Results for 'Henry E. Kyburg Jr'

916 found
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  1. Probabilistic Inference and Probabilistic Reasoning.Jr: Henry E. Kyburg - 1990 - Philosophical Topics 18 (2):107-116.
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  2.  45
    Uncertain Inference.Henry E. Kyburg Jr & Choh Man Teng - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
    Coping with uncertainty is a necessary part of ordinary life and is crucial to an understanding of how the mind works. For example, it is a vital element in developing artificial intelligence that will not be undermined by its own rigidities. There have been many approaches to the problem of uncertain inference, ranging from probability to inductive logic to nonmonotonic logic. Thisbook seeks to provide a clear exposition of these approaches within a unified framework. The principal market for the book (...)
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  3.  21
    On a Certain Form of Philosophical Argument.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1970 - American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (3):229 - 237.
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  4.  40
    Getting Fancy with Probability.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1992 - Synthese 90 (2):189 - 203.
    There are a number of reasons for being interested in uncertainty, and there are also a number of uncertainty formalisms. These formalisms are not unrelated. It is argued that they can all be reflected as special cases of the approach of taking probabilities to be determined by sets of probability functions defined on an algebra of statements. Thus, interval probabilities should be construed as maximum and minimum probabilities within a set of distributions, Glenn Shafer's belief functions should be construed as (...)
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  5.  33
    Recent Work in Inductive Logic.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1964 - American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (4):249 - 287.
  6.  35
    Matters of Metaphysics.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1992 - Review of Metaphysics 46 (2):409-411.
    These essays are characterized by meticulous argument in the analytical tradition. The book concerns matters of metaphysics in a broad sense: philosophy of mind and the problems of subjectivity; questions concerning nomological and statistical laws of nature; and, as we would expect, chance and induction.
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  7.  26
    Bets and Beliefs.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1968 - American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1):54 - 63.
  8.  18
    Comments on Salmon's "Inductive Evidence".Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1965 - American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (4):274 - 276.
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  9.  15
    Decisions, Conclusions, and Utilities.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1977 - Synthese 36 (1):87 - 96.
  10.  12
    Direct Measurement.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1979 - American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4):259 - 272.
  11.  19
    Reply to Professor Freudenthal.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1977 - Synthese 36 (4):493 - 498.
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  12.  46
    Epistemological Probability.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1971 - Synthese 23 (2/3):309 - 326.
  13. Probabilistic Metaphysics by Patrick Suppes. [REVIEW]Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):45-49.
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  14.  80
    Chance, Cause, Reason: An Inquiry into the Nature of Scientific Evidence.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (3):500-502.
  15.  18
    How the Laws of Physics Lie.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1990 - Noûs 24 (1):174.
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  16.  39
    The hobgoblin.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1987 - The Monist 70 (2):141 - 151.
    Ralph Waldo Emerson said, “a Foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines.” The alleged evidence has mounted that ordinary folk are prone to inconsistency, and particularly that they are prone to inconsistency when it comes to probabilistic judgments. I write “alleged,” because it is open to question whether the experiments that provide this evidence are well designed—in particular whether Quine’s principle of logistical charity has been followed. I also do so because (...)
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  17. Rational Decision and Causality. [REVIEW]Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1987 - International Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):72-74.
     
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  18.  15
    Chance.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1976 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (3):355 - 393.
  19.  30
    Don't Take Unnecessary Chances!Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 2002 - Synthese 132 (1/2):9 - 26.
    The dominant argument for the introduction of propensities or chances as an interpretation of probability depends on the difficulty of accounting for single case probabilities. We argue that in almost all cases, the "single case" application of probability can be accounted for otherwise. "Propensities" are needed only in theoretical contexts, and even there applications of probability need only depend on propensities indirectly.
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  20. Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible Inference by Judea Pearl. [REVIEW]Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (8):434-437.
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  21. Rethinking the Foundations of Statistics. [REVIEW]Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):677-680.
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  22. The Fixation of Belief and Its Undoing. [REVIEW]Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1994 - International Studies in Philosophy 26 (1):122-123.
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  23. ``Conjunctivitis".Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1970 - In Marshall Swain (ed.), Induction, acceptance, and rational belief. Dordrecht,: Reidel. pp. 55-82.
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  24.  55
    Salmon's paper.E. KyburgHenry - 1965 - Philosophy of Science 32 (2):147-151.
  25.  8
    Theories as mere conventions.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1956 - In C. Wade Savage (ed.), Scientific Theories. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 158-174.
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  26. Convention, confirmation, and credibility.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1989 - In Marjorie Clay & Keith Lehrer (eds.), Knowledge and skepticism. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
  27.  9
    Dennett's beer.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1996 - In Kenneth M. Ford & Zenon W. Pylyshyn (eds.), The Robot's Dilemma Revisited: The Frame Problem in Artificial Intelligence. Ablex.
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  28.  4
    Induction.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1990 - In Henry Ely Kyburg (ed.), Science & reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Induction is the inference from a sample to a population, regardless of the possible existence of exceptions. Induction is used in the practice of science and engineering based on knowledge that can be accepted as evidence. There are two bodies of knowledge: evidential corpus, a set of propositions acceptable as evidence in a certain context; and practical corpus, a set of propositions counting as “practically certain” in that context. There are five kinds of induction described: statistical, universal, nomic, theoretical, and (...)
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  29.  61
    Probability is the Very Guide of Life: The Philosophical Uses of Chance.Kyburg Jr, E. Henry & Mariam Thalos (eds.) - 2003 - Open Court.
    This collection represents the best recent work on the subject and includes essays by Clark Glymour, James H. Fetzer, and Wesley C. Salmon.
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  30. Leeds' infernal machine.E. KyburgHenry - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):92-94.
  31.  41
    (3 other versions)The Justification of Induction.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1956 - Journal of Philosophy 53 (12):394-400.
  32.  3
    The Limits of Science.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1990 - In Henry Ely Kyburg (ed.), Science & reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
    It has been manifested over the past few centuries that science provides superbly powerful tools and methods for modifying the natural world. Many people would agree that it has also offered explanation and understanding. But it is still unclear that these tools and methodology can propel us to solve all of the cognitive dilemmas that exist. It has been assumed, for example, that scientific knowledge and religious knowledge are so different that they cannot even clash with one another. But the (...)
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  33.  37
    Probability and rationality.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1961 - Philosophical Quarterly 11 (44):193-200.
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  34.  2
    Causality.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1990 - In Henry Ely Kyburg (ed.), Science & reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
    The distinction between cause and effect has been viewed as crucial to scientific thinking. David Hume dedicates many pages of his “Enquiry” to the argument of causality, and it appears to be of central vitality to our understanding of the world, despite the fact that he can find nothing to the notion. In Hume's prose, one senses both disappointment and heroic resignation. Some philosophers view causality—sometimes even universal causality—as a needed assumption or basic “presupposition” of science. It is sometimes argued (...)
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  35.  4
    Choosing Among Conventions.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1990 - In Henry Ely Kyburg (ed.), Science & reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
    The majority of the philosophical attention on induction has been connected with universal conventions: “All crows are black,” “All emeralds are green,” “Every creature with kidneys is a creature with a heart,” and others. It has been observed that if it can be shown how and why such conventions can be given rational justification by our restrained observations of the world, the outcome will be simpler. It is felt that it is but a small step from here to quantitative laws (...)
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  36.  6
    Dispositions and Modalities.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1990 - In Henry Ely Kyburg (ed.), Science & reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Probabilistic connections are simple to reproduce counterfactually or hypothetically, since this involves simply adding the required statements to our evidential corpus without worrying about erasing some statements. In the serious uniform causal connections' case, the problem is complicated by the fact that some erasures will almost always have to be made, and that leads to the problems of intention and vagueness. On the other hand, uniform causal connections, considered both counterfactually and hypothetically, are exactly the connections needed to be taken (...)
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  37.  5
    Decision Theory.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1990 - In Henry Ely Kyburg (ed.), Science & reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Efforts to get scientific knowledge reap valuable knowledge about the world. It is often rewarding simply to know more, but a greater benefit of knowing more is that, knowing the future, one can make sound decisions. There is an easy and unified decision theory that, if only it applied to everything, would solve all the decision problems humans face. It is known as “Bayesian” decision theory because it requires a set of probabilities determined over the world states.
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  38.  5
    Idealization.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1990 - In Henry Ely Kyburg (ed.), Science & reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
    In order for an “ideal” to make relevance, it is not mandatory, certainly, to be able to reach it. It is enough that it is possible to approach it, and even only to a certain extent. To be able to approach the ideal arbitrarily closely is not needed, even “theoretically.” To make sense of the “improvement” we can get in approaching an ideal, the measure of how close the ideal needs to be must be determined. In the thermometer's case, the (...)
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  39.  4
    Logic and Mathematics.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1990 - In Henry Ely Kyburg (ed.), Science & reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter discusses the philosophy and logic behind the mathematical ideas of first-order logic, metalanguages, arithmetic, and geometry. It familiarizes the reader to these mathematical ideas, which will be used in succeeding chapters. The chapter also contrasts that mathematical or logical theories can utilize these mathematical ideas, while scientific theories will find them inapplicable. First-order logic involves conclusions based on premises which are given to be true with no room for imprecision or vagueness, both of which are crucial to the (...)
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  40.  2
    Laws and Theories.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1990 - In Henry Ely Kyburg (ed.), Science & reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
    In general, quantities should be interpreted in the same way as random quantities or random variables are interpreted in statistics: namely, as functions from a domain to a special set of objects. The fact that they reflect to some level the structure of a set of mathematical objects makes the range of these functions extraordinary. Measurement, meanwhile, is not a process of “assigning numbers to objects,” but rather of formulating the values of quantity functions given to objects. More briefly, it (...)
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  41.  4
    Levels of Corpora.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1990 - In Henry Ely Kyburg (ed.), Science & reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
    One problem that has been plaguing for the long term is the problem of choosing the levels of rational corpora. Since what goes into a corpus is what has a probability higher than the index of that corpus, that index has a bearing on what is in a corpus. We have two levels to deal with, since the focus is both with the evidential corpus and with the practical corpus. What principles can be used to select these levels? A practical (...)
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  42.  7
    Measurement.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1990 - In Henry Ely Kyburg (ed.), Science & reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
    The chapter begins by explaining the concepts of quantity and magnitude. It then presents the method of measurement without using magnitude. This method of direct measurement can be achieved through the observation of the transitive relation among objects. A particular set of equivalence classes is selected to serve as a unit of measurement and is assigned magnitude. The concept of measurement error and approximation is then introduced. In some cases, such as temperature, indirect measurement, or measurement in terms of a (...)
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  43.  5
    Observation and Error.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1990 - In Henry Ely Kyburg (ed.), Science & reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge is distinguished between knowledge about the relations of ideas, like mathematical truths and logic, and knowledge of matters of fact or empirical knowledge of the world, which is derived from “sense experience.” Observational sentences are based on sense experience and can sometimes be judged to be true or false. Thus, the possibility of errors in observational judgment must be allowed. We can acknowledge the existence of observational error in general, and even be unable to specify any particular observation statement (...)
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  44.  7
    Probability.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1990 - In Henry Ely Kyburg (ed.), Science & reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
    There are two main classes of interpretations of probability. The first are those that rely on a measure of frequency. The other is those that take a logical or subjective view of a unique event, independent of past or future events. The interpretation of probability which is used in the book is then defined as evidential probability, a function based on a set of known statements based on frequency or measure. The properties of probability are then enumerated and explained. Probabilities (...)
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  45.  6
    Philosophy and Science.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1990 - In Henry Ely Kyburg (ed.), Science & reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter chronicles the complex relationship between philosophy and science throughout history. It illustrates how they have mutually influenced each other in modern times. Philosophy and science are thought to be polar opposites, but they are not as different as they seem to be. Philosophy is considered part of the humanities and not the sciences. However, it can be argued that schools of science branched off from the domain of philosophy. Scientific studies start as or are inspired by philosophical ideas. (...)
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  46.  7
    Relativity and Revolution.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1990 - In Henry Ely Kyburg (ed.), Science & reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
    In the previous chapter, it was considered in very broad terms what can happen when the ties are cut between observability and certainty. More needs to be proved, however, before the framework developed can be applied to the types of real theories of interest: quantum mechanics, relativity, and other such highbrow creations. Particularly, close observation at the nature of those statements is needed in the corpus of practical certainties that comprise the analytical observational content of the corpus that we get (...)
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  47.  6
    Speculation.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1990 - In Henry Ely Kyburg (ed.), Science & reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Speculation is often opposed with scientific knowledge. Life existence on other planets of the solar system is through “sheer speculation,” while the chemical nature of the other planets' atmospheres is a matter of scientific knowledge. The present chapter does not dispute the distinction but it aims to examine the importance to science of speculation. The most vital role of speculation is that it provides us with scientific theories.
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  48.  6
    Statistical Causality.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1990 - In Henry Ely Kyburg (ed.), Science & reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
    An answer to the fact that it is very complex to find convincing grounds for considering in universal deterministic uniformity has been to suggest that causality is indeed universal: all events are caused—but many, if not all, causal laws are statistical or probabilistic in character. Thus, a law of causality does not spell out what will be the effect of a given cause in a particular case; it just provides a probability of a given effect when the cause is determined. (...)
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  49.  44
    The Reference Class.Henry E. Kyburg - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (3):374-397.
    The system presented by the author in The Logical Foundations of Statistical Inference suffered from certain technical difficulties, and from a major practical difficulty; it was hard to be sure, in discussing examples and applications, when you had got hold of the right reference class. The present paper, concerned mainly with the characterization of randomness, resolves the technical difficulties and provides a well structured framework for the choice of a reference class. The definition of randomness that leads to this framework (...)
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  50.  66
    Worlds‐Antiworlds; Antimatter in Cosmology, Hannes Alfven.Mazhar Hasan & Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1972 - World Futures 11 (sup1):1-10.
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