CHAPTER I FRANCIS BACON AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE Of the great scientific figures of early seventeenth century England - Harvey, Gilbert, and Bacon - none was so often referred to by members of the Royal Society for a statement of the ...
The assignment of this pseudo-explanatory function in a supernatural realm, beyond the pale of any kind of verification, seems, however, of dubious value and can hardly be said to do justice to the power and subtlety of Plato's myths. For it would not raise them appreciably above the level of the whimsical products of an artist's imagination, designed to please or to relieve the mind after a strenuous intellectual exercise, rather than to uncover significant philosophic truths.
The difficulty is serious, and unless we find a satisfactory solution we must admit that Descartes' thought moves in a vicious circle, or that the ideas, the building blocks of his philosophy, contain incompatible elements inasmuch as they appear both as self-sufficient and as dependent on extrinsic support. The problem of the cartesian circle, as it is customarily called, is therefore more than a special difficulty and would seem to warrant a careful re-examination in the light of recent contributions to (...) the study of Descartes' philosophy. (shrink)
The revival of ancient Greek scepticism in the 16th and 17th centuries was of the greatest importance in changing the intellectual climate in which modern science developed, and in developing the attitude that we now call "The scientific outlook". Many streams of thought came together contributing to various facets of this crucial development. One of the most fascinating of these is that of "constructive scepticism", the history of one of whose forms is traced in this study by Prof. Van Leeuwen. (...) The sceptical crisis that arose during the Renaissance and Refor mation challenged the fundamental principles of the many areas of man's intellectual world, in philosophy, theology, humane and moral studies, and the sciences. The devastating weapons of classical scep ticism were employed to undermine man's confidence in his ability to discover truth in any area whatsoever by use of the human faculties of the senses and reason. These sceptics indicated that there was no area in which human beings could gain any certain knowledge, and that the effort to do so was fruitless, vain, presumptuous, and perhaps even blasphemous. StaI'ting with the writings of Hen ric us Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim and Michel de Montaigne, a thoroughly destructive sceptical movement developed, attacking both the old and the new science, philosophy and theology, and insisting that true and certain knowledge can only be gained by Revelation. (shrink)
H. G. Liddell & R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, rev. and aug. by Sir H. S. Jones. with the ass. of R. McKenzie, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1940. ῥυθμός , Ion. ῥυσμός (v. infr. 111, IV), ὁ : (ῥέω) :— A. any regular recurring motion (“πᾶς ῥ. ὡρισμένῃ μετρεῖται κινήσει” Arist.Pr.882b2) : I. measured motion, time, whether in sound or motion, Democr.15c ; = ἡ τῆς κινήσεως τάξις, Pl.Lg.665a, cf. 672e ; “ὁ ῥ. ἐκ τοῦ ταχέος (...) - Études grecques et (...) latines. (shrink)