8 found
Order:
See also
Hedda Hassel Mørch
University of Oslo
  1. Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible with Russellian Panpsychism?Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2018 - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is a leading scientific theory of consciousness, which implies a kind of panpsychism. In this paper, I consider whether IIT is compatible with a particular kind of panpsychism known as Russellian panpsychism, which purports to avoid the main problems of both physicalism and dualism. I will first show that if IIT were compatible with Russellian panpsychism, it would contribute to solving Russellian panpsychism’s combination problem, which threatens to show that the view does not avoid the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. The Evolutionary Argument for Phenomenal Powers.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives:293-316.
    Epiphenomenalism is the view that phenomenal properties – which characterize what it is like, or how it feels, for a subject to be in conscious states – have no physical effects. One of the earliest arguments against epiphenomenalism is the evolutionary argument (James 1890/1981; Eccles and Popper 1977; Popper 1978), which starts from the following problem: why is pain correlated with stimuli detrimental to survival and reproduction – such as suffocation, hunger and burning? And why is pleasure correlated with stimuli (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Does Dispositionalism Entail Panpsychism?Hedda Hassel Mørch - manuscript
    According to recent arguments for panpsychism, all (or most) physical properties are dispositional, dispositions require categorical grounds, and the only categorical properties we know are phenomenal properties. Therefore, phenomenal properties can be posited as the categorical grounds of all (or most) physical properties – in order to solve the mind–body problem and/or in order avoid noumenalism about the grounds of the physical world. One challenge to this case comes from dispositionalism, which agrees that all physical properties are dispositional, but denies (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  98
    The Argument for Panpsychism From Experience of Causation.Hedda Hassel Mørch - forthcoming - In William Seager (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. Routledge.
  5. Panpsychism and Causation: A New Argument and a Solution to the Combination Problem.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2014 - Dissertation, Oslo
    Panpsychism is the view that every concrete and unified thing has some form of phenomenal consciousness or experience. It is an age-old doctrine, which, to the surprise of many, has recently taken on new life. In philosophy of mind, it has been put forth as a simple and radical solution to the mind–body problem (Chalmers 1996, 2003;Strawson 2006; Nagel 1979, 2012). In metaphysics and philosophy of science, it has been put forth as a solution to the problem of accounting for (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  6.  19
    Is Matter Conscious?Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2017 - Nautilus 47:90-96.
    Why the central problem in neuroscience is mirrored in physics.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  12
    The Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2017 - Philosophy Now 121:12-16.
    Non-technical introduction to Giulio Tononi's Integrated Information Theory of consciousness.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  2
    Review of Re-Emergence: Locating Conscious Properties in a Material World by Gerald Vision. [REVIEW]Philip Goff & Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2012 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.