_ Source: _Page Count 24 This article has three main interconnected aims. First, I illustrate the historiographical conceptions of three early analytic philosophers: Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein. Second, I consider some of the historiographical debates that have been generated by the recent historical turn in analytic philosophy, looking at the work of Scott Soames and Hans-Johann Glock, in particular. Third, I discuss Arthur Danto’s _Analytic Philosophy of History_, published 50 years ago, and argue for a reinvigorated analytic philosophy of history.

_ Source: _Page Count 24 This article has three main interconnected aims. First, I illustrate the historiographical conceptions of three early analytic philosophers: Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein. Second, I consider some of the historiographical debates that have been generated by the recent historical turn in analytic philosophy, looking at the work of Scott Soames and Hans-Johann Glock, in particular. Third, I discuss Arthur Danto’s _Analytic Philosophy of History_, published 50 years ago, and argue for a reinvigorated analytic philosophy of history.

The sixteen essays in this volume confront the current debate about the relationship between philosophy and its history. On the one hand intellectual historians commonly accuse philosophers of writing bad - anachronistic - history of philosophy, and on the other, philosophers have accused intellectual historians of writing bad - antiquarian - history of philosophy. The essays here address this controversy and ask what purpose the history of philosophy should serve. Part I contains more purely theoretical and methodological discussion, of such (...) questions as whether there are 'timeless' philosophical problems, whether the issues of one epoch are commensurable with those of another, and what style is appropriate to the historiography of the subject. The essays in Part II consider a number of case-histories. They present important revisionist scholarship and original contributions on topics drawn from ancient, early modern and more recent philosophy. All the essays have been specially commissioned, and the contributors include many of the leading figures in the field. The volume as a whole will be of vital interest to everyone concerned with the study of philosophy and of its history. (shrink)

The narrativist insight -- From analytic philosophy of history to narrativism -- Three tenets of narrativist philosophy of historiography -- Representationalism and non-representationalism -- Reasoning in historiography -- Colligation -- Underdetermination and epistemic values -- From truth to warranted assertion -- The tri-partite theory of justification in historiography -- Historiography between objectivism and subjectivism -- Postnarrativist philosophy of historiography.

Paradigms of historiography of philosophy in India have being changed since late 19th c. till present, depending on the social and cultural context of the history of Indian philosophy as a part of contemporary Indian culture. This change manifests itself in the conceptions of Indian historians concerning the teaching of Buddhist Mahāyāna school of Yogācāra (4th c. and later). Historians of colonial times, basing themselves on the philosophy of Neovedаntism (S. Radhakrishnan, S. Dasgupta), regarded Buddhism as a derivate of (...) late Vedic culture and Yogācāra as a teaching that reflected - though in an essentially transmuted form - the ideology of Upaniṣads. The latter, according to Neovedantists, was based on the postulate of the existence of the single cosmic soul - Brahman, the true human Self (Ātman) being identical to it. Historians of the late colonial and early postcolonial times (P.T. Raju, D.P. Chattopadhyaya, A.K. Chatterjee, partly also S. Dasgupta) brought Yogācāra closer to the teachings of European idealism, mainly to conceptions of G. Berkeley, G.W.F. Hegel, F. Bradley, J.E. McTaggart, trying to demonstrate a principal identity of fundamental problems in Indian and Western philosophy. At the same time, they brought Yogācāra together with the teaching of Brāhmaṇic school, Advaita Vedānta, regarded as another form of Indian idealism. In later times, following the evolution of contemporary Indian culture and changings in its social and political context, historians like D.J. Kalupahana became to analyze Yogācāra as a kind of philosophy of mind. All these facts show the dependence of strategies of historico-philosophical studies in India on its social, political and cultural context: in the Yogācāra teaching mainly those aspects call attention that a historian sees as the closest to the problematic field of contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

This book investigates how, from the seventeenth century onward, philosophers, philologists and historians described various world "cultures", colonized the past (or national pasts), and thus invented Europe's philosophical nature. In the recent past, critical discussions concerning notions such as "cultural area" and "area studies", as well as their relativizations by means of conceptions that avoid splitting clearly identified areas (inter alia, "third space", "hybridity", "diaspora", or "cosmopolitism"), drew attention to the long history of cultural territorialization. This book attempts to open (...) the history of philosophy to reflexive and globalizing tendencies elaborated in the field of "world history". From the seventeenth century onward, in both modern Europe and North America, historical sciences - notably philosophical historiography and cultural history - colonized both the past (or national pasts) and the "rest" of the world. The contributions gathered in the present volume address both phenomena to the extent that they have been linked with modern historicization of philosophy, sciences, and culture. (shrink)

The fifty entries in this _Companion_ cover the main issues in the philosophies of historiography and history, including natural history and the practices of historians. Written by an international and multi-disciplinary group of experts A cutting-edge updated picture of current research in the field Part of the renowned _Blackwell Companions_ series.

Lectures delivered as a series at Johns Hopkins University during 1982-83.

This article considers the implications of inferentialist philosophy of language for debates in the historiography of philosophy. My intention is to mediate and refine the polemics between contextualist historians and ‘analytic’ or presentist historians. I claim that much of Robert Brandom’s nuanced defence of presentism can be accepted and even adopted by contextualists, so that inferentialism turns out to provide an important justification for orthodox history of philosophy. In the concluding sections I argue that the application of Brandom’s theory (...) has important limits, and that some polemics by contextualists against presentists are therefore justified. (shrink)

"This volume presents stimulating and provocative work on how the history of philosophy is done and how it should be done, by Michael Frede, a pre-eminent figure in ancient philosophy until his early death in 2007. His Nellie Wallace lectures are published here accompanied by three related articles."--Publisher.

This chapter contains sections titled: An Intellectual Historiography Why and When Historiography Needs Social Theory Why and When Does Social Theory Needs Historiography? Conclusion References.

The paper aims to disclosure of key points in the development of the German tradition of historiography of philosophy after the 90s of the 18th century. The starting point was the so-called «dispute about the method» of historiography, which erupted in the last decade of the 18th century not without the influence of Kant’s «critical philosophy». Its participants (Reinhold, Fülleborn, Goess, Grohmann, Tennemann, and others) put forward different theses, but they agreed that it is Kant’s philosophy that makes (...) it possible to create a «philosophical history of philosophy». A type of historiography was formed, which was based on the criterion of «progress of philosophy» and Kant’s position was considered as a standard for any historiography. Subsequently, other types of historiography were formed, which followed either the opposite criterion of «regress» or «decadence», or tried to combine both of these criteria (Hegel). In the second half of the 19th century «history of problems» becomes widespread as a principle of research and presentation of the history of philosophy, its main representatives were W. Windelband, N. Hartmann, H. Heimsoeth. Instead, in the second half of the 20th century the dominant type of historiography is the «history of concepts», which finds linguistic and philosophical justification in Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. In recent decades, the German tradition of historiography has been enriched by K. Flasсh’s project «historical philosophy» and by D. Henrich program «constellation research». In both of these projects, there is a noticeable attraction to microhistory, going beyond the «classic» texts, discovering hitherto unknown figures and sources that significantly expand the established practice of the historiography of philosophy. (shrink)

In the 19th century, the history of philosophy becomes the history of a particular science. Modern philosophical historiography is an ambivalent project. On the one hand, we find an affirmative concept of Bildung through tradition and historical insight; on the other, there arises a critical reflection on historical education in the light of an emerging critique of modern culture. The book offers a comprehensive overview of the debate.

Alan J. Holland. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Main entry under title: Philosophy, its history and historiography. (Royal Institute of Philosophy Conference; v. 1983) ...

The history of science and the philosophy of science have a long and tangled relationship. On the one hand, philosophical reflection on science can be guided, shaped, and challenged by historical scholarship—a process begun by Thomas Kuhn and continued by successive generations of ‘post-positivist’ historians and philosophers of science. On the other hand, the activity of writing the history of science raises methodological questions concerning, for instance, progress in science, realism and antirealism, and the semantics of scientific theories, questions which (...) are the subject of continued debate in philosophy. Clearly the history and the philosophy of science will continue to challenge each other's research agendas and guiding assumptions. (shrink)

A systematic and comprehensive treatment of pertinent issues, the book defends two main theses.

This chapter contains sections titled: Facts Evidence The Structure of Description and Justification Explanation and Understanding Summary References Further Reading.

The fifty entries in this Companion cover the main issues in the philosophies of historiography and history, including natural history and the practices of historians. •Written by an international and multi-disciplinary group of experts •A cutting-edge updated picture of current research in the field •Part of the renowned Blackwell Companions series.

This paper provides one of the many ways of doing historiography, specifically concerning Indian philosophy. After making some general observations on the limitations of a historian and a historiographer in general—it would provide a brief analysis of the historiography of Indian philosophy by looking at the recent attempts at periodization. The development of 'Indian philosophy' as a label to a concept, issues concerning the use of darśana for its representation, and reeking it as a space of strange intellectual (...) landscape by contemporary scholars are discussed subsequently. While using historiography implicitly as a methodological tool, an attempt is made to probe into the contemporary conception of Indian philosophy. Though it doesn’t claim to provide any determinate conclusions regarding either periodization or conceptualization of Indian philosophy, the paper emphasizes the need to probe these concerns further and the need to use a historiographical approach to such a study. (shrink)

Volume 28, Issue 3, May 2020, Page 431-441.

It is tempting to dismiss the first half of Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy. At first blush, it would not seem to be essential to Dewey’s foremost concern to provide a naturalized account of knowing that avoids the hoary philosophical dualisms of body/mind, thing/person, material/ideal, and practical/theoretical. The load-bearing chapters would seem to be in the latter philosophical half in which he takes on the task of developing a positive account rather than the early historical...

The idea of a unity of intellectual history (Geistesgeschichte) is a genuinely philosophical thought. In the shadow of Hegel, it is about the legitimation of historiographical work in a universal perspective thought centered in Europe. The legitimation strategies are complex and amount to the formation of a canon of philosophy. This project is associated with the name of the philosopher and historian of philosophy Wilhelm Dilthey. Dilthey saw it as his task to secure the unity of intellectual history. To this (...) end, he introduced a pluralism of methods – logic, psychology, anthropology, philosophy of history, hermeneutics, literary research and others – into the study of intellectual history. I am speaking here of the Dilthey project, whose actuality, chances and risks are discussed in the article. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: A Perennial Crisis? When “Historiography” Faces “Philosophy” The Poststructuralist/Postmodernist Challenge Practicing Historians and the Challenge of Philosophy Concluding Comment References.

Departing from Charles Taylors’s statement that philosophy is inescapably historical, the paper tries to examine several attempts to write the history of African philosophy. It notes that contrary to the experience of many other regional philosophies there is yet no comprehensive history of African philosophy which takes full account of its the different spectrums and periods. A good number of authors who have tried to recount the history of African philosophy have dwelt only on aspects or periods of that philosophy (...) thus precluding the advantage of presenting African philosophy as a coherent whole. An examination of the weakness and the strong points of some of these works leads to the assertion of the necessity of comprehensive history of African philosophy, as well as a weighing of the possible reasons why no serious attempt have been made in that direction. Writing such a work will be the last complement of the History of Africa. (shrink)

Departing from Charles Taylors’s statement that philosophy is inescapably historical, the paper tries to examine several attempts to write the history of African philosophy. It notes that contrary to the experience of many other regional philosophies there is yet no comprehensive history of African philosophy which takes full account of its the different spectrums and periods. A good number of authors who have tried to recount the history of African philosophy have dwelt only on aspects or periods of that philosophy (...) thus precluding the advantage of presenting African philosophy as a coherent whole. An examination of the weakness and the strong points of some of these works leads to the assertion of the necessity of comprehensive history of African philosophy, as well as a weighing of the possible reasons why no serious attempt have been made in that direction. Writing such a work will be the last complement of the History of Africa. (shrink)

One of the traditional subjects of discussion among historians of philosophy is the question of the status of the history of philosophy as well as a discipline, as well as the tasks, possibilities, and limitations of some approaches and genres of the historiography of philosophy. The article focuses on the analysis of the contribution to these discussions of studies in the historiography of philosophy, which began in Francophone philosophy in the 1970s with the publication of the studies of (...) L. Braun and M. Gueroult, in particular, the answers to the mentioned questions, proposed within the framework of these studies. The starting point of the article is the historical scheme of the attitude of philosophers to the past of philosophy, proposed by Y. Lafrance, which makes it possible to determine the place of the history of philosophy as a discipline in philosophical activity and to study the historiography of philosophy as an element of such activity. In this article, three research projects of the historiography of philosophy were analyzed – the «history of the history of philosophy» by L. Braun, the studies in the doxography by A. Laks and M. Frede, the social history of the historiography of philosophy by C. König-Pralong. Based on the analysis of the mentioned projects, the article support the conclusion that the history of philosophy cannot be considered either only as a historical or only as a philosophical discipline, and also that a historian of philosophy cannot investigate a subject without simultaneously constructing it on the basis of historical data, which always remain outside the historiographic construction. (shrink)

Although Bernard Lonergan is known primarily for his cognitional theory and theological methodology, he long sought to formulate a modern philosophy of history free of progressive and Marxist biases. Yet he never addressed this in any single work, and his reflections on the subject are scattered in various writings. In this pioneering work, Thomas McPartland shows how Lonergan’s overall philosophical position offers a fresh and comprehensive basis for considering historiography. Taking Lonergan’s philosophy of historical existence into the realm of (...) an epistemological philosophy of history, he demonstrates how the philosopher’s approach builds on the actual performance of historians and, as a result, integrates the insights of historical specialists into a framework of functional complementarity. McPartland draws on all of Lonergan’s philosophical writing—as well as on the vast literature of historiography—to detail Lonergan’s notions of historical method, historical objectivity, and historical knowledge. Along the way, he explains what Lonergan means by hermeneutics; by historical description, explanation, ideal-types, and narrative; by evaluative and dialectical analyses; and how these elements are all functionally related to each other. He also delineates the defining features of psychohistory, cultural history, intellectual history, history of ideas, and history of philosophy, indicating how these disciplines play complementary roles in the critical encounter with the past. Ultimately, McPartland argues that Lonergan has established the principles of a historical discipline—the history of consciousness—that weaves together a philosophy of consciousness with rigorous historical research to grasp long-term trends resulting from “differentiations of consciousness.” His work offers a distinct perspective on historical method that takes historical objectivity seriously while providing new insight into the thought of this important philosopher. (shrink)