An abstract framework for structured arguments is presented, which instantiates Dung's ('On the Acceptability of Arguments and its Fundamental Role in Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Logic Programming, and n- Person Games', Artificial Intelligence , 77, 321-357) abstract argumentation frameworks. Arguments are defined as inference trees formed by applying two kinds of inference rules: strict and defeasible rules. This naturally leads to three ways of attacking an argument: attacking a premise, attacking a conclusion and attacking an inference. To resolve such attacks, preferences may (...) be used, which leads to three corresponding kinds of defeat: undermining, rebutting and undercutting defeats. The nature of the inference rules, the structure of the logical language on which they operate and the origin of the preferences are, apart from some basic assumptions, left unspecified. The resulting framework integrates work of Pollock, Vreeswijk and others on the structure of arguments and the nature of defeat and extends it in several respects. Various rationality postulates are proved to be satisfied by the framework, and several existing approaches are proved to be a special case of the framework, including assumption-based argumentation and DefLog. (shrink)
We present a formal, mathematical model of argument structure and evaluation, taking seriously the procedural and dialogical aspects of argumentation. The model applies proof standards to determine the acceptability of statements on an issue-by-issue basis. The model uses different types of premises (ordinary premises, assumptions and exceptions) and information about the dialectical status of statements (stated, questioned, accepted or rejected) to allow the burden of proof to be allocated to the proponent or the respondent, as appropriate, for each premise separately. (...) Our approach allows the burden of proof for a premise to be assigned to a different party than the one who has the burden of proving the conclusion of the argument, and also to change the burden of proof or applicable proof standard as the dialogue progresses from stage to stage. Useful for modeling legal dialogues, the burden of production and burden of persuasion can be handled separately, with a different responsible party and applicable proof standard for each. Carneades enables critical questions of argumentation schemes to be modeled as additional premises, using premise types to capture the varying effect on the burden of proof of different kinds of questions. (shrink)
ABSTRACT Inspired by legal reasoning, this paper presents a semantics and proof theory of a system for defeasible argumentation. Arguments are expressed in a logic-programming language with both weak and strong negation, conflicts between arguments are decided with the help of priorities on the rules. An important feature of the system is that these priorities are not fixed, but are themselves defeasibly derived as conclusions within the system. Thus debates on the choice between conflicting arguments can also be modelled. The (...) semantics of the system is given with a fixpoint definition, while its proof theory is stated in dialectical style, where a proof takes the form of a dialogue between a proponent and an opponent of an argument: an argument is shown to be justified if the proponent can make the opponent run out of moves in whatever way the opponent attacks. (shrink)
This paper studies the modelling of legal reasoning about evidence within general theories of defeasible reasoning and argumentation. In particular, Wigmore's method for charting evidence and its use by modern legal evidence scholars is studied in order to give a formal underpinning in terms of logics for defeasible argumentation. Two notions turn out to be crucial, viz. argumentation schemes and empirical generalisations.
We investigate under what conditions contrary-to-duty (CTD) structures lacking temporal and action elements can be given a coherent reading. We argue, contrary to some recent proposals, that CTD is not an instance of defeasible reasoning, and that methods of nonmonotonic logics are inadequate since they are unable to distinguish between defeasibility and violation of primary obligations. We propose a semantic framework based on the idea that primary and CTD obligations are obligations of different kinds: a CTD obligation pertains to, or (...) pre-supposes, a certain context in which a primary obligation is already violated. This framework is presented initially as an extension of Standard Deontic Logic (SDL), a normal modal logic of type KD, and is illustrated by application to a series of examples. The concluding section is concerned with some resemblances between CTD and defeasible reasoning. We show first that the SDL-based framework contains a flaw and must be adjusted. A discussion of possible adjustments, including an alternative treatment in terms of a preference-based semantics, reveals difficulties that are reminiscent of problems in defeasible reasoning and intensional accounts of defeasible conditionals. (shrink)
Autonomous vehicles are one of the most spectacular recent developments of Artificial Intelligence. Among the problems that still need to be solved before they can fully autonomously participate in traffic is the one of making their behaviour conform to the traffic laws. This paper discusses this problem by way of a case study of Dutch traffic law. First it is discussed to what extent Dutch traffic law exhibits features that are traditionally said to pose challenges for AI & Law models, (...) such as exceptions, rule conflicts, open texture and vagueness, rule change, and the need for commonsense knowledge. Then three approaches to the design of law-conforming AV are evaluated in light of the challenges posed by Dutch traffic law, which includes an assessment of the usefulness of AI & Law models of nonmonotonic reasoning, argumentation and case-based reasoning. (shrink)
In abstract argumentation, each argument is regarded as atomic. There is no internal structure to an argument. Also, there is no specification of what is an argument or an attack. They are assumed to be given. This abstract perspective provides many advantages for studying the nature of argumentation, but it does not cover all our needs for understanding argumentation or for building tools for supporting or undertaking argumentation. If we want a more detailed formalization of arguments than is available with (...) abstract argumentation, we can turn to structured argumentation, which is the topic of this special issue of Argument and Computation. In structured argumentation, we assume a formal language for representing knowledge and specifying how arguments and counterarguments can be constructed from that knowledge. An argument is then said to be structured in the sense that normally, the premises and claim of the argument are made explicit, and the relationship between the premises and claim is formally defined (for instance, using logical entailment). In this introduction, we provide a brief overview of the approaches covered in this special issue on structured argumentation. (shrink)
This paper reviews the history of AI & Law research from the perspective of argument schemes. It starts with the observation that logic, although very well applicable to legal reasoning when there is uncertainty, vagueness and disagreement, is too abstract to give a fully satisfactory classification of legal argument types. It therefore needs to be supplemented with an argument-scheme approach, which classifies arguments not according to their logical form but according to their content, in particular, according to the roles that (...) the various elements of an argument can play. This approach is then applied to legal reasoning, to identify some of the main legal argument schemes. It is also argued that much AI & Law research in fact employs the argument-scheme approach, although it usually is not presented as such. Finally, it is argued that the argument-scheme approach and the way it has been employed in AI & Law respects some of the main lessons to be learnt from Toulmin’s The Uses of Argument. (shrink)
This paper studies the use of hypothetical and value-based reasoning in US Supreme-Court cases concerning the United States Fourth Amendment. Drawing upon formal AI & Law models of legal argument a semi-formal reconstruction is given of parts of the Carney case, which has been studied previously in AI & law research on case-based reasoning. As part of the reconstruction, a semi-formal proposal is made for extending the formal AI & Law models with forms of metalevel reasoning in several argument schemes. (...) The result is compared with Rissland’s (1989) analysis in terms of dimensions and Ashley’s (2008) analysis in terms of his process model of legal argument with hypotheticals. (shrink)
This paper presents a theory of reasoning with evidence in order to determine the facts in a criminal case. The focus is on the process of proof, in which the facts of the case are determined, rather than on related legal issues, such as the admissibility of evidence. In the literature, two approaches to reasoning with evidence can be distinguished, one argument-based and one story-based. In an argument-based approach to reasoning with evidence, the reasons for and against the occurrence of (...) an event, e.g., based on witness testimony, are central. In a story-based approach, evidence is evaluated and interpreted from the perspective of the factual stories as they may have occurred in a case, e.g., as they are defended by the prosecution. In this paper, we argue that both arguments and narratives are relevant and useful in the reasoning with and interpretation of evidence. Therefore, a hybrid approach is proposed and formally developed, doing justice to both the argument-based and the narrative-based perspective. By the formalization of the theory and the associated graphical representations, our proposal is the basis for the design of software developed as a tool to make sense of the evidence in complex cases. (shrink)
Doug Walton, who died in January 2020, was a prolific author whose work in informal logic and argumentation had a profound influence on Artificial Intelligence, including Artificial Intelligence and Law. He was also very interested in interdisciplinary work, and a frequent and generous collaborator. In this paper seven leading researchers in AI and Law, all past programme chairs of the International Conference on AI and Law who have worked with him, describe his influence on their work.
In a criminal trial, a judge or jury needs to reason about what happened based on the available evidence, often including statistical evidence. While a probabilistic approach is suitable for analysing the statistical evidence, a judge or jury may be more inclined to use a narrative or argumentative approach when considering the case as a whole. In this paper we propose a combination of two approaches, combining Bayesian networks with scenarios. Whereas a Bayesian network is a popular tool for analysing (...) parts of a case, constructing and understanding a network for an entire case is not straightforward. We propose an explanation method for understanding a Bayesian network in terms of scenarios. This method builds on a previously proposed construction method, which we slightly adapt with the use of scenario schemes for the purpose of explaining. The resulting structure is explained in terms of scenarios, scenario quality and evidential support. A probabilistic interpretation of scenario quality is provided using the concept of scenario schemes. Finally, the method is evaluated by means of a case study. (shrink)
We provide a retrospective of 25 years of the International Conference on AI and Law, which was first held in 1987. Fifty papers have been selected from the thirteen conferences and each of them is described in a short subsection individually written by one of the 24 authors. These subsections attempt to place the paper discussed in the context of the development of AI and Law, while often offering some personal reactions and reflections. As a whole, the subsections build into (...) a history of the last quarter century of the field, and provide some insights into where it has come from, where it is now, and where it might go. (shrink)
In a criminal trial, evidence is used to draw conclusions about what happened concerning a supposed crime. Traditionally, the three main approaches to modeling reasoning with evidence are argumentative, narrative and probabilistic approaches. Integrating these three approaches could arguably enhance the communication between an expert and a judge or jury. In previous work, techniques were proposed to represent narratives in a Bayesian network and to use narratives as a basis for systematizing the construction of a Bayesian network for a legal (...) case. In this paper, these techniques are combined to form a design method for constructing a Bayesian network based on narratives. This design method is evaluated by means of an extensive case study concerning the notorious Dutch case of the Anjum murders. (shrink)
Decisions concerning proof of facts in criminal law must be rational because of what is at stake, but the decision‐making process must also be cognitively feasible because of cognitive limitations, and it must obey the relevant legal–procedural constraints. In this topic three approaches to rational reasoning about evidence in criminal law are compared in light of these demands: arguments, probabilities, and scenarios. This is done in six case studies in which different authors analyze a manslaughter case from different theoretical perspectives, (...) plus four commentaries on these case studies. The aim of this topic is to obtain more insight into how the different approaches can be applied in a legal context. This will advance the discussion on rational reasoning about evidence in law and will contribute more widely to cognitive science on a number of topics, including the value of probabilistic accounts of cognition and the problem of dealing with cognitive biases in reasoning under uncertainty in practical contexts. (shrink)
This paper takes up Berman and Hafner's (1993) challenge to model legal case-based reasoning not just in terms of factual similarities and differences but also in terms of the values that are at stake. The formal framework of Prakken and Sartor (1998) is applied to examples of case-based reasoning involving values, and a method for formalising such examples is proposed. The method makes it possible to express that a case should be decided in a certain way because that advances certain (...) values. The method also supports the comparison of conflicting precedents in terms of values, and it supports debates on the relevance of distinctions in terms of values. (shrink)
This article presents a formal dialogue game for adjudication dialogues. Existing AI & law models of legal dialogues and argumentation-theoretic models of persuasion are extended with a neutral third party, to give a more realistic account of the adjudicator’s role in legal procedures. The main feature of the model is a division into an argumentation phase, where the adversaries plea their case and the adjudicator has a largely mediating role, and a decision phase, where the adjudicator decides the dispute on (...) the basis of the claims, arguments and evidence put forward in the argumentation phase. The model allows for explicit decisions on admissibility of evidence and burden of proof by the adjudicator in the argumentation phase. Adjudication is modelled as putting forward arguments, in particular undercutting and priority arguments, in the decision phase. The model reconciles logical aspects of burden of proof induced by the defeasible nature of arguments with dialogical aspects of burden of proof as something that can be allocated by explicit decisions on legal grounds. (shrink)
This paper presents a formal reconstruction of a Dutch civil legal case in Prakken’s formal model of adjudication dialogues. The object of formalisation is the argumentative speech acts exchanged during the dispute by the adversaries and the judge. The goal of this formalisation is twofold: to test whether AI & law models of legal dialogues in general, and Prakken’s model in particular, are suitable for modelling particular legal procedures; and to learn about the process of formalising an actual legal dispute.
Carneades is a recently proposed formalism for structured argumentation with varying proof standards, inspired by legal reasoning, but more generally applicable. Its distinctive feature is that each statement can be given its own proof standard, which is claimed to allow a more natural account of reasoning under burden of proof than existing formalisms for structured argumentation, in which proof standards are defined globally. In this article, the two formalisms are formally related by translating Carneades into the ASPIC+ framework for structured (...) argumentation. Since ASPIC+ is defined to generate Dung-style abstract argumentation frameworks, this in effect translates Carneades graphs into abstract argumentation frameworks. For this translation, we prove a formal correspondence and show that certain rationality postulates hold. It is furthermore proved that Carneades always induces a unique Dung extension, which is the same in all of Dung's semantics, allowing us to generalise Carneades to cycle-containing structures. (shrink)
In this paper several recent factor- and dimension-based models of precedential constraint are formally investigated and an alternative dimension-based model is proposed. Simple factor- and dimension-based syntactic criteria are identified for checking whether a decision in a new case is forced, in terms of the relevant differences between a precedent and a new case, and the difference between absence of factors and negated factors in factor-based models is investigated. Then Horty’s and Rigoni’s recent dimension-based models of precedential constraint are critically (...) examined. An alternative to their reason models is proposed which is less expressive but arguably easier to apply in practice. (shrink)
This paper compares two ways of formalising defeasible deontic reasoning, both based on the view that the issues of conflicting obligations and moral dilemmas should be dealt with from the perspective of nonmonotonic reasoning. The first way is developing a special nonmonotonic logic for deontic statements. This method turns out to have some limitations, for which reason another approach is recommended, viz. combining an already existing nonmonotonic logic with a deontic logic. As an example of this method the language of (...) Reiter's default logic is extended to include modal expressions, after which the argumentation framework in default logic of [20, 22] is used to give a plausible logical analysis of moral dilemmas and prima facie obligations. (shrink)
This article investigates to what extent protocols for dynamicdisputes, i.e., disputes in which the information base can vary at differentstages, can be justified in terms of logics for defeasible argumentation. Firsta general framework is formulated for dialectical proof theories for suchlogics. Then this framework is adapted to serve as a framework for protocols fordynamic disputes, after which soundness and fairness properties are formulated for such protocols relative to dialectical proof theories. It then turns out that certaintypes of protocols that are (...) perfectly fine with a static information base, arenot sound or fair in a dynamic setting. Finally, a natural dynamic protocolis defined for which soundness and fairness can be established. (shrink)
A well-known ambiguity in the term ‘argument’ is that of argument as an inferential structure and argument as a kind of dialogue. In the first sense, an argument is a structure with a conclusion supported by one or more grounds, which may or may not be supported by further grounds. Rules for the construction and criteria for the quality of arguments in this sense are a matter of logic. In the second sense, arguments have been studied as a form of (...) dialogical interaction, in which human or artificial agents aim to resolve a conflict of opinion by verbal means. Rules for conducting such dialogues and criteria for their quality are part of dialogue theory. Usually, formal accounts of argumentation dialogues in logic and artificial intelligence presuppose an argument-based logic. That is, the ways in which dialogue participants support and attack claims are modelled as the construction of explicit arguments and counterarguments (in the inferential sense). However, in this paper formal models of argumentation dialogues are discussed that do not presuppose arguments as inferential structures. The motivation for such models is that there are forms of inference that are not most naturally cast in the form of arguments (such as abduction, statistical reasoning and coherence-based reasoning) but that can still be the subject of argumentative dialogue. Some recent work in artificial intelligence is discussed which embeds non-argumentative inference in an argumentative dialogue system, and some general observations are drawn from this discussion. (shrink)
This article investigates to what extent protocols for dynamic disputes, i.e., disputes in which the information base can vary at different stages, can be justified in terms of logics for defeasible argumentation. First a general framework is formulated for dialectical proof theories for such logics. Then this framework is adapted to serve as a framework for protocols for dynamic disputes, after which soundness and fairness properties are formulated for such protocols relative to dialectical proof theories. It then turns out that (...) certain types of protocols that are perfectly fine with a static information base, are not sound or fair in a dynamic setting. Finally, a natural dynamic protocol is defined for which soundness and fairness can be established. (shrink)
In this article the argumentation structure of the court’s decision in the Popov v. Hayashi case is formalised in Prakken’s (Argument Comput 1:93–124; 2010) abstract framework for argument-based inference with structured arguments. In this framework, arguments are inference trees formed by applying two kinds of inference rules, strict and defeasible rules. Arguments can be attacked in three ways: attacking a premise, attacking a conclusion and attacking an inference. To resolve such conflicts, preferences may be used, which leads to three corresponding (...) kinds of defeat, after which Dung’s (Artif Intell 77:321–357; 1995) abstract acceptability semantics can be used to evaluate the arguments. In the present paper the abstract framework is instantiated with strict inference rules corresponding to first-order logic and with defeasible inference rules for defeasible modus ponens and various argument schemes. The main techniques used in the formal reconstruction of the case are rule-exception structures and arguments about rule validity. Arguments about socio-legal values and the use of precedent cases are reduced to arguments about rule validity. The tree structure of arguments, with explicit subargument relations between arguments, is used to capture the dependency relations between the elements of the court’s decision. (shrink)
John Pollock (1940?2009) was an influential American philosopher who made important contributions to various fields, including epistemology and cognitive science. In the last 25 years of his life, he also contributed to the computational study of defeasible reasoning and practical cognition in artificial intelligence. He developed one of the first formal systems for argumentation-based inference and he put many issues on the research agenda that are still relevant for the argumentation community today. This paper presents an appreciation of Pollock's work (...) on defeasible reasoning and its relevance for the computational study of argument. In our opinion, Pollock deserves to be remembered as one of the founding fathers of the field of computational argument, while, moreover, his work contains important lessons for current research in this field, reminding us of the richness of its object of study. (shrink)
(See also the separate entry for the volume itself.) This introduction has three parts. The first providing an overview of some main lines of research in deontic logic: the emergence of SDL, Chisholm's paradox and the development of dyadic deontic logics, various other puzzles/challenges and areas of development, along with philosophical applications. The second part focus on some actual and potential fruitful interactions between deontic logic, computer science and artificial intelligence. These include applications of deontic logic to AI knowledge representation (...) in legal systems, to modelling computer systems where it is expected that sub-ideal states will emerge and require countermeasures, to norm-governed human interactions with computer systems, and to the representation of some features of multi-agent systems where different agent-like computer systems interact with one another. The third and final part briefly groups and previews the papers in the anthology. (shrink)
This anthology contains revised versions of selected papers presented at the fourth bi-annual international deontic logic conference, DEON’98. This volume includes our substantial introduction, and an article from me as a contributor. The volume includes papers from all four distinguished invited speakers, David Makinson, Donald Nute, Claudio Pizzi, and the founder of deontic logic, Georg Von Wright. Other notables among the authors are Dov Gabbay (co-editor of the Handbook on Philosophical Logic vols.1-4, and editor of a number of logic book (...) series); Lars Lindahl (author of Position and Change: A Study in Law and Logic); Andrew Jones (past editor of the Norwegian Journal of Philosophical Logic, and the co-author of the entry “Deontic Logic and Contrary-to-Duties” in the 2nd edition of Handbook on Philosophical Logic); and Marek Sergot (a leading researcher at the interface of deontic logic and computer science.). (shrink)
This paper proposes a formal top-level model of explaining the outputs of machine-learning-based decision-making applications and evaluates it experimentally with three data sets. The model draws on AI & law research on argumentation with cases, which models how lawyers draw analogies to past cases and discuss their relevant similarities and differences in terms of relevant factors and dimensions in the problem domain. A case-based approach is natural since the input data of machine-learning applications can be seen as cases. While the (...) approach is motivated by legal decision making, it also applies to other kinds of decision making, such as commercial decisions about loan applications or employee hiring, as long as the outcome is binary and the input conforms to this paper’s factor- or dimension format. The model is top-level in that it can be extended with more refined accounts of similarities and differences between cases. It is shown to overcome several limitations of similar argumentation-based explanation models, which only have binary features and do not represent the tendency of features towards particular outcomes. The results of the experimental evaluation studies indicate that the model may be feasible in practice, but that further development and experimentation is needed to confirm its usefulness as an explanation model. Main challenges here are selecting from a large number of possible explanations, reducing the number of features in the explanations and adding more meaningful information to them. It also remains to be investigated how suitable our approach is for explaining non-linear models. (shrink)
This paper outlines a multi-agent architecture for regulated information exchange of crime investigation data between police forces. Interactions between police officers about information exchange are analysed as negotiation dialogues with embedded persuasion dialogues. An architecture is then proposed consisting of two agents, a requesting agent and a responding agent, and a communication language and protocol with which these agents can interact to promote optimal information exchange while respecting the law. Finally, dialogue policies are defined for the individual agents, specifying their (...) behaviour within a negotiation. Essentially, when deciding to accept or reject an offer or to make a counteroffer, an agent first determines whether it is obligatory or permitted to perform the actions specified in the offer. If permitted but not obligatory, the agent next determines whether it is in his interest to accept the offer. (shrink)
This paper outlines a multi-agent architecture for regulated information exchange of crime investigation data between police forces. Interactions between police officers about information exchange are analysed as negotiation dialogues with embedded persuasion dialogues. An architecture is then proposed consisting of two agents, a requesting agent and a responding agent, and a communication language and protocol with which these agents can interact to promote optimal information exchange while respecting the law. Finally, dialogue policies are defined for the individual agents, specifying their (...) behaviour within a negotiation. Essentially, when deciding to accept or reject an offer or to make a counteroffer, an agent first determines whether it is obligatory or permitted to perform the actions specified in the offer. If permitted but not obligatory, the agent next determines whether it is in his interest to accept the offer. (shrink)
In this paper a new use case for legal argumentation support tools is considered: supporting discussions about analyses of complex criminal cases with the help of Bayesian probability theory. By way of a case study, two actual discussions between experts in court cases are analysed on their argumentation structure. In this study the usefulness of several recognised argument schemes is confirmed, a new argument scheme for arguments from statistics are proposed, and an analysis is given of debates between experts about (...) the validity of their arguments. From a practical point of view the case study yields insights into the design of support software for discussions about Bayesian analyses of complex criminal cases. (shrink)
In this paper, we propose an argumentation formalism that allows for both deductive and abductive argumentation, where ‘deduction’ is used as an umbrella term for both defeasible and strict ‘forward’ inference. Our formalism is based on an extended version of our previously proposed information graph formalism, which provides a precise account of the interplay between deductive and abductive inference and causal and evidential information. In the current version, we consider additional types of information such as abstractions which allow domain experts (...) to be more expressive in stating their knowledge, where we identify and impose constraints on the types of inferences that may be performed with the different types of information. A new notion of attack is defined that captures a crucial aspect of abductive reasoning, namely that of competition between abductively inferred alternative explanations. Our argumentation formalism generates an abstract argumentation framework and thus allows arguments to be formally evaluated. We prove that instantiations of our argumentation formalism satisfy key rationality postulates. (shrink)
This anthology contains revised versions of selected papers presented at the the fourth bi-annual international deontic logic conference, DEON’06. There is a substantial introduction (see separate entry), papers from all four invited speakers, David Makinson, Donald Nute, Claudio Pizzi, and Georg Von Wright. After the introduction and lead chapter "Deontic Logic - as I See It" by G.H. von Wright, there are nineteen articles grouped under six headings, "Norms and Truth", "Agency and Time", "Analysis of Normative Conflicts", "Defeasibility and Norm (...) Conflicts", Computer System Applications", and "Combinations of Logics". The collection contains a number of influential articles and a large array of key authors in deontic logic contribute. (shrink)