We construct a type p with preweight ω with respect to itself in a theory with few types. A type with this property must be present in a stable theory with finitely many (but more than one) countable models. The construction is a modification of Hrushovski's important pseudoplane construction.
0-categorical o-minimal structures were completely described by Pillay and Steinhorn 565–592), and are essentially built up from copies of the rationals as an ordered set by ‘cutting and copying’. Here we investigate the possible structures which an 0-categorical weakly o-minimal set may carry, and find that there are some rather more interesting examples. We show that even here the possibilities are limited. We subdivide our study into the following principal cases: the structure is 1-indiscernible, in which case all possibilities are (...) classified up to binary structure; the structure is 2-indiscernible, classified up to ternary structure; the structure is 3-indiscernible, in which case we show that it is k-indiscernible for every finite k. We also make some remarks about the possible structures of higher arities which an 0-categorical weakly o-minimal structure may carry. (shrink)
Systemic risks are risks produced through interconnected non-wrongful actions of individuals, in the sense that an individual's action is a negligible cause of the risk. Due to scale effects of interaction, their consequences can be serious but they are also difficult to predict and assess via a risk assessment. Since we can have good reason to engage in the interconnected activities giving rise to systemic risk, we incur a concurrent collective responsibility to ensure that the risks are fairly distributed and (...) well regulated. James argues that fairness in this context requires taking reasonably available precautions ensuring for each risk-bearer a favourable ratio of expected benefits over expected losses. In sections 2 and 3 we argue that such a conception of fairness applies but only on the condition that the systemic risks created are irreversible risks and that the general background conditions of justice are imperfectly fair. When risks are reversible, compensatory justice can correct for unfairness in risk imposition. Where risks are irreversible, compensatory justice necessarily fails, giving rise to a collective responsibility to regulate fairly ex ante. Additionally, where background conditions of justice are fully fair and the systemic risk is well understood, risk bearers can be said to have consented to the systemic risk. If they are not fair, we argue that the primary political obligation should lie in fixing the fairness of the backgrounds of justice. A related reason for addressing the general background conditions of fairness is that James’ account of fairness in systemic risk imposition encounters a baseline problem. If expected risks and benefits are calculated again an unfair historic background condition, systemic risk imposition would not be fully fair. Section 4 shows why differences in evidentiary uncertainty as to probability and levels of harm and effective responses require a normatively appropriate response in the form of additional precautions. We show that the evidentiary standards set for risk-based cost-benefit analysis have a connection with deontology because they express a postulate of equal treatment in formal terms. Systemic risks can have different possible degrees of epistemological certainty due to factors of social and natural origin, such as more available research funding or higher degrees of complexity for some systemic risks but not others. These differences have to be mitigated by taking even greater precautions in difficult-to-research systemic risks. (shrink)
An emerging discipline depends on a rich and multifaceted supply of theoretical and methodological approaches. The diversity of perspectives offered in this book will serve as a guide for future explorations in action science.
This paper aims to show that fairness in trade calls for relaxing existing WTO rules to include a greater liberalisation of labour migration. After having addressed several objections to global egalitarianism, it will argue, first, that the world’s rich and the world’s poor participate in a same multilateral trading system whose point is primarily to reduce trade barriers, and hence to establish global economic competitions, in order to raise their standards of living; second, that these competitions are subject to requirements (...) of formal and substantive fairness; and, third, that the substantive fairness of the competitions that are taking place in the field of trade in goods is likely to require a greater liberalisation of labour migration, especially low-skilled labour from developing countries. (shrink)
We define a generalized notion of rank for stable theories without dense forking chains, and use it to derive that every type is domination-equivalent to a finite product of regular types. We apply this to show that in a small theory admitting finite coding, no realisation of a nonforking extension of some strong type can be algebraic over some realisation of a forking extension.
The Archive as the Repertoire.Jana Herwig - forthcoming - Mind and Matter: Comparative Approaches Towards Complexity;[... Based on the Symposium... Which Took Place 2010 in the Context of the Paraflows Festival in Vienna].details