60 found
Order:
See also
Henry Jackman
York University
  1. Semantic Intuitions, Conceptual Analysis, and Cross-Cultural Variation.Henry Jackman - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (2):159 - 177.
    While philosophers of language have traditionally relied upon their intuitions about cases when developing theories of reference, this methodology has recently been attacked on the grounds that intuitions about reference, far from being universal, show significant cultural variation, thus undermining their relevance for semantic theory. I’ll attempt to demonstrate that (1) such criticisms do not, in fact, undermine the traditional philosophical methodology, and (2) our underlying intuitions about the nature of reference may be more universal than the authors suppose.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  2.  25
    William James on Conceptions and Private Language.Henry Jackman - 2017 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 30:175-193.
    William James was one of the most frequently cited authors in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, but the attention paid to James’s Principles of Psycho- logy in that work is typically explained in terms of James having ‘committed in a clear, exemplary manner, fundamental errors in the philosophy of mind.’ (Goodman 2002, p. viii.) The most notable of these ‘errors’ was James’s purported commitment to a conception of language as ‘private’. Commentators standardly treat James as committed to a conception of language as (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Intuitions and Semantic Theory.Henry Jackman - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (3):363-380.
    While engaged in the analysis of topics such as the nature of knowledge, meaning, or justice, analytic philosophers have traditionally relied extensively on their own intuitions about when the relevant terms can, and can't, be correctly applied. Consequently, if intuitions about possible cases turned out not to be a reliable tool for the proper analysis of philosophically central concepts, then a radical reworking of philosophy's (or at least analytic philosophy's) methodology would seem to be in order. It is thus not (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  4.  90
    We Live Forwards but Understand Backwards: Linguistic Practices and Future Behavior.Henry Jackman - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (2):157-177.
    Ascriptions of content are sensitive not only to our physical and social environment, but also to unforeseeable developments in the subsequent usage of our terms. This paper argues that the problems that may seem to come from endorsing such 'temporally sensitive' ascriptions either already follow from accepting the socially and historically sensitive ascriptions Burge and Kripke appeal to, or disappear when the view is developed in detail. If one accepts that one's society's past and current usage contributes to what one's (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  5.  58
    Externalism, Metasemantic Contextualism, and Self-Knowledge.Henry Jackman - 2015 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 228-247.
    This paper examines some of the interactions between holism, contextualism, and externalism, and will argue that an externalist metasemantics that grounds itself in certain plausible assumptions about self- knowledge will also be a contextualist metasemantics, and that such a contextualist metasemantics in turn resolves one of the best known problems externalist theories purportedly have with self-knowledge, namely the problem of how the possibility of various sorts of ‘switching’ cases can appear to undermine the ‘transparency’ of our thoughts (in particular, our (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  6
    "Meaning Holism".Henry Jackman - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A general introduction to the issues surrounding the question of semantic holism.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  7. Temporal Externalism and Epistemic Theories of Vagueness.Henry Jackman - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):79-94.
    'Epistemic' theories of vagueness notoriously claim that (despite the appearances to the contrary) all of our vague terms have sharp boundaries, it's just that we can't know what they are. Epistemic theories are typically criticized for failing to explain (1) the source of the ignorance postulated, and (2) how our terms could come to have such precise boundaries. Both of these objections will, however, be shown to rest on certain 'presentist' assumptions about the relation between use and meaning, and if (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  8.  83
    Charity, Self-Interpretation, and Belief.Henry Jackman - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:143-168.
    The purpose of this paper is to motivate and defend a recognizable version of N. L. Wilson's "Principle of Charity" Doing so will involve: (1) distinguishing it fromthe significantly different versions of the Principle familiar through the work of Quine and Davidson; (2) showing that it is compatible with, among other things, both semantic externalism and "simulation" accounts of interpretation; and (3) explaining how it follows from plausible constraints relating to the connection between interpretation and self-interpretation. Finally, it will be (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  9.  21
    Interpretivism and "Canonical" Ascriptions.Henry Jackman - 2015 - Studia Philosophica Estonica:1-10.
    This paper investigates the crucial notion of a "canonical ascription statement" in Bruno Mölder's /Mind Ascribed/, and argues that the reasons given for preferring the book's approach of canonicallity to a more common understanding of canonicallity in terms of the ascriptions we would "ideally" make are not only unpersuasive, but also leave the interpretivist position more open to skeptical worries than it should be. The paper further argues that the resources for a more compelling justification of Mölder's conception of canonicality (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Temporal Externalism and Our Ordinary Linguistic Practices.Henry Jackman - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):365-380.
    Temporal externalists argue that ascriptions of thought and utterance content can legitimately reflect contingent conceptual developments that are only settled after the time of utterance. While the view has been criticized for failing to accord with our “ordinary linguistic practices”, such criticisms (1) conflate our ordinary ascriptional practices with our more general beliefs about meaning, and (2) fail to distinguish epistemically from pragmatically motivated linguistic changes. Temporal externalism relates only to the former sort of changes, and the future usage relevant (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  11. Semantic Norms and Temporal Externalism.Henry Jackman - 1996 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    There has frequently been taken to be a tension, if not an incompatibility, between "externalist" theories of content (which allow the make-up of one's physical environment and the linguistic usage of one's community to contribute to the contents of one's thoughts and utterances) and the "methodologically individualist" intuition that whatever contributes to the content of one's thoughts and utterances must ultimately be grounded in facts about one's own attitudes and behavior. In this dissertation I argue that one can underwrite such (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  12. Convention and Language.Henry Jackman - 1998 - Synthese 117 (3):295-312.
    This paper has three objectives. The first is to show how David Lewis' influential account of how a population is related to its language requires that speakers be 'conceptually autonomous' in a way that is incompatible with content ascriptions following from the assumption that its speakers share a language. The second objective is to sketch an alternate account of the psychological and sociological facts that relate a population to its language. The third is to suggest a modification of Lewis' account (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  13. Ordinary Language, Conventionalism and a Priori Knowledge.Henry Jackman - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (4):315–325.
    This paper examines popular 'conventionalist' explanations of why philosophers need not back up their claims about how 'we' use our words with empirical studies of actual usage. It argues that such explanations are incompatible with a number of currently popular and plausible assumptions about language's 'social' character. Alternate explanations of the philosopher's purported entitlement to make a priori claims about 'our' usage are then suggested. While these alternate explanations would, unlike the conventionalist ones, be compatible with the more social picture (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  14.  95
    Moderate Holism and the Instability Thesis.Henry Jackman - 1999 - American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (4):361-69.
    This paper argues that popular criticisms of semantic holism (such as that it leaves the ideas of translation, disagreement and change of mind problematic) are more properly directed at an "instability assumption" which, while often associated with holism, can be separated from it. The versions of holism that follow from 'interpretational' account of meaning are not committed to the instability assumption and can thus avoid many of the problems traditionally associated with holism.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  15.  54
    Prejudice, Humor and Alief: Comments on Robin Tapley’s “Humour, Beliefs, and Prejudice”.Henry Jackman - 2012 - Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (2):29-33.
    In her “Humor, Belief and Prejudice”, Robin Tapley concludes: -/- "Racist/racial, sexist/gender humor is funny because we think it’s true. We know the beliefs exist in the laugher, there’s no way to philosophically maneuver around that." -/- In what follows I’ll be trying to do some philosophical maneuvering of the sort she thinks hopeless in the quote above.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Foundationalism, Coherentism, and Rule-Following Skepticism.Henry Jackman - 2003 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (1):25-41.
    Semantic holists view what one's terms mean as function of all of one's usage. Holists will thus be coherentists about semantic justification: showing that one's usage of a term is semantically justified involves showing how it coheres with the rest of one's usage. Semantic atomists, by contrast, understand semantic justification in a foundationalist fashion. Saul Kripke has, on Wittgenstein's behalf, famously argued for a type of skepticism about meaning and semantic justification. However, Kripke's argument has bite only if one understands (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17.  57
    Prudential Arguments, Naturalized Epistemology, and the Will to Believe.Henry Jackman - 1999 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 35 (1):1 - 37.
    This paper argues that treating James' "The Will to Believe" as a defense of prudential reasoning about belief seriously misrepresents it. Rather than being a precursor to current defenses of prudential arguments, James paper has, if anything, more affinities to certain prominent strains in contemporary naturalized epistemology.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  18. Expression, Thought, and Language.Henry Jackman - 2003 - Philosophia 31 (1-2):33-54.
    This paper discusses an "expressive constraint" on accounts of thought and language which requires that when a speaker expresses a belief by sincerely uttering a sentence, the utterance and the belief have the same content. It will be argued that this constraint should be viewed as expressing a conceptual connection between thought and language rather than a mere empirical generalization about the two. However, the most obvious accounts of the relation between thought and language compatible with the constraint (giving an (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19. Semantic Pragmatism and a Priori Knowledge: (Or 'Yes We Could All Be Brains in a Vat').Henry Jackman - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):455-480.
    Hillary Putnam has famously argued that we can know that we are not brains in a vat because the hypothesis that we are is self-refuting. While Putnam's argument has generated interest primarily as a novel response to skepticism, his original use of the brain in a vat scenario was meant to illustrate a point about the "mind/world relationship." In particular, he intended it to be part of an argument against the coherence of metaphysical realism, and thus to be part of (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20.  96
    Temporal Externalism, Constitutive Norms, and Theories of Vagueness.Henry Jackman - 2006 - In Tomas Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content? The Internalism/Externalism Dispute. Cambridge Scholars Press.
    Another paper exploring the relation between Temporal externalism and Epistemicism about Vagueness, but with slightly more emphasis on the role of constitutive norms relating to our concept of truth.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21.  50
    Temporal Externalism, Normativity and Use.Henry Jackman - manuscript
    Our ascriptions of content to utterances in the past attribute to them a level of determinacy that extends beyond what could supervene upon the usage up to the time of those utterances. If one accepts the truth of such ascriptions, one can either (1) argue that subsequent use must be added to the supervenience base that determines the meaning of a term at a time, or (2) argue that such cases show that meaning does not supervene upon use at all. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22.  64
    Individualism and Interpretation.Henry Jackman - 1998 - Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (1):31-38.
    'Interpretational' accounts of meaning are frequently treated as incompatible with accounts stressing language's 'social' character. However, this paper argues that one can reconcile interpretational and social accounts by distinguishing "methodological" from "ascriptional" individualism. While methodological individualism requires only that the meaning of one's terms ultimately be grounded in facts about oneself, ascriptional individualism requires that the meaning of one's terms be independent of how others use theirs. Interpretational accounts are committed only to methodological individualism, while arguments for languages social character (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  23. Charity and the Normativity of Meaning.Henry Jackman - manuscript
    It has frequently been suggested that meaning is, in some important sense, normative. However, precisely what is particularly normative about it is often left without any satisfactory explanation, and the ‘normativity thesis’ has thus, justly, been called into question. That said, it will be argued here that the intuition that meaning is ‘normative’ is on the right track, even if many of the purported explanations for meaning’s normativity are not. In particular, rather that being particularly social, the normativity of meaning (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. James' Pragmatic Account of Intentionality and Truth.Henry Jackman - 1998 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 34 (1):155-181.
    William James presents a preference-sensitive and future-directed notion of truth that has struck many as wildly revisionary. This paper argues that such a reaction usually results from failing to see how his accounts of truth and intentionality are intertwined. James' forward-looking account of intentionality (or "knowing") compares favorably the 'causal' and 'resemblance-driven' accounts that have been popular since his day, and it is only when his remarks about truth are placed in the context of his account of intentionality that they (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25.  77
    Deference and Self-Knowledge.Henry Jackman - 2000 - Southwest Philosophy Review 16 (1):171-180.
    It has become increasingly popular to suggest that non-individualistic theories of content undermine our purported a priori knowledge of such contents because they entail that we lack the ability to distinguish our thoughts from alternative thoughts with different contents. However, problems relating to such knowledge of 'comparative' content tell just as much against individualism as non-individualism. Indeed, the problems presented by individualistic theories of content for self-knowledge are at least, if not more, serious than those presented by non-individualistic theories. Consequently, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26.  84
    Radical Interpretation and the Permutation Principle.Henry Jackman - 1996 - Erkenntnis 44 (3):317-326.
    Davidson has claimed that to conclude that reference is inscrutable, one must assume that "If some theory of truth... is satisfactory in the light of all relevant evidence... then any theory that is generated from the first theory by a permutation will also be satisfactory in the light of all relevant evidence." However, given that theories of truth are not directly read off the world, but rather serve as parts of larger theories of behavior, this assumption is far from self-evident. (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27. Holism, Relevance, and Thought Content.Henry Jackman - 1999 - Proceedings of the Ohio Philosophical Association 1999:140-151.
    NB: This paper has been largely displaced by my: “Externalism, Metasemantic Contextualism and Self-Knowledge”, in Goldberg, (ed.) Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 228-247. // -/- While straightforwardly ambiguous words like “bank” and obviously indexical words like “I” are unproblematically treated as referring to different things in different contexts, such variations are displayed by terms that seem neither ambiguous nor indexical. This paper will argue that traditional accounts of word meaning (in which a single fixed (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28.  69
    Belief, Rationality, and Psychophysical Laws.Henry Jackman - 2000 - In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Philosophy Documentation Center. pp. 47-54.
    This paper argues that Davidson's claim that the connection between belief and the "constitutive ideal of rationality" precludes the possibility of any type-type identities between mental and physical events relies on blurring the distinction between two ways of understanding this "constitutive ideal", and that no consistent understanding the constitutive ideal allows it to play the dialectical role Davidson intends for it.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  29. Wittgenstein & James's Stream of Thought.Henry Jackman - manuscript
    William James has been characterized as “the major whipping boy of the later Wittgenstein,” and the currency of this impression of the relation between James and Wittgenstein is understandable. Reading Wittgenstein and his commentators can leave one with the impression that James was a badly muddled “exponent of the tradition in the philosophy of mind that [Wittgenstein] was opposing.” There have been recent attempts to resist this trend, but even these tend to focus on the affinities between the two philosophers, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30.  82
    Davidson, Skepticism and the Pragmatics of Justification.Henry Jackman - manuscript
    This paper is concerned with Davidson's argument that very general properties of the theory of interpretation make the skeptical claim that most of our beliefs could turn out to be false insupportable. Conceived as a 'straight' answer to the skeptic Davidson's argument is not especially convincing. In particular, Davidson's answer to the skeptic presupposes a framework that allows for a new and seemingly more radical skepticism according to which we might not even have beliefs at all. Nevertheless, there is a (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31.  91
    Indeterminacy and Assertion.Henry Jackman - manuscript
    This paper will appeal a recent argument for the indeterminacy of translation to show not that meaning is indeterminate, but rather that assertion cannot be explained in terms of an independent grasp of the concept of truth. In particular, it will argue that if we try to explain assertion in terms of truth rather than vice versa, we ultimately will not be able to make sense of the difference between assertion and denial. This problem with such 'semantic' accounts of assertion (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  82
    Incompatibility Arguments and Semantic Self Knowledge.Henry Jackman - 2007 - Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (1):173-180.
    There has been much discussion recently of what has been labeled the “Brown-Boghossian-McKinsey”, “Brown-McKinsey” or sometimes just “McKinsey” arguments for the incompatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. However, while the three author's arguments have been treated as interchangeable, they are not identical. In particular, Brown’s and Boghossian’s arguments have a fairly serious flaw that cannot so easily be attributed to McKinsey. In what follows, I’ll (1) present a version of the ‘received’ “Brown-Boghossian-McKinsey” argument, (2) outline what I take to be the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33.  73
    William James's Naturalistic Account of Concepts and His 'Rejection of Logic'.Henry Jackman - 2018 - In Philosophy of Mind in the Nineteenth Century: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 5. New York: Routledge. pp. 133-146.
    William James was one of the most controversial philosophers of the early part of the 20 century, and his apparent skepticism about logic and any robust conception of truth was often simply attributed to his endorsing mysticism and irrationality out of an overwhelming desire to make room for religion in his world-view. However, it will be argued here that James’s pessimism about logic and even truth (or at least ‘absolute’ truth), while most prominent in his later views, stem from the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34.  72
    Minimalism, Psychological Reality, Meaning and Use.Henry Jackman - 2007 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism: New Essays on Semantics and Pragmatics. Oxford University Press.
    A growing number of philosophers and linguists have argued that many, if not most, terms in our language should be understood as semantically context sensitive. In opposition to this trend, Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore defend a view they call "Semantic Minimalism", which holds that there are virtually no semantically context sensitive expressions in English once you get past the standard list of indexicals and demonstratives such as "I", "you", "this", and "that". While minimalism strikes many as obviously false, it (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35.  58
    James's Empirical Assumptions.Henry Jackman - 2004 - Streams of William James 6 (1):23-27.
    Those sympathetic to the naturalistic side of James hope that his critique of ‘philosophical materialism’ can be separated from those elements of his thinking that are essential to his pragmatism. Such a separation is possible once we see that James’s critique of materialism grows out of his views about its incompatibility with the existence of objective values. Objective values (as James understands them) are incompatible, however, not with materialism in its most general form, but rather with materialism that understood the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36.  52
    Descriptive Atomism and Foundational Holism: Semantics Between the Old Testament and the New.Henry Jackman - 2005 - ProtoSociology 21:5-19.
    While holism and atomism are often treated as mutually exclusive approaches to semantic theory, the apparent tension between the two usually results from running together distinct levels of semantic explanation. In particular, there is no reason why one can’t combine an atomistic conception of what the semantic values of our words are (one’s “descriptive semantics”), with a holistic explanation of why they have those values (one’s “foundational semantics”). Most objections to holism can be shown to apply only to holistic version (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37.  12
    Ordinary Language, Conventionalism and a Priori Knowledge.Henry Jackman - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (4):315-325.
    This paper examines popular‘conventionalist’explanations of why philosophers need not back up their claims about how‘we’use our words with empirical studies of actual usage. It argues that such explanations are incompatible with a number of currently popular and plausible assumptions about language's ‘social’character. Alternate explanations of the philosopher's purported entitlement to make a priori claims about‘our’usage are then suggested. While these alternate explanations would, unlike the conventionalist ones, be compatible with the more social picture of language, they are each shown to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38.  58
    Truth, Rationality, and Humanity.Henry Jackman - manuscript
    When we interpret someone in terms of their beliefs and desires, we are doing something other than merely describing them, but it is far from clear what this something else is. As Dennett puts it, while there is a growing consensus about the "not-purely-descriptive nature of intentional attribution," there remains considerable disagreement over which norms govern the play of this "dramatic interpretation game." This paper will discuss three candidates for specifying the content of these norms, truth, rationality and humanity. It (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Pragmatism, Normativity and Naturalism.Henry Jackman - manuscript
    This paper argues that, according to James, we are committed to their being a kind of stable consensus, and we are committed to its being one that we can recognize ourselves in, but by underwriting such regulative ideals through a ‘will to believe’ rather than a transcendental argument, we make our commitment to their being an end of inquiry a practical rather than theoretical one. Objectivity is something we are committed to making, not something that we are committed to their (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40.  40
    Philosophy in the Flesh. [REVIEW]Henry Jackman - 2000 - Teaching Philosophy 23 (4):398-401.
  41.  41
    William James.Henry Jackman - 2008 - In C. J. Misak (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of American Philosophy. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 60-86.
    A brief (10,000 word) introduction to James's philosophy with particular focus on the relation between James's naturalism and his account of various normative notions like rationality, goodness and truth.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42.  52
    Conventionalism, Objectivity, and Constitution.Henry Jackman - manuscript
    John Haugeland has recently attempted to provide a naturalistic account of intentionality that explains how we can (collectively) misidentify objects in the world in terms of the interplay of two types of 'recognitional' skill. Nevertheless, it is argued here that his inegalitarian conception of the two sorts of skill leaves him with a quasi-conventionalist account of our relation to the world which lacks the more robust sort of objectivity that a more holistic theory could provide.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43.  40
    Jamesian Pluralism and Moral Conflict.Henry Jackman - 2005 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 41 (1):123 - 128.
    While most pragmatists view themselves as pluralists of one sort or another, Talisse and Aikin argue thatthe two views are, in fact, "not compatible". However, while their charge may be true of the types of pluralism that they consider, these pluralisms all presuppose a type of realism about value that the pragmatic pluralist need not accept. In what follows, I'll argue that the 'non-realist' account of value that one finds in James underwrites a type of pluralism that is both substantial (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44.  33
    Transparency, Responsibility and Self-Knowledge.Henry Jackman - 2009 - Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):143-151.
    Akeel Bilgrami has always argued that the contents of our thoughts are constitutively constrained by what we could be said to know about them. In earlier work he explained this in terms of a connection between thought and rationality, but his recent book argues that the ultimate ground for self-knowledge rests in our notion of responsibility. This paper will examine these arguments, and suggest that if Bilgrami is right about how self-knowledge is grounded, then it need not constrain our content (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45.  22
    Readings in the Philosophy of Language. [REVIEW]Henry Jackman - 1999 - Teaching Philosophy 22 (2):197-200.
  46.  29
    Mind in a Physical World. [REVIEW]Henry Jackman - 2000 - Teaching Philosophy 23 (3):277-279.
  47.  28
    The Nature of Consciousness. [REVIEW]Henry Jackman - 2000 - Teaching Philosophy 23 (1):100-102.
  48.  22
    Justification, Ambiguity, and Belief: Comments on McEvoy’s “The Internalist Counterexample to Reliabilism”.Henry Jackman - 2005 - Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (2):183-186.
    Unadorned process reliabilism (hereafter UPR) takes any true belief produced by a reliable process (undefeated by any other reliable process) to count as knowledge. Consequently, according to UPR, to know p, you need not know that you know it. In particular, you need not know that the process by which you formed your belief was reliable; its simply being reliable is enough to make the true belief knowledge. -/- Defenders of UPR are often presented with purported counterexamples describing subjects who (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49.  33
    Belief Ascriptions, Prototypes and Ambiguity.Henry Jackman - manuscript
    A belief ascription such as “Oedipus believes that his mother is the queen of Thebes” can be understood in two ways, one in which it seems true, and another in which it seems false. It can seem true because the woman who was, in fact, Oedipus’ mother was believed by him to be the queen of Thebes. It can seem false because Oedipus himself would have sincerely denied that Jocasta could be correctly characterized as “Oedipus’s mother.” Belief ascriptions thus seem (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50.  32
    James, Intentionality and Analysis.Henry Jackman - manuscript
    James was always interested in the problem of how our thoughts come to be about the world. Nevertheless, if one takes James to be trying to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a thought's being about an object, counterexamples to his account will be embarrassingly easy to find. James, however, was not aiming for this sort of analysis of intentionality. Rather than trying to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for every case of a thought's being about an object, James focused (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 60