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Helen Frowe
Stockholm University
  1.  74
    Defensive Killing: An Essay on War and Self-Defence.Helen Frowe - 2014 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Most people believe that it is sometimes morally permissible for a person to use force to defend herself or others against harm. In Defensive Killing, Helen Frowe offers a detailed exploration of when and why the use of such force is permissible. She begins by considering the use of force between individuals, investigating both the circumstances under which an attacker forfeits her right not to be harmed, and the distinct question of when it is all-things-considered permissible to use force against (...)
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  2. Lesser-Evil Justifications for Harming: Why We’Re Required to Turn the Trolley.Helen Frowe - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):460-480.
    Much philosophical attention has been paid to the question of whether, and why, one may divert a runaway trolley away from where it will kill five people to where it will kill one. But little attention has been paid to whether the reasons that ground a permission to divert thereby ground a duty to divert. This paper defends the Requirement Thesis, which holds that one is, ordinarily, required to act on lesser-evil justifications for harming for the sake of others. Cases (...)
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  3. The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction.Helen Frowe - 2011 - Routledge.
    The Ethics of War and Peace is a lively introduction to one of the oldest but still most relevant ethical debates. Focusing on the philosophical questions surrounding the ethics of modern war, Helen Frowe presents contemporary just war theory in a stimulating and accessible way. This 2nd edition includes new material on weapons and technology, and humanitarian intervention, in addition to: theories of self-defence and national defence jus ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum the moral status of (...)
     
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  4. A Practical Account of Self-Defence.Helen Frowe - 2010 - Law and Philosophy 29 (3):245-272.
    I argue that any successful account of permissible self- defence must be action-guiding, or practical . It must be able to inform people’s deliberation about what they are permitted to do when faced with an apparent threat to their lives. I argue that this forces us to accept that a person can be permitted to use self-defence against Apparent Threats: characters whom a person reasonably, but mistakenly, believes threaten her life. I defend a hybrid account of self-defence that prioritises an (...)
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  5.  9
    The moral irrelevance of moral coercion.Helen Frowe - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    An agent A morally coerces another agent, B, when A manipulates non-epistemological facts in order that B’s moral commitments enjoin B to do what A wants B to do, and B is motivated by these commitments. It is widely argued that forced choices arising from moral coercion are morally distinct from forced choices arising from moral duress or happenstance. On these accounts, the fact of being coerced bears on what an agent may do, the voluntariness of her actions, and/or her (...)
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  6. The Duty to Remove Statues of Wrongdoers.Helen Frowe - 2019 - Journal of Practical Ethics 7 (3):1-31.
    This paper argues that public statues of persons typically express a positive evaluative attitude towards the subject. It also argues that states have duties to repudiate their own historical wrongdoing, and to condemn other people’s serious wrongdoing. Both duties are incompatible with retaining public statues of people who perpetrated serious rights violations. Hence, a person’s being a serious rights violator is a sufficient condition for a state’s having a duty to remove a public statue of that person. I argue that (...)
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  7.  23
    Civilian Liability.Helen Frowe - 2019 - Ethics 129 (4):625-650.
    Adil Ahmad Haque argues that civilians who contribute to unjust lethal threats in war, but who do not directly participate in the war, are not liable to defensive killing. His argument rests on two central claims: first, that the extent of a person’s liability to defensive harm in virtue of contributing to an unjust threat is limited to the cost that she is initially required to bear in order to avoid contributing, and, second, that civilians need not bear lethal costs (...)
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  8. Equating Innocent Threats and Bystanders.Helen Frowe - 2008 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (4):277-290.
    abstract Michael Otsuka claims that it is impermissible to kill innocent threats because doing so is morally equivalent to killing bystanders. I show that Otsuka's argument conflates killing as a means with treating a person herself as a means. The killing of a person can be a means only if that person is instrumental in the threat to Victim's life. A permission to kill a person as a means will not permit killing bystanders. I also defend a permission to kill (...)
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  9. Self-Defence and the Principle of Non-Combatant Immunity.Helen Frowe - 2011 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (4):530-546.
    The reductivist view of war holds that the moral rules of killing in war can be reduced to the moral rules that govern killing between individuals. Noam Zohar objects to reductivism on the grounds that the account of individual self-defence that best supports the rules of war will inadvertently sanction terrorist killings of non-combatants. I argue that even an extended account of self-defence—that is, an account that permits killing at least some innocent people to save one's own life—can support a (...)
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  10. The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction.Helen Frowe - 2011 - New Abington: Routledge.
    When is it right to go to war? When is a war illegal? What are the rules of engagement? What should happen when a war is over? How should we view terrorism? _The Ethics of War and Peace_ is a fresh and contemporary introduction to one of the oldest but still most relevant ethical debates. It introduces students to contemporary Just War Theory in a stimulating and engaging way, perfect for those approaching the topic for the first time. Helen Frowe (...)
     
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  11.  90
    Threats, Bystanders and Obstructors.Helen Frowe - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):365-372.
    In this paper I argue that the widespread view that obstructors are a special sort of bystander is mistaken. Obstructors make Victim worse off by their presence, and thus are more properly described as innocent threats. Only those characters who do not make Victim worse off by their presence can be classified as bystanders.
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  12.  14
    On the Redundancy of Jus Ad Vim: A Response to Daniel Brunstetter and Megan Braun.Helen Frowe - 2016 - Ethics and International Affairs 30 (1):117 - 129.
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  13.  39
    How We Fight: Ethics in War.Helen Frowe & Gerald Lang (eds.) - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    How We Fight: Ethics in War contains ten groundbreaking essays by some of the leading philosophers of war. The essays offer new perspectives on key debates including pacifism, punitive justifications for war, the distribution of risk between combatants and non-combatants, the structure of 'just war theory', and bases of individual liability in war.
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  14. Killing John to Save Mary: A Defence of the Distinction Between Killing and Letting Die.Helen Frowe - 2013 - In J. Campbell, M. O’Rourke & H. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics and Responsibility. MIT Press.
    Introduction This paper defends the moral significance of the distinction between killing and letting die. In the first part of the paper, I consider and reject Michael Tooley’s argument that initiating a causal process is morally equivalent to refraining from interfering in that process. The second part disputes Tooley’s suggestion it is merely external factors that make killing appear to be worse than letting die, when in reality the distinction is morally neutral. Tooley is mistaken to claim that we are (...)
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  15.  89
    The Justified Infliction of Unjust Harm.Helen Frowe - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):345 - 351.
  16.  43
    Non-Combatant Liability in War.Helen Frowe - unknown
    The principle of non-combatant immunity holds that it is impermissible to intentionally target non-combatants in war, even if they belong to the ‘unjust side’ of a war. This principle is traditionally defended by the claim that non-combatants are materially innocent: that, unlike combatants, non-combatants do not threaten. But this view is prima facie implausible. Non-combatants often contribute to their country’s war effort. More recent defences of the PNI therefore seek to show that a non-combatant is not liable to be killed (...)
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  17.  23
    II—Claim Rights, Duties, and Lesser-Evil Justifications.Helen Frowe - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):267-285.
    This paper explores the relationship between a person's claim right not to be harmed and the duties this claim confers on others. I argue that we should reject Jonathan Quong's evidence-based account of this relationship, which holds that an agent A's possession of a claim against B is partly determined by whether it would be reasonable for A to demand B's compliance with a correlative duty. When B's evidence is that demanding compliance would not be reasonable, A cannot have a (...)
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  18.  24
    Jeff McMahan, Killing In War. [REVIEW]Helen Frowe - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (1):112-115.
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  19.  23
    Bystanders, Risks, and Consent.Helen Frowe - 2020 - Bioethics 34 (9):906-911.
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  20.  5
    Chatterjee, Deen K., Ed. The Ethics of Preventive War.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. 280. $104.99 ; $29.99. [REVIEW]Helen Frowe - 2015 - Ethics 126 (1):215-220.
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  21. Civilian Immunity in War • by Igor Primoratz, Ed.Helen Frowe - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):394-395.
    This collection of essays is presented as offering the first real philosophical and legal treatment of the Principle of Non-Combatant Immunity . Primoratz's own essay serves as a useful summary of some of the most influential attempts to rule in all, but only, combatants as legitimate military targets. However, this will feel like very familiar territory to those already working in Just War Theory, as will Uwe Steinhoff's essay, which surveys the same positions . Several of the essays are expositional (...)
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  22.  10
    Defending Defensive Killing: Reply to Barry, McMahan, Ferzan, Renzo, and Haque.Helen Frowe - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (6):750 - 766.
    This article responds to objections to the account of permissible harming developed in Defensive Killing, as raised by Christian Barry, Jeff McMahan, Kimberly Ferzan, Massimo Renzo and Adil Haque. Each paper deserves much more attention than I can give it here. I focus on Barry’s important observations regarding the liability to defensive harm of those who fail to rescue. In response to McMahan, I grant some of McMahan’s objections to my rejection of the moral equivalence of threats and bystanders, but (...)
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  23.  10
    Introduction.Helen Frowe - 2019 - Ethics 129 (4):544-547.
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  24.  4
    Intervening Agency and Civilian Liability.Helen Frowe - forthcoming - Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-11.
    Adam Hosein has recently proposed that a sufficient degree of intervening agency between a person’s contribution to an unjust lethal threat and the posing of that threat can exempt the contributor from liability to defensive killing. Hosein suggests that this will exempt most civilians from liability to lethal defence even if they contribute to unjust killings. I argue that intervening agency does not bear on a person’s responsibility for a threat, and does not exempt her from liability to defensive killing.
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  25.  8
    Introduction: Symposium on War and Causation.Helen Frowe & Massimo Renzo - forthcoming - Journal of Applied Philosophy.
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  26.  12
    Introduction: Symposium on Causation in War.Helen Frowe & Massimo Renzo - 2020 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 37 (3):341-345.
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  27.  12
    Introduction: Symposium on The Ethics of Indirect Intervention.Helen Frowe & Benjamin Matheson - forthcoming - Journal of Applied Philosophy.
  28.  40
    If You’Ll Be My Bodyguard: Agreements to Save and the Duty to Minimize Harm.Helen Frowe - 2019 - Ethics 129 (2):204-229.
    This article explores how agreements to preferentially save can ground an exception to the duty to minimize harm when saving. A rescuer preferentially saves if she knowingly fails to minimize harm among prospective victims, even though minimizing harm would not have imposed greater costs on the rescuer herself. Allowing rescuers to act on agreements to preferentially save is justified by the reasons we have to respect the agreements that agents form as a means of pursuing their own ends.
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  29.  17
    Killing the Innocent in Self-Defence.Helen Frowe - unknown
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  30.  4
    Liability for Wrongful Assistance: On Causing Unjust Harm in the Course of Suboptimal Rescue.Helen Frowe - forthcoming - Journal of Applied Philosophy.
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  31.  6
    Review: Deen K. Chatterjee, Ed., The Ethics of Preventive War. [REVIEW]Helen Frowe - 2015 - Ethics 126 (1):215-220.
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  32.  66
    Review of Larry May (Ed.), War: Essays in Political Philosophy_. [REVIEW]Helen Frowe - 2008 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (11).
  33.  16
    Symposium on Seth Lazar’s Sparing Civilians : Introduction.Helen Frowe - 2018 - Law and Philosophy 37 (3):229-241.
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  34. Wrongful Observation.Helen Frowe & Jonathan Parry - 2019 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 47 (1):104-137.
    According to common-sense morality, agents can become morally connected to the wrongdoing of others, such that they incur special obligations to prevent or rectify the wrongs committed by the primary wrongdoer. We argue that, under certain conditions, voluntary and unjustified observation of another agent’s degrading wrongdoing, or of the ‘product’ of their wrongdoing, can render an agent morally liable to bear costs for the sake of the victim of the primary wrong. We develop our account with particular reference to widespread (...)
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  35. Introduction.Gerald Lang & Helen Frowe - 2014 - In Helen Frowe & Gerald Lang (eds.), How We Fight: Ethics in War. Oxford University Press.
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