Madole & Harden develop some good ideas about how to understand genetic causality more clearly, but they frame the benefits of behavior genetics research at a largely collective level, focused on the pros and cons of different ways to engineer the gene pool or social behavior. This neglects the individual benefits of hereditarian insights for mate choice and parenting.

Some authors defending the “hereditarian” hypothesis with respect to differences in average IQ scores between populations have argued that the sorts of environmental variation hypothesized by some researchers rejecting the hereditarian position should leave discoverable statistical traces, namely changes in the overall variance of scores or in variance–covariance matrices relating scores to other variables. In this paper, I argue that the claims regarding the discoverability of such statistical signals are broadly mistaken—there is no good reason to suspect that (...) the hypothesized environmental causes would leave detectable traces of the sorts suggested. As there remains no way to gather evidence that would permit the direct refutation of the environmental hypotheses, and no direct evidence for the hereditarian position, it remains the case, I argue, that the hereditarian position is unsupported by current evidence. (shrink)

Continuing Franz Boas' work to establish anthropology as an academic discipline in the US at the turn of the twentieth century, Alfred L. Kroeber re-defined culture as a phenomenon sui generis. To achieve this he asked geneticists to enter into a coalition against hereditarian thoughts prevalent at that time in the US. The goal was to create space for anthropology as a separate discipline within academia, distinct from other disciplines. To this end he crossed the boundary separating anthropology from (...) biology in order to secure the boundary. His notion of culture, closely bound to the concept of heredity, saw it as independent of biological heredity (culture as superorganic) but at the same time as a heredity of another sort. The paper intends to summarise the shifting boundaries of anthropology at the beginning of the twentieth century, and to present Kroeber?s ideas on culture, with a focus on how the changing landscape of concepts of heredity influenced his views. The historical case serves to illustrate two general conclusions: that the concept of culture played and plays different roles in explaining human existence; that genetics and the concept of Weismannian hard inheritance did not have an unambiguous unidirectional historical effect on the vogue for hereditarianism at that time; on the contrary, it helped to establish culture in Kroeber's sense, culture as independent of heredity. (shrink)

Philosophers of science widely believe that the hereditarian theory about racial differences in IQ is based on methodological mistakes and confusions involving the concept of heritability. I argue that this "received view" is wrong: methodological criticisms popular among philosophers are seriously misconceived, and the discussion in philosophy of science about these matters is largely disconnected from the real, empirically complex issues debated in science.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Phenotype/Genotype Distinction and the Disappearance of the BodyGabriel GuddingThe discipline of genetics has long been a rhetorical and heuristic locus for social and political issues. As such, the science has influenced culture through the avenues of law, medicine, warfare, social work, and even, since 1972 in California, the education of kindergarten students. It has affected how we view the body, morality, romance, biography, and agency—not to mention procreation (...) and death.In many ways the delamination of genotype from phenotype was the first cut, so to speak, in this new cosmetics of life. The distinction between structure and expression arose from an interdisciplinary struggle for authority in the biological sciences at the turn of the century. This preceptual split in the organism between structure and expression came over time to fundamentally alter the percepts of the body, in terms of how the body is juridically, medicinally, and otherwise, generally perceived and understood. More importantly and interestingly, this delamination within the organism between its genotype and phenotype eventually led to a sense of the body’s fragility and its eventual “disappearance” as a seat of agency, morality, and identity; and in turn these three groundings of modernity have been redistributed to the gene, the genotype, and the genome. In one sense, then, this paper traces not so much the birth of a new view of the body (the genetic) but the drama of its disappearance, in which the body melts to a silhouette and is replaced by the genotype and its expression, the phenotype.In 1911 Wilhelm Johannsen of the University of Copenhagen published “The Genotype Conception of Heredity,” 1 which introduced to geneticists the ideas of “phenotype” and “genotype.” Johannsen coined these terms in objection to what he considered to be an erroneous conception of heredity, [End Page 525] which he called the “transmission view”: the idea that “personal qualities” (such as honesty or good looks) could themselves be or otherwise influence “the true heritable elements or traits” passed on from one generation to another. He called this transmission view “apparent heredity” and claimed that this idea relied upon an economic-juridical model of the transmission of property—and thereby provided no disciplined or profound understanding of true heredity. He asserted that in factthe transmission-conception of heredity represents exactly the reverse of the real facts, just as the famous Stahlian theory of “phlogiston” was an expression diametrically opposite to the chemical reality. The personal qualities of any individual organism do not at all cause the qualities of its offspring; but the qualities of both ancestor and descendent are in quite the same manner determined by the nature of the “sexual substances”—i.e., the gametes—from which they have developed. Personal qualities are then the reactions of the gametes joining to form a zygote; but the nature of the gametes is not determined by the personal qualities of the parents or ancestors in question. This is the modern view of heredity. 2This was indeed a profoundly new view of heredity: Johannsen quite boldly and deliberately intended his genotype-phenotype distinction to stand as a watershed between the old science of heredity—exemplified by Mendel, Galton, Weismann, and others—and the new science of genetics. He said, “The science of genetics is in a transition period, becoming an exact science just as the chemistry in the times of Lavoisier, who made the balance an indispensable implementation in chemical research.” 3 And he was right: genetics was indeed in a transition period, primarily due to the theoretically accommodating qualities of this new distinction. The science of genetics became radically simplified: the confusion which arose from the attempts to correlate characteristics to their corresponding units of hereditarian influence diminished. Viewing personal qualities and characteristics, in all their variation, as expressions of underlying structures instead of mutual correlates to them drastically simplified the theoretical and experimental aspects of heredity.Not only did this distinction revolutionize the science of heredity, it helped insinuate the new science of genetics into a position of autonomy and authority with respect to the other life sciences. Historians of science, such as Jan Sapp, have suggested that the genotype-phenotype distinction played a... (shrink)

Histories of psychology regularly celebrate the foundational role played in the development of early American psychology by Darwin's theory of evolution through natural selection, and in particular the development of functional psychology and behaviorism. In this article it is argued that although Darwin's theory did play an influential role, early American psychology did not generally reflect the hereditarian determinism of his theory of evolution by natural selection. However, early American psychologists did accept one critical implication of Darwin's theory, which (...) is that evolution by natural selection does not ensure the highest development of the human race. This partly explains the social interventive zeal that was a distinctive feature of early American psychology. (shrink)

Summary Long-standing claims have been made for nearly the entire twentieth century that the biometrician, Karl Pearson, and his colleague, W. F. R. Weldon, rejected Mendelism as a theory of inheritance. It is shown that at the end of the nineteenth century Pearson considered various theories of inheritance (including Francis Galton's law of ancestral heredity for characters underpinned by continuous variation), and by 1904 he ?accepted the fundamental idea of Mendel? as a theory of inheritance for discontinuous variation. Moreover, in (...) 1909, he suggested a synthesis of biometry and Mendelism. Despite the many attempts made by a number of geneticists (including R. A. Fisher in 1936) to use Pearson's chi-square (X 2, P) goodness-of-fit test on Mendel's data, which produced results that were ?too good to be true?, Weldon reached the same conclusion in 1902, but his results were never acknowledged. The geneticist and arch-rival of the biometricians, Williams Bateson, was instead exceptionally critical of this work and interpreted this as Weldon's rejection of Mendelism. Whilst scholarship on Mendel, by historians of science in the last 18 years, has led to a balanced perspective of Mendel, it is suggested that a better balanced and more rounded view of the hereditarian-statistical work of Pearson, Weldon, and the biometricians is long overdue. (shrink)

The case of the Juke family is one of the most notable episodes of the history of eugenics in the USA. The Jukes were initially brought to the fore in the 1870s by a famous investigation that aimed at estimating the interplay of heredity and environment in determining the problems of poverty and crime. This inquiry triggered a harsh confrontation between two polar interpretations of the study, an “environmentalist” one and a “hereditarian” one. It was with the later reassessment (...) of the case made by the Eugenics American Office (ERO) in the 1910s that the controversy was considered closed with the victory of the eugenicists’ hereditarian stance. As a result, the family was made a living proof of the alleged hereditary nature of crime and pauperism and a case study in support of the eugenicists’ plea for the sterilization of people deemed the bearers of hereditary defectiveness. In this article, I explore the role played by pedigrees and other diagrammatic representations in the eugenicists’ appropriation of the meaning of the case of the Juke family and the role played by this appropriation in asserting the superiority of the ERO’s method of work over rival approaches. (shrink)

In the late 1800s, Charles Darwin and other naturalists supported a blending view of inheritance whereby offspring possess a middling mix of their parents' traits. Many of these naturalists also argued that individuals pass at least some of their acquired characteristics to their descendants. Darwin proposed that acquired characteristics and other environmentally induced changes in a parent's hereditary material account in large part for the inheritable variations that drove evolution. Inspired by the evolutionary theories of his first cousin, Darwin, Francis (...) Galton developed hereditarian notions that helped to lay the foundation for both genetics and eugenics. Eugenics was endorsed by evolutionary geneticists such as August Weismann, Karl Pearson, W. F. R. Weldon, William Bateson, and Hugo de Vries, which, as a result, gave it enormous scientific credibility in America and Europe. This chapter explores the role of biology in the emergence of the eugenics movement in the Anglo-Saxon world. (shrink)

Over the arc of his career, E. O. Wilson first embraced, then popularized, and finally rejected an extreme genetical hereditarian view of human nature. The controversy that ensued during the period of popularization (largely in the 1970s and 1980s) obscured the fact that empirical and theoretical research during this time undercut the assumptions necessary for this view. By the end of his career, Wilson accepted the fact that individual/kin selection models were insufficient to explain human behavior and society, and (...) he began conducting research based upon multilevel (group) selection, an idea he had previously scorned. (shrink)

In 1904, Ellen Richards introduced “euthenics.” By 1912, Lewellys Barker, director of medicine and physician-in-chief at Johns Hopkins Hospital, would tell the _New York Times_ that the “task of eugenics” and the “task of euthenics” was the “Task for the Nation.” Alongside the emergence of hereditarian eugenics, where fate was firmly rooted in heredity, this article places euthenics into the same Progressive Era demands for the scientific management over environmental issues like life and labor, health and hygiene, sewage and (...) sanitation. I argue that euthenics not only heralded women as leaders in the quest for what Richards and eugenicists termed “racial improvement,” but also aimed to make reforms through environmental and educational changes rather than hereditary interventions. Seeking to recuperate the figure of Ellen Richards in the history of science, I place Richards and her euthenics more into the debate over eugenics rather than over the emergence of home economics. Building on the work of Donald Opitz, Staffan Bergwik, and Brigette Van Tiggelen, this article shows, first, how Richards’ career threads the needle between the home and the laboratory as sites of science making, not as separate spheres but as overlapping realms, and helps recover how domestic concerns shaped the focus of the life sciences. Second, this article shows how euthenics shaped eugenics by looking at the writings of American eugenicists Charles Davenport, Paul Popenoe, and David Starr Jordan. Third, the article describes how euthenics took root in new academic departments of domestic science, home economics, and departments child welfare and family life in the 1920 and 1930s, most notably the department of euthenics at the Kansas State Agricultural College from 1926 and the Institute of Euthenics at Vassar College after 1923. (shrink)

Bernard Norton's research concentrated on the Biometrical school of Darwinism and the social implications of the hereditarian ideas that began to gain popularity in the closing years of the nineteenth century. In this article I want to look at the previous generation of evolutionists, the evolutionary morphologists against whom the Biometricians (and their great rivals, the early Mendelians) were reacting. Despite the prominence of evolutionary morphology in the post-Darwinian era, comparatively little historical work has been done on it. In (...) helping to fill this gap, I hope to honour Bernard Norton's memory by throwing light on a movement that forms a conceptual bridge linking the original Darwinian debate to the Biometrical – Mendelian controversy. I shall also argue that evolutionary morphology had ideological overtones that helped to shape the cultural environment within which the eugenics movement would emerge. Although originally a product of the Victorian faith in progress, evolutionary morphology seemed to confirm that exposure to an unstimulating environment led to degeneration. It thus fuelled the concern over racial degeneration which the supporters of eugenics would seek to allay through the application of their new hereditarian philosophy. (shrink)

City College of New York The hereditarian theory of race differences in IQ was briefly revived with the appearance of The Bell Curve but then quickly dismissed. The authors attempt a defense of it here, with an eye to conceptual and logical issues of special interests to philosophers, such as alleged infirmities in the heritability concept. At the same time, some relevant post-Bell Curve empirical data are introduced.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Nature and Nurture in French Ethnography and Anthropology, 1859-1914Martin StaumThe adaptability of non-European peoples to "civilization" was a critical issue deriving from the perennial nature-nurture question that haunted debates in the human sciences in late nineteenth-century France.1 The emerging scholarly disciplines of anthropology and ethnography helped provide a scientific veneer that bolstered existing cultural prejudices concerning the innate limitations or retarded development of non-Europeans. Certainly there were many other (...) pragmatic reasons for imperial expansion, and racists did not automatically become imperialists. But if, as Edward Said contended, imperialism "depends upon the idea of having an empire," there is no doubt that many ethnographers and anthropologists helped legitimate the idea.2 Their debates retain a resonance in our twenty-first century postcolonial world struggling with questions of identity, integration, and cultural diversity.Relying on reports from travelers, missionaries, or colonial officials, human scientists from across the political and religious spectrum justified European superiority. Although a few journalists and philosophers outside the scholarly societies represented a minority anti-imperialist counter-current, the remarkable pervasiveness of hierarchical thinking affected both socially radical anthropologists and more conservative ethnographers.3 While ethnographers proclaimed universal fraternity, they conceded that physical differences affected [End Page 475] intellect and character. The later attack on hereditarianism by Durkheimian sociologists and isolated anthropologists with the catalyst of the Dreyfus Affair is all the more striking.4 As George Stocking has argued concerning a British Victorian thinker, the cultural differences between Europeans and non-Europeans became so entangled with biological issues that there was "difficulty conceptualizing them except in terms of 'race.' "5The two most notable anthropological scholarly societies of the late nineteenth century, both founded in 1859, were the Société d'ethnographie orientale et américaine and the Société d'anthropologie de Paris. Historians have justifiably noted their mutual aversion and have contrasted their differences over scientific method, politics, and religion.6 The ethnographers, inspired by a student of Japanese language and Asian religion, Léon de Rosny (1837-1914), were largely linguists and specialists in Asian texts and pre-Columbian codices that represented partly civilized peoples. Rosny invented the term "ambiantisme" for a philosophy that ostensibly privileged the cultural milieu rather than inborn human nature.7 The society membership varied between 115 in 1864 and 470 in 1878, though it declined to 165 by 1903.8 As a group, compared to the anthropologists, they were more politically conservative, more socially elite, and more inclined toward conventional religion, with its belief in the unity of the species. Their "science of destiny" stressed human freedom and unalterably opposed philosophical materialism.9 [End Page 476]The anthropologists, headed by physician and anatomist Paul Broca (1824-80) consisted of a hard core of like-minded medically trained colleagues. The anthropologists' membership peaked around 500 both in 1885 and 1905, though, they, too declined to 165 by 1914.10 Historians have analyzed the nature-nurture issue more subtly for the anthropologists.11 While the Society almost always expressed interest in both physical and cultural spheres, they privileged the study of crania as an index to the intellectual and moral characteristics of "races." The more extreme hereditarians thought that the nature of allegedly inferior "races" precluded perfectibility. Armand de Quatrefages (1810-92), professor of anthropology at the Muséum national d'histoire naturelle and pioneer of the so-called Muséum school, in his later years cast doubt on whether physical indicators actually demonstrated human superiority. However, the Muséum school did not generally renounce racial hierarchy, though they believed that environmental influences formed and continued to shape human varieties.12 In addition, philosophical materialists, militant atheists, and politically radical thinkers dominated the society in the generation after Broca's death. Almost all were neo-Lamarckians who leavened the idea of a fixed human nature with the possibility of adaptation to a milieu and transmissible acquired characteristics.13 The medical physiologist Charles Richet reported that "heredity and milieu are not antagonistic, but synergistic."14 However, many accounts underplay the differential application of neo-Lamarckianism. In this "racial evolutionist paradigm" already noticed by Laurent Mucchielli, even the Muséum school found only civilized people adaptable... (shrink)

The personal, political, and aesthetic ideals that Irish modernists found embodied in the figure of Charles Stewart Parnell—independence, self-mastery, and a capacity for radical self-fashioning—have been well attested in Irish literary historiography. What has been less often noted is the centrality of sexual health to the conception, articulation, and emulation of those virtues, particularly when attempting to translate Parnell’s public persona to the stage. This essay addresses this lacuna by tracing how a medicalized and politicized conception of sex informed Irish (...) modernist efforts to dramatize the Parnell myth at the Abbey Theatre. It begins by establishing the hitherto underexamined ways in which the Parnell myth informed the infamously divisive sexual politics of J. M. Synge’s The Playboy of the Western World (1907), in which the fallen leader and his career provide a template for Christy Mahon and the virile autonomy he is held to embody. Building on this analysis, the essay proceeds to explore the ways in which Synge’s restaging of the Parnell myth, and the medicalized and politicized model of sex which underpinned it, informed Lady Augusta Gregory’s efforts to resuscitate (and sanitize) Parnell for Abbey audiences in 1911’s The Deliverer. Finally, through a close reading of Lennox Robinson’s largely overlooked 1918 play, The Lost Leader, the essay charts how the organicist and hereditarian model of sexual health upon which earlier iterations of the Parnell myth had rested began to give place to a more psychoanalytic model. It then identifies the implications of this shift for Robinson’s reading of Irish politics in the wake of the 1916 Easter Rising. In doing so, the essay highlights the ways in which sexual health emerged as an extra-moral normative framework in Irish political discourse, and it demonstrates how a Medical Humanities approach and a sensitivity to the social history of medicine in Ireland can enrich critical understandings of the Parnell myth and its modernist afterlives. (shrink)

This article looks at Galton's regression to the mean from several traditionally unrelated but interwoven venues: as a law of trait heredity; as a statistical artifact infiltrating careless research designs; as an illustration of cognitive bias. Hereditarians argue for the first of these, disputed by biogeneticists, who view R to M as a mere correlate of generational traits decline. Research designers busy themselves with the second perspective, but to explain the concept, cavalierly adduce various organismic states that sum as "error (...) variance" Research on subjective probability finds R to M in unexpected places. Across these contexts, the weight of argument falls on R to M's confounding rather than causal role in vexing data analysis. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)