After a long period during which the involvement of laypersons was considered undesirable in the Western tradition of science, we have recently witnessed numerous collaborations which suggest that the desirability of societal involvement in the scientific practice is becoming recognized. This article argues that the historical considerations that once led to this division in cognitive labour have been in transformation, having undergone diverse shifts. In a first instance, the exclusion of laypersons from science is analysed in terms of the key (...) concepts of systematicity, universality, and authority. For that, two examples are given: the case of the British photographic survey and that of the American Museum of Natural History. Next, the dissolution of these barriers between scientists and laypersons is discussed and illustrated by examples: the Dystrophic Epidermolysis Bullosa Research Association in Austria, Fukushima nuclear monitoring stations, and the French Association of Muscular Dystrophy. It is concluded that, for science to be truly democratized, co-produced knowledge needs to be integrated in political decision-making processes, which is currently still lacking. Furthermore, since expertise can also be found in society, non-certified experts should work in conjunction with scientists, yet at the same time, the divide between experts and non-experts must be maintained. The inclusion of non-scientific experts in decision-making is fundamentally different from the inclusion of lay stakeholders. Hence, different participatory roles should be expected from stakeholders, experts, or scientists, and the most important challenge now is how to formally define such roles. (shrink)

Stingless bees are among the most dominant pollinators in the south tropics. As such, the rational beekeeping of stingless bee species, called meliponiculture, is an ancient and relevant activity, related to sustainable agricultural development, and which connects traditional knowledge to innovation and novelty. Given the relevance of this topic, this paper discusses the possibilities of a semiotically mediated communication between humans and Meliponini (stingless bees). Zoosemiotics, as the studies of animal views of the world, is the ideal modelling system for (...) the investigation of the possibilities of mutual understanding between these two species. Starting from the premise that, for there to be inter-specific communication, there must be a shared code, and that this depends on the biological makeup and sensory apparatus of both organisms involved in the communication process, this research suggests that a possible way to communicate with stingless bees is with the use of olfactory (chemical) signals, since this channel seems to be common to both humans and bees. Considering that for human-animal relations one party must be able to recognize the other (iconic learning), it is revealed that chemical signals do allow bees to recognize individual humans, even going so far as profiling this person as ‘not a threat’. Finally, bees are seen to act cooperatively while the beekeeper is taking action to protect and maintain the nest, something that can be interpreted as an opening of semiotic relations, where the bees are deeming the beekeeper as part of their social group. (shrink)

We regularly wield powers that, upon close scrutiny, appear remarkably magical. By sheer exercise of will, we bring into existence things that have never existed before. With but a nod, we effect the disappearance of things that have long served as barriers to the actions of others. And, by mere resolve, we generate things that pose significant obstacles to others' exercise of liberty. What is the nature of these things that we create and destroy by our mere decision to do (...) so? The answer: the rights and obligations of others. And by what seemingly magical means do we alter these rights and obligations? By making promises and issuing or revoking consent When we make promises, we generate obligations for ourselves, and when we give consent, we create rights for others. Since the rights and obligations that are affected by means of promising and consenting largely define the boundaries of permissible action, our exercise of these seemingly magical powers can significantly affect the lives and liberties of others. (shrink)

Origens : Alex Atala, Fernando e Humberto Campana -- Presente : Fernando e Humberto Campana e Jum Nakao -- Intermezzo : convívio : Jam Nakao e colaboradores -- Destinos : Alex Atala e Jum Nakao -- Entrevistas -- Um pouco de história.

L'uomo è un animale razionale, oltreché politico, socievole, come dice Aristotele. Ma quello del pensiero occidentale è un cammino, non sempre lineare, lungo momenti di apertura e ripiegamento della ragione. Quando la ragione è strumento del conoscere è in una fase di apertura, in cui fioriscono le scoperte scientifiche, l'arte, il pensiero politico ed economico; quando invece la stessa ragione perde il suo carattere strumentale divenendo pensiero assoluto, ripiegato su di sé, cede il passo alla follia, fino agli orrori del (...) Nazismo. La follia è il capitolo oscuro di un logos assolutizzato, che non lascia spazio alla molteplicità dei punti di vista, è la deriva di una ragione non 'addomesticata', privata del contraddittorio con il reale. Con un linguaggio preciso ma accessibile, Campana Comparini, al dualismo ragione 'aperta' e feconda/ragione 'chiusa' e assolutizzata, oppone una diversa categoria filosofica di lettura del reale: la follia della croce; ovvero una prospettiva in cui la fede nel Cristo-uomo diventa la base da cui partire per rifondare la principale caratteristica dell'uomo, cioè il pensiero. La 'follia della croce' non è tanto un'alternativa, quanto il terreno su cui reimpiantare la logica della razionalità umana, poiché viene prima di essa. Una lettura per guardare da un'altra prospettiva le origini del pensiero occidentale."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Psychopaths are renowned for their immoral behavior. They are ideal candidates for testing the empirical plausibility of moral theories. Many think the source of their immorality is their emotional deficits. Psychopaths experience no guilt or remorse, feel no empathy, and appear to be perfectly rational. If this is true, sentimentalism is supported over rationalism. Here, I examine the nature of psychopathic practical reason and argue that it is impaired. The relevance to morality is discussed. I conclude that rationalists can explain (...) the moral deficits of psychopaths as well as sentimentalists. In the process, I identify psychological structures that underpin practical rationality. (shrink)

It is common for philosophers to argue that psychopaths are not morally responsible because they lack some of the essential capacities for morality. In legal terms, they are criminally insane. Typically, however, the insanity defense is not available to psychopaths. The primary reason is that they appear to have the knowledge and understanding required under the M’Naghten Rules. However, it has been argued that what is required for moral and legal responsibility is ‘deep’ moral understanding, something that psychopaths do not (...) have either due to their lacking empathy or practical reason. In the first part of the paper, I argue that psychopaths do not lack the abilities required for deep moral understanding, although they have deficits in those areas. According the M’Naghten Rules, therefore, psychopaths are not insane. Under a less strict formulation of the insanity plea, like the Model Penal Code, however, there is a good case to be made for their lacking substantial capacity. I argue that because psychopathy is an essentially moral disorder, and because of the nature of psychopathic violence, psychopaths should not be excused under the insanity plea. It would be tantamount to excusing someone for committing a crime because they are bad. Arguably, this contravenes the entire system of law. (shrink)

Shame is a painful emotion concerned with failure to live up to certain standards, norms, or ideals. The subject feels that she falls in the regard of others; she feels watched and exposed. As a result, she feels bad about the person that she is. The most popular view of shame is that someone only feels ashamed if she fails to live up to standards, norms, or ideals that she, herself, accepts. In this paper, I provide support for a different (...) view, according to which shame is about failure to live up to public expectations. Such a view of shame has difficulties explaining why an audience is central to shame, why shame concerns the self as a whole, and why the social rank of someone affects their ability to shame others. These features, I argue, are best explained by reference to the descent of shame in the emotion connected with submission in nonhuman animals. The function of submission—to appease relevant social others—also throws light on the sort of emotion that shame is. From the point of view of other people, a subject who experiences shame at her own failing is someone who is committed to living together with others in a socially sanctioned way. The argument is not that we must understand the nature of shame in terms of what it evolved for, but that its heritage is important to understanding the emotion that shame has become. (shrink)

Empathy is one of the most talked about and widely studied concepts of recent years. Some argue it can help create a more just society, improve medical care and even avert global catastrophe. Others object that it is morally problematic. Who is right? And what is empathy anyway? Is it a way of feeling with others, or is it simply feeling sorry for them? Is it a form of knowledge? What is its evolutionary origin? In this thorough and clearly-written introduction (...) to the philosophy of empathy Heidi Maibom explores these questions and more, examining the following topics: The nature of empathy and key themes in the literature Empathy as a way of understanding others, particularly 'simulation theory' and 'perspective-taking' Empathy, emotional contagion, and sympathy Empathy's role in moral understanding or motivation Empathy and art appreciation, with examples from film, music and fiction Empathy and mental disorder, such as psychopathy and autism. Including chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary, Empathy is an excellent resource for students of philosophy of mind and psychology, psychology, and cognitive science, as well as for those in related subjects such as art, literature and politics. (shrink)

It used to be thought that folk psychology is the only game in town. Focusing merely on what people do will not allow you to predict what they are likely to do next. For that, you must consider their beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. Recent evidence from developmental psychology and fMRI studies indicates that this conclusion was premature. We parse motion in an environment as behavior of a particular type, and behavior thus construed can feature in systematizations that we know. Building (...) on the view that folk psychological knowledge is knowledge of theoretical models, I argue that social knowledge is best understood as lying on a continuum between behavioral and full-blown psychological models. Between the two extremes, we have what I call social models. Social models represent social structures in terms of their overall purpose and circumscribe individuals' roles within them. These models help us predict what others will do or plan what we should do without providing information about what agents think or want. Thinking about social knowledge this way gives us a more nuanced picture of what capacities are engaged in social planning and interaction, and gives us a better tool with which to think about the social knowledge of animals and young children. (shrink)

This book explores the thesis that legal roles force people to engage in moral combat, an idea which is implicit in the assumption that citizens may be morally required to disobey unjust laws, while judges may be morally required to punish citizens for civil disobedience. Heidi Hurd advances the surprising argument that the law cannot require us to do what morality forbids. The 'role-relative' understanding of morality is shown to be incompatible with both consequentialist and deontological moral philosophies. In (...) the end, Hurd shows that our best moral theory is one which never makes one actor's moral success turn on another's moral failure. Moral Combat is a sophisticated, well-conceived and carefully argued book on a very important and controversial topic at the junction between legal and political philosophy. It will be of interest to moral, legal, and political philosophers, as well as teachers and students of professional ethics in law. (shrink)

Para deleite dos religiosos, a história da filosofia oficial − que continua, ao que parece, infectada pelo espírito teológico − consagrou a "aposta de Pascal" como uma das soluções modelares ao problema ético suscitado pela questáo clássica da existência ou náo de Deus. No raciocínio de Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), aquele que aposta na existência do deus judaico-cristáo ganhará a felicidade eterna caso ele efetivamente exista; em contrapartida, uma vez sendo este Deus uma realidade, a aposta na sua inexistência resultará na (...) danaçáo do apostador equivocado. Ocorre que a história da filosofia oficial parece desconhecer a alternativa ateísta que Denis Diderot (1713-1784) propõe a essa questáo das conseqüências da existência ou náo de Deus na vida e na morte dos seres humanos. Lançando máo de uma fábula que permite uma analogia com o tema do ateísmo, em que um ateu, depois de morrer, constata que a alma é de fato imortal, que Deus realmente existe, e que, portanto, náo ter tido fé em vida náo foi uma aposta inteligente, Diderot, no seu Diálogo de um filósofo com a Marechala de... (1774), reflete sobre os desdobramentos para o ateu dessa experiência inesperada. É sobre essa náo-aposta do ateu que trata este artigo. Palavras-chave : Aposta de Pascal, Ateísmo, Deus, Diderot, Virtude. (shrink)

: Este artigo é o segundo de uma tríade que trata do diálogo, mais precisamente do envolvimento, entre a filosofia de Denis Diderot e o ceticismo. O primeiro artigo, intitulado “O jovem Diderot e o ceticismo dos Pensamentos”, foi publicado na revista Dois Pontos, em sua edição dedicada ao tema do ceticismo (cf. PIVA, 2007), e limitou-se a uma análise minuciosa do problema da postura cética nos Pensamentos filosóficos, de 1746. O presente artigo, por seu turno, examina duas questões (...) fundamentais, desta vez em O passeio do cético ou As alamedas, de 1747, último livro em que o ceticismo é evocado com destaque pelo enciclopedista, dois anos antes de ele render-se definitivamente ao materialismo ateu: 1) a interpretação que Diderot desenvolve do ceticismo e 2) sua posição diante dele. Já o terceiro e derradeiro texto da tríade examinará – evidentemente, numa próxima oportunidade – a presença do ceticismo no pensamento diderotiano da maturidade, ou seja, no período que se inicia em 1749, com a redação da Carta sobre os cegos, quando a questão da dúvida cética passa a perder em suas obras a relevância que tinha na origem de suas reflexões, mudando, até mesmo, de registro. (shrink)

Some time ago, Quine asserted that to be is to be value of a variable. This entails that if one wishes to accept any theory as true, we must be committed to the existence of those objects over which we existentially quantify. I suggest instead that we are committed only to the existence of things for which certain intrinsic properties are contingent (those that an object can have independent of the properties that make it a member of a certain kind). (...) Any discourse that involves existential quantification over entities for which those properties can change should be given an objectual interpretation, and these objects are therefore real. In contrast, all discourse that involves existential quantification over objects who have at least some intrinsic properties essentially, which are properties that are not what make them members of a kind, will be given a substitutional interpretation, which does not entail a realist interpretation. This conception of ontological commitment has potential direct consequences in several areas -- the status of fictional characters, the debate about the existence of god, realism about mathematical entities, and so on. (shrink)

I suggest a revised meta-linguistic account that distinguishes between the language used to talk about a particular language -- the meta-language -- from direct speech reports made within a language -- the object language. Making this distinction leads to a kind of meta-linguistic analysis of competence with names that is not simply tautologous, so long as competence with names is not construed as knowing this: 'Tyler' is whatever is called 'Tyler'. Rather, it should be this: the name 'Tyler' is whatever (...) speakers of an object language call "Tyler," where the double quotes represent direct speech acts. This makes it possible that the schema, 'X' is whatever speakers of an object language call "X," could very well be informative, and serve as an explanation of what a speaker understands when competent with a name. Well, it would insofar as a speaker could learn something about the meaning of the the name 'Tyler' by examining its utterances. In fact, something like this must have to have some truth to it. After all, even non-fluent children learn to speak a language, in part, by attending to utterances of certain expressions in particular situations. The major difference is that when we are finally competent with the expression 'duck' it is not because we have grasped the previous schema. It is because we will engage in duck-awareness behaviors when our environment has something to with ducks at a certain time. In contrast, simply understanding the previous schema is exactly what competence with names consists in. (shrink)

Global Corporate Citizenship (GCC) continues to become increasingly popular in large corporations. However, this concept has rarely been considered in small and medium size enterprises (SMEs). A case study of a Norwegian clothing company illustrates how GCC can be also applied to small companies. This case study also shows that SMEs can be very innovative in exercising corporate citizenship, without necessarily following the patterns of large multinational companies. The company studied engages as partner in some voluntary labor initiatives promoted by (...) the government, employs people in marginal situations, and exerts influence for the adoption of good working conditions in its supply chain. Environmental issues and actions of solidarity are also considered within a global scope. Ethics of care and concern for specific aspects of the common good seem crucial as GCC drivers in this company, as do personal values, character, and leadership of the owner-manager of the firm. (shrink)

Much of the literature concerning epistemic injustice has focused on the variety of harms done to socially marginalized persons in their capacities as potentialcontributorsto knowledge projects. However, in order to understand the full implications of the social nature of knowing, we must confront the circulation of knowledge and the capacity of epistemic agents to take up knowledge produced by others and make use of it. I argue that members of socially marginalized lay communities can sufferepistemic trust injusticeswhen potentially powerful forms (...) of knowing such as scientific understandings are generated in isolation from them, and when the social conditions required for aresponsibly-placed trustto be formed relative to the relevant epistemic institutions fail to transpire. (shrink)

This paper completes a triad developed around the issue of scepticism in the enlightened thinking of Denis Diderot. The first one, entitled "The young Diderot and the scepticism of Thoughts ", was published in the journal Two Points , in its edition devoted to the subject of scepticism (cf. PIVA, 2007), and was limited to an analysis of the problem of attitude sceptical on Thoughts philosophical , in 1746. The second, "The clearing of Diderot with scepticism", published in the (...) journal Transformation (cf. PIVA, 2009), deals with two fundamental questions, this time on The tour of the sceptic or The boulevards , of 1747, latest book in that the scepticism is raised to prominence by encyclopedist, since two years later he finally surrenders to the atheistic materialism. They are: 1) the interpretation that develops Diderot's scepticism and 2) its position before him. In this paper we will examine the presence of scepticism in thought diderotiano of maturity, namely the period beginning in 1749 with the drafting of the Charter for the blind , considering how they and where it is addressed records in some of the most significant texts its philosophical maturity. (shrink)

Fictional names present unique challenges for semantic theories of proper names, challenges strong enough to warrant an account of names different from the standard treatment. The theory developed in this paper is motivated by a puzzle that depends on four assumptions: our intuitive assessment of the truth values of certain sentences, the most straightforward treatment of their syntactic structure, semantic compositionality, and metaphysical scruples strong enough to rule out fictional entities, at least. It is shown that these four assumptions, taken (...) together, are inconsistent with referentialism, the common view that names are uniformly associated with ordinary individuals as their semantic value. Instead, the view presented here interprets names as context-sensitive expressions, associated in a context of utterance with a particular act of introduction, or dubbing, which is then used to determine their semantic value. Some dubbings are referential, which associate names with ordinary individuals as their semantic values; others are fictional, which associate names, instead, with sets of properties. Since the semantic values of names can be of different sorts, the semantic rule interpreting predication must be complex as well. In the body of the paper, I show how this new treatment of names allows us to solve our original puzzle. I defend the complexity of the semantic predication rule, and address additional worries about ontological commitment. (shrink)

Since Hume, many ethicists have assumed that inferring normative claims from descriptive claims is fallacious. Some classic examples that illustrate this fact are those in which everyone commits some act, but we do not therefore conclude that it is the right thing to do. Everyone may jump off a bridge, asserts your mother, but that does not entail that you should. However, not all such claims illustrate this. In fact, some of them illustrate precisely the opposite claim. For example, consider (...) the person who repeatedly bemoans the unfairness or sadness of dying, and who is often faced with the response that this happens to everyone. What should she do? One plausible response is that she should accept the fact that this occurs and make her peace with it, an unequivocally normative directive. This example, then, is a prima facie counterexample to the infamous gap between is-claims and ought-claims. (shrink)

In this note, the problem of tracking random references and rejecting random perturbations in a quadrotor, both generated by an auxiliary system named exosystem, is solved by extending the deterministic tracking problem to the area of stochastic processes. Besides, it is considered that only a part of the state vector of the quadrotor is available through measurements. As a consequence, the state vector of the plant must be estimated in order to close the control loop. On this basis, a controller (...) to track random references and to reject random perturbations is developed by combining a Kalman filter to estimate the references and perturbations of an exosystem and an observer to estimate the states of a quadrotor. Besides, to obtain a more practical controller, the analysis is carried out in discrete time. Numerical simulations are used in a quadrotor to confirm the validity and effectiveness of the proposed control. (shrink)

Feminist philosophers of science have been prominent amongst social epistemologists who draw attention to communal aspects of knowing. As part of this work, I focus on the need to examine the relations between scientific communities and lay communities, particularly marginalized communities, for understanding the epistemic merit of scientific practices. I draw on Naomi Scheman's argument (2001) that science earns epistemic merit by rationally grounding trust across social locations. Following this view, more turns out to be relevant to epistemic assessment than (...) simply following the standards of "normal science". On such an account, philosophers of science need to attend to the relations between scientific communities and various lay communities, especially marginalized communities, to understand how scientific practices can rationally ground trust and thus earn their status as "good ways of knowing". Trust turns out to involve a wide set of expectations on behalf of lay communities. In this paper I focus on expectations of knowledge sharing, using examples of "knowledge-sharing whistleblowers" to illustrate how failures in knowledge sharing with lay communities can erode epistemic trust in scientific communities, particularly in the case of marginalized communities. (shrink)

It is widely assumed that Christianity enjoins its followers to practice universal, unconditional forgiveness. But universal, unconditional forgiveness is regarded by many as morally problematic. Some Christian scholars have denied that Christianity in fact requires universal, unconditional forgiveness, but I believe they are mistaken. In this essay, I show two things: that Christianity does enjoin universal, unconditional forgiveness of a certain sort, and that Christians, and perhaps other theists, are always justified in exercising unconditional forgiveness. Though most philosophers treat forgiveness (...) as grounded in our beliefs about the offender's current state, I argue that we might more fruitfully ground forgiveness in hope for the wrongdoer. Christianity's commitment to the existence of an omnipotent God who is concerned about the moral status of His creatures always justifies such hope and thus always justifies forgiveness. (shrink)

A close look at the Jesuit and Catholic recusant network that existed in the English midlands yields a pathway to the Chandos portrait of Shakespeare. The portrait is traced from the 3rd Duke of Chandos to Grafton Manor, seat of the Shrewsbury earls and a principal Jesuit center in the Jesuit district comprising Worcestershire and Warwickshire created in 1623. The article finds that during Shakespeare’s lifetime, Grafton Manor was owned by a Catholic recusant member of the Talbot family with ownership (...) ties to Welbeck Abbey located in the small township of Holbeck, Nottinghamshire; the parish of Holbeck included Welbeck Abbey and the adjacent Holbeck Hall, which was owned by the family that sheltered Edmund Campion and which served later as home to a major Jesuit library and as a shelter for Jesuits themselves. Keeping in mind Shakespeare’s indebtedness to North family writings as source material for the plays, the article finds that the provenance of an unpublished manuscript by George North which influenced Shakespeare, the manuscript’s content, and George North’s circle of acquaintances lead directly to Edmund Campion and the Pierrepont family that sheltered him before his execution by the crown in 1581. The article shows ties of the George North manuscript to Welbeck Abbey, ties of the North family to the nearby Wroxton Abbey, and possible ties of the alleged painter of the Chandos portrait to the North family at Wroxton Abbey. The article is written in response to the recently published book by Dennis McCarthy and June Schlueter on the discovery of an unpublished manuscript written by George North that they believe inspired Shakespeare. Further shown through parallel language and thought that George North in writing A Brief Discourse likely drew material from Campion’s Histories of Ireland, including material that eventually led to the episodes on Jack Cade in 2 Henry VI and the Merlin prophecy in King Lear—all before Campion’s Histories was absorbed by Holinshed’s Chronicles and ultimately absorbed by Shakespeare. The article, utilizing research by an eminent Jesuit historian showing a personally advantageous relationship between George North’s patron, the Queen’s favored Sir Christopher Hatton, and the Jesuit William Crichton, traces the Shakespeare First Folio discovered on the Isle of Bute in 2016 back through time to the North family and ultimately to the Jesuit Crichton. In consideration of a probable biographical relationship between Shakespeare and Hatton, another connection between Shakespeare and the Jesuits is revealed. Lastly, the article details textual support for the author’s previous research showing a relationship between the writings of the Jesuit John Floyd and the Shakespearean canon—hinting that Shakespeare assisted the Jesuits. (shrink)

This book provides an approach to Emerson that walks the line between traditional and revisionist interpretations of his life and works. The author presents Emerson as a man of faith whose unique synthesis of Kantian and Vedantic philosophies resulted in a view of faith that was one hundred years ahead of its time.

Este artigo trata da presença, da interpretação e do diálogo com o ceticismo na primeira fase do pensamento de Denis Diderot, em particular nos seus Pensamentos Filosóficos, palco de uma crise metafísica e religiosa que antecedeu a formulação do seu materialismo ateu.

“News! Oh! Yes, I always like news.” Throughout Emma, Jane Austen’s eponymous heroine repeatedly betrays her intense love of gossip. Other characters (notably, Miss Bates and Mr. Knightley) also indulge and rejoice in this style of conversation, as does the novel’s own narrator. In this chapter, the authors propose to examine the multifaceted and ambiguous role played by gossip in Emma, in light of the diverse opinions expressed by a number of critics and philosophers about the ethical and psychological significance (...) of this form of human discourse. They argue that Austen exhibits a fascinating, consistently ambivalent evaluative attitude toward the information-rich chitchat of her characters. She reveals a sensitivity to the moral dangers of gossip, as well as to what evolutionary psychologists have identified as its fundamental role in the regulation of human societies, and in the development of more indispensable forms of linguistic communication. (shrink)