission and fusion. (shrink)

The essay constructs an ontological theory designed to capture the categories instantiated in those portions or levels of reality which are captured in our common sense conceptual scheme. It takes as its starting point an Aristotelian ontology of “substances” and “accidents”, which are treated via the instruments of mereology and topology. The theory recognizes not only individual parts of substances and accidents, including the internal and external boundaries of these, but also universal parts, such as the “humanity” which is an (...) essential part of both Tom and Dick, and also “individual relations”, such as Tom’s promise to Dick, or their current handshake. (shrink)

Scholars have detected hostility to technology in Daoist thought. But is this a problem with any machine or only some applications of some machines by some people? I show that the problem is not with machines per se but with the people who introduce them, or more exactly with their knowledge. It is not knowledge as such that causes the disorder Laozi and Zhuangzi associate with machines; it is confused, disordered knowledge—superficial, inadequate, unsubtle, and artless. In other words the problem (...) is not with machines but with the ethics of engineering and the government of technology. The Daoist argument does not devalue machines or knowledge of them; instead, it sets a new goal, defining an alternative ideal—alternative to techniques held hostage to despotic ideas about efficiency and profit. (shrink)

Henri Bergson (1859-1941) was once the most famous philosopher in the world, but his reputation waned in the latter half of the 20th century. Barry Allen here makes the case for Bergson as a great philosopher, one whose thought has much to contribute to contemporary philosophical questions. Living in Time presents chapters on each of Bergson's four major works, explaining his theories of time, perception, memory, and panpsychic consciousness, his innovative concept of virtual existence, his objection to Darwin, his (...) controversy with Einstein, his philosophy of creative evolution, and his social philosophy of closed and open society. In particular Allen focusses on Bergson's powerful ideas on time. Classical arguments for determinism fallaciously apply spatial concepts to consciousness; once we take time seriously, which means acknowledging its reality as duration and its difference from space, Bergson showed that the arguments for determinism become insupportable. Bergson's ideas on time and evolution offer a comparison with Nietzsche, which Allen develops, exposing both philosophical concurrence and systematic difference. The book's conclusion discusses the question of Bergson and naturalism and summarizes the ontology of the virtual that emerges as a core part of Bergson's thought. (shrink)

La place de Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) dans le siècle des Lumières, comme dans l'histoire des idées, est difficile à déterminer. Tenu à l'écart des courants dominants de son époque, il n'a été lu et étudié que bien après sa mort. Sa pensée n'a cessé depuis de faire l'objet d'interprétations diverses et contradictoires : certains la jugent tournée vers le passé, nourrie de l'humanisme grec et latin revivifié par le christianisme ; d'autres y voient la préfiguration des grandes visions modernes de (...) l'histoire. Son oeuvre, écrit Alain Pons, dépasse l'opposition entre Anciens et Modernes ; elle a l'ambition de fonder une science nouvelle, non pas du monde naturel mais du monde des hommes, sous la forme d'une étude des nations. Pour ce faire, le philosophe napolitain unit intimement deux savoirs distincts : une philosophie de l'esprit humain qu'il ne veut pas réduire à la pure raison, et une philologie qui explore le savoir historique accumulé depuis la plus lointaine antiquité. Cette lecture met en lumière la façon dont, selon Vico, naissent, vivent et peuvent mourir les nations, et comment se construisent chez elles les "choses humaines" - religions, langages, coutumes, lois, institutions politiques. Elle donne son relief à l'intuition fondamentale qui fait l'originalité du philosophe : c'est dans le temps de l'histoire et dans la vie des nations que l'homme accomplit son humanité. La Science nouvelle (1744) ouvre certaines voies dans lesquelles vont s'engager la philosophie moderne et les sciences humaines. Elle aide à comprendre les interrogations, les espoirs et les craintes que le destin des nations fait toujours naître. (shrink)

All athletes experience victory and defeat, but how many truly learn from the experience of sport? For ancient Greek philosophers, sport was an integral part of education. Today, athletics programs remain in schools, but we face a growing gap between the modern sports experience and enduring educational values. This book seeks to bridge that gap by advocating a philosophical approach to the sports experience. Combining issues and ideas from traditional philosophy with contemporary analyses of sport and applied "thinking activities," this (...) book invites athletes to learn about life from their experience of sport. The text works its way from internal reflection to social interaction by addressing four important topics: self-discovery, responsibility, respect, and citizenship. This sequence is important because authentic self-knowledge is an essential foundation for effectively dealing with the personal and social challenges faced by philosophical athletes. Reid discusses specific issues such as violence, racism, and performance-enhancing drugs in their relevant contexts, although philosophical athletes focus on the big picture, approaching each issue from a complete vision of themselves, their moral commitments, and their social roles. Athletes as diverse as the teenage college recruit and the aging weekend-warrior will gain insight into their sports experience and into their lives. This philosophical approach maximizes what we can learn from sport and gives us the best chance for leading better lives because of it. (shrink)

Face à la violence, que peut la philosophie? Cette question se pose avec une terrible acuité après les attentats de janvier contre Charlie Hebdo et l'hyper-cacher. Le présent ouvrage prétend y apporter une réponse en prenant du recul et à travers la philo française contemporaine de Sartre à Levinas en passant par Camus, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Simone Weil, Canguilhem, Cavaillès, Lévi-Strauss, Deleuze, Foucault, Jankélévitch et Derrida. Sartre, c'est à la fois l'être et le néant et toutes les questions politiques de l'après-guerre (...) ; Camus, l'absurde et la révolte avec le refus de la violence ; Merleau-Ponty, la justification du communisme et donc d'une certaine forme de totalitarisme ; Simone Weil, Canguilhem et Cavaillès mettent le pacifisme à l'épreuve et en avant l'expérience de la nécessité ; Lévi-Strauss pose le problème de la violence face à la diversité humaine repensée ; Deleuze confronte la métaphysique à la politique. Foucault souligne l'enfermement intolérable ; Jankélévitch Derrida et Levinas pose le problème de l'éthique et de la métaphysique et de l'impossible pardon face au génocide juif. Ici c'est toute la philosophie c'est-à-dire, l'action et la pensée les oeuvres et les relations, l'histoire et l'actualité qui tentent de répondre à une certaine folie du monde. (shrink)

Les débuts pathologiques de l'aventure américaine -- Prélude à l'émigration norvégienne vers l'Amérique : Kierkegaard en Norvège au XIXe siècle -- Les travaux remarquables de David Swenson -- Les choix théoriques de Walter Lowrie, ou comment Søren Kierkegaard fut métamorphosé en "S.K." -- Quelques interprétations anglophones marquantes : Collins, Thomte, Thomas, Holmer, Sponheim (James Collins, Reidar Thomte, John Heywood Thomas, Paul Holmer, Paul Sponheim--interprète de Kierkegaard) -- Le Kierkegaard de Howard Vincent Hong et Edna Hong : un Kierkegaard-phare pour les (...) recherches à venir. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the prospects for logical, semantic, metaphysical, and epistemic characterisations of the autonomy of ethics.

This study investigates the hypothesis that the advantage corporate social performance (CSP) yields in attracting human resources depends on the degree of job choice possessed by the job seeking population. Results indicate that organizational CSP is positively related to employer attractiveness for job seekers with high levels of job choice but not related for populations with low levels suggesting advantages to firms with high levels of CSP in the ability to attract the most qualified employees.

An ethical theory is alienating if accepting the theory inhibits the agent from fitting participation in some normative ideal, such as some ideal of integrity, friendship, or community. Many normative ideals involve non-consequentialist behavior of some form or another. If such ideals are normatively authoritative, they constitute counterexamples to consequentialism unless their authority can be explained or explained away. We address a range of attempts to avoid such counterexamples and argue that consequentialism cannot by itself account for the normative authority (...) of all plausible such ideals. At best, consequentialism can find a more modest place in an ethical theory that includes non-consequentialist principles with their own normative authority. (shrink)

Le droit applicable à l’exercice de l’autorité parentale a été remanié par la loi du 4 mars 2002. Il existe désormais un statut légal du couple parental, applicable quelle que soit la situation familiale des parents, conditionné par l’établissement du lien de filiation de l’enfant. Ce droit commun est gouverné par un principe supérieur : les père et mère exercent en commun l’autorité parentale. La consécration progressive d’un principe d’autorité parentale conjointe (1970,1987,1993, 2002) est certes un progrès en ce qu’elle (...) invite les parents à s’accorder et à se consulter dans l’exercice de l’autorité parentale, mais l’indifférenciation des situations familiales sur laquelle repose désormais la notion de « coparentalité » est excessive en ce qu’elle conduit à détacher le principe du modèle d’un couple uni. Une autre orientation pourrait être prise : celle consistant à rapprocher du mariage le concubinage avec vie maritale, ce qui supposerait de prendre en la matière le contre-pied de la loi de 1999. L’apport le plus apparent de la loi du 4 mars 2002 est de prévoir tout un arsenal de dispositions de nature à assurer l’effectivité du principe de coparentalité, en particulier les conventions et la résidence alternée. Les conventions marquent, sous l’angle de la notion d’ordre public, l’avènement du pluralisme familial, nouveauté encadrée par un corps de règles de plus en plus tentaculaire. Quant à la résidence alternée, cette modalité présente le défaut majeur d’être désormais légale, ce qui implique sa vocation à s’appliquer à tous. Il serait souhaitable pour cette raison de rétablir dans la loi le principe de la résidence habituelle de l’enfant chez l’un de ses parents et de réserver la résidence alternée à la pratique judiciaire, à titre très exceptionnel et expérimental, pour des enfants en âge de l’assumer. (shrink)

Plato’s partition argument infers that the soul has parts from the fact that the soul experiences mental conflict. We consider an ambiguity in the concept of mental conflict. According to the first sense of conflict, a soul is in conflict when it has desires whose satisfaction is logically incompatible. According to the second sense of conflict, a soul is in conflict when it has desires which are logically incompatible even when they are unsatisfied. This raises a dilemma: if the mental (...) conflict is supposed to be the latter kind of conflict, then the partition argument is valid but is likely unsound; if it’s supposed to be the former kind, then the partition argument has true premises but is invalid. We explain this dilemma in detail and defend a dispositionalist solution to it. (shrink)

Deals with the topic of causality. This book traces the evolution of causal thinking from antiquity to the present and culminates with a description of five key conditions that must be satisfied to demonstrate a causal effect.

Virtue ethics and virtue epistemology shift the focus of evaluation from thin concepts to thick ones. Simon Blackburn has argued that a shift to thick ethical concepts dooms us to talking past one another. I contend that virtue epistemologists can answer Blackburn's objection, thus salvaging genuine disagreement about the epistemically thick. Section I introduces the standard cognitivist and non-cognitivist analyses of thick concepts. Section II argues that thick epistemic concepts are subject to combinatorial vagueness. I contend that virtue epistemologists share (...) vague concepts of intellectual virtue and open-mindedness. Section III addresses Allan Gibbard's worry that appealing to vagueness exacerbates the problem. I conclude that for genuine disagreement to occur, the parties must (1) share vague concepts; and (2) agree on the goals of their conceptual analyses. (shrink)

Andrews explores spiritual practices that were the vital source from which everything else about Transcendentalism-texts, ideas, and social action-flowed. These practices are eminently available to spiritual seekers today, both those who are connected to conventional forms of religiosity and those who are allergic to 'religion.

McTaggart famously argued that time is unreal. Today, almost no one agrees with his conclusion.1 But his argument remains thelocus classicusfor both the A–theory and the B-theory of time. I want to show how McTaggart's argument provided the impetus for both of these opposing views of the nature of time. I will also present and defend what I take to be the correct view of the nature of time.

As conceived by analytic philosophers ontology consists in the application of the methods of mathematical logic to the analysis of ontological discourse. As conceived by realist philosophers such as Meinong and the early Husserl, Reinach and Ingarden, it consists in the investigation of the forms of entities of various types. The suggestion is that formal methods be employed by phenomenological ontologists, and that phenomenological insights may contribute to the construction of adequate formal-ontological languages. The paper sketches an account of what (...) might be involved in this new discipline, an account which is illustrated in application to the formal-ontological problems raised by negative states of affairs. (shrink)

This volume encompasses deeply critical dialogues that question how the field of psychology exists within and is shaped by the current neoliberal political context. Spanning from psychoanalysis to post-colonial theory, these far-reaching discussions consider how a greater ethical responsiveness to human experience and sociopolitical arrangements may reopen the borders of psychological discourse. With the understanding that psychology grows in the soil of neoliberal terrain and is a chief fertilizer for neoliberal expansion, the interviews in this book explore alternative possibilities for (...) this field of study might function. By offering their own unique responses regarding the current condition of their respective disciplines, these scholars critically consider the current conceptual frameworks that set the theoretical boundaries of psychology, and contemplate the ethical responsibilities currently affecting the field. This book will prove essential for scholars and students across several disciplines including psychology, philosophy, ethics, and post-colonial and socio-cultural studies, as well as practicing mental health professionals with an interest in the importance of psychological and social theory. (shrink)

Much of the discussion of Naive Realism about veridical experience has focused on a consequence of adopting it—namely, disjunctivism about perceptual experience. However, the motivations for being a Naive Realist in the first place have received relatively little attention in the literature. In this paper, I will elaborate and defend the claim that Naive Realism provides the best account of the phenomenal character of veridical experience.

Essays discuss the social and moral meanings of Freudian thought and examine the changes Freud's ideas have undergone in various fields of psychology.

This study examines the similarities and differences in pre- and post-Sarbanes-Oxley corporate ethics codes and codes of conduct using the framework of structuration theory. Following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) legislation in 2002 in the United States, publicly traded companies there undertook development and revision of their codes of ethics in response to new regulatory requirements as well as incentives under the U.S. Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, which were also revised as part of the SOX mandates. Questions that remain are (...) whether these new or revised codes are effective means of communicating changed ethical foci and attitudes in organizations. Centering resonance analysis (CRA) is used to identify differences and similarities across time and industries by analyzing word networks of 46 pre- and post-SOX corporate codes of ethics. Analyses focus on content and structure of generated word networks as well as resulting factors that emerged from the texts. Results are interpreted from the structuration perspective that content and structure of codes are constrained and enabled by system structures while they function to produce and reproduce those structures. Results indicate that corporate codes of ethics are formal discourses of ethics, laws, and control. Code structure has changed across time, with an increased emphasis on compliance in post-SOX codes. Implications for research and practice are discussed in light of findings. (shrink)

This paper examines three approaches to the relationship between our moral reasons to bear costs for others’ sake before and beyond the call of duty. Symmetry holds that you are required to optimise your beneficial sacrifices even when they are genuinely supererogatory. If you are required to bear a cost C for the sake of a benefit B, when they are the only costs and benefits at stake, you are also conditionally required to bear an additional cost C, for the (...) sake of an additional benefit B, when enough other costs and benefits are at stake that both of your alternatives are presumptively supererogatory. Disconnection rejects the requirement to optimise when your options are presumptively supererogatory and maintains that you have an entirely free hand to choose as you will among them. Asymmetry holds that when acting beyond the call of duty you are entitled to a measure of additional freedom compared to when you are not taking on supererogatory costs—you can prioritise your own well-being and reasons to a greater degree—but places constraints on the options that you may permissibly choose. We defend a version of Asymmetry and explore its implications for recent debates on charitable giving. (shrink)