„The principle is nothing of what it is the principle“ – this applies for Plotinos’ One. It is neither the consciousness, nor the affectivity, neither the light, nor the life, neither the presence, nor the heaven. The paper show this on the text of Plotinos’ Treatise 38 [VI, 7]. It attributes, however, all these determinations, or processes not to the One, but to the intellect. It is the intellectualized soul, which relates through them to the One, not the One itself. (...) It is the soul, for which the One is the good, not for the One itself. The soul, ascending One, does not stop on the level of intellect; in the end it rests in One without those determinations. (shrink)

This article aims to clarify the meaning of henology for Lacan and Žižek. Žižek apparently rejects Neoplatonic way of thinking, but by considering Lacanian Henology through its origin, Etienne Gilson, Lacanian henology and Žižek’s Hegelian reading of the One become converged. Both of them think the movement of the One from one principle and its two aspects. The principle is that the One gives something that it does not have, and it corresponds to Lacanian definition of love. (...) Regarding its two aspects, the first one is the logical necessity that generates necessarily the One, and the second is the logical contingency that generates contingently the surplus element. By this, we can clarify the theoretical development of each period of Lacan. In early Lacan, henology was a logic that ties his “the Symbolic” and Freudian Death drive. In middle Lacan, his main concern was the mathematical logic as the logic of the Id, and henology became the generative logic of the subject of enunciation or the subject of the jouissance. But at the same time, this movement produces as a co-product a inassimilable remainder, “object a” with the subject of signifiant. In late Lacan, by virtue of the “necessary” movement of the One and its “contingent” co-product, the universe of the discourse became indeterminate, undecidable, “not-all,” which means for Lacan “the contingent.” This characteristic became the logic of Lacanian “sexuation.”. (shrink)

RESUMEN En el libro X de la Metafísica se trazan las líneas generales de una henología. La reconstrucción de la argumentación debe hacerse desde dos pilares fundamentales: (a) la guía de problemas o aporías que proporciona el libro iii y (b) el proyecto ontológico anunciado en el libro iv, donde se señala la relación entre ontología y henología. El rasgo fundamental de dicha henología sería su subordinación a la ontología. El artículo argumenta que para Aristóteles el rol de la henología (...) es ante todo destructivo, pues con dicha doctrina se pretende establecer -ante todo- la imposibilidad de considerar al "uno" (τὸ ἓν) como principio de los entes. ABSTRACT In the Metaphysics, especially in Book X, are drawn the general lines of a henology. For the proper understanding of this doctrine it is necessary to reconstruct its argumentation from two fundamental basis: (a) the guide of puzzles or aporias that book iii provides and (b) the ontological project announced in book IV where the relationship between ontology and henology is indicated. Once the explanations of Book X are framed a theory about unity (τὸ ἓν) can be systematically assembled, whose fundamental feature would be the following: henology as a science is a subordinate part of ontology. The role of henology is for Aristotle primarily destructive, that is, with this doctrine it is intended to establish the impossibility of considering the 'one' (τὸ ἓν) as a principle of the entities. (shrink)

Thus Plotinus (what is his status in the history of metaphysics and in the "Platonic" era, if one follows Heidegger's reading?), who speaks of presence, that is, also of morphē, as the trace of nonpresence, as the amorphous (to gar ikhnos tou amorphous morphē). A trace which is neither absence nor presence, nor, in whatever modality, a secondary modality.In his reading of Heidegger in his 2003 seminar, published as The Beast and the Sovereign, Derrida is particularly troubled by one particular (...) aspect of Heidegger: Heidegger's "superabundant use" of the language of Walten.1 "As you see," Derrida writes of Heidegger's use of Walten, "late in my life of reading Heidegger, I have just discovered a word that seems to .. (shrink)

One of the major puzzling themes in the history of Platonism is how theology is integrated with philosophy. In particular, one may well wonder how Plato's superordinate first principle of all, Idea of the Good, comes to be understood by his disciples as a mind or in some way possessing personal attributes. In what sense is the Good supposed to be God? In this paper I explore some Platonic accounts of the first principle of all in order to understand where (...) the integration of the personal into the metaphysical is organic and where it is not. I conclude that the “ontological” and the “henological” construals of the first principle of all differ in their openness to “intellectualizing” that principle. (shrink)

마이스터 에크하르트의 유비 이론은 토마스 아퀴나스의 유비 이론으로부터 많은 영향을 받았다. 이는 에크하르트가 도미니코회 소속 신학자이자 철학자로서, 그 전통을 이어가고 있음을 보인다. 그럼에도 불구하고 그가 전개한 유비 이론은 그의 선대 철학자인 토마스 아퀴나스의 유비 이론과는 커다란 차이를 보인다. 이러한 차이에 근거하여, 현대의 많은 연구자들이 에크하르트의 유비이론을 비판했다. 그들은 에크하르트의 유비 이론이 토마스의 유비 이론을 잘못 이해한 결과라고 주장한다. 하지만 이 글에서는 에크하르트가 전개한 유비 이론의 독창성과 고유성을 드러냄으로써, 이러한 입장이 틀렸다는 것을 보이고자 한다. 에크하르트는 토마스의 유비 이론을 의도적으로 변형, 사용함으로써, (...) 그만의 독창적인 사상을 확립할 수 있었다. 에크하르트와 토마스가 서로 다른 입장을 갖는 이유는, 유비 이론에서 선차적 유비항과 후차적 유비항이 맺는 관계를 각각 다르게 설명하기 때문이다. 토마스는 일차적인 유비항뿐만 아니라 이차적인 유비항도 그만의 존재와 형상을 소유할 수 있다고 주장한다. 하지만 에크하르트의 관점에서, 일차적 유비항은 자신의 고유한 존재를 소유한 반면, 이차적 유비항들은 그 자체로 자신의 존재를 소유할 수 없다. 따라서 이차적 유비항들은 존재를 갖기 위해 일차적 유비항에 전적으로 의존한다. 즉, 이차적 유비항으로서 창조된 사물들은 일차적 유비항인 신에게 존재를 외부적으로 빌려온다. 이는 신 존재의 절대성을 강화하는 동시에 피조물의 존재를 아무것도 아닌 것으로 격하시킨다. 그러나 에크하르트의 철학적 기획은 단순히 두 유비항간의 차이를 드러내는 것에 그치지 않는다. 에크하르트는 신을 일자, 혹은 지성으로 제시함으로써, 유비 이론에서 드러난 대립이 일자의 ‘비구분성’을 강화시키는 동시에 일자 안의 어떠한 ‘구분성’도 배제함을 보인다. 에크하르트는 존재(신의 존재를 포함한 모든 존재)가 구분성의 계기가 된다고 주장한다. 이러한 관점에서 일자와 창조된 존재 간의 구분이 심해질수록, 일자의 비구분성은 더욱더 강화된다. 더욱이 일자의 비구분성은 신의 존재를 통해서 야기된 구분성까지도 배제한다. 즉 자신 안에 자신이 낳는 ‘구분성’까지도 허용하지 못하는 것이다. 이러한 ‘절대적 비구분성’ 속에서, 일자는 이제 자신을 매개로 자신과 완전히 동일한 것만을 낳게 된다. 이를 우리는 ‘일의적 원인론’이라 부른다. 이러한 존재론적 대립과 구분성을 허용함으로써 일자는 자신의 단일성과 자기-매개성을 확립할 수 있었다. 이처럼 일의적 원인론과 유비적 원인론이 갖는 상관관계가 고찰될 때에만, 우리는 에크하르트의 유비 이론이 그의 철학 체계 내에서 지니는 독창적인 가치와 역할을 알 수 있게 된다. (shrink)

In the 10th century, the Brethren of Purity conceived a henological arithmetic which they believed could explain the mathematical structure of the cosmos (as a macroanthropos), and could lead the student to the discovery of the real substance of his own soul (as a micro-cosmos), a discovery which is the first step towards knowledge of metaphysical and theological truth.

The aim of this article is to show that the trinitarian theology of Origen of Alexandria shares the same theoretical structure as the henology of Plotinus. In particular, there is a strong correspondence between the trinitarian hypostases in Origen and the moments of the One in Plotinus: the Father is the One; the Son-Logos is the Intelligence; finally, the Holy Spirit is the Soul. Both Origen and Plotinus seem to assume the ontological difference between God, who, on the one (...) hand, comes before the generation of the Son, i.e., before the distinction between Father and Son, and who is indeed God, and, on the other hand, God who is the Father as he generates the Son and who, by doing so, distinguishes himself from himself. The system of ideas which represents the basis of both the theology of Origen and the henology of Plotinus is evidently a Platonic one. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the term kinêsis bears different connotations when associated with two different Plotinian hypostases in the Enneads: Intellect and Soul1. I propose an interpretation of this term as intellectual movement when it is associated with the Intellect and spatial movement when it is associated with the Soul.In the first section, I evaluate the meaning of kinêsis in reference to the hypostasis Intellect. In the second section, I turn to a critical examination of kinêsis associated with (...) the hypostasis Soul, emphasising the conceptual complexity of the term. I develop my interpretation on the distinction between kinêsis tês ousias and kinêsis pros ousias, translating the former as ‘movement of the hypostasis’ and the latter as ‘movement from the hypostasis.’ On this revised reading, I conclude that kinêsis in Plotinus is a context-dependent concept that alters its significance according to the hypostasis and introductory locution (‘tês’ or ‘pros’) with which it is associated. I conclude by linking Plotinian henology with Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines to illuminate an ongoing conversation between Plotinian metaphysics and Platonic and Aristotelian concepts of movement. (shrink)

English summary: Neoplatonism leads to the difficulty of explaining what is nature beyond being or essence. But what does being beyond the being mean? And if the One is above being, what can he be, if not nothing? The erudite discussions explored by Jean-Marc Narbonne lead readers along paths of ontology and henology, through our speculative tradition, from Aristotle, Plato, and Plotinus to Heidedegger. French description: Quiconque s'est expose a la pensee neoplatonicienne, ete confronte a la difficulte d'expliquer en (...) quoi consiste la nature au-dela de l'etre ou de l'essence - selon la formule platonicienne -, du Premier principe des Neoplatoniciens. Que peut bien signifier etre au-dela de l'etre? Est-ce que n'est pas dit etre tout ce qui existe, et si l'Un est au-dela de l'etre, que peut-il justement etre, si ce n'est le rien, le neant? Et s'il n'est pas pur neant, c'est donc que, d'une certaine maniere, il est. Des lors, pourquoi ne pas l'admettre plutot que d'emprunter ce curieux et apparemment inutile detour par l'Un, par l' henologie? Ces interrogations sont centrales, puisque d'elles depend l'intelligence de ce qui constitue l'essentiel de notre tradition speculative, les courants ontologique et henologique, respectivement rattaches aux noms d'Aristote et de Platon/Plotin, formant l'armature meme de notre heritage conceptuel. Et l'oubli meme de l'etre decrie par Heidegger, dans tout cela? Peut-il avoir le meme sens dans une philosophie de l'etre et dans une philosophie qui, expressement, methodiquement, choisit de se situer dans une perspective autre que celle de l'etre, etre que par la justement, elle n'oublie pas, mais qu'intentionnellement elle delaisse et maintient a distance? Jean-Marc Narbonne est professeur de Philosophie ancienne a l'Universite Laval (Quebec) et s'interesse a la tradition platonicienne et a son influence dans l'histoire occidentale et dans la pensee contemporaine. Il est l'auteur de Plotin. Les deux matieres (1993), La Metaphysique de Plotin (1994) et Plotin. Traite 25 (1998). (shrink)

With his philosophy of transcendence, Karl Jaspers is considered one of the few great metaphysicians of the 20th century. This study is devoted to the roots of his transcendental thinking in the philosophy of Plotinus (c. 204–270). It demonstrates the constitutive role that reference to the philosophia perennis played for Jaspers, as well as his early and intensive engagement with the founder of Neoplatonism, who for Jaspers was ‘the metaphysician par excellence’. His connection with Plotinus opens up fascinating new perspectives (...) on Jaspers’ concept of existential self-emergence as an ascent to the One, and on his henological philosophy of reason and his speculative paradoxical thinking about God. (shrink)

The article first gives an exegesis of the famous passage in the "Republic", 505d11-506a2. Attention is drawn to the fact that the principle that every soul does everything for the Good can be translated in two ways: Every soul does everything for the sake of the Good, or goes to all lengths for the sake of the Good. Depending on the different translations, we have a different picture of the platonic Socrates in the Republic, an intellectualistic Socrates for whom irrational (...) desires do not exist, or a Socrates who also accepts irrational desires. The article favours the first one. Then it attempts to show that we can elucidate some dark points in the Socratic thesis that the Good is what every soul pursues and for which every soul does everything, with the help of Aquinas’s distinction between it actio hominis and actio humana. Finally, the article outlines three substantive answers to the question “What is the Good?” – the henological, the perfectionist and the structuralist. Instead of advancing a new answer, the article suggests an uncontroversial formal starting point for an answer to this question. (shrink)

In the field of phenomenology philosophers more and more frequently show interest in early Christian thought – including apophatic theology – which, in result, affects the understanding of the role and significance of art. „Invisibility” in art and the manifestation of God through the work of art is a mystery which cannot be satisfactorily explained by traditional philosophical aesthetic models. Negative theology, together with its key apophatic way brings a new perspective of understanding art into contemporary aesthetic debates. Its 'reductive' (...) application can be found especially in the theory of the icon. Paweł Florenski's icon analysis and Jean-Luc Marion's category of the ‘saturated phenomenon’ converge in many points. Henry Dume ry’s henological reduction which is complementary to, but at the same time exceeds Edmunda Husserl's reductions, extends the horizon of the 'invisible' dimension of art by the relation the Spirit (intelligibility) makes with Transcendence. In the article I will show the cohesion of contemporary phenomenological thought, early Christian apophatics and the theory of the icon. I will also consider whether an aesthetic and theological framework so structured could be valid and useful as a general philosophical theory of art. (shrink)

Aristotle construed metaphysics primarily in terms of ontology, whereas Plato had developed a different approach to the philosophy of principles. The main task of the metaphysical theory of principles is the quest for the absolute. For Plato, however, the absolute is the one; and this idea – most influentially advocated by Plotinus – is the foundation of a tradition that construes metaphysics mainly in terms of henology. The central aspects of this doctrine are the idea of the transcendence of (...) the absolute one, the perspective of negative theology, and – in Plotinus – a genuinely philosophical kind of mysticism. (shrink)

Aristotle construed metaphysics primarily in terms of ontology, whereas Plato had developed a different approach to the philosophy of principles. The main task of the metaphysical theory of principles is the quest for the absolute. For Plato, however, the absolute is the one; and this idea - most influentially advocated by Plotinus - is the foundation of a tradition that construes metaphysics mainly in terms of henology. The central aspects of this doctrine are the idea of the transcendence of (...) the absolute one, the perspective of negative theology, and - in Plotinus - a genuinely philosophical kind of mysticism. (shrink)

RESUMEN En el libro X de la Metafísica se trazan las líneas generales de una henología. La reconstrucción de la argumentación debe hacerse desde dos pilares fundamentales: (a) la guía de problemas o aporías que proporciona el libro iii y (b) el proyecto ontológico anunciado en el libro iv, donde se señala la relación entre ontología y henología. El rasgo fundamental de dicha henología sería su subordinación a la ontología. El artículo argumenta que para Aristóteles el rol de la henología (...) es ante todo destructivo, pues con dicha doctrina se pretende establecer -ante todo- la imposibilidad de considerar al "uno" (τὸ ἓν) como principio de los entes. ABSTRACT In the Metaphysics, especially in Book X, are drawn the general lines of a henology. For the proper understanding of this doctrine it is necessary to reconstruct its argumentation from two fundamental basis: (a) the guide of puzzles or aporias that book iii provides and (b) the ontological project announced in book IV where the relationship between ontology and henology is indicated. Once the explanations of Book X are framed a theory about unity (τὸ ἓν) can be systematically assembled, whose fundamental feature would be the following: henology as a science is a subordinate part of ontology. The role of henology is for Aristotle primarily destructive, that is, with this doctrine it is intended to establish the impossibility of considering the 'one' (τὸ ἓν) as a principle of the entities. (shrink)

Ibn Gabirol apresenta, em sua obra Fons Vitae, um modelo metafísico baseado no hilemorfismo universal, ou seja, na presença de matéria e de forma em todos os seres, tanto corpóreos quanto espirituais. Embora considerado um autor neoplatônico, Ibn Gabirol não explicita propriamente uma henologia, mas parte das realidades sensíveis e corpóreas em direção às mais sutis. Este artigo pretende inverter essa apresentação do autor, buscando redesenhar sua metafísica a partir da Essência Primeira até o fim da criação. Para tanto, o (...) ponto específico analisado, ainda que de modo incipiente, é a questão da unidade e seu qualificativo uno/una, tanto na atribuição que ele faz em seu modelo ontológico, quanto nos seus aspectos lógicos. In his work Fons Vitae, Ibn Gabirol presents a metaphysical model based on universal hylomorphism, i.e., on the presence of matter and form in all beings both corporeal and spiritual. Although considered a neoplatonic author, Ibn Gabirol does not properly present a henology, but starts from sensible and corporeal realities and then treats the more subtle ones. This article intends to invert the author's presentation, seeking to redesign his metaphysics from the first essence to the end of creation. To this end, the specific point that is analyzed (although in an incipient way) is the question of unity and its qualifier 'one', both in the attribution Ibn Gabirol makes in his ontological model and in the model's logical aspects. (shrink)

RESUMEN En el libro X de la Metafísica se trazan las líneas generales de una henología. La reconstrucción de la argumentación debe hacerse desde dos pilares fundamentales: (a) la guía de problemas o aporías que proporciona el libro iii y (b) el proyecto ontológico anunciado en el libro iv, donde se señala la relación entre ontología y henología. El rasgo fundamental de dicha henología sería su subordinación a la ontología. El artículo argumenta que para Aristóteles el rol de la henología (...) es ante todo destructivo, pues con dicha doctrina se pretende establecer -ante todo- la imposibilidad de considerar al "uno" (τὸ ἓν) como principio de los entes. ABSTRACT In the Metaphysics, especially in Book X, are drawn the general lines of a henology. For the proper understanding of this doctrine it is necessary to reconstruct its argumentation from two fundamental basis: (a) the guide of puzzles or aporias that book iii provides and (b) the ontological project announced in book IV where the relationship between ontology and henology is indicated. Once the explanations of Book X are framed a theory about unity (τὸ ἓν) can be systematically assembled, whose fundamental feature would be the following: henology as a science is a subordinate part of ontology. The role of henology is for Aristotle primarily destructive, that is, with this doctrine it is intended to establish the impossibility of considering the 'one' (τὸ ἓν) as a principle of the entities. (shrink)

The article first (i) gives an exegesis of the famous passage in the Republic, 505d11-506a2. Attention is drawn to the fact that the principle that every soul does everything for the Good (panta prattei) can be translated in two ways: Every soul does everything for the sake of the Good, or goes to all lengths for the sake of the Good. Depending on the different translations, we have a different picture of the platonic Socrates in the Republic, an intellectualistic Socrates (...) for whom pure irrational desires do not exist, or a Socrates who also accepts irrational desires. The article favours the first picture. Then it (ii) attempts to show that we can elucidate two dark points in the Socratic thesis that the Good is what every soul pursues and for which every soul does everything, with the help of Aquinas. Finally, the article (iii) outlines three substantive answers to the question ``What is the Good?'' - the henological, the perfectionist and the structuralist - and shows that these three answers lead into a trilemma. Instead of advancing a new answer, the article suggests an uncontroversial formal starting point for an answer to this question. (shrink)

The principle of performative contradiction. On the epistemological significance of the dialogue form in Plato's "Euthydemus". - In this study, an analysis of the section 285d-288a of Plato's "Euthydemus" shall show two things: (1) The sophistic model of a world in which there is no contradiction, in which every linguistic utterance is true and every action correct, has no semantic inconsistencies, but can only be rejected with the help of the principle of performative contradictions. (2) It is precisely these performative (...) contradictions that make it necessary for Plato to philosophize not in treatises but in dialogues; in other words, that the philosophical relevance of the Platonic form of dialogue can be seen, among other things, in the fact that - in contrast to philosophical forms of representation such as the treatise, the essay, and a henology as reconstructed and represented by the Tübingen School - it permits the representation of performative reflections and performative contradictions. (shrink)

Aristotle’s 'Metaphysics' defends a number of theses about oneness ['to hen']. For interpreting the 'Metaphysics'’ positive henology, two such theses are especially important: 'to hen' and being ['to on'] are equally general and so intimately connected that there can be no science of the former which isn’t also a science of the latter, and to hen is the foundation ['archē'] of number qua number. Aristotle decisively commits himself to both and. The central goal of this article is to improve (...) our understanding of what the 'Metaphysics'’ endorsement of their conjunction amounts to. To this end we explore three manners of being one which enter into Aristotle’s 'Metaphysics': I call them 'unity, uniqueness', and 'unit-hood'. On the view the article defends, it’s unity that’s at issue in Aristotle’s endorsement of and unit-hood that’s at issue in his endorsement of. The 'Metaphysics'’ positive henology as whole, I suggest, is best interpreted by positing a theory-internal distinction between unity, uniqueness, and unit-hood. (shrink)

This essay will investigate the context – in terms of both sources (by means of influence, transformation, or contrast) and ancient reception – of the concept of the dynamic unity of the Father in the Son and the Son in the Father (John 10:38, 14:10, 17:21) in both ‘pagan’ and Christian Middle-Platonic and Neoplatonic thinkers. The Christians include Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Gregory of Nyssa, but also Evagrius Ponticus and John Scottus Eriugena. The essay will outline, in ‘Middle Platonism’, (...) the hierarchical theology of a first and second God (and sometimes a third), and in Neoplatonism, Plotinus’ three hypostases arranged in hierarchical order, which will be contrasted with Origen’s and the Cappadocians’ three divine hypostases that are equal – like those of Augustine. Thus, for Origen not only is the Son in the Father, as in a ‘pagan’ Middle and Neoplatonic scheme, but also the Father is in the Son, in a perfect reciprocity of dynamic unity. Origen subscribes to this reciprocity because, as I argue, he is no real ‘subordinationist’, but the precursor of the Nicene and Constantinopolitan line (the Cappadocians, especially Nyssen, developed and emphasised the notion of equality, bringing the three Hypostases of the Trinity to the level of Plotinus’ One, but the premises were all in Origen’s theology and his concept of the coeternity of the three Hypostases and their common divinity: Nyssen, like Athanasius, even use Origen’s arguments in his own anti-Arian polemic, as we shall see). Origen even interpreted Philo’s theology, also close to so-called Middle Platonism, in a non-subordinationistic sense, attributing to the Hypostasis of Logos/Sophia the various dynameis, such as Logos and Sophia, that Philo used most probably in a non-hypostatic sense. I shall also demonstrate how Gregory of Nyssa, significantly following Origen, in his work Against Eunomius used John 14:10a to refute the philosophical argument of Eunomius, who had a profoundly subordinationistic view of Christ with respect to the Father. Gregory’s solution is that neither the Father nor the Son are in an absolute sense, but both are in a reciprocal relation or σχέσις, what I shall present as Gregory’s own version of the dynamic unity (in turn grounded in Origen). I shall also concentrate on the use that Gregory makes of John 17:21-23 to argue that the unity of the Father and the Son, and of all believers – and eventually all humans – in them, is substantiated by the Holy Spirit, who is seen as a bond of unity. I shall study how the notion of the Father in the Son and the Son in the Father relates to the parallel statements in John 14:10, that Christ is in the disciples (and all believers) and these are in Christ – what I will call an ‘expansive’ notion of dynamic unity – and John 17:21, that just as the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, so the disciples and all believers too should become ‘one’ in the Father and the Son. Here, as I shall argue, Middle and Neoplatonic henology comes to the fore as a possible background and interpretive lens at the same time. I shall show how Origen joined it to the unifying force of charity-love (agape), in turn a central theme in John, and how Evagrius, performing his exegesis of these verses, interpreted henosis. A coda will explore the corollary of the Divinity ‘all in all’, which is not only a central tenet of Origen’s theology, but also of that of Proclus. It will be pointed out how this concept relates to the issue of the dynamic unity within the divine. (shrink)

RESUMEN En el libro X de la Metafísica se trazan las líneas generales de una henología. La reconstrucción de la argumentación debe hacerse desde dos pilares fundamentales: (a) la guía de problemas o aporías que proporciona el libro iii y (b) el proyecto ontológico anunciado en el libro iv, donde se señala la relación entre ontología y henología. El rasgo fundamental de dicha henología sería su subordinación a la ontología. El artículo argumenta que para Aristóteles el rol de la henología (...) es ante todo destructivo, pues con dicha doctrina se pretende establecer -ante todo- la imposibilidad de considerar al "uno" (τὸ ἓν) como principio de los entes. ABSTRACT In the Metaphysics, especially in Book X, are drawn the general lines of a henology. For the proper understanding of this doctrine it is necessary to reconstruct its argumentation from two fundamental basis: (a) the guide of puzzles or aporias that book iii provides and (b) the ontological project announced in book IV where the relationship between ontology and henology is indicated. Once the explanations of Book X are framed a theory about unity (τὸ ἓν) can be systematically assembled, whose fundamental feature would be the following: henology as a science is a subordinate part of ontology. The role of henology is for Aristotle primarily destructive, that is, with this doctrine it is intended to establish the impossibility of considering the 'one' (τὸ ἓν) as a principle of the entities. (shrink)

A comprehensive reading of Heidegger's work from the mid-1930s to the 1960s that seeks to develop an ecological thinking rooted in reflections on the Heraclitean 'hen', relationality, and the impossibility of totality. An elaboration of the structural homology between Heidegger's use of the terms 'Technik' and 'metaphysics' sets the stage for his later work or topology. The Spätwerk is presented as an irresolvable polarity between 'Technik' and 'Ereignis', between a totalizing movement and a movement of disruption. This serves as the (...) basis for reflections on human experience of and as the ecological. Nature as Limit serves as a contribution to both eco-philosophy and to philosophical methodology more broadly, with philological and hermeneutic excursions that engage the relationship between language and the ecological motifs being developed in the work. (shrink)

RESUMEN En el libro X de la Metafísica se trazan las líneas generales de una henología. La reconstrucción de la argumentación debe hacerse desde dos pilares fundamentales: (a) la guía de problemas o aporías que proporciona el libro iii y (b) el proyecto ontológico anunciado en el libro iv, donde se señala la relación entre ontología y henología. El rasgo fundamental de dicha henología sería su subordinación a la ontología. El artículo argumenta que para Aristóteles el rol de la henología (...) es ante todo destructivo, pues con dicha doctrina se pretende establecer -ante todo- la imposibilidad de considerar al "uno" (τὸ ἓν) como principio de los entes. ABSTRACT In the Metaphysics, especially in Book X, are drawn the general lines of a henology. For the proper understanding of this doctrine it is necessary to reconstruct its argumentation from two fundamental basis: (a) the guide of puzzles or aporias that book iii provides and (b) the ontological project announced in book IV where the relationship between ontology and henology is indicated. Once the explanations of Book X are framed a theory about unity (τὸ ἓν) can be systematically assembled, whose fundamental feature would be the following: henology as a science is a subordinate part of ontology. The role of henology is for Aristotle primarily destructive, that is, with this doctrine it is intended to establish the impossibility of considering the 'one' (τὸ ἓν) as a principle of the entities. (shrink)

RESUMEN En el libro X de la Metafísica se trazan las líneas generales de una henología. La reconstrucción de la argumentación debe hacerse desde dos pilares fundamentales: (a) la guía de problemas o aporías que proporciona el libro iii y (b) el proyecto ontológico anunciado en el libro iv, donde se señala la relación entre ontología y henología. El rasgo fundamental de dicha henología sería su subordinación a la ontología. El artículo argumenta que para Aristóteles el rol de la henología (...) es ante todo destructivo, pues con dicha doctrina se pretende establecer -ante todo- la imposibilidad de considerar al "uno" (τὸ ἓν) como principio de los entes. ABSTRACT In the Metaphysics, especially in Book X, are drawn the general lines of a henology. For the proper understanding of this doctrine it is necessary to reconstruct its argumentation from two fundamental basis: (a) the guide of puzzles or aporias that book iii provides and (b) the ontological project announced in book IV where the relationship between ontology and henology is indicated. Once the explanations of Book X are framed a theory about unity (τὸ ἓν) can be systematically assembled, whose fundamental feature would be the following: henology as a science is a subordinate part of ontology. The role of henology is for Aristotle primarily destructive, that is, with this doctrine it is intended to establish the impossibility of considering the 'one' (τὸ ἓν) as a principle of the entities. (shrink)

In the central chapter of this short work, Dumery shows that the Husserlian reduction cannot be stopped at the level of the constituting ego with its corresponding essences, for this level of intentionality necessarily involves a community of subjects and a world of essences. This multiplicity shows that passivity and dependence are characteristic of even this level and forces us beyond to a fourth level, the transcendent One. In supporting chapters Dumery discusses the philosopher's stance vis-à-vis religion and other areas (...) of human experience, "henology" vs. "ontology" as a philosophic basis for discussing God, and negative theology. He clarifies the classic proofs for God's existence from his own phenomenological viewpoint. The book is admirably lucid and forceful. The translation is very good, though the translator's Introduction is needlessly long and confused for such a short and clear text.—W. G. E. (shrink)

In the central chapter of this short work, Dumery shows that the Husserlian reduction cannot be stopped at the level of the constituting ego with its corresponding essences, for this level of intentionality necessarily involves a community of subjects and a world of essences. This multiplicity shows that passivity and dependence are characteristic of even this level and forces us beyond to a fourth level, the transcendent One. In supporting chapters Dumery discusses the philosopher's stance vis-à-vis religion and other areas (...) of human experience, "henology" vs. "ontology" as a philosophic basis for discussing God, and negative theology. He clarifies the classic proofs for God's existence from his own phenomenological viewpoint. The book is admirably lucid and forceful. The translation is very good, though the translator's Introduction is needlessly long and confused for such a short and clear text.—W. G. E. (shrink)