early modern philosophers commonly appeal to a mathematical method to demonstrate their philosophical claims. Since such claims are not always followed by what we would recognize as mathematical proofs, they are often dismissed as mere rhetoric. René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, and Benedict de Spinoza are perhaps the most well-known early modern philosophers who fall into this category. It is a matter of dispute whether the ordo geometricus amounts to more than a method of presentation in Spinoza’s philosophy. Descartes and Hobbes (...) clearly appeal to a method of discovery modeled after geometry, but neither employs it to develop a heavily quantitative physics. Whereas Descartes’s version of the geometrical method .. (shrink)

Descartes' arguments against the substantial form -- Aquinas' introduction of the substantial form -- Suarez's defense of the substantial form -- Sanchez's skeptical humanist attack -- The mechanical alternative to substantial forms -- Cartesian science and the principles of Aristotelian mechanics -- Atoms, modes, and other heresies -- Descartes' metaphysical alternative to substantial forms.

: This paper interprets Descartes's use of the Scholastic doctrine of divine concurrence in light of contemporaneous sources, and argues against two prevailing occasionalist interpretations. On the first occasionalist reading God's concurrence or cooperation with natural causes is always mediate (i.e., concurrence reduces to God's continual recreation of substances). The second reading restricts God's immediate concurrence to his co-action with minds. This paper shows that Descartes's metaphysical commitments do not necessitate either form of occasionalism, and that he is more plausibly (...) and charitably read as appropriating elements of Scholastic views on concurrence to bridge the gap between his metaphysics and physics. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 54, Issue 2-3, pp 204 - 249 René Descartes is neither a Conceptualist nor a Platonist when it comes to the ontological status of the eternal truths and essences of mathematics but articulates a view derived from Proclus. There are several advantages to interpreting Descartes’ texts in light of Proclus’ view of universals and philosophy of mathematics. Key passages that, on standard readings, are in conflict are reconciled if we read Descartes as appropriating Proclus’ threefold distinction among (...) universals. Specifically, passages that appear to commit Descartes to a Platonist view of mathematical objects and the truths that follow from them are no longer in tension with the Conceptualist view of universals implied by his treatment of the eternal truths in the _Principles of Philosophy._ This interpretation also fits the historical evidence and explains why Descartes ends up with seemingly inconsistent commitments to divine simplicity and God’s efficient creation of truths that are not merely conceptually distinct from the divine essence. (shrink)

: In this paper I address the vexed question of secondary causation in René Descartes' physics, and examine several influential interpretations, especially the one recently proposed by Dennis Des Chene. I argue that interpreters who regard Cartesian bodies as real secondary causes, on the grounds that the modes of body include real forces, contradict Descartes' account of modes. On the other hand, those who deny that Descartes affirms secondary causation, on the grounds that forces cannot be modes of extension, commit (...) Descartes to the problematic view that the undetermined and immutable will of God is the sole cause of determinate and variable motions. Des Chene's contextualist approach to Descartes' texts leads him to an intermediate position that combines elements of both interpretations. However, in my view, Des Chene's interpretation likewise fails to resolve apparent tensions in Descartes' claims. I thus propose to separate the issue of secondary causation from what Des Chene dubs 'the problem of force'. On the basis of this approach, and a study of Jesuit commentaries familiar to Descartes, I develop a new interpretation which takes seriously Descartes' claim that the laws of nature are the secondary and particular causes of particular motions and changes in motion. (shrink)

This dissertation presents a new interpretation of Rene Descartes' views on body/body causation by examining them within their historical context. Although Descartes gives the impression that his views constitute a complete break with those of his predecessors, he draws on both Scholastic Aristotelian concepts of the efficient cause and existing anti-Aristotelian views. ;The combination of Aristotelian and anti-Aristotelian elements in Descartes' theory of causation creates a tension in his claims about the relationship between the first cause, God, and the secondary (...) causes, created things. To make sense of Descartes' position on secondary causation I study the 16th and 17th century debates on secondary causation, God's concurrence, and the action of efficient causes. I examine the Aristotelian commentaries of the Jesuit philosophers Francisco Suarez, Francisco Toledo, Antonio Rubio and the Coimbran Commentators. I also analyze the anti-Aristotelian views on nature and causation found in Sebastian Basson's textbook on natural philosophy. ;The Jesuit philosophers, like Descartes, deny that the extendedness and impenetrability of matter requires the existence of occult forces to penetrate the matter and exercise causality. Rather they argue that causality is exercised by a thing's form and that causal interaction requires only contiguity not penetration. They also downplay the importance of the final cause, making the efficient cause prior in the study of nature. While Descartes rejects their hylomorphism, he agrees with the Jesuits that there are secondary efficient causes which determine God's action, causing a specific kind of effect. However, for Descartes the secondary causes are the laws of nature, not individual substances. ;Descartes' reduction of all natural change to the local motion of material particles is reminiscent of Basson's anti-Aristotelian natural philosophy. Basson reacts against the Jesuit view of secondary causation, arguing that it commits them to attributing cognition to physical causes. His own account of natural causation contains both mechanistic elements, which we find in a more developed form in Descartes' philosophy, and Neoplatonic and Stoic elements which Descartes rejects. (shrink)

In hac dissertatione primo ostendo Cartesii “argumentum a priori” contra formas substantiales proprie intelligendum esse ex definitione formae substantialis, quam F. Suarez proposuit, et ex ipsius argumentis a priori pro ea. Hoc quidem argumentum Cartesianum non nisi polemicam vim habere videtur, nam Cartesius potius ex superioritate explanationum mechanicarum a se percepta formas substantiales impugnavit. Tamen ipsum factum, Cartesium scil. in doctrinamSuarezianam de forma substantiali incurrisse, doctrinae Suarezianae auctoritatem et famam contestatur. Aliis verbis, Descartes sane demonstrationem, qua Suarezii argumenta ad absurdum (...) reducentur, maiori momenti esse exspectavit quam argumentationem contra doctrinam Thomisticam de forma substantiali. Secundo ostendo definitionem Suarezianam formae substantialis novam conceptionem causalitatis formalis exegisse. Suarez causalitatem formalem ad modum unionis formae substantiali cum materia limitavit, quo pacto vim eius in philosophia naturali diminuit significantiamque causarum materialis ac efficientis in nova philosophia mechanistica anticipavit. Hoc modo serior metaphysica scholastica indirecte velut dispositionem fundamentalem praebuit ad rerum naturalium explanationes mechanisticas recipiendas ac sustinendas.In this paper I first show that Descartes’ a priori argument against substantial forms is properly understood against the background of Suárez’s definition of and a priori arguments for the substantial form. Even though Descartes’ a priori argument appears to have only a polemical value since his own path to the elimination of substantial forms was based on the perceived superiority of mechanical explanations, the fact that Descartes targeted Suárez’s account of the substantial form in his polemical argument bears witness to its widespread influence. In other words, Descartes expected that a proof that reduced Suárez’s argument to absurdity would have a greater impact than an argument directed against Aquinas’ account of substantial forms. Secondly, I show that Suárez’s definition of the substantial form prompted a reconceptualization of the role of formal causality. Suárez limits formal causality to the mode of union between the substantial form and matter, thus deemphasizing its importance to natural philosophical explanations and anticipating the emphasis on material and efficient causes typical of the new mechanical philosophy. In this indirect manner, late Scholastic metaphysics provided a general framework in which mechanical explanations of natural phenomena could find a place and take hold. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 46 René Descartes is neither a Conceptualist nor a Platonist when it comes to the ontological status of the eternal truths and essences of mathematics but articulates a view derived from Proclus. There are several advantages to interpreting Descartes’ texts in light of Proclus’ view of universals and philosophy of mathematics. Key passages that, on standard readings, are in conflict are reconciled if we read Descartes as appropriating Proclus’ threefold distinction among universals. Specifically, passages that appear (...) to commit Descartes to a Platonist view of mathematical objects and the truths that follow from them are no longer in tension with the Conceptualist view of universals implied by his treatment of the eternal truths in the _Principles of Philosophy_. This interpretation also fits the historical evidence and explains why Descartes ends up with seemingly inconsistent commitments to divine simplicity and God’s efficient creation of truths that are not merely conceptually distinct from the divine essence. (shrink)

The atomist philosopher, David Gorlaeus was a student of theology at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands when he died in 1612 at the age of 21. We know little about his short life, but two works by him, Exercitationes Philosophicae and Idea Physicae, survived and were published posthumously in 1620 and 1651 respectively. They contain the intriguing but often underdeveloped views of a budding philosopher whose ideas might have been completely forgotten but for two later perceptions of his (...) philosophical contribution: one negative and one positive.On the negative side, in 1642 the heretical implications of Gorlaeus’ philosophy were linked to René Descartes when Gijsbert Voetius, the Rector.. (shrink)

This article analyses the underlying interpretation of the natural world as mechanical during the early modern period. It describes the so-called mechanical ideal and discusses three cases involving important interpretations of the philosophical implications of this ideal. It suggests that the mechanical ideal raised new problems in different contexts and inspired antagonistic views of its philosophical implications in proponents who operated within the same intellectual context. It also discusses foundationalism versus mitigated scepticism and animated machines versus mechanical animations.

The sheer variety of both cognitive and non-cognitive contributions to the emergence of a scientific culture in the West and the complex relations to pre-modern developments that scholars have brought to light over the past decades have put into question both the Enlightenment and Kuhnian accounts of the scientific revolution. Gaukroger’s work performs the ambitious but indispensable task of beginning to formulate an alternative way of understanding this momentous transition, one based on recent scholarship. Gaukroger treats science as both “a (...) particular kind of cognitive product, and as a particular kind of cultural product” . His overarching goal is to show that examining the interrelations between the two can teach us something about modernity that focusing on one, to the exclusion of the other, cannot. He argues that the enduring success of Western science was not due to its advances , but due to its ability to consolidate. Successful consolidation promotes the cognitive claims of science and builds a scientific culture to legitimate them. Hence, throughout this book, Gaukroger explores how particular advances were legitimated by their ability to reinforce revelation, unify different disciplines, and exemplify the. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 46 René Descartes is neither a Conceptualist nor a Platonist when it comes to the ontological status of the eternal truths and essences of mathematics but articulates a view derived from Proclus. There are several advantages to interpreting Descartes’ texts in light of Proclus’ view of universals and philosophy of mathematics. Key passages that, on standard readings, are in conflict are reconciled if we read Descartes as appropriating Proclus’ threefold distinction among universals. Specifically, passages that appear (...) to commit Descartes to a Platonist view of mathematical objects and the truths that follow from them are no longer in tension with the Conceptualist view of universals implied by his treatment of the eternal truths in the _Principles of Philosophy_. This interpretation also fits the historical evidence and explains why Descartes ends up with seemingly inconsistent commitments to divine simplicity and God’s efficient creation of truths that are not merely conceptually distinct from the divine essence. (shrink)

In hac dissertatione primo ostendo Cartesii “argumentum a priori” contra formas substantiales proprie intelligendum esse ex definitione formae substantialis, quam F. Suarez proposuit, et ex ipsius argumentis a priori pro ea. Hoc quidem argumentum Cartesianum non nisi polemicam vim habere videtur, nam Cartesius potius ex superioritate explanationum mechanicarum a se percepta formas substantiales impugnavit. Tamen ipsum factum, Cartesium scil. in doctrinamSuarezianam de forma substantiali incurrisse, doctrinae Suarezianae auctoritatem et famam contestatur. Aliis verbis, Descartes sane demonstrationem, qua Suarezii argumenta ad absurdum (...) reducentur, maiori momenti esse exspectavit quam argumentationem contra doctrinam Thomisticam de forma substantiali. Secundo ostendo definitionem Suarezianam formae substantialis novam conceptionem causalitatis formalis exegisse. Suarez causalitatem formalem ad modum unionis formae substantiali cum materia limitavit, quo pacto vim eius in philosophia naturali diminuit significantiamque causarum materialis ac efficientis in nova philosophia mechanistica anticipavit. Hoc modo serior metaphysica scholastica indirecte velut dispositionem fundamentalem praebuit ad rerum naturalium explanationes mechanisticas recipiendas ac sustinendas.In this paper I first show that Descartes’ a priori argument against substantial forms is properly understood against the background of Suárez’s definition of and a priori arguments for the substantial form. Even though Descartes’ a priori argument appears to have only a polemical value since his own path to the elimination of substantial forms was based on the perceived superiority of mechanical explanations, the fact that Descartes targeted Suárez’s account of the substantial form in his polemical argument bears witness to its widespread influence. In other words, Descartes expected that a proof that reduced Suárez’s argument to absurdity would have a greater impact than an argument directed against Aquinas’ account of substantial forms. Secondly, I show that Suárez’s definition of the substantial form prompted a reconceptualization of the role of formal causality. Suárez limits formal causality to the mode of union between the substantial form and matter, thus deemphasizing its importance to natural philosophical explanations and anticipating the emphasis on material and efficient causes typical of the new mechanical philosophy. In this indirect manner, late Scholastic metaphysics provided a general framework in which mechanical explanations of natural phenomena could find a place and take hold. (shrink)

This paper interprets Descartes's use of the Scholastic doctrine of divine concurrence in light of contemporaneous sources, and argues against two prevailing occasionalist interpretations. On the first occasionalist reading God's concurrence or cooperation with natural causes is always mediate. The second reading restricts God's immediate concurrence to his co-action with minds. This paper shows that Descartes's metaphysical commitments do not necessitate either form of occasionalism, and that he is more plausibly and charitably read as appropriating elements of Scholastic views on (...) concurrence to bridge the gap between his metaphysics and physics. (shrink)

The modern view of causation can be traced back to the mechanistic science of Descartes, whose rejection of Aristotelian physics, with its concept of substantial forms, in favor of mechanical explanations was a turning-point in the history of philosophy. However the reasoning which led Descartes and other early moderns in this direction is not well understood. This book traces Descartes' groundbreaking theory of scientific explanation back to the mathematical demonstrations of Aristotelian mechanics and interprets these advances in light of the (...) available arguments for and against substantial forms. It also examines how Descartes' new theory led him to develop a metaphysical foundation for his science that could avoid skeptical objections. It will appeal to a wide range of readers interested in the philosophy and science of the early modern period. (shrink)

The sheer variety of both cognitive and non-cognitive contributions to the emergence of a scientific culture in the West and the complex relations to pre-modern developments that scholars have brought to light over the past decades have put into question both the Enlightenment and Kuhnian accounts of the scientific revolution. Gaukroger’s work performs the ambitious but indispensable task of beginning to formulate an alternative way of understanding this momentous transition, one based on recent scholarship. Gaukroger treats science as both “a (...) particular kind of cognitive product, and as a particular kind of cultural product”. His overarching goal is to show that examining the interrelations between the two can teach us something about modernity that focusing on one, to the exclusion of the other, cannot. He argues that the enduring success of Western science was not due to its advances, but due to its ability to consolidate. Successful consolidation promotes the cognitive claims of science and builds a scientific culture to legitimate them. Hence, throughout this book, Gaukroger explores how particular advances were legitimated by their ability to reinforce revelation, unify different disciplines, and exemplify the. (shrink)