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Hemdat Lerman
University of Warwick
  1. Non-Conceptual Experiential Content and Reason-Giving.Hemdat Lerman - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):1-23.
    According to John McDowell and Bill Brewer, our experiences have the type of content which can be the content of judgements - content which is the result of the actualization of specific conceptual abilities. They defend this view by arguing that our experiences must have such content in order for us to be able to think about our environment. In this paper I show that they do not provide a conclusive argument for this view. Focusing on Brewer’s version of the (...)
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  2.  42
    Attention, Salience, and the Phenomenology of Visual Experience.Hemdat Lerman - 2022 - In Sophie Archer (ed.), Salience: A Philosophical Inquiry. London, UK: pp. 24-49.
    Both introspection and empirical studies suggest that visual attention can affect the phenomenology of our visual experience. However, the exact character of such effects is far from clear. My aim in this chapter is to spell out the main difficulties involved in attempting to achieve a clearer view of these effects, and to make some suggestions as to how we can make progress with this issue while avoiding tempting mistakes. I do this by discussing the question of whether there is (...)
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  3. Perception, Causation, and Objectivity.Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    Perceptual experience, that paradigm of subjectivity, constitutes our most immediate and fundamental access to the objective world. At least, this would seem to be so if commonsense realism is correct — if perceptual experience is (in general) an immediate awareness of mind-independent objects, and a source of direct knowledge of what such objects are like. Commonsense realism raises many questions. First, can we be more precise about its commitments? Does it entail any particular conception of the nature of perceptual experience (...)
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  4.  67
    Demonstrative Content and the Experience of Properties.Hemdat Lerman - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):489-515.
    John McDowell (in Mind and World) and Bill Brewer (in Perception and Reason) argue that the content of our perceptual experience is conceptual in the following sense. It is of the type of content that could be the content of a judgement – that is, a content which results from the actualization of two (or more) conceptual abilities. Specifically, they suggest that the conceptual abilities actualized in experience are demonstrative abilities, and thus the resulting content is of the type we (...)
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  5.  59
    The Intellectual Powers: A Study of Human Nature, by P. M. S. Hacker. [REVIEW]Hemdat Lerman - 2015 - Mind 124 (496):1278-1285.