Results for 'Henry E. Kyburg Jr'

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  1. Henry E. Kyburg, Jr., "Probability and Inductive Logic". [REVIEW]Michael Martin - 1972 - Theory and Decision 2 (4):380.
  2.  2
    Probability and Inference: Essays in Honour of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr.William Harper & Gregory Wheeler - 2007 - College Publications.
    Recent advances in philosophy, artificial intelligence, mathematical psychology, and the decision sciences have brought a renewed focus to the role and interpretation of probability in theories of uncertain reasoning. Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. has long resisted the now dominate Bayesian approach to the role of probability in scientific inference and practical decision. The sharp contrasts between the Bayesian approach and Kyburg's program offer a uniquely powerful framework within which to study several issues at the heart of scientific (...)
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  3.  13
    Henry E. Kyburg Jr. Theory and Measurement. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Etc. 1984, Viii + 273 Pp. [REVIEW]Patrick Suppes - 1988 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (3):989.
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  4.  29
    Against Conditionalization.Fahiem Bacchus, Henry E. Kyburg Jr & Mariam Thalos - 1990 - Synthese 85 (3):475 - 506.
  5. Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1961 - Wesleyan University Press.
  6.  19
    Probabilistic Inference and Probabilistic Reasoning.Jr: Henry E. Kyburg - 1990 - Philosophical Topics 18 (2):107-116.
  7. Probabilistic Inference and Probabilistic Reasoning.Jr: Henry E. Kyburg - 1990 - Philosophical Topics 18 (2):107-116.
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  8.  20
    Recent Work in Inductive Logic.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1964 - American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (4):249 - 287.
  9. Probability as a Guide in Life.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 2001 - The Monist 84 (2):135-152.
    Bishop Butler, [Butler, 1736], said that probability was the very guide of life. But what interpretations of probability can serve this function? It isn’t hard to see that empirical views won’t do, and many recent writers-for example John Earman, who has said that Bayesianism is “the only game in town”-have been persuaded by various dutch book arguments that only subjective probability will perform the function required. We will defend the thesis that probability construed in this way offers very little guidance, (...)
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  10.  47
    The Hobgoblin.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1987 - The Monist 70 (2):141 - 151.
    Ralph Waldo Emerson said, “a Foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines.” The alleged evidence has mounted that ordinary folk are prone to inconsistency, and particularly that they are prone to inconsistency when it comes to probabilistic judgments. I write “alleged,” because it is open to question whether the experiments that provide this evidence are well designed—in particular whether Quine’s principle of logistical charity has been followed. I also do so because (...)
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  11.  26
    Epistemology and Inference. Henry E. Kyburg, Jr.Stephen Spielman - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (1):149-150.
  12.  50
    Chance, Cause, Reason: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Scientific Evidence.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (3):500-502.
  13.  30
    Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief. Henry E. Kyburg, Jr.Wesley C. Salmon - 1967 - Philosophy of Science 34 (3):283-285.
  14.  2
    Rational Decision and Causality. [REVIEW]Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1987 - International Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):72-74.
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  15.  38
    Subjective Probability : Criticisms, Reflections and Problems. [REVIEW]Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 157 - 180.
  16.  29
    Getting Fancy with Probability.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1992 - Synthese 90 (2):189 - 203.
    There are a number of reasons for being interested in uncertainty, and there are also a number of uncertainty formalisms. These formalisms are not unrelated. It is argued that they can all be reflected as special cases of the approach of taking probabilities to be determined by sets of probability functions defined on an algebra of statements. Thus, interval probabilities should be construed as maximum and minimum probabilities within a set of distributions, Glenn Shafer's belief functions should be construed as (...)
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  17. ``Conjunctivitis&Quot.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1970 - In Marshall Swain (ed.), Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. pp. 55-82.
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  18.  18
    Bets and Beliefs.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1968 - American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1):54 - 63.
  19.  5
    Chance.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1976 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (3):355 - 393.
  20.  13
    Comments on Salmon's "Inductive Evidence".Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1965 - American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (4):274 - 276.
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  21.  9
    Decisions, Conclusions, and Utilities.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1977 - Synthese 36 (1):87 - 96.
  22.  5
    Direct Measurement.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1979 - American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4):259 - 272.
  23.  23
    Don't Take Unnecessary Chances!Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 2002 - Synthese 132 (1/2):9 - 26.
    The dominant argument for the introduction of propensities or chances as an interpretation of probability depends on the difficulty of accounting for single case probabilities. We argue that in almost all cases, the "single case" application of probability can be accounted for otherwise. "Propensities" are needed only in theoretical contexts, and even there applications of probability need only depend on propensities indirectly.
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  24.  17
    Epistemological Probability.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1971 - Synthese 23 (2/3):309 - 326.
  25.  4
    How the Laws of Physics Lie.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1990 - Noûs 24 (1):174.
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  26.  13
    On a Certain Form of Philosophical Argument.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1970 - American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (3):229 - 237.
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  27.  11
    Reply to Professor Freudenthal.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1977 - Synthese 36 (4):493 - 498.
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  28.  26
    The Justification of Deduction.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1958 - Review of Metaphysics 12 (1):19 - 25.
    If someone comes to my house, saying, "Here is a bone; I hope Obrecht likes it," I might answer with a deductive argument: "You may rest assured on that score. Obrecht is a dog, and all dogs like bones; therefore Obrecht will like it." We may formalize this argument as follows: Let G be the bone, O be Obrecht, D be the class of dogs, B be the class of bones, and, finally, let L be the class of ordered pairs (...)
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  29.  12
    Matters of Metaphysics.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1992 - Review of Metaphysics 46 (2):409-411.
    These essays are characterized by meticulous argument in the analytical tradition. The book concerns matters of metaphysics in a broad sense: philosophy of mind and the problems of subjectivity; questions concerning nomological and statistical laws of nature; and, as we would expect, chance and induction.
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  30.  50
    The Fixation of Belief and Its Undoing. [REVIEW]Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):721-725.
  31.  29
    The Justification of Deduction.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1958 - Review of Metaphysics 12 (1):19-25.
    If someone comes to my house, saying, "Here is a bone; I hope Obrecht likes it," I might answer with a deductive argument: "You may rest assured on that score. Obrecht is a dog, and all dogs like bones; therefore Obrecht will like it." We may formalize this argument as follows: Let G be the bone, O be Obrecht, D be the class of dogs, B be the class of bones, and, finally, let L be the class of ordered pairs (...)
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  32.  4
    Probabilistic Metaphysics by Patrick Suppes. [REVIEW]Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):45-49.
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  33.  4
    Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible Inference by Judea Pearl. [REVIEW]Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (8):434-437.
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  34.  1
    Rethinking the Foundations of Statistics. [REVIEW]Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):677-680.
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  35.  7
    The Fixation of Belief and Its Undoing. [REVIEW]Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1994 - International Studies in Philosophy 26 (1):122-123.
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  36.  3
    The Fixation of Belief and Its Undoing. [REVIEW]Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):721-725.
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  37.  1
    The Hobgoblin.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1987 - The Monist 70 (2):141-151.
    Ralph Waldo Emerson said, “a Foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines.” The alleged evidence has mounted that ordinary folk are prone to inconsistency, and particularly that they are prone to inconsistency when it comes to probabilistic judgments. I write “alleged,” because it is open to question whether the experiments that provide this evidence are well designed—in particular whether Quine’s principle of logistical charity has been followed. I also do so because (...)
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  38.  37
    Salmon's Paper.E. KyburgHenry - 1965 - Philosophy of Science 32 (2):147-151.
  39.  9
    Book Review:Philosophy of Science A: Formal Approach Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. [REVIEW]Alex C. Michalos - 1969 - Philosophy of Science 36 (3):326-.
  40.  28
    Probability is the Very Guide of Life: The Philosophical Uses of Chance.Kyburg Jr, E. Henry & Mariam Thalos (eds.) - 2003 - Open Court.
    This collection represents the best recent work on the subject and includes essays by Clark Glymour, James H. Fetzer, and Wesley C. Salmon.
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  41.  80
    Quantities, Magnitudes, and Numbers.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (3):377-410.
    Quantities are naturally viewed as functions, whose arguments may be construed as situations, events, objects, etc. We explore the question of the range of these functions: should it be construed as the real numbers (or some subset thereof)? This is Carnap's view. It has attractive features, specifically, what Carnap views as ontological economy. Or should the range of a quantity be a set of magnitudes? This may have been Helmholtz's view, and it, too, has attractive features. It reveals the close (...)
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  42.  43
    Theory and Measurement.Henry E. Kyburg (ed.) - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.
    Measurement is fundamental to all the sciences, the behavioural and social as well as the physical and in the latter its results provide our paradigms of 'objective fact'. But the basis and justification of measurement is not well understood and is often simply taken for granted. Henry Kyburg Jr proposes here an original, carefully worked out theory of the foundations of measurement, to show how quantities can be defined, why certain mathematical structures are appropriate to them and what (...)
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  43.  89
    The Justification of Induction.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1956 - Journal of Philosophy 53 (12):394-400.
  44.  65
    Belief, Evidence, and Conditioning.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (1):42-65.
    Since Ramsey, much discussion of the relation between probability and belief has taken for granted that there are degrees of belief, i.e., that there is a real-valued function, B, that characterizes the degree of belief that an agent has in each statement of his language. It is then supposed that B is a probability. It is then often supposed that as the agent accumulates evidence, this function should be updated by conditioning: BE(·) should be B(·E)/B(E). Probability is also important in (...)
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  45.  3
    Theories as Mere Conventions.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1990 - In C. Wade Savage (ed.), Scientific Theories. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 158-174.
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  46.  3
    Dennett's Beer.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1996 - In K. M. Ford & Z. W. Pylyshyn (eds.), The Robot's Dilemma Revisited: The Frame Problem in Artificial Intelligence. Ablex.
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  47. KYBURG, HENRY E., Jr: "Epistemology and Inference". [REVIEW]D. H. Mellor - 1984 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35:175.
  48.  4
    Kyburg Henry E. Jr., The Justification of Deduction. The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 12 No. 1 , Pp. 19–25.Charles A. Baylis - 1960 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 25 (4):339-340.
  49. Leeds' Infernal Machine.E. KyburgHenry - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):92-94.
  50.  19
    Probability and Rationality.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1961 - Philosophical Quarterly 11 (44):193-200.
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