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Hichem Naar
University of Duisburg-Essen
  1. The fittingness of emotions.Hichem Naar - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13601-13619.
    We often assess emotions as appropriate or inappropriate depending on certain evaluative aspects of the world. Often using the term ‘fittingness’ as equivalent to ‘appropriateness’, many philosophers of emotion take fittingness assessments of emotions to be a broadly representational matter. On this sort of view, an emotion is fitting or appropriate just in case there is a kind of representational match between the emotion and the object, a matching analogous to truth for belief. This view provides an account of the (...)
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  2. Sentimental perceptualism and the challenge from cognitive bases.Michael Milona & Hichem Naar - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3071-3096.
    According to a historically popular view, emotions are normative experiences that ground moral knowledge much as perceptual experiences ground empirical knowledge. Given the analogy it draws between emotion and perception, sentimental perceptualism constitutes a promising, naturalist-friendly alternative to classical rationalist accounts of moral knowledge. In this paper, we consider an important but underappreciated objection to the view, namely that in contrast with perception, emotions depend for their occurrence on prior representational states, with the result that emotions cannot give perceptual-like access (...)
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  3. Subject‐Relative Reasons for Love.Hichem Naar - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2):197-214.
    Can love be an appropriate response to a person? In this paper, I argue that it can. First, I discuss the reasons why we might think this question should be answered in the negative. This will help us clarify the question itself. Then I argue that, even though extant accounts of reasons for love are inadequate, there remains the suspicion that there must be something about people which make our love for them appropriate. Being lovable, I contend, is what makes (...)
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  4.  90
    Emotion: More like Action than Perception.Hichem Naar - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2715-2744.
    Although some still advance reductive accounts of emotions—according to which they fall under a more familiar type of mental state—contemporary philosophers tend to agree that emotions probably constitute their own kind of mental state. Agreeing with this claim, however, is compatible with attempting to find commonalities between emotions and better understood things. According to the advocates of the so-called ‘perceptual analogy’, thinking of emotion in terms of perception can fruitfully advance our understanding even though emotion may not be reducible to (...)
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  5. A Dispositional Theory of Love.Hichem Naar - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):342-357.
    On a naive reading of the major accounts of love, love is a kind of mental event. A recent trend in the philosophical literature on love is to reject these accounts on the basis that they do not do justice to the historical dimension of love, as love essentially involves a distinctive kind of temporally extended pattern. Although the historicist account has advantages over the positions that it opposes, its appeal to the notion of a pattern is problematic. I will (...)
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  6.  70
    Skepticism about reasons for emotions.Hichem Naar - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (1):108-123.
    According to a popular view, emotions are perceptual experiences of some kind. A common objection to this view is that, by contrast with perception, emotions are subject to normative reasons. In response, perceptualists have typically maintained that the fact that emotions can be justified does not prevent them from being perception-like in some fundamental way. Given the problems that this move might raise, a neglected alternative strategy is to deny that there are normative reasons for emotions in the first place. (...)
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  7. Side-Effect effect without side effects: The pervasive impact of moral considerations on judgments of intentionality.Florian Cova & Hichem Naar - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):837-854.
    Studying the folk concept of intentional action, Knobe (2003a) discovered a puzzling asymmetry: most people consider some bad side effects as intentional while they consider some good side effects as unintentional. In this study, we extend these findings with new experiments. The first experiment shows that the very same effect can be found in ascriptions of intentionality in the case of means for action. The second and third experiments show that means are nevertheless generally judged more intentional than side effects, (...)
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  8.  58
    The Real Issue with Recalcitrant Emotions: Reply to Grzankowski.Hichem Naar - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (5):1035-1040.
    In a recent paper in this journal, Alex Grzankowski sets out to defend cognitivism about emotion against what he calls the ‘problem of recalcitrance’ that many contemporary theorists take as a strong reason to reject the view. Given the little explicit discussion we find of it in a large part of the literature, however, it is not clear why exactly recalcitrant emotions are supposed to constitute a problem for cognitivism in the first place. Grzankowski outlines an argument that he thinks (...)
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  9. The possibility of fitting love: irreplaceability and selectivity.Hichem Naar - 2021 - Synthese 198 (2):985-1010.
    The question whether there are reasons for loving particular individuals, and what such reasons might be, has been subject to scrutiny in recent years. On one view, reasons for loving particular individuals are some of their qualities. A problem with crude versions of this view, however, is that they both construe individuals as replaceable in a problematic way and fail to do justice to the selectivity of love. On another view, by contrast, reasons for loving particular individuals have to do (...)
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  10.  37
    Sentiments.Hichem Naar - 2018 - In Hichem Naar & Fabrice Teroni (eds.), The Ontology of Emotions. Cambridge University Press.
    I discuss the intuitive distinction between emotions and sentiments, and argue that sentiments cannot be reduced to emotions (and hence constitute their own category of affective state). ​.
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  11.  32
    Emotion: Animal and Reflective.Hichem Naar - 2019 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 57 (4):561-588.
    According to the judgment theory of emotion, emotions necessarily involve evaluative judgments. Despite a number of attractions, this theory is almost universally held to be dead, for a very simple reason: it is overly intellectualistic. On behalf of the judgment theorist, I defend a simple strategy, namely, to claim that her view is restricted to a special class of emotions, a strategy that is rooted in a plausible distinction between two broad classes of emotion. It turns out that, if the (...)
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  12. Testing Sripada's Deep Self model.Florian Cova & Hichem Naar - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):647 - 659.
    Sripada has recently advanced a new account for asymmetries that have been uncovered in folk judgments of intentionality: the ?Deep Self model,? according to which an action is more likely to be judged as intentional if it matches the agent's central and stable attitudes and values (i.e., the agent's Deep Self). In this paper, we present new experiments that challenge this model in two ways: first, we show that the Deep Self model makes predictions that are falsified, then we present (...)
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  13. Moral Beliefs for the Error Theorist?François Jaquet & Hichem Naar - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1):193-207.
    The moral error theory holds that moral claims and beliefs, because they commit us to the existence of illusory entities, are systematically false or untrue. It is an open question what we should do with moral thought and discourse once we have become convinced by this view. Until recently, this question had received two main answers. The abolitionist proposed that we should get rid of moral thought altogether. The fictionalist, though he agreed we should eliminate moral beliefs, enjoined us to (...)
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  14.  59
    Gratitude: Generic vs. Deep.Hichem Naar - 2019 - In Robert Roberts & Daniel Telech (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Gratitude. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 15-34.
    In this paper, I argue that gratitude is not necessarily affective or motivating. Against a common trend in recent philosophical treatments of the notion, indeed, I argue for the introduction of an important but neglected kind of gratitude that is simply a matter of believing that one has been benefitted by a benevolent benefactor. I will call this non-affective, non-motivating kind of gratitude “generic,” and the kind – taking center stage in the literature – that is affective and motivating “deep.” (...)
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  15. Love as a Disposition.Hichem Naar - forthcoming - In Christopher Grau & Aaron Smuts (eds.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Love. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter proposes that the question “What is love?” be given an ontological treatment. Rather than asking whether love can be identified with a familiar mental phenomenon (desire, emotion, etc.), it suggests that we should first ask what kind of phenomenon love is, where a kind should here be understood as the most general category to which a given phenomenon belongs, an inquiry that is largely missing from contemporary discussions about love. After motivating this project, the chapter discusses and rejects (...)
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  16.  81
    Real‐World Love Drugs: Reply to Nyholm.Hichem Naar - 2015 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (2):197-201.
    In a recent article, Sven Nyholm argues that the use of biomedical enhancements in our romantic relationships would fail to secure the final value we attribute to love. On Nyholm's view, one thing we desire for its own sake is to be at the origin of the love others have for us. The satisfaction of this desire, he argues, is incompatible with the use of BE insofar as they are responsible for the attachment characteristic of love. In particular, the use (...)
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  17.  33
    Emotions and the Action Analogy: Prospects for an Agential Theory of Emotions.Hichem Naar - 2024 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 10 (1):64-78.
    According to the action analogy, emotions and actions have certain structural and normative similarities that no theory of emotions should ignore. The action analogy has recently been used in an objection against the so-called perceptual theory of emotions, often defended by means of an analogy between emotion and perception. Beyond the dialectical significance of the action analogy, one might wonder whether it can support a picture of emotions as fundamentally action-like—what I call an agential theory. This article is a first (...)
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  18.  19
    Value Feelings: A Defense.Hichem Naar - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (4):69.
    The goal of this paper is to provide an initial defense of a neglected epistemology of value according to which a fundamental mode of access to evaluative facts and properties is constituted by a distinctive kind of feeling, sometimes called ‘value feeling’. The paper defends the appeal to value feelings against some objections that have been leveled against it, objections intended to show that it is a nonstarter. The paper argues that these objections can be met and that the view (...)
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  19. Qui peut sauver la morale? Essai de métaéthique.François Jaquet & Hichem Naar - 2019 - Paris: Ithaque. Edited by Hichem Naar.
    Vous pensez peut-être que la peine de mort est injuste ? Ou que l’avortement est moralement acceptable ? Se pourrait-il alors que vous vous trompiez ? C’est en tout cas l’avis des théoriciens de l’erreur. D’après ces philosophes, tous les jugements moraux sont faux parce qu’ils présupposent à tort l’existence de faits moraux à la fois objectifs et non naturels. Organisé autour de ce défi nihiliste, le présent ouvrage aborde les principales théories métaéthiques comme autant de tentatives, plus ou moins (...)
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  20.  26
    Le caractère personnel des émotions.Hichem Naar - 2016 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141 (2):197-214.
    Cet article explore la viabilité de la conjonction de trois thèses : (1) qu’il existe des valeurs objectives ; (2) que certaines émotions ont pour fonction de les représenter ; (3) que de telles émotions représentent ces valeurs de manière fiable. Nous cherchons plus particulièrement à réconcilier la troisième thèse avec l’observation que les émotions ont un aspect subjectif ou personnel qu’il n’est pas possible d’éliminer. -/- This article explores the viability of the conjunction of three claims: (1) that there (...)
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  21. Do intuitions about Frankfurt-style cases rest on an internalist prejudice?Florian Cova & Hichem Naar - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (3):290-305.
    “Frankfurt-style cases” are widely considered as having refuted the Principle of Alternate Possibilities by presenting cases in which an agent is morally responsible even if he could not have done otherwise. However, Neil Levy has recently argued that FSCs fail because our intuitions about cases involving counterfactual interveners are inconsistent, and this inconsistency is best explained by the fact that our intuitions about such cases are grounded in an internalist prejudice about the location of mental states and capacities. In response (...)
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  22.  17
    Introduction.Hichem Naar & Fabrice Teroni - 2017 - In Hichem Naar & Fabrice Teroni (eds.), The Ontology of Emotions. Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-13.
    What is an emotion? No one will seriously doubt that it is a psychological entity of some sort. Rich and lively philosophical debates have failed to generate any stable picture regarding the nature of emotions that extends much beyond this platitude, however. At most, a bare majority of philosophers would agree that emotions exemplify the following features. First, emotions are characterized by a certain phenomenology: they are felt. Second, they are intentional phenomena and, as such, are in one way or (...)
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  23.  39
    Emotions as States.Hichem Naar - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    A common distinction in emotion theory is between ‘occurrent emotions’ and ‘dispositional emotions’, ‘emotional episodes’ and ‘emotional states’, ‘emotions’ and ‘sentiments’, or more neutrally between ‘short-term emotions’ and ‘long-term emotions’. While short-term emotions are, or necessarily comprise, experiences, long-term emotions are generally seen as states that can exist without experience. Given the theoretical importance of experience for emotion theorists, long-term emotions are often cast aside as of secondary importance, or at any rate as in need of separate treatment. In this (...)
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  24. Le pouvoir.Hichem Naar - 2018 - In Emma Tieffenbach & Julien Deonna (eds.), Dictionnaire des valeurs. Edition d'Ithaque.
    A short entry on the nature of social power, in particular on the question whether it can be understood in terms of powers as discussed in the metaphysics literature (in French).
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  25.  4
    Evolutionary Psychology and Seduction Strategies.Hichem Naar & Alberto Masala - 2010 - In Fritz Allhoff, Kristie Miller & Marlene Clark (eds.), Dating ‐ Philosophy for Everyone. Oxford, UK: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 195–210.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Sexual Selection, Women's Preferences, and Mating Intelligence The Seduction Community: Human Excellence and Empowering Social Art in a Post‐Scarcity Era Is It Wrong to Try to Raise Your Mating Intelligence? Is Raising Your Mate Value a Good Thing? A Deflationist Solution to the Problem Conclusion: What About Women?
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  26.  15
    Metaethics, Normativity, and Value : Introduction.Hichem Naar & Michele Palmira - 2016 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 11 (2-3):65-69.
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  27.  72
    The Ontology of Emotions.Hichem Naar & Fabrice Teroni - 2018 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Hichem Naar.
    The nature of emotion is an important question in several philosophical domains, but little attention has so far been paid to identifying the general ontological category to which emotions belong. Given that they are short-lived, are they events? Since they often have components or stages, are they processes? Or does their close link with behaviour mean they are dispositions? In this volume, leading scholars investigate these basic ontological issues, contributing to current discussions about emotions and paving the way for new (...)
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  28. Art and Emotion.Hichem Naar - 2013 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A survey of some of the major issues surrounding our emotional responses to artworks. Topics discussed include the paradox of fiction, the paradox of tragedy, and the nature of emotion in response to music.
     
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  29.  43
    A Defence of Sentiments: Emotions, Dispositions, and Character.Hichem Naar - unknown
    Contemporary emotion research typically takes the phenomenon of emotion to be exhausted by a class of mental events that are intentional, conscious, and related to certain sorts of behaviour. Moreover, other affective phenomena, such as moods, are also considered to be relatively short-term, episodic, or occurrent states of the subject undergoing them. Emotions, and other putative emotional phenomena that common-sense takes as long-lasting, non-episodic, or dispositional are things that both philosophers and scientists sometimes recognise, but that are relatively neglected in (...)
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  30.  19
    Le nativisme moral.Hichem Naar - 2011 - In Masala & Ravat (ed.), La morale humaine et les sciences. Editions Matériologiques.
    Dans cet essai, je me concentre sur le débat entre nativistes et empiristes au sujet des origines de la morale : la morale serait-elle innée, là depuis la naissance, ou serait-elle un produit de la culture, acquise par le biais d’un conditionnement social ? Nous verrons que cette question soulève d’importants problèmes conceptuels, notamment celui de savoir ce que l’on entend ici par ‘morale’. Des considérations méthodologiques seront également soulevées : quels types de données peuvent montrer que le nativisme (ou (...)
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  31. The Good Life as Conceptual Art.Hichem Naar - 2010 - American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-Journal 2 (1):17-23.
    If we take conceptual art seriously, that is, if we consider that art does not have clear-cut boundaries and that it is not limited to the production of aesthetic objects, then a whole spectrum of possible artworks is open to us. Not only can random objects be conceived as artistic, but cognitive states and behaviors can also be meaningfully conceived as pieces of art by their producer and by any sensitive observer. If one is to take one’s life as a (...)
     
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  32.  14
    The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being.Hichem Naar - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):307-310.
  33.  22
    The Rationality of Love.Hichem Naar - 2022 - Oxford University Press.
    The Rationality of Love addresses the question whether love belongs, paradoxically enough, to the realm of reason, whether love belongs to the class of responses, such as belief and action, that admit of norms of justification and rationality. Are there normative reasons to love someone? Can love be an appropriate or fitting response to an individual? Or is love, like perceptual experiences, sensations, and urges, the sort of thing we just have and for which we cannot be normatively criticizable? Ordinary (...)
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  34.  13
    Review of Jonathan Mitchell: Emotion as Feeling Towards Value: A Theory of Emotional Experience[REVIEW]Hichem Naar - 2023 - Ethics 134 (1):158-164.
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  35.  19
    La vérité émotionnelle. [REVIEW]Hichem Naar - 2011 - RÉPHA, revue étudiante de philosophie analytique 4:93-104.
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  36.  34
    Review: Emotion and Value. Edited by Sabine Roeser and Cain Todd. [REVIEW]Hichem Naar & Christine Tappolet - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):675-678.
    © The Authors 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] is widely accepted that emotions have something to do with values. The major task of contemporary philosophy of emotion is to say precisely what that something is. How exactly are emotions related to evaluative properties? Unsurprisingly, there are various ways they may be related. First, emotions might themselves be bearers of value. It might be a good thing (...)
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  37.  52
    Review: The Pursuit of Unhappiness, Daniel Haybron. [REVIEW]Hichem Naar - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):307 - 310.
  38. Review: On Romantic Love, Berit Brogaard. [REVIEW]Hichem Naar - 2015 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 9.
  39. Review: Emotional Truth, Ronald de Sousa. [REVIEW]Hichem Naar - 2011 - Metapsychology Online Reviews:xx-yy.