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Hilary Kornblith [95]Hilary Stuart Kornblith [1]
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Hilary Kornblith
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
  1. Knowledge and its Place in Nature.Hilary Kornblith - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
    Hilary Kornblith argues for a naturalistic approach to investigating knowledge. Knowledge, he explains, is a feature of the natural world, and so should be investigated using scientific methods. He offers an account of knowledge derived from the science of animal behavior, and defends this against its philosophical rivals. This controversial and refreshingly original book offers philosophers a new way to do epistemology.
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  2.  76
    On Reflection.Hilary Kornblith - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Hilary Kornblith presents a new account of mental reflection, and its importance for knowledge, reasoning, freedom, and normativity. He argues that reflection cannot solve the philosophical problems it has traditionally been thought to, and offers a more realistic, demystified view of its nature which draws on dual process approaches to cognition.
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  3.  19
    Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.Hilary Kornblith - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1):167-171.
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  4. Inductive Inference and its Natural Ground.Hilary Kornblith - 1993 - MIT Press.
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  5. Belief in the Face of Controversy.Hilary Kornblith - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford University Press.
    We often find that beliefs we hold are in conflict with the beliefs of epistemic peers, individuals who are just as intelligent, just as well-informed, and just as scrupulous in forming their beliefs as we are. Is it permissible to maintain our beliefs in the face of such disagreement? It is argued here that continued belief in these circumstances is not epistemically permissible, and that this has striking consequences for the practice of philosophy: we cannot reasonably hold on to our (...)
     
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  6.  60
    The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Hilary Kornblith & Richard Foley - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (1):131.
  7. Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism.Hilary Kornblith (ed.) - 2001 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    This anthology brings together ten papers which have defined and advanced the debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology.
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  8. Epistemic Normativity.Hilary Kornblith - 1993 - Synthese 94 (3):357 - 376.
    This paper examines the source and content of epistemic norms. In virtue of what is it that epistemic norms have their normative force? A semantic approach to this question, due to Alvin Goldman, is examined and found unacceptable. Instead, accounts seeking to ground epistemic norms in our desires are argued to be most promising. All of these accounts make epistemic norms a variety of hypothetical imperative. It is argued that such an account may be offered, grounding our epistemic norms in (...)
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  9. Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action.Hilary Kornblith - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):33-48.
  10.  7
    Knowledge and Its Place in Nature.Hilary Kornblith - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):403-410.
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  11. Naturalism and Intuitions.Hilary Kornblith - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):27-49.
    This paper examines the relationship between methodological naturalism and the standard practice within philosophy of constructing theories on the basis of our intuitions about imaginary cases, especially in the work of Alvin Goldman. It is argued that current work in cognitive science presents serious problems for Goldman's approach.
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  12. Beyond Foundationalism and the Coherence Theory.Hilary Kornblith - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (10):597-612.
  13. The Metaphysics of Irreducibility.Derk Pereboom & Hilary Kornblith - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 63 (August):125-45.
    During the 'sixties and 'seventies, Hilary Putnam, Jerry Fodor, and Richard Boyd, among others, developed a type of materialism that eschews reductionist claims.1 In this view, explana- tions, natural kinds, and properties in psychology do not reduce to counterparts in more basic sciences, such as neurophysiology or physics. Nevertheless, all token psychological entities-- states, processes, and faculties--are wholly constituted of physical entities, ultimately out of entities over which microphysics quantifies. This view quickly became the standard position in philosophy of mind, (...)
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  14.  19
    Inductive Inference and its Natural Ground: An Essay in Naturalistic Epistemology.Hilary Kornblith - 1993 - International Phenomenological Society.
    An account of inductive inference is presented which addresses both its epistemological and metaphysical dimensions. It is argued that inductive knowledge is possible by virtue of the fit between our innate psychological capacities and the causal structure of the world.
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  15. Is Philosophical Knowledge Possible?Hilary Kornblith - 2013 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism. Routledge. pp. 260.
  16. The Role of Reasons in Epistemology.Hilary Kornblith - 2015 - Episteme 12 (2):225-239.
    The notion of a reason often plays a central role in epistemological theories. Justification is often explained in terms of the having of appropriate reasons, and a variety of epistemological distinctions are most naturally explained, it seems, by adverting to reasons. This paper examines the extent to which we may, instead, make do without appeal to such a notion. It is argued that the extent to which the notion of a reason should play an important role in epistemological theorizing will (...)
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  17. Testimony, Memory and the Limits of the a Priori.David Christensen & Hilary Kornblith - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 86 (1):1-20.
    A number of philosophers, from Thomas Reid1 through C. A. J. Coady2, have argued that one is justified in relying on the testimony of others, and furthermore, that this should be taken as a basic epistemic presumption. If such a general presumption were not ultimately dependent on evidence for the reliability of other people, the ground for this presumption would be a priori. Such a presumption would then have a status like that which Roderick Chisholm claims for the epistemic principle (...)
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  18.  98
    Referring to Artifacts.Hilary Kornblith - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (1):109-114.
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  19.  89
    The Contextualist Evasion of Epistemology.Hilary Kornblith - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s1):24 - 32.
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  20. Distrusting Reason.Hilary Kornblith - 1999 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):181–196.
    The activity of reason-giving plays an important role in our intellectual lives. Some philosophers, however, have expressed a deep distrust of this activity. This chapter examines the grounds for such distrust and argues that it deserves a far more serious hearing than it is typically given. There are important cases in which the very activity of reason giving should be called into question, but the kinds of challenges to reason giving which are most concerning are, it is argued, ones which (...)
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  21. The Role of Intuition in Philosophical Inquiry: An Account with No Unnatural Ingredients.Hilary Kornblith - 1998 - In M. DePaul & W. Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. pp. 129-141.
     
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  22. What is It Like to Be Me?Hilary Kornblith - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):48-60.
    Introspection plays an ineliminable role in affording us with self-knowledge, or so it is widely believed. It is argued here that introspective evidence, by itself, is often insufficient to ground reasonable belief about many of our mental states, and the knowledge we do have of much of our mental life is crucially dependent on other sources.
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  23.  20
    Inductive Inference and its Natural Ground-An Essay in Naturalistic Epistemology.Hilary Kornblith & N. Vassallo - 1996 - Epistemologia 19 (1):175-176.
  24.  30
    Knowledge Needs No Justification.Hilary Kornblith - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 5--23.
    The Standard View in epistemology is that knowledge is justified, true belief plus something else. This chapter argues that Standard View should be rejected: knowledge does not require justification. The nature of knowledge and the nature of justification can be better understood if we stop viewing justification as one of the necessary conditions for knowledge.
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  25.  16
    The Contextualist Evasion of Epistemology.Hilary Kornblith - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):24-32.
  26. A Reliabilist Solution to the Problem of Promiscuous Bootstrapping.Hilary Kornblith - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):263-267.
    Jonathan Vogel has presented a disturbing problem for reliabilism. 1 Reliabilists claim that knowledge is reliably produced true belief. Reliabilism is, of course, a version of externalism, and on such a view, a knower need have no knowledge, no justified belief, indeed, no conception that his or her belief is reliably produced. It is the fact that the knower's true belief is reliably produced which makes it a case of knowledge, not any appreciation of this fact. But Vogel now argues (...)
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  27. What Reflective Endorsement Cannot Do.Hilary Kornblith - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):1-19.
    We sometimes stop to reflect on our mental states, and such reflection can lead, at times, to changing our minds. It can, as well, lead us to endorse the very attitudes which we previously held. Such reflective endorsement has been called upon to play a wide range of roles in philosophical theorizing. It has been thought to ground a distinction between two fundamentally different kinds of knowledge: reflective knowledge and mere animal knowledge. It has been thought to serve as a (...)
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  28. Why Should We Care About the Concept of Knowledge?Hilary Kornblith - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):38-52.
    Can we learn something interesting about knowledge by examining our concept of knowledge? Quite a bit, many argue. My own view, however, is that the concept of knowledge is of little epistemological interest. In this paper, I critically examine one particularly interesting defense of the view that the concept of knowledge is of great epistemological interest: Edward Craig's Knowledge and the State of Nature. A minimalist view about the value of examining our concept of knowledge is defended.
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  29. Appeals to Intuition and the Ambitions of Epistemology.Hilary Kornblith - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 10--25.
     
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  30.  51
    Sosa on Human and Animal Knowledge.Hilary Kornblith - 2004 - In Greco John (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics. pp. 126--134.
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  31. Goldman and His Critics.Hilary Kornblith & Brian McLaughlin (eds.) - 2016 - Blackwell.
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  32. In Defense of a Naturalized Epistemology.Hilary Kornblith - 1999 - In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 158--169.
     
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  33. Sosa in Perspective.Hilary Kornblith - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):127--136.
    Ernest Sosa draws a distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge, and this distinction forms the centerpiece of his new book, A Virtue Epistemology . This paper argues that the distinction cannot do the work which Sosa assigns to it.
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  34. A Naturalistic Epistemology: Selected Papers.Hilary Kornblith - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume draws together influential work by Hilary Kornblith on naturalistic epistemology. This approach sees epistemology not as conceptual analysis, but as an explanatory project constrained and informed by work in cognitive science. These essays expound and defend Kornblith's distinctive view of how we come to have knowledge of the world.
     
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  35.  20
    Conditions on Cognitive Sanity and the Death of Internalism.Hilary Kornblith - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. pp. 77--88.
  36.  45
    Epistemic Obligation and the Possibility of Internalism.Hilary Kornblith - 2001 - In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 231--248.
  37. Naturalism: Both Metaphysical and Epistemological.Hilary Kornblith - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):39-52.
  38.  7
    Reasons and Knowledge.Hilary Kornblith - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (3):460.
  39.  5
    An Essay on Free Will.Hilary Kornblith - 1984 - Ethics 94 (4):711-712.
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  40.  25
    Epistemic Agency.Hilary Kornblith - 2016 - In Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas (ed.), Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications. Oxford University Press UK.
    Over the years, the notion of epistemic agency has played a larger and larger role in Ernest Sosa’s epistemology. In his most recent work, epistemic agency plays an absolutely central role in explaining why it is that our beliefs are subject to normative evaluation. This chapter argues that there are problems with the accounts of epistemic agency which Sosa gives at every stage of his work. More than this, there are other resources within Sosa’s epistemology which can do all the (...)
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  41. Knowledge in Humans and Other Animals.Hilary Kornblith - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:327-346.
    This paper defends an approach to epistemology which treats the study of knowledge as on a par with the study of natural kinds. Knowledge is seen as a natural phenomenon subject to empirical investigation. In particular, it is argued that work in cognitive ethology is relevant to understanding the nature of knowledge, and that this approach sheds light on traditional philosophical questions about knowledge, including questions about the source of epistemic normativity.
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  42. Introspection and Misdirection.Hilary Kornblith - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (4):410 – 422.
    Internalist theories of justification put introspection to work in service of the task of error detection. Introspecting to determine whether our beliefs are well-supported by reasons is supposed to reveal where it is that our beliefs fail to measure up to appropriate standards. Internalists do not, however, offer any empirical evidence that introspection can constructively play this role. This chapter examines relevant evidence from social psychology about the way in which introspection actually works. It is argued that introspection is especially (...)
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  43. Does Reliabilism Make Knowledge Merely Conditional?Hilary Kornblith - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):185–200.
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  44. Naturalistic Epistemology and Its Critics.Hilary Kornblith - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (1):237-255.
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  45.  7
    Justification and Knowledge.Hilary Kornblith & George Pappas - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (4):627.
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  46.  58
    Some Social Features of Cognition.Hilary Kornblith - 1987 - Synthese 73 (1):27 - 41.
    This paper describes and assesses a number of dispositions which are instrumental in allowing us to take on the opinions of others unselfconsciously. It is argued that these dispositions are in fact reliable in the environments in which they tend to come into play. In addition, it is argued that agents are, by their own lights, justified in the beliefs they arrive at as a result of these processes. Finally, these processes are argued to provide a basis for rejecting the (...)
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  47.  92
    How Internal Can You Get?Hilary Kornblith - 1988 - Synthese 74 (3):313 - 327.
    This paper examines Laurence BonJour''s defense of internalism inThe Structure of Empirical Knowledge with an eye toward better understanding the issues which separate internalists from externalists. It is argued that BonJour''s Doxastic Presumption cannot play the role which is required of it to make his internalism work. It is further argued that BonJour''s internalism, and, indeed, all other internalisms, are motivated by a Cartesian view of an agent''s access to her own mental states. This Caretsian view is argued to be (...)
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  48.  47
    Replies to Alvin Goldman, Martin Kusch and William Talbott. [REVIEW]Hilary Kornblith - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):427–441.
  49.  74
    Is There Room for Armchair Theorizing in Epistemology?Hilary Kornblith - 2013 - In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge. pp. 195.
    Some philosophers believe that epistemological theories are a priori knowable. Others weaken this claim slightly, arguing that epistemological theorizing is properly conducted “from the armchair.” It is argued here that even this claim is far too strong. This paper defends the view that epistemological theorizing must take account of empirical work in psychology, and, without this, epistemology inevitably loses touch with the very phenomena it seeks to account for.
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  50.  48
    How Central Are Judgment and Agency to Epistemology?Hilary Kornblith - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (10):2585-2597.
    Ernest Sosa’s Judgment and Agency marks an important change from his earlier work in epistemology. While belief was at the center of his earlier approach to epistemological issues, a far more sophisticated mental state, judgment, plays the central role here. This paper examines the significance of this change in focus, and argues that there is reason to favor the earlier belief-centered approach over this new judgment-centered account.
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